

**Final Report  
Security Perceptions Survey  
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## Final Report, Security Perceptions Survey<sup>1</sup> Larissa Fast and Dawn Wiest<sup>2</sup>

What do aid workers identify as the central threats to their physical safety and security? We know little about how humanitarian actors perceive threats to their physical security and what measures they perceive to be effective in mitigating these threats. As yet, no systematic study has been conducted about perceptions of humanitarian workers in relation to security threats and measures. What threats or risks do individual humanitarian workers consider to be the most dangerous? The most likely to occur? What security measures make them feel safe? On both policy and practical levels, research on how humanitarian actors perceive their own security and vulnerabilities helps us understand what they define as the most pressing and probable threats to their security or safety, and assesses the effectiveness of various security measures, including training, in addressing the threats and risks that staff members perceive to be most pressing in their own context.

This study assessed how humanitarian actors experience and perceive insecurity, and the effectiveness of various security measures in addressing the threats they face. As such, it begins to address the issues identified above. The results of the research can help organizations in identifying what they do and do not do well, and in adapting or modifying existing training courses, various security measures, and organizational support structures and policies. In other words, the study has policy and practical implications for how agencies can more effectively respond to and address what humanitarian personnel identify as threats to their security.

### I. Summary of Findings

This study is exploratory and identifies areas and priorities for future research as opposed to drawing broader conclusions about perceptions and experiences of security threats and measures for humanitarians. Nevertheless, it identifies nine major findings, which hold for the sample population of this study but not for the aid worker population more generally:

- **In general, respondents faced low-threat security incidents at a far greater rate than they faced incidents that are considered very dangerous.**
- **Work stress was the most commonly cited experience.**

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<sup>1</sup> The United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC provided the funding for this research.

<sup>2</sup> Larissa Fast is the primary investigator, author, and grantee for this research. Dawn Wiest, as the data analyst for the research, is included here as a co-author of the report. Many other individuals assisted with this research – not least of whom are the 180 individuals who completed the survey – and deserve my thanks for their assistance. Mark Gunty, Alicia Simoni, and Maurice Amollo Amollo deserve special mention: Mark for his work in setting up and managing the web-based survey, both Mark and Alicia for help with designing the survey, and Amollo for coding the paper surveys. Others who helped to publicize the research or collect survey data include Jennie Cook of CARE, Jan Davis and Maret Laev of RedR, Jennifer Helmuth of MEDA, Heather Hughes of Oxfam, Michael O'Neill of SCF-US, John Schafer of InterAction, Paul Davies, and Sam Sherman. Elizabeth Rowley and Michael O'Neill read a draft version of the report and provided helpful comments. My sincere apologies in advance to anyone I have forgotten to include in this list.

- **Respondent scores indicate that vehicle accidents made them feel the most unsafe of all.**
- **Ambient insecurity alone did not explain security perceptions among respondents. In fact, higher perception of risk was consistently related to actual experience of incidents and not to country of posting.**
- **Respondents rated acceptance security measures much more favorably than they did deterrence or protective measures.**
- **Among respondents, a greater proportion of men than women received security training.**
- **Gender did not predict which respondents felt the most *highly* threatened by security incidents.**
- **Respondents posted in large cities experienced fewer threatening incidents and tended to feel safer than those posted elsewhere.**
- **International staff respondents experienced more medium-threat incidents than did national staff.**

In general, the data demonstrate the need to pay attention to the full array of perceived and actual security risks and threats, as well as the more specific characteristics that raise or lower risk for individuals and within context.

## II. Data and Methods

Three initial issues motivated and guided this study. The study was designed to:

1. Help us understand what humanitarian personnel define as the most pressing and probable threats to their security or safety;
2. Disaggregate differences in perceived threats to security according to general categories (e.g., gender, status as national/international staff, length of experience, and country); and
3. To assess the effectiveness of various security measures, including training, in addressing the threats/risks that people perceive to be most pressing in their own context.

To address these questions, the survey contained five basic sections: placement information, security training, demographics, security threats and incidents, and security and safety measures (see Appendix 4 for the complete survey). Existing research on the general topic of physical safety and security in conflict zones helped to identify relevant demographic categories. For example, Dennis King's compilations of ReliefWeb data (e.g., King 2002a; 2002b) suggested that certain positions (e.g., drivers) are more at risk and the 2006 ODI/CIC study (Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006) found that incident rates are rising for national staff and decreasing for international staff. Sheik and colleagues (Sheik et al. 2000) suggest risk factors such as length of time in country (1/3 of the incidents in their study happened to individuals in country

less than three months), and other literature (e.g., African Rights 1994) proposes multi-mandate organizations are most at risk. For these reasons, the first three sections asked about the main focus of the organization's work, the respondent's job title, and the length of time in a particular posting and in the humanitarian/development sector, in addition to the basic categories of age, nationality, sex, marital status. Other questions included information about security training and the "country of reference" for the survey. Table 2.3 contains a breakdown of the demographic data of the sample population. (All tables are located in the appendices at the end of this report).

The remainder of the survey collected information about actual experience of safety and security incidents, as well as perceptions of these safety and security threats and measures.<sup>3</sup> A matrix asked respondents if they or a colleague had experienced particular security incidents over the past month, three months, or six months. The final analysis collapsed these options into a six month category (see Table 3.1). For all comparisons of actual incidents and perceptions, we used only self-reported data (i.e., not data about colleagues' experiences). Using a Likert Scale (ratings from 1-7), three other matrices collected information about the degree to which respondents felt threatened by particular types of safety or security incidents (see Table 1.2 for a list of incidents and their classifications), felt particular measures made them feel safer (see Table 1.3 for a list of security measures and their classifications), and felt secure at particular locations (i.e., home, office, field sites, traveling between locations). For example, low-threat incidents included (but were not limited to) demonstrations, checkpoints, illness and evacuation, while medium-threat incidents covered car-jackings, landmines, and theft. The high-threat incident category incorporated ambush, armed robbery, and sexual violence. Again, existing research was useful in identifying these factors. For example, King's data (King 2002a; 2002b) demonstrated ambush, and therefore travel, was the most prominent type of security incident. Other studies (e.g., Fast 2007; Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006) revealed a disconnect between perceptions and experience of actual incidents. This made it important to establish some kind of a base of experience, since this colours people's perceptions of danger. For this reason, the survey included a matrix asking for self and colleagues' experience of actual security incidents (see Table 1.2 for a list of incidents and their classifications). The study results, as reported below, provide evidence that perceptions of security/insecurity are strongly linked to actual experiences.

#### a. Data Collection and Analysis

The initial draft survey was developed and then revised based upon comments and suggestions from experts in the NGO security management field and experts in survey design. Approximately 15 people completed the survey as a pilot test, and we further refined the questionnaire as a result of their comments. We posted the web version of the survey after finalizing the paper version. Three additional qualitative questions in the web version asked about a particular security event, its effect on an individual's functioning in his/her assignment, and for further comments. See Appendix 4 for a complete list of survey questions.

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<sup>3</sup> Security incidents usually refer to acts of violence, while safety incidents refer to accidents, illness, and disease (Martin 1999; Van Brabant 2000). While clearly these are separate types of incidents with different causes, to eliminate wordiness in and to facilitate the analysis for this report, these have been collapsed under the heading of "security" incidents, threats, or measures.

Data collection occurred for both paper and web versions between mid-March and the end of November 2006. We disseminated information about the survey and its goals via numerous venues: word of mouth via personal networks, emails to selected individuals at a variety of agencies, and several NGO security or human resources staff members sent out emails to their employee, colleague, or membership lists. In addition, we posted information about the survey on the the RedR and AidWorkers Forum websites. Although it is possible some respondents discovered the survey by chance, the vast majority likely found out about the research via colleagues or friends. Consequently, the survey is a non-probability sample, most akin to a snowball sample (Henry 1990) and is not representative of the total population of humanitarian workers (see below).

For analytic purposes, the raw survey data were categorized into nominal, ordinal, and ratio variables.<sup>4</sup> For example, the survey asked respondents to identify their nationality and a particular country for which they filled out the survey, referred to as the "country of reference" variable. If nationality matched country of reference, we coded respondents as national staff. Otherwise, we coded them as international staff. Respondents also indicated the length of time they had been in the country of reference and in the position that they held. These data were categorized into an ordinal scale with four categories ranging from 3 months or less to more than 3 years. Also, we created a new variable called "multi-issue organization" out of the individual organizational sector variables. If a respondent checked off more than one sector (e.g. human rights and development) then s/he was coded as working for a multi-issue organization. More details about the variables in this study and their distributions are available in the tables in Appendix 2.

Because of the diversity of "country of reference" for the study, it was necessary to group these for analysis purposes. It is difficult to get a listing of the risk or threat levels for individual countries, since many agencies are hesitant to share such politically sensitive information (a problem, more generally, for research of this nature). As a result, we used the ASI Group threat map, which adorns many a wall of security officers of UN and NGO agencies, to group countries into categories (see Table 1.1 for the actual ASI country classifications). For other data categories, we grouped incidents into low, medium, and high threat incidents (see Table 1.2) and security measures into the acceptance, protection, and deterrence categories (see Table 1.3) of the security management triangle (Van Brabant 2000).

The variables depicting respondent characteristics (e.g., sex, time in country, sector, age) are the independent variables in the study. The dependent variables are security incidents and security perceptions. We analyzed both the original survey items (e.g. whether respondents experienced any incident such as a vehicle accident) and scales created from the individual items (e.g., scores on perception scales<sup>5</sup>). More detailed information on all variables and our analytic method can be found in Appendices 1 and 3.

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<sup>4</sup> Nominal data are classification data with no ordering (e.g. gender). Ordinal data are ordered data with no natural zero, such as a Likert scale (e.g. security perceptions scales). Finally, ratio data are ordered, with a constant scale that has a natural zero (e.g. number of security incidents). See also (Gray 2004) for more information on variables and types of data.

<sup>5</sup> Perception scales are averages across individual items and range in score from 1 to 7. Each scale provides a rank order of observations along a continuum that is not assumed to be linear.

The final sample included 180 survey responses, including approximately 30 paper-based surveys. The sample population characteristics included the following:

- More men than women (60% vs. 40%);
- The greatest proportion of respondents completed the survey for Africa (37%) followed by Asia (15%);
- The majority of respondents worked in the non-governmental organization (NGO) or international NGO (INGO) sectors (88%);
- Most respondents were posted in a large city (67%);
- Most respondents worked in the profession for more than 3 years (72%);
- Nearly half the respondents had been in their position for 1 year or less (48%); and
- Half the respondents had received no security training (50%).

Table 2.3, in Appendix 2, summarizes the sample profile in more detail.

#### b. Limitations of the Data

Like all research on this general topic, there are a number of caveats to interpreting the data and analysis results. **These caveats prohibit us from generalizing from the survey sample to the broader relief and development population. Readers should bear in mind that these results apply only to the group of individuals who participated in the survey. As a result, this study is exploratory and suggestive, and identifies areas and priorities for future research as opposed to conclusions about perceptions and experiences of security threats and measures for humanitarians more broadly.** This section outlines some of the limitations of the sample and survey results.

First, the sample is not representative. A stratified sample would have ensured, as much as possible, that respondents were systematically selected from theoretically or conceptually important strata such as country of posting, type of organization (such as inter-governmental organization (IGO) vs. INGO, or INGO vs. local NGO), years in country, and location of posting (such as city vs. rural). Second, the sample was not based on random selection. This relates to the first limitation of representativeness but also affects the interpretation of results. We cannot make inferences to the population, as mentioned above, but instead can only make claims about the sample. The data collection method itself – meaning, the distribution of the survey via the internet and training seminars – influenced the sample population. In self-selecting to complete the survey, respondents demonstrated their interest in and support of research on this issue and their willingness to take the time to complete the survey, all of which might characterize only a sub-set of the larger population of aid workers. For example, given that the majority of respondents (84.4%) completed the web survey, they must have had access to the internet. As a result, the sample population would not reflect the experiences of those without regular internet access at work, such as support staff (e.g., drivers or logisticians) or those posted in very remote areas. As the sample characteristics demonstrate, the sample includes more international (73.9%) vs. national (24.1%) staff (see Table 2.3). Additionally, the vast majority of the sample population consisted of project or managerial level postings (e.g., country director, head of office, project officer, technical advisor), which further limits the representativeness of the sample. Third, the small size of the sample may mask the significance of variables such as gender or length of time in country. This concern also relates to the two above-mentioned limitations.

Furthermore, the years of reference vary among survey respondents. While the vast majority of the surveys are for the immediate or near recent past, at least one respondent completed a survey for an African country from his experience there several decades ago. This is an issue in terms of accuracy of the responses for both incidents and perceptions and for the ASI classifications, which are for the fall of 2006. Consequently, a country may be more (or less) dangerous for the time period for which the respondent completed the survey than the ASI classification suggests. Relatedly, the ASI classifications are for individual countries and do not disaggregate in terms of different security levels for regions within a country. For the purposes of this survey, however, which does not ask for an exact posting location in the country, this is not as relevant.

Finally, as Table 2.2 demonstrates, the "country of reference" includes countries such as the United States, the UK, Japan, and Canada (17 of 180 total). Some of these respondents completed the survey with these countries as their "country of reference," while others, who were based in these countries as headquarters staff, completed the survey with other countries (e.g., countries to which they traveled) in mind. Because the survey did not require or assume that individuals lived in their country of reference (i.e., it was designed to allow individuals who make periodic visits to a particular country to complete the survey), we included these results in the final sample even though discrepancies might exist.<sup>6</sup> Together, these various caveats limit the quality of the conclusions we are able to reach from the data.

### III. Findings

The full data analysis results appear in the tables in Appendix 3.

#### a. Aid Workers: In Constant Peril?

The data highlight several general findings about the nature of security and insecurity in relief and development work.

- **In this sample, humanitarian workers reported experiencing low-threat security incidents far more often than they faced incidents that are considered very dangerous.**<sup>7</sup> 71.7% of respondents experienced at least one low-threat incident, compared to 31.1% and 37.2% who experienced any high-threat and medium-threat incident respectively (see Tables 3.1 and 1.3). The average number of low-threat incidents among respondents who experienced any such incident was 3.97. This compares to an average of 2.05 high-threat and 1.98 medium-threat incidents (see Table 3.2).<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The majority of respondents (86.5%) lived and worked in the country of reference at the time of completing the survey.

<sup>7</sup> Because other research and anecdotal evidence have demonstrated a link between length of time in the field and security incidents, we controlled for the length of time in the field to obtain this result. We used the variable of "three months or less" based on the results of (Sheik et al. 2000) but also tested models with other time frames (such as 1 year or more). However, length of time, regardless of amount, had no significant effect in all cases.

<sup>8</sup> As with all test results cited in this report, because results are based on a non-probability sample of humanitarian workers, the statistical tests shown in the tables only apply to the sample and not to the population. The probability against the null hypothesis ( $p \leq .05$ ) for the Anova and chi-square tests is



- **Work stress was the most commonly cited experience across respondents.** 57.8% of respondents indicated that they had experienced work stress (see Table 3.1). In fact, 64% of respondents reported that they experienced *any* stress incident (work stress, disgruntled colleagues, partner organizations, and/or beneficiary populations) within the last six months and within this group, the average was 2 incidents (not shown in table).

#### **When other factors are taken into account,**

- **International staff were more likely to experience any medium- or low- threat incident than were national staff.**<sup>9</sup> International staff were around 3 times more likely than national staff to experience an incident in either of these categories. They were also nearly 4 times more likely to experience a high number of low-threat incidents than were national staff (see Table 3.3).

These general trends point to several issues. First, the finding that international staff are more likely than national staff to experience low- and medium-threat incidents is consistent with more recent research on aid worker fatalities that suggests that the average number of incidents (primarily fatalities and kidnappings or severe injury) for international staff over time is higher than that of national staff (Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006, Fig. 10, 17-18). However, the ODI/CIC study also demonstrates a trend that incidents against internationals are decreasing while the average (and actual) number of incidents against nationals are increasing. The research reported here suggests it is conceivable that this trend holds only for high-threat (e.g., fatalities or severe injury) incidents. Furthermore, the data demonstrate national staff in this sample experienced a greater variety of high- and medium-threat incidents, while international staff in this sample experienced a greater variety of low-threat incidents (see Table 3.2). This may reflect a shift in risk, in which a shift occurs from international to national staff, and also in type of incident.

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interpreted as the probability that differences in means (Anova) or logits (Chi-Square) are large enough to be considered real rather than chance effects of the characteristics of the respondents that are included in the sample.

<sup>9</sup> It is not possible from the survey data to determine how many incidents national or international staff experienced, because the survey only asked *whether* a respondent experienced particular types (or type) of incident within a period of time. Table 3.2, however, reports the percentages of national staff and international staff respondents who experienced high-, medium-, and low-threat incidents (14.9%, 21.3%, and 66% respectively for national staff, and 36.8%, 42.9%, and 73.7% respectively for international staff). Table 3.2 also reports the means for each category of incidents, which refer to the variety of types of incidents within a category among those who experienced any incident in that category. A higher mean indicates that among those who experienced any incidents, the group (e.g., national or international staff) experienced a greater *variety* of incidents within the category. In other words, a mean of 4.4 within the low-threat category for international staff indicates that international staff experienced an average of 4.4 different types of low-threat incidents (e.g., work stress, demonstration, illness, or riots) as opposed to national staff, who experienced an average of 2.5 different types of low-threat incidents. The data in Table 3.2 show that national staff experienced a greater variety of incidents within the high- and the medium- threat categories, while international staff experienced a greater variety of low-threat incidents.

Several different explanations may account for these findings. The greater variety and experience of low-threat incidents among international staff may result from the type of positions international vs. national staff tend to occupy, with international staff occupying more management than support staff positions and national staff often occupying more support than management staff positions. Low-threat incidents would appear to represent a greater threat to management staff, whereas high-threat incidents could represent a greater threat to support or program staff, such as health workers, drivers, or guards. This suggests that risk may differ not only based upon international vs. national staff status but also position within the organization, regardless of nationality. Alternatively, these results could reflect the general pattern of less consistent reporting of security incidents related to national staff. To further unpack these findings, it is necessary to conduct more research. A limitation of this study, mentioned above, is the much higher percentage of international vs. national staff who completed this survey. In reality, the aid worker population includes more national than international staff. To fully understand the specific threats that national staff face, it is necessary to design and carry out research methodologies that better reach them and address their needs and concerns.

The other findings, in contrast, highlight areas that have not received as much attention in existing research. Of particular import are the high percentages of individuals who report work stress (58%) and at least one low threat incident (71%). Neither finding is particularly surprising, since humanitarian work is stressful by nature and usually occurs in situations of ongoing violence or tension. What is of note, however, is the disjuncture between research and lived experience. Research on security issues tends to focus on fatalities or other mid- to high-level security incidents among aid workers (see, among others, Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006; Rowley 2005) yet this study points to the higher prevalence of low-level and non-fatal security incidents. As others have pointed out, such as the Antares Foundation, the Headington Institute, and security manuals with sections on coping with stress (e.g., Bickley 2003), work stress can and does affect the ability of aid workers to effectively function in their jobs, therefore raising the likelihood of preventable security incidents occurring.

Overall, the data appear to suggest the need to pay attention to the full array of safety and security incidents, from safety threats, such as vehicle accidents and work stress, to the other less severe security threats that aid workers face.

b. Debunking the Cowboy Myth: Does Reality = Perceptions?

This section focuses on the actual experiences of respondents and relationships between the reality of experienced incidents and the perception of risk. Generally the data demonstrate a correlation between perceived risk and actual incidents, supporting the idea that experience of security incidents makes people feel less safe.

- **Respondents reported that they did not feel very insecure in general.** The average scores on high-threat, medium-threat, and low-threat incident scales were not dramatically different (see Table 3.4). At 3.48, the medium-threat incident scale had the highest average score.<sup>10</sup> This was followed by the high-threat incident scale with an average score of 3.13 and the low-threat incident scale, which averaged 2.99.

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<sup>10</sup> The low-, mid-, and high-threat security perceptions scales range from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the lowest level of insecurity (i.e. most safe) and 7 indicating the highest level of insecurity (i.e. most unsafe).

- **Respondent scores indicate that vehicle accidents made them feel the most unsafe of all.** The average security perceptions score for vehicle accidents was 4.15, while all other types of threats received average scores below 4.0 (see Table 3.4).

**When other factors are taken into account,**

- **The odds of experiencing any threatening incident were greatest for personnel posted in countries classified as “very dangerous.”** Personnel posted in these countries were 4 times more likely than others to experience at least one of the high threat incidents and nearly 7 times more likely than others to experience any incident in the medium-threat category (see Table 3.3).

The logistic regression analysis related to this finding reveals that country of posting is more important than some of the other significant factors in the bivariate analysis for understanding which respondents experienced any high- or medium-threat incident. For example, the bivariate analysis (see Table 3.2) would lead us to predict that inter-governmental organization (IGO) staff are at greater risk than others of experiencing a security incident, but the coefficient is only marginally significant when other factors are taken into account. Regression analysis suggests that country of posting is more important for understanding experience: the bivariate analysis was confounded by the distribution of humanitarian workers across countries. Given the marginal significance of the logit, however, a larger sample size could potentially yield a significant effect for personnel working for IGOs.

- **Ambient insecurity alone did not explain security perceptions among humanitarian workers in this population.** In fact, higher perception of risk was consistently related to actual experience of incidents and not to country of posting. Respondents who experienced any high-threat or medium-threat incidents were 6 times more likely than others to rate high-threat incidents as highly threatening. They were also 4 times more likely to rate medium-threat incidents and 8 times more likely to rate low-threat incidents as highly threatening (see Table 3.7).
- **Age mattered for the experience and perceptions of low-threat incidents only.** Personnel thirty five or older were 30% less likely to experience any low-threat incident (see Table 3.3). They were also 2.6 times more likely than others to view such incidents as highly threatening (see Table 3.7).

Again, the findings highlight several important issues. First, even though individuals working in countries that are more dangerous experience significantly more incidents, this factor alone does not explain higher perceptions of insecurity. In other words, ambient insecurity – meaning insecurity due to the environment more generally (Fast 2007) – alone does not explain the increase in the perception of risk. Instead, an individual’s actual experience of an incident better explains his or her perception of the degree of danger. That is, those who experienced at least one medium- or high-threat incident also perceived a higher risk.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> There is an association between the experience of different types of incidents: 63% of respondents who had experienced any low-threat incident also experienced at least one mid- or high-threat incident, and 98% who had experienced any mid- or high-threat incident also experienced at least one low-threat incident. When all incident variables are included in the regression model, it is the experience of mid- or

Second, the results on age present an apparent contradiction. It is conceivable that the lower likelihood of experiencing low-threat incidents is due to the fact that more experienced and older aid workers are better at predicting and avoiding situations that put them at risk, and that they understand the potential escalation of these types of incidents, which is why they rate them as more threatening. Furthermore, in this sample the age variable correlated closely with marital status and whether respondents had dependents, meaning older respondents tended to be married and have dependents.<sup>12</sup> As a result, the finding that age did not have an impact on the experience or perception of insecurity for mid- and high-threat incidents suggests that having a spouse or dependents does not necessarily translate into perceiving an environment as more dangerous.

Finally, the discussion about the number of vehicle accidents as opposed to violence as the cause of fatalities is a topic debated in the security field. While some suggest vehicle accidents are the cause of more fatalities or serious injuries than deliberate violence against aid workers, others disagree. The finding here suggests that regardless of which is true in reality, respondents feel, on average, that vehicle accidents make them feel the most unsafe in their daily lives when compared to other types of incidents.

c. The Security Management Triangle: A One-legged Stool?

The findings regarding security mechanisms and measures demonstrate a clear preference for “acceptance” as a security management strategy.

- **Respondents rated acceptance security measures much more favorably than they did deterrence or protective measures.** The average score for acceptance measures was 5.68, compared to 4.61 for protective measures and 2.98 for deterrence measures.<sup>13</sup> With average scores of 5.93 and 5.80 respectively, having good relations with local partners and with local officials were the highest ranked items on the acceptance measures scale (see Table 3.9).
- **Respondents rated armed escort the lowest of all security measures.** The deterrence scores increased slightly for armed guards at residences and offices and the presence of international peacekeeping troops, but these remained well below the averages for both protective and acceptance measures (see Table 3.9).
- **Respondents ranked the more common protective measures (e.g., communication equipment) more favourably than the average score for all protective measures combined.** Those more favourably rated included information

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high-threat incidents and not low-threat incidents that accounts for differences in respondents’ security perceptions.

<sup>12</sup> The sample was too small and non-representative to control for age as well as marital status. We tested models using the marital variable and they had the same pattern as age. In other words, the two variables (age, marital status) were too closely connected in our sample and we therefore used age in the models for this report.

<sup>13</sup> The scale for security measures is the logical reverse of the other perceptions scales. Like the other scales, the security measures scale ranges from 1 to 7, but here 1 indicates the lowest level of perceived security (i.e. least safe) and 7 indicates the highest level of perceived security (i.e. most safe).

sharing about security incidents, security training, seatbelts, and ready access to communication equipment (see Table 3.9).

### Controlling for other characteristics,

- **Men felt less positively than women about protective measures.** The odds that men in this sample felt positively about protective measures were 32% lower than for women (see Table 3.11).

These findings, as indicated above, clearly indicate that respondents believe acceptance measures, such as culturally appropriate dress and behaviour or good relationships with local communities and partners, are more effective in making them *feel* safe. However, the data do not allow us to examine whether acceptance measures actually translate to decreased incidents or actual improvements in levels of insecurity, since the data asked about perceptions of the effectiveness of security measures as opposed to whether specific security measures were actually in place. In this sample, ratings for protective measures differed somewhat across categories. Those individuals who self-reported working for human rights organizations tended to rank protective measures more favourably than those working in other sectors,<sup>14</sup> and men tended to rank these measures less favourably than women (see Table 3.11). In contrast, in this sample there were no differences between groups of respondents across categories for both deterrence and acceptance measures.<sup>15</sup> This suggests that irrespective of demographic categories or country of posting, people rate deterrence measures less favourably (average score of 2.98) and acceptance measures more favourably (average score of 5.68). These findings run counter to actual trends in the field, where acceptance measures appear to be losing currency among security professionals as effective security management mechanisms.

#### d. Security Training: Help or Hindrance?

Overall, approximately half of the respondents received security training (see Table 2.3). Among different groups, however, the data demonstrate some intriguing differences and findings related to the effects of security training.

- **Personnel varied on whether they had security training.** 58.3% of men compared to 38.0% of women had any security training. 55.3% of international staff received security training, compared to 36.2% of national staff (see Table 2.4).

### When other factors are taken into account,

- **Security training was positively associated with security incidents.** Irrespective of other factors, personnel who had any security training were 3.7 times more likely than personnel with no security training to experience any medium-threat incident (see Table 3.3). However, the cause and effect relationship is not clear. It is possible that

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<sup>14</sup> Human rights personnel were 4 times more likely than personnel in all other sectors to give protective measures a highly favorable score on the perceptions of security measures scale (see Table 3.11).

<sup>15</sup> However, the logit for posting in very dangerous countries is marginally significant and indicates that workers in these countries may feel *even more positively* about acceptance measures than workers posted elsewhere (see Table 3.11). A larger sample size may yield a statistically significant result for this relationship.

individuals experienced an incident and seek out security training in order to minimize their vulnerability to future incidents.

- **Security training had a minimal effect on security perceptions.** Except for perceptions of safety at field sites, security training had no significant effect on perceptions when controlling for other factors in the analysis. Personnel with security training felt safer at field sites than others – the odds show they were 36% *less* likely than personnel with no security training to feel very unsafe at field sites (see Table 3.8).<sup>16</sup> In contrast, mean scores on the perceptions scales for high- and low-threat incidents were higher for personnel with security training than for those with no such training (see Table 3.5).<sup>17</sup> It is important to remember, however, that the presence of other factors that can also influence perceptions confounds the bivariate analysis. Logistic regression reveals that, in general, the experience of incidents is far more important than security training in influencing perceptions.

The gender difference in terms of who has security training is particularly striking, while the national/international staff discrepancy confirms existing data (InterAction 2001; Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006). What is especially interesting, however, is the contradictory effect security training appears to have on how secure people feel. On the one hand, the data show that those with security training feel safer than those without security training at field sites (see Table 3.8), implying that security training is potentially useful in making people feel safer in unfamiliar situations. On the other hand, security training seems to be associated with higher incidents and perceptions scores. The mean scores of the perceptions of security threats for those with security training are higher than those who did not receive security training (see Table 3.5), although when the number of incidents is taken into account, those with security training do not score significantly higher than others (see Table 3.7). Furthermore, those with security training were more likely to experience any medium-threat incident than those without training (see Table 3.3). This last finding is somewhat counter-intuitive, especially because those posted in high/very high danger countries are not significantly more likely to have had security training than others. In other words, it is not possible to explain this finding by simply stating that those with training are posted in more dangerous countries.<sup>18</sup>

As the comments above indicate, the cause and effect relationship between these variables is not clear. Nevertheless, several explanations for the findings are possible. It is possible that individuals experience an incident and seek out security training in order to minimize the vulnerability to future incidents, thus explaining the finding. Alternatively, it is possible that security training makes individuals more aware of threats and risks and more knowledgeable about what to do in these situations, but does not actually influence or decrease their fear. In fact, it might even make them more fearful. If this is the case, simply providing people with

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<sup>16</sup> An odds ratio below 1 indicates that the category of respondents listed in the table has lower odds for the outcome than respondents in the comparison category. In other words, whatever the odds ratio for the comparison category, the value of the odds ratio for the category in the table is x percent lower. The higher the percentage, the more potent the effect of having the attribute listed in the table.

<sup>17</sup> See Footnote 8 for an explanation of means vs. percentages. A higher mean indicates that among those who experienced any incidents, the group (e.g., those with or without security training) experienced a greater *variety* of incidents within the category.

<sup>18</sup> 56% of those posted in very dangerous countries had security training compared to 49% of those posted elsewhere. However, the difference is too small to be statistically significant for this sample.

security training is not an effective antidote to manage individuals' perceptions of threat and risk, even though it does provide them with more knowledge and awareness.

e. Gender: Does it Matter?

The findings related to gender are somewhat surprising, since they suggest that men find some locations more unsafe than women and are more likely to experience certain types of incidents.

- **Men and women were *not* equal on security training.** 58.3% of men compared to 38.0% of women had any security training (see Table 2.4).
- **Men and women were equally as likely to be posted in the most dangerous countries.** Although a slightly higher percentage of women (26.8%) than men (22.2%) were posted in the most dangerous countries, the difference was not large enough to attain statistical significance for the sample (result not reported in tables).
- **Men tended to rank some locations as less safe than women.** In security perceptions at the office, men averaged a score of 2.64 compared to 2.19 for women. In security perceptions at field sites, men averaged a score of 3.94 compared to 3.26 for women, and an average of 3.87 for traveling between sites compared to 3.33 for the same site for women (see Table 3.6).

**Controlling for other characteristics,**

- **Gender did make a difference for the experience of some threatening incidents.** This relationship held for medium-threat incidents only: men were nearly 4 times more likely than women to experience any medium-threat incident (see Table 3.3).

The bivariate and multivariate analyses offer more nuance regarding this finding. While the bivariate analysis reveals which respondents experienced the highest number of incidents, the multivariate analysis reveals which were most likely to experience *any* incident in the first place. The bivariate analysis (see Table 3.2) uncovered no statistical differences between men and women with respect to the average number of medium threat incidents reported by those who had experienced any incidents. However, the multivariate analysis shows that men were more likely than women to encounter such incidents in the first place, irrespective of other factors (see Table 3.3).

- **Gender did not predict who feels *highly* threatened by incidents but may affect security perceptions at specific locations.** When other factors are taken into account, gender does not explain which respondents felt the most insecure of all (see Table 3.7). However, the odds that a respondent felt insecure at different locations are slightly higher for men than for women but do not achieve statistical significance. Perceptions at field sites disaggregated by gender are marginally significant (see Table 3.8).

Aside from the finding that men receive significantly more security training than women, the findings did not uncover significant trends related to gender differences, with the exception of experience of mid-threat incidents. Men were more likely to experience certain types of incidents (e.g., those classified as mid-threat, such as crime and banditry, carjacking, landmine

explosions) and reported feeling less safe in certain situations. While this suggests that men and women experience and perceive security differently, it is not clear why this is so. The higher but statistically insignificant odds for men with regard to security perceptions at various locations suggest that with more data, more substantial gender differences might emerge. In other words, gender does appear to matter, but in ways not fully apparent in this sample. Thus, gender as related to security incidents needs more data and analysis.

f. The Not-so-bucolic Countryside: Are People Really Safer in Non-urban Areas?

The findings related to location of posting turn the common assumption that people are safer – that there is less crime and risk – in more rural areas on its head. Instead, the data reveal that both actual incidents and perceived risk are higher outside urban areas (defined as cities of more than 100,000 people).

- **Personnel posted in large cities were less likely than others to experience the most threatening incidents.** 23.0% of respondents posted in large cities experienced at least one high-threat incident compared to 48.3% of respondents that were posted elsewhere. 30.3% of respondents posted in large cities experienced at least one medium-threat incident compared to 51.7% of respondents posted elsewhere (see Table 3.2).
- **Personnel posted in large cities tended to feel safer than those posted elsewhere.** The average perceptions scale score for highly threatening incidents was 2.96 for personnel in large cities and 3.48 for others (see Table 3.5).

**Controlling for other characteristics,**

- **The odds of experiencing a highly dangerous incident were lower for personnel posted in large cities than for others.** Personnel posted in large cities were 32% less likely to experience a highly threatening incident than were others, irrespective of country of posting and all other factors (see Table 3.3).
- **Urban-posted personnel were significantly less likely than others to experience a high number of low-threat incidents.** The odds of urban-posted personnel experiencing a high number of low-threat incidents were 28% less than non-urban-posted personnel (see Table 3.3).
- **Personnel posted in large cities were no more or less likely to feel very unsafe.** Although they averaged slightly lower scores on the security perceptions scales, when other factors are considered, urban workers were as likely as non-urban workers to give incidents the most unsafe ratings. The experience of any incident accounts for bivariate differences in perceptions between urban and non-urban personnel (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6).

Those posted outside large urban areas consistently reported higher numbers of incidents – low, medium, and high incidents (see Table 3.2). The finding also holds for perceptions (see Table 3.5), since those posted in non-urban areas also feel less safe even though there are no differences at the extreme (feeling very unsafe). It is possible that the relative isolation of more



rural areas makes people feel more unsafe, due to the lack of services and access to assistance. Additionally, staff in non-urban areas are likely closer to the front lines and/or working in refugee camps, which are often in more insecure areas, thus explaining the result. This finding serves to emphasize the importance of support for individuals posted outside urban areas as well as the need to ensure for security strategies that take into account the possibility of higher risk for those posted in these areas.

g. Odds and Ends: What Else Does the Data Tell Us?

In general, the commentary in the open-ended questions at the end of the survey provided support for the general conclusion that actual experience of incidents has a greater influence on perception of threat than the ambient security situation. One respondent wrote: "Personal incidents have a much greater and more immediate affect on one's sense of safety than a larger scale prevailing poor security situation. However the on-going stress of a prevailing situation can also be very detrimental." Multiple respondents wrote about how a particular incident influenced their later choices, even though some indicated their experiences had a minimal impact. For example, a kidnap threat or a theft made them stay at home more or a negative travel experience prompted them to make contingency plans or to assess the security situation before accepting a new assignment.

The responses to the open-ended questions at the end of the web survey provided some additional contextual information. One respondent wrote about the psychological effect of experiencing a security incident. The respondent reported being mugged and thereafter feeling much more experienced in dealing with threats. In addition, some believed incidents provide credibility and a sense of "admission to a club." Bragging rights about different or shared experiences of incidents and danger are common fodder for discussion among those who have worked in more dangerous settings.

Furthermore, numerous respondents wrote about specific types of security threats. Although security incidents often originate from outside the organization and within the environment, this is not always the case. Lack of sleep (e.g., due to bombings or fear) are a contributing factor to stress and impede the ability of individuals to respond creatively and effectively to stressful incidents. Another wrote about the security threats that originate from fellow staff members, and specifically about gender and sexual harassment issues or tensions between national and international staff that often do not receive the same kind of attention.<sup>19</sup> Several individuals wrote about airports, taxi travel, and personal safety in hotels/guest houses for individuals arriving in or visiting a new country as neglected in terms of security management. One respondent arrived at the airport during a security incident and was unable to make a connection with the pick-up person.

Finally, several respondents offered some more innovative and useful suggestions for security management strategies. One individual emphasized the important of drivers as ambassadors of the organization, and shared that his/her organization selected drivers to represent all identity (e.g., tribal, ethnic, religious) groups in the country. This gave the organization flexibility in

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<sup>19</sup> While there were no significant differences between men and women regarding self-reports of sexual violence or reporting on colleagues experiencing sexual violence, women rated sexual violence more threatening to their safety than did men (3.5 versus 2.4 respectively, not reported in tables).

deciding who to send to a particular region. Another emphasized the importance of contingency planning and carrying a list of contacts at all times, in case of emergency.

#### IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

The findings from this study generate a number of preliminary implications and recommendations for research and security management. Overall, **the data suggest the need to pay attention to the full array of safety and security incidents**, from safety threats, such as vehicle accidents and work stress, to the less severe security threats that aid workers face. The lesser types of security threats have been a neglected area of research, since most studies have focused primarily on fatalities or severe threats. Furthermore, security management strategies should ideally reflect the various identities (i.e., national vs. international, position within the organization, gender etc.) that influence the type(s) of threat they face.

**Recommendation: Agencies (and research) should ensure a focus on and respond to the full range of security threats, not simply high-threat and high-impact incidents.**

Second, **not all demographic characteristics are related to the experience or perceptions of security threats and measures**. There were no statistically significant relationships for a number of the demographic factors and the experience of incidents or perceptions of degree of security. Whether or not the individual had dependents, his/her marital status, age, and time spent in country generally did not prove significant for this sample. Moreover, the time in the profession and the amount of security training (i.e., whether the training lasted for one or multiple days) were not significant for this sample. On the other hand, those who self-reported working for organizations with a human rights mandate (which could include those working on rights-based development or advocacy issues) tended to report higher perceptions of threat and were significantly more likely to rank protective measures more favorably than were personnel in other sectors. Because human rights workers in developing countries publicize state abuses nationally and internationally, they are often targets of state repression. Moreover, in highly volatile contexts, the threat of attack by non-state agents such as guerilla fighters is also high. During the Algerian civil war, for example, human rights activists were under assault not only by the police and the military but also by Islamist militants. The type of assault ranged from simple harassment by the police to murder (Wiest 2007). Furthermore, irrespective of demographic categories and country of posting, respondents rated acceptance measures the most favourably of all.

**Recommendation: Agencies that privilege protective and deterrent measures should revisit the importance of acceptance measures as a security management strategy that makes staff *feel* more secure.**

Third, **the data demonstrate the influence of actual experience of incidents in making people feel less safe**. Even though individuals working in countries that are more dangerous experience significantly more incidents, these ambient levels of insecurity alone do not explain higher perceptions of insecurity. Instead, an individual's actual experience of an incident better explains his or her perception of the degree of danger. This highlights the importance of not neglecting security management strategies in countries that have low ambient levels of insecurity.

**Recommendation: Agencies should ensure appropriate and immediate responses to security incidents that are designed to address the physical, psychological, and security management impacts of the actual incident. In addition, responses should deal with the impact the experience of an incident may have on an individual's perceptions of insecurity and levels of fear.**

**Recommendation: Agencies should pay attention to security management in all their country programs, not solely or primarily in those countries that have higher ambient levels of violence/insecurity.**

Fourth, **the study highlights the need for and limitations of research on this topic.** The study and its limitations demonstrate the need to create research designs that more effectively solicit the participation and support of national staff and their experiences of security threats and measures, and the participation of staff from a greater variety of positions within an organization. The difficulty of identifying and sampling the total population of humanitarian and development workers continually handicaps our ability to generate findings that are generalizable across the population of aid workers. Other studies on this topic have signaled similar issues (e.g., Barnett 2004, Rowley 2005, Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006).

**Recommendation: Future research should implement research designs that more effectively solicit participation from national staff about their perceptions of and needs related to security issues.**

In addition, **the study findings emphasize the need for more research in a number of areas**, especially gender differences among aid workers in relation to security,<sup>20</sup> the prevalence and impact of the full range of security incidents, a comparative study of the effectiveness of specific security measures (or categories of measures) in reducing actual numbers of incidents (see analysis above in section "The Security Management Triangle"), and the effectiveness of security training and its influence on perceptions and risk. On the last topic, although the data did not suggest any relationship between security training and security perceptions, there is compelling evidence that those who experience incidents rank their environments as more unsafe. The data indicated that people who self reported at least one high- or medium-threat incident were between 4 and 8 times more likely to rate higher on the security perceptions scale (most unsafe) than those who have not experienced an incident (see Table 3.7). One area for future research is to look at what types of interventions might interrupt this escalation of fear (i.e., making the escalation reversible as opposed to irreversible). Ideally, security training will decrease the odds that personnel will experience security incidents as well as give them a realistic sense of the security context. However, the findings show an association between those with security training and higher perceptions scores. Does this mean that security training makes people feel more unsafe? Not necessarily, since we do not know whether people seek training after an incident, a factor that could account for the findings. What this does emphasize, as indicated above, is the need for more research on security training: the timing of

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<sup>20</sup> Few have studied the impact of gender on security. The only study of which the author is aware is a study, conducted by some graduate students at George Washington University in Washington, DC, for Save the Children-US. See Alexis Gaul, Michael Keegan, Marjorie Lawrence, and Maria Lya Ramos, 2006. NGO security: Does gender matter? Washington, DC: Save the Children, US and The George Washington University.

security training (i.e., whether offered or voluntarily sought), the potential impact of follow-up training or recurrent security training as opposed to "one-off" training sessions of varying length, and the effectiveness of security training in general in preventing and addressing fears and actual threats.

**Recommendation: More research on the following topics: gender differences, the prevalence and impact of the full range of security incidents, the effectiveness of specific security measures in reducing risk, and the effectiveness of security training and its influence on perceptions and risk.**

In summary, although researchers are making progress in identifying and analyzing humanitarian security issues, we still have a long way to go in achieving a better understanding of causes and perceptions of security and security incidents, as well as the effectiveness of security measures.

## Appendix 1 – Data Classification

Table 1.1: ASI Classifications

The country grouping classifications used for the data analysis are from the ASI Group ([www.asigroup.com](http://www.asigroup.com)) "world threat map." The map indicates that ASI examines "the following to assess the threat level of a specific destination: crime, violent demonstrations/protests/civil unrest, espionage, ethnic conflict, insurgency, kidnapping, elections, political stability, terrorism, war." The countries are grouped according to the Fall 2006 security level classifications.

<b>VERY LOW</b>	Bermuda, Greenland, Iceland, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Samoa, Seychelles, Tonga, Vanuatu
<b>LOW</b>	Aruba, Austria, Barbados, Bhutan, Brunei, Canada, Cape Verde, Cayman Islands, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Dominica, Finland, French Guinea, Grenada, Ireland, Japan, Lesser Antilles, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mauritius, Netherland Antilles, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turks & Caicos, Uruguay
<b>MEDIUM</b>	Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Belize, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, China, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, The Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam
<b>HIGH</b>	Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia & Hercegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, East Timor, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrzgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, Niger, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Western Sahara, Yemen, Zambia
<b>VERY HIGH</b>	Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire/Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian territory/oPt, Republic of Congo, Somalia, Zimbabwe

Table 1.2: Security Incident Classifications

<b>LOW</b>	
(Ambient insecurity – present in the situation or by virtue of being in the wrong place at the wrong time)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Threats of abduction, kidnapping, or hostage-taking</li> <li>Arrest or detention</li> <li>Attacks on civilian population</li> <li>Armed/unarmed individuals at checkpoint</li> <li>Bullying in the workplace</li> <li>Checkpoints: Unarmed individuals</li> <li>Checkpoints: Armed individuals</li> <li>Demonstration</li> <li>Disgruntled colleagues or staff</li> <li>Disgruntled partner organizations</li> <li>Disgruntled beneficiary organizations</li> <li>Evacuation</li> <li>Illness</li> <li>Inexperienced colleagues</li> <li>Natural disaster</li> <li>Presence of anti-personnel landmines (APM)</li> <li>Presence of anti-vehicle landmines (AVM)</li> <li>Presence of unexploded ordnance or improvised explosive device (IED) (e.g., roadside bomb)</li> <li>Riots or mob violence</li> <li>Travel in marked vehicles</li> <li>Travel in unmarked vehicles</li> <li>Use of weapons (e.g., handgun or rocket-propelled grenade) near home or office</li> <li>Vehicle accident</li> <li>Visible presence and/or use of small arms and light weapons (e.g., handgun or rocket-propelled grenade)</li> <li>Walking alone</li> <li>Walking in pairs or groups</li> <li>Work stress</li> </ul>
<b>MEDIUM</b>	
(Acts of violence against property, ambient violence with an increase in level of destruction or damage)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Car-jacking</li> <li>Crime or banditry</li> <li>Explosion: Anti-personnel landmine (APM)</li> <li>Explosion: Anti-vehicle landmine (AVM)</li> <li>Explosion: Unexploded ordnance</li> <li>Explosion: Improvised explosive device (IED) (e.g., roadside bomb)</li> <li>Theft or looting at office or warehouse</li> <li>Theft or break-in at residence</li> </ul>
<b>HIGH</b>	
(Acts of violence against individuals, targeted acts against property)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Abduction, kidnapping, or hostage-taking</li> <li>Aerial bombing</li> <li>Ambush</li> <li>Armed robbery</li> <li>Arson</li> </ul>

or individual)	Artillery, rockets, or mortar fire Assault Homicide/murder Sexual violence or assault
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Table 1.3: Security Measures Classifications

<b>ACCEPTANCE</b>	
Strategies to increase political and social consent for an agency's presence and work (Van Brabant 2000)	Culturally appropriate dress and behaviour Ethic and/or religious diversity in local staff Having good relationships with the community in areas in which we work Having good relationships with local officials Having good relationships with local partners
<b>PROTECTION</b>	
Strategies that use protective devices and procedures to address the vulnerability of an agency (i.e., "hardening the target") (Van Brabant 2000)	Blast plates and/or armoured vehicles Communication/information sharing about security Compound protective measures (e.g., high walls, lighting) Curfews First aid training Ready access to communication equipment Restricted movement outside "safe" areas Security alarms Security training Seatbelts Travel in marked vehicles Travel in unmarked vehicles Walking or traveling in groups Unarmed guards at residence or office
<b>DETERRENCE</b>	
Strategies that attempt to deter threats with counter-threats (e.g., political, legal, military or economic sanctions, armed escort) (Van Brabant 2000)	Armed escort Armed guards at residence or office Presence of international military or peacekeeping force

## Appendix 2 – Sample Characteristics

Table 2.1: Nationality of Respondents

Country	Number of respondents	Country	Number of respondents
USA	40	Egypt	1
UK	31	Eritrea	1
France	22	Finland	1
Canada	19	Ghana	1
Zambia	8	Guatemala	1
Australia	5	Haiti	1
India	4	Ireland	1
Georgia	3	Malawi	1
Germany	3	Mali	1
Italy	3	Nepal	1
Bangladesh	2	Nicaragua	1
Israel/oPt	2	Pakistan	1
Kenya	2	Poland	1
Netherlands	2	Russia	1
South Africa	2	Spain	1
Afghanistan	1	Sudan	1
Albania	1	Swaziland	1
Argentina	1	Switzerland	1
Austria	1	Togo	1
Belgium	1	Turkey	1
Cambodia	1	Uganda	1
Congo Brazzaville	1	Zimbabwe	1
DRC	1	Unknown	1
Denmark	1		
		<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>



Table 2.2: Respondents' Country of Reference

Country of reference	Number of respondents	Country of reference	Number of respondents
Afghanistan	19	Zimbabwe	2
Sudan	13	Albania	1
Indonesia	11	Algeria	1
United States	9	Angola	1
Chad	8	Bangladesh	1
Kenya	7	Bolivia	1
Sri Lanka	7	Bulgaria	1
UK	6	Burundi	1
Zambia	6	Canada	1
Congo Brazzaville	5	East Timor	1
Georgia	5	Ecuador	1
Iraq	5	El Salvador	1
Haiti	4	Ghana	1
Israel/oPt	4	Guatemala	1
Uganda	4	Honduras	1
Bosnia	3	Japan	1
Egypt	3	Kosovo	1
Lebanon	3	Macedonia	1
Liberia	3	Malawi	1
Nepal	3	Mali	1
Yugoslavia	3	Moldova	1
Cambodia	2	Niger	1
Colombia	2	Pakistan	1
DRC	2	Philippines	1
Jordan	2	Russia	1
Mozambique	2	Rwanda	1
Nicaragua	2	South Africa	1
Sierra Leone	2	Togo	1
Tajikistan	2	Uzbekistan	1
Tanzania	2	Yemen	1
		<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>

Table 2.3: Survey Demographics (N=180)<sup>1</sup>

<b>Gender</b>			<b>Time in humanitarian sector</b>	
	Women	40%	Less than 6 months	1.1%
	Men	60	6 – 12 months	3.3
<b>Age</b>			1 – 3 years	22.8
	Under 35	39.7%	> 3 years	69.4
	35 or older	60.3	<b>Time in current organization</b>	
<b>Family Status</b>			Less than 6 months	6.1%
	Single without dependents	38.9%	6 – 12 months	15.0
	Single with dependents	4.4	1 – 3 years	33.9
	Married/with partner without dependents	22.2	> 3 years	26.7
	Married/with partner with dependents	33.9	<b>Time in current position</b>	
<b>Status</b>			Less than 6 months	22.8%
	International Staff	73.9%	6 – 12 months	25.6
	National Staff	26.1	1 – 3 years	35.6
<b>Region of Posting</b>			> 3 years	15.6
	Africa	36.7%	<b>Living Status</b>	
	Asia	15.6	Living/working in reference country	85.6%
	Americas	12.8	Live elsewhere and make periodic visits to reference country	13.3
	Europe	12.8	<b>Time in Country</b>	
	Central Asia	12.2	3 months or less	13.3%
	Middle East	10.0	Less than 1 year (> 3 months)	14.1
<b>Type of Position</b>			1 – 3 years	20.2
	Field-based Staff	52.8%	More than 3 years	52.4
	HQ-based Staff	33.9	<b>Security Training</b>	
	Consultant	7.2	None	49.7%
	Other	5.6	Multiple day	35.2
			Full day	7.8
			Less than full day	7.3

<b>Type of Organization</b>		<b>Timing of Security Training</b>	
United Nations agency	6.1%	Less than 6 months ago	23.3%
Other inter-governmental agency	6.1	6 – 12 months ago	26.7
Large international NGO (50 or more total employees)	70.6	More than 1 year ago	43.8
Small international NGO (less than 50 employees)	12.2	<b>ASI Country Classification</b>	
Large national NGO	2.8	Low/Mid danger	14.5%
Small national NGO	.6	High danger	61.7
<b>Sector</b>		Very high danger	23.9
	Relief	<b>Mine Status of Country<sup>2</sup></b>	
	Development	High mine danger	19.4%
	Peace	Minimal to no mine danger	80.6
	Human Rights		
Combination of issues	57.8		
<b>Location of posting</b>			
Large urban area (100,000 + people)	67.8%		
Smaller urban area (< 100,000 people)	17.8		
Rural area	14.4		

1. The percentages in this table do not always add to 100 because of rounding error or missing data.

2. Countries rated as “High mine danger” are those that are most affected by the presence of Anti-Vehicle and Anti-Personnel Mines: Angola, Afghanistan, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. Data source: Landmine Action.

Table 2.4: Percent of Respondents with any Security Training<sup>1</sup>

<b>Gender</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>% w/security training</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>% w/security training</b>
Women	71	38.0%	Relief	115	49.6%
Men	108	58.3	Development	117	48.7
<b>Age</b>			Peace	25	36.0
	Under 35	71	40.8%	Human Rights	27
35 or older	107	57.0	Combination of issues	104	42.3

<b>Status</b>			<b>Location of posting</b>		
International Staff	132	55.3%	Large urban area (100,000 + people)	122	42.6%
National Staff	47	36.2	Smaller urban area (< 100,000 people)	31	71.0
<b>Region of Posting</b>			Rural area	26	61.5
Africa	65	52.3%	<b>Time in humanitarian sector</b>		
Asia	28	39.3	Less than 6 months	2	100%
Americas	23	56.5	6 – 12 months	6	16.7
Europe	23	43.5	1 – 3 years	41	46.3
Central Asia	22	63.6	> 3 years	124	54.0
Middle East	18	44.4	<b>Time in current organization</b>		
<b>Type of Position</b>			Less than 6 months	11	54.5%
Field-based Staff	94	51.1%	6 – 12 months	27	44.4
HQ-based Staff	61	50.8	1 – 3 years	61	52.5
Consultant	13	46.2	> 3 years	48	66.7
Other	10	50.0	<b>Living Status</b>		
<b>Type of Organization</b>			Living/working in reference country	153	48.4
United Nations agency	11	63.6%	Live elsewhere and make periodic visits to reference	24	66.7
Other inter-governmental agency	11	63.6	<b>ASI Country Classification</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>% with security</b>
Large international NGO (50 or more total)	126	48.4	Low/Mid danger	12	46.1%
Small international NGO (less than 50 employees)	22	40.9	High danger	54	49.1
Large national NGO	5	40.0	Very high danger	24	55.8
Small national NGO	1	100			

1. The N in each cell is based on the number of respondents in the category who answered the question about security training.

## Appendix 3 – Data Analysis

### Analysis Narrative

All security perceptions scales were created from respondents' responses on individual survey questions. The score on each perception scale is the mean of the sum of scores on individual items (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3 in Appendix 1 for the list of items on the scales). The study contains and analyzes ten perceptions scales and three incidents scales. The perceptions scales include: high-threat incidents, medium-threat incidents, low-threat incidents (see Table 1.2); security perceptions at home, office, at field sites, and traveling; and security perceptions of deterrence, protective, and acceptance security measures (see Table 1.3). Incident scales were also created by taking the mean of scores on the individual scale items. There are three incident scales: high-threat, medium-threat, and low-threat (see Table 1.2).

We performed bivariate analysis of means and binary logistic regression analysis on the data.<sup>21</sup> Bivariate analysis compares groups of respondents on mean (averages) scale scores. In essence, bivariate analysis compares the mean of a dependent variable (incidents or perceptions) across categories of one independent variable (e.g. gender or age). While bivariate analysis offers insight into general patterns, multivariate analysis helps us identify the characteristics of the respondents and the environment that are most likely to explain differences in the dependent variable (i.e. perceptions and incidents). In other words, because personnel are identified by many factors, including gender, country of posting, years in the profession, and age, it is important to isolate which of these characteristics are most likely to account for differences in experiences and perceptions among respondents. For our multivariate analysis, we chose logistic regression over ordinary linear regression for three reasons. First, we were interested in understanding which of the various possible factors account for the experience of *any* security incident that respondents themselves experienced. For incidents, we created a dichotomous dependent variable with "1" indicating that a respondent did experience at least one incident and "0" indicating that a respondent had no such experience. Second, we wanted to isolate the factors that help differentiate those respondents who experienced a high number of security incidents from those who did not<sup>22</sup> and to compare those who had scored highest on the perceptions scale from those who scored average or below. For perceptions, a value of "1" indicates respondents who scored above average while "0" indicates those who scored average or below. Third, the assumptions of binary logistic regression are less strict than those for ordinary linear regression. This form of regression does not assume a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables; neither the dependent variable nor the error terms need be normally distributed; and variances of the independent variables do not need to be the same within each category.

The basic element of the prediction equation in binary logistic regression is the logit, which calculates changes in the log odds of the dependent variable at different levels of the

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<sup>21</sup> In the report, the bivariate results are reported first in Section III (Findings) and in Tables 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.9, and 3.10. The regression models, which control for other variables, are reported in Section III after the phrase "Controlling for other characteristics" or "When other factors are taken into account" and in Tables 3.3, 3.7, 3.8, and 3.11.

<sup>22</sup> Because of the nature of the sample and the incident distributions, however, this analysis was performed for low-threat incidents only. A large enough number of respondents experienced a high number of low-threat incidents, while only a small number experienced a high number of mid- or high-threat incidents.

independent variables.<sup>23</sup> In other words, a logit estimates the log odds that the dependent variable is equal to "1", controlling for all other independent variables. For easier interpretation, all logits were converted to odds ratios. The odds ratio tells us how much the odds of the dependent variable increase or decrease given the level of the independent variable(s). The further an odds ratio is from 1, the greater the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. If the odds ratio is greater than 1, then the odds are higher that a respondent in that group, in contrast to a respondent in the comparison group (e.g. men compared to women; international staff compared to national staff), experienced the outcome (e.g. sense of security; a threatening incident). If the odds ratio is less than 1 (e.g. .36), then the odds are lower that a respondent in that group compared to a respondent in the contrast category experienced the outcome. Odds ratios below 1 are interpreted as the percentage of the odds for the contrast group (i.e. the group not listed in the table). To facilitate understanding of the results, and to make reading less cumbersome, we use the terms "more/less likely" or "lower/higher likelihood" throughout the report.

We assessed the relative importance of the independent variables in explaining perceptions and experiences through the magnitude of mean differences, the size of the odds ratio in the regression models, and statistical testing. However, because results are based on a non-probability (meaning non-random and non-representative) sample of humanitarian workers, the statistical tests only apply to the sample and not to the general population of aid workers. The probability against the null hypothesis ( $p \leq .05$ ) for the Anova and Chi-square tests is interpreted as the probability that differences in means (Anova) or logits (Chi-Square) are large enough to be considered real rather than chance effects of the characteristics of the respondents that are included in the sample. Because we did not formalize hypotheses before the analysis phase, we used two-tail significance tests. Two-tail tests are more stringent because the probability that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected covers a larger area under the density curve.

We assessed the quality of our regression models using Nagelkerke's R-Square and the percent of cases that the regression models classified correctly. Nagelkerke's R-Square measures the general strength of association between the dependent and independent variables. It ranges from 0 to 1, with values close to zero indicating weak association and values close to 1 indicating strong association. Classification tables tell us how well the models estimate the data. A model that fits the data perfectly (i.e. predicts the dependent variable perfectly) would yield 100% correct classification of cases.

As one of our quality tests, we also examined the confidence intervals for the odds ratios. Generally, a narrow confidence interval suggests the accuracy of the estimation. For some variables, however, confidence intervals were wider than would be ideal. A sample based on proportional random selection within theoretically important categories (such as country of posting, sector, time in country) would have yielded narrower intervals and more confidence in the results. Given this caveat, the value of this study lies in suggested explanations for differences in experiences and perceptions among humanitarian workers as well as in the directions for future research that the findings illuminate.

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<sup>23</sup> A logit can be interpreted as the logged probability ( $p$ ) that a respondent will score "1" on the dependent variable for a specified category of the independent variable:  $\text{logit}(p) = \log(p/1-p) = \log(p) - \log(1-p)$ .

Table 3.1: Incidents Reported by Respondents (N=180)<sup>1</sup>

	% Respondents (self)	% Colleagues
<b>HIGH-THREAT INCIDENTS</b>	<b>31.1%</b>	<b>56.7%</b>
Artillery, rockets, or mortar fire	19.4	13.9
Aerial bombing	12.2	8.9
Armed robbery	7.8	29.4
Assault	6.1	20.0
Abduction, kidnapping, hostage taking	5.6	18.3
Ambush	4.4	15.6
Sexual violence	4.4	14.4
Homicide <sup>2</sup>	3.9	13.3
<b>MEDIUM-THREAT INCIDENTS</b>	<b>37.2%</b>	<b>52.2%</b>
Crime or banditry	20.0	27.8
Theft or break-in at office	16.1	22.2
Theft or break-in at residence	12.2	26.7
Explosion of unexploded ordinance	6.7	10.0
Presence of improvised explosive devices	6.7	9.4
Presence of anti-personnel land mines	5.0	13.3
Car jacking	4.4	30.0
Explosion of anti-vehicle landmines	2.8	8.9
<b>LOW-THREAT INCIDENTS</b>	<b>71.7%</b>	<b>71.7%</b>
Work stress	57.8	45.0
Armed checkpoints	42.8	33.3
Visible presence and/or use of small arms or light weapons	30.6	26.1
Disgruntled colleagues	27.8	25.0
Disgruntled beneficiary population	26.7	23.9
Attacks on civilian population	25.0	23.3
Disgruntled partner organizations	20.6	15.6
Evacuation	17.8	30.0
Riots or mobs	17.2	20.6
Vehicle accident	12.8	37.2
Arrest or detention	5.6	22.8

1. Figures are based on the percent of respondents who reported that they themselves or a colleague had experienced *any* of the listed incidents.

2. Because 3.9% of respondents indicated that they themselves had experienced homicide, the interpretation of the figures for this category is uncertain. It is likely that the respondents who responded positively to this item knew of someone who had been murdered or had witnessed a murder. Further, one should not assume that the figure for colleagues indicates the percentage of respondents who knew of a colleague being murdered. It is possible that some respondents knew a colleague who was murdered but it also possible that some respondents had a colleague who knew of someone who was murdered.

Table 3.2: Self-reported Incidents by Respondent Characteristics<sup>1, 2</sup>

	N	High-threat		Mid-threat		Low-threat	
		% any	Mean	% any	Mean	% any	Mean
<b>ALL RESPONDENTS</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>31.1%</b>	<b>2.05</b>	<b>37.2%</b>	<b>1.98</b>	<b>71.7%</b>	<b>3.97</b>
Security training – yes	90	37.8	2.00	48.9**	2.02	66.7	4.56**
Security training – no	89	24.7	2.14	25.8	1.91	76.4	3.47
In country three months or less	24	45.8	1.36	33.3	1.87	79.2	4.26
In country more than three months	133	33.8	2.22	44.4	2.00	82.7	3.92
International staff	133	36.8**	1.94	42.9**	1.87	73.7	4.41***
National staff	47	14.9	2.86	21.3	2.60	66.0	2.58
Posted in large urban area	122	23.0***	1.96	30.3**	1.73	68.0	3.35***
Posted outside of large urban area	58	48.3	2.14	51.7	2.30	79.3	5.01
Posted in country ranked high or very high danger on ASI scale	154	35.1**	2.07	40.9**	2.03	72.1	4.28***
Posted in country ranked low/medium danger on ASI scale	26	7.7	1.50	15.4	1.25	69.2	2.06
Male	108	33.3	2.28	43.5*	2.06	71.3	3.89
Female	72	28.2	1.65	28.2	1.80	71.8	4.12
Age thirty-five or older	108	27.8	2.00	33.3	1.94	64.8**	3.59*
Younger than thirty-five	71	35.2	2.12	42.3	2.01	81.7	4.48
Worked in humanitarian sector more than 3 years	125	30.4	2.13	36.0	2.00	71.2	3.95
Worked in humanitarian sector 3 years or less	49	28.6	1.57	38.8	1.63	69.4	3.76
Field-based staff	95	41.1**	2.05	46.3**	2.16	84.2***	4.21
Not field-based staff	84	20.2	2.06	27.4	1.65	57.1	3.60
Works for an IGO	22	59.1**	1.69	63.6**	1.79	77.3	5.82***
Works in non-governmental sector	155	27.7	2.16	34.2	2.04	72.3	3.69
Works for a large INGO	127	27.6	2.34	37.0	2.00	76.4	3.71*
Works for small INGO, NGO, or IGO	50	42.0	1.57	40.0	1.95	64.0	4.75
Works for relief organization <sup>3</sup>	116	36.2 <sup>+</sup> (21.9)	1.93 (2.43)	41.4 (29.7)	1.79 (2.47)	79.3** (57.8)	3.97 (3.97)
Works for development organization <sup>3</sup>	117	25.6* (41.3)	2.17 (1.92)	35.9 (39.7)	1.88 (2.16)	70.9 (73.0)	3.65 <sup>+</sup> (4.54)
Works for peace building organization <sup>3</sup>	25	28.0 (31.6)	1.71 (2.10)	36.0 (37.4)	1.55 (2.05)	64.0 (72.9)	4.62 (3.88)
Works for human rights organization <sup>3</sup>	27	44.4 (28.8)	2.42 (1.95)	55.6* (34.0)	2.23 (1.90)	77.8 (70.6)	5.29** (3.71)
Works for multi-issue organization <sup>3</sup>	104	26.0* (41.5)	2.04 (1.85)	34.6 (43.1)	1.72 (2.14)	75.0 (72.3)	3.61 (4.36)

1. Figures for colleagues are not included; they are based on respondent self-report only.

2. Because formal hypotheses were not established prior to analyses, significance levels are based on two-sided tests. Two-sided tests are more stringent than one-sided tests because the probability in favor of the null hypotheses can fall within an area under the density curve that is 2X greater than that for a one-sided test. Significance levels: <sup>+</sup> p <= .07; \* p <= .05; \*\* p <= .01; \*\*\* p <= .001

3. The figure in parentheses denotes anyone working outside the sector. For example, the figure in parentheses for “works for human rights organization” is for all personnel who do not work this type of organization.



Table 3.3: Odds Ratios for Self-reported Incidents (N=152)<sup>1</sup>

	Model 1: Any high-threat incident <sup>2</sup>	Model 2: Any medium-threat incidents <sup>2</sup>	Model 3: Any low-threat incidents <sup>2</sup>	Model 4: High number of low-threat incidents <sup>5</sup>
Had security training	1.66	3.67**	.61	2.01
In country three months or less	1.29	.23	.32	.635
International staff	2.22	2.91*	3.31*	3.76**
Posted in large urban context	.327**	.43 <sup>+</sup>	.17*	.280**
Posted in ASI very high danger country	4.0**	6.7***	3.86 <sup>4</sup>	3.32**
Male	1.48	3.67**	2.39	.908
Thirty-five or older	.87	.43 <sup>+</sup>	.30*	.541
Works for an IGO	2.81 <sup>+</sup>	1.83	.59	1.89
Human rights <sup>3</sup>	1.64	2.64	.91	2.42
Field-based staff	1.28	.67	.99	1.12
Nagelkerke R2	.32	.43	.26	.37
Cases classified correctly	76%	78%	82%	71%

1. Because formal hypotheses were not established prior to analyses, significance levels are based on two-sided tests. Two-sided tests are more stringent than one-sided tests because the probability in favor of the null hypotheses can fall within an area under the density curve that is 2X greater than that for a one-sided test. Significance levels: <sup>+</sup> p <= .07; \* p <= .05; \*\* p <= .01; \*\*\* p <= .001.

2. The results are based on logistic regression analysis. For each threat category, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the respondent himself or herself experienced at least one incident and equal to 0 if the respondent experienced no incidents. Because of missing data on the time in country variable, only 152 observations are included in the regression analysis.

3. A dummy variable for each other sectors (e.g. Relief) was included separately in models. Because these variables did not reach statistical significance, the results of these models are not included in the table.

4. Although the odds ratio for posting in a very dangerous country is high (3.86), the coefficient does not attain statistical significance because of the exceptionally wide confidence interval, which ranges from .616 to 15.46. Because of the distribution of cases, the confidence interval for this variable is very wide in all models though the effect is strong enough to attain statistical significance in all but model 3.

5. The dependent variable for model 4 is based on the number of low-threat incidents experienced by respondents. Respondents who experienced an above average (3.69) number of incidents in this category were coded 1 and others were coded 0. Because there were no significant differences among respondents in mean number of high- or mid-threat incidents experienced (among respondents who had experienced any incident in these categories), logistic regression analysis was conducted for low-threat incidents only.

Table 3.4: Average Scores for Security Perceptions Scales<sup>1</sup>

	N	Average score		N	Average score
<b>High-threat incidents</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>3.13</b>	<b>Low-threat incidents</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>2.99</b>
Abduction, kidnapping, hostage taking	142	3.37	Armed checkpoints	151	3.68
Aerial bombing	128	2.39	Arrest or detention	144	2.67
Ambush	136	3.27	Attacks on civilian population	147	3.84
Armed robbery	157	3.78	Bullying in the workplace	133	2.35
Artillery, rockets, or mortar fire	135	2.82	Demonstrations	158	3.34
Assault	148	3.44	Disgruntled beneficiary population	149	2.90
Homicide	152	2.97	Disgruntled colleagues	147	2.45
Sexual violence	150	2.85	Disgruntled partner organizations	139	2.14
			Illness	160	3.30
			Inexperienced colleagues	154	3.44
			Natural disaster	154	2.99
<b>Medium threat incidents</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>3.48</b>	Presence of anti-personnel land mines	131	2.91
Car jacking	152	3.54	Presence of anti-vehicle landmines	128	2.84
Crime or banditry	159	3.87	Unexploded ordinance/improvised explosive devices	137	3.09
Theft or break-in at office	154	2.86	Riots or mobs	159	3.61
Theft or break-in at residence	164	3.66	Threat of abduction	145	3.43
			Traveling in marked vehicles	145	2.66
			Traveling in unmarked vehicles	145	2.74
			Unarmed checkpoints	138	2.33
			Vehicle accident	157	4.15
			Visible presence and/or use of small arms or light weapons	152	3.32
			Walking alone	156	3.19
			Walking in groups	153	2.44
			Work stress	161	3.21

1. The security perceptions scales range from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating that respondent feels the least unsafe and 7 indicating that the respondent feels the most unsafe.

Table 3.5: Average Scores for Security Perceptions Scales by Respondent Characteristics<sup>1</sup>

	N	High-threat	N	Mid-threat	N	Low-threat
Security training – yes	78	3.37*	85	3.47	79	3.14*
Security training – no	64	2.84	68	3.46	67	2.77
In country three months or less	22	2.92	22	3.25	22	2.67
In country more than three months	102	3.14	111	3.51	105	2.96
International staff	114	3.25 <sup>+</sup>	118	3.57	115	3.08*
National staff	29	2.68	36	3.18	32	2.57
Posted in large urban area	95	2.96*	103	3.37	98	2.84 <sup>+</sup>
Posted outside of large urban area	48	3.48	51	3.70	49	3.22
Posted in country ranked high or very high danger on ASI scale	125	3.26**	132	3.63**	128	3.10***
Posted in country ranked low or medium danger on ASI scale	18	2.25	22	2.61	19	2.06
Male	85	3.07	91	3.45	87	2.98
Female	58	3.23	63	3.52	60	2.95
Age thirty-five or older	81	3.01	89	3.47	84	3.02
Younger than thirty-five	61	3.30	64	3.46	62	2.91
Worked in humanitarian sector more than 3 years	104	3.14	112	3.38	108	2.99
Worked in humanitarian sector 3 years or less	37	3.06	39	3.69	36	2.87
Field-based staff	78	3.28	83	3.47	81	3.03
Not field-based staff	64	2.97	70	3.48	65	2.89
Works for an IGO	19	3.14	20	3.55	19	3.05
Works in non-governmental sector	122	3.12	132	3.47	126	2.96
Works for a large INGO	99	3.11	109	3.44	102	2.94
Works for small INGO, NGO, or IGO	42	3.16	43	3.61	43	3.05
Works for relief organization <sup>2</sup>	99	3.16 (3.08)	104	3.34 (3.77)	101	2.91 (3.09)
Works for development organization <sup>2</sup>	90	3.02 (3.33)	98	3.46 (3.51)	92	2.96 (2.98)
Works for peace building organization <sup>2</sup>	22	3.17 (3.13)	23	3.49 (3.48)	23	3.02 (2.96)
Works for human rights organization <sup>2</sup>	22	3.35 (3.09)	26	3.91 (3.39)	26	3.23 (2.91)
Works for multi-issue organization <sup>2</sup>	84	2.91* (3.51)	89	3.26* (3.79)	86	2.81* (3.19)
High threat incidents-yes	47	3.69***	49	3.90*	47	3.45***
High threat incidents-no	96	2.86	105	3.28	100	2.74
Medium threat incidents-yes	59	3.75***	62	4.12***	58	3.37***
Medium threat incidents-no	84	2.70	92	3.05	89	2.71
Low threat incidents-yes	106	3.27 <sup>+</sup>	112	3.62 <sup>+</sup>	106	3.04
Low threat incidents-no	37	2.75	42	3.11	41	2.78

1. Because formal hypotheses were not established prior to analyses, significance levels are based on two-sided tests. Two-sided tests are more stringent than one-sided tests because the probability in favor of the null hypotheses can fall within an area under the density curve that is 2X greater than that for a one-sided test. Significance levels: +  $p \leq .07$ ; \*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ .

2. The figure in parentheses denotes anyone working outside the sector. For example, the figure in parentheses for "works for human rights organization" is for all personnel who do not work this type of organization.

Table 3.6: Average Security Perceptions Score at Various Locations by Respondent Characteristics<sup>1, 2</sup>

	N	Home	N	Office	N	At field sites	N	Traveling
<b>ALL RESPONDENTS</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>2.55</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>2.46*</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>3.66</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>3.65*</b>
Security training – yes	89	2.74 <sup>+</sup>	89	2.67	88	3.69	83	3.92
Security training – no	87	2.37	87	2.24	80	3.62	78	3.37
In country three months or less	22	2.89	22	2.39	22	3.36	21	3.71
In country more than three months	132	2.45	131	2.43	125	3.66	120	3.55
International staff	131	2.76***	132	2.61**	129	3.67	122	3.79*
National staff	46	1.96	45	2.00	40	3.62	40	3.21
Posted in large urban area	120	2.36**	119	2.36	113	2.59	109	3.56
Posted outside of large urban area	57	2.96	58	2.65	56	3.80	53	3.84
Posted in country ranked high or very high danger on ASI scale	141	2.67**	152	2.60***	146	3.68	139	3.75*
Posted in country ranked low/medium danger on ASI scale	26	1.88	25	1.56	23	3.52	23	3.09
Male	106	2.69	106	2.64***	99	3.94**	96	3.87**
Female	70	2.34	70	2.19	69	3.26	65	3.33
Age thirty-five or older	106	2.58	106	2.49	101	3.59	98	3.62
Younger than thirty-five	70	2.50	70	2.40	67	3.78	63	3.72
Worked in humanitarian sector more than 3 years	125	2.57	124	2.55	121	3.70	115	3.59
Worked in humanitarian sector 3 years or less	47	2.57	48	2.17	45	3.44	44	3.72
Field-based staff	94	2.74*	94	2.67*	93	3.63	88	3.73
Not field-based staff	82	2.33	82	2.21	75	3.68	73	3.55
Works for an IGO	22	3.14*	22	2.73	20	3.65	18	3.69
Works in non-governmental sector	152	2.48	153	2.44	147	3.67	142	3.66
Works for a large INGO	124	2.52	125	2.49	122	3.61	119	3.65
Works for small INGO, NGO, or IGO	50	2.68	50	2.42	45	3.84	41	3.69
Works for relief organization <sup>3</sup>	114	2.73* (2.24)	115	2.57 (2.24)	109	3.75 (3.50)	105	3.74 (3.50)
Works for development organization <sup>3</sup>	114	2.46 (2.73)	115	2.35 (2.66)	110	3.70 (3.59)	105	3.60 (3.75)

Works for peace building organization <sup>3</sup>	24	2.83 (2.51)	24	2.37 (2.47)	23	3.96 (3.62)	20	3.77 (3.64)
Works for human rights organization <sup>3</sup>	25	3.08* (2.47)	25	2.84 (2.39)	24	4.04 (3.60)	21	3.83 (3.63)
Works for multi-issue organization <sup>3</sup>	101	2.65 (2.43)	102	2.40 (2.55)	97	3.83* (3.31)	92	3.62 (3.66)
High threat incidents-yes	55	3.20***	55	3.11***	54	4.20**	49	4.26***
High threat incidents-no	122	2.26	122	2.16	115	3.41	113	3.39
Medium threat incidents-yes	67	3.07***	67	2.92***	66	4.06**	61	4.05**
Medium threat incidents-no	110	2.24	110	2.17	103	3.41	101	3.42
Low threat incidents-yes	128	2.62	128	2.58*	124	3.76	118	3.70
Low threat incidents-no	49	2.37	49	2.14	45	3.40	44	3.52

1. The security perceptions scales range from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating that respondent feels the least unsafe and 7 indicating that the respondent feels the most unsafe.

2. Because formal hypotheses were not established prior to analyses, significance levels are based on two-sided tests. Two-sided tests are more stringent than one-sided tests because the probability in favor of the null hypotheses can fall within an area under the density curve that is 2X greater than that for a one-sided test. Significance levels: + p <= .07; \* p <= .05; \*\* p <= .01; \*\*\* p <= .001.

3. The figure in parentheses denotes anyone working outside the sector. For example, the figure in parentheses for "works for human rights organization" is for all personnel who do not work this type of organization.

Table 3.7: Odds Ratios for Security Perceptions Scales<sup>1, 2</sup>

	Model 1: Perceptions of high-threat incidents (N=120) <sup>3</sup>	Model 2: Perceptions of medium-threat incidents (N=129)	Model 3: Perceptions of low- threat incidents (N=123)
Had security training	1.09	.74	.99
In country three months or less	.38	.75	.42
International staff	2.10	2.61 <sup>+</sup>	1.44
Posted in large urban context	.39	.82	.83
Posted in ASI very high danger country	1.71	1.10	.88
Male	.58	.81	.89
Thirty-five or older	1.06	1.51	2.56 <sup>*</sup>
Works for an IGO	.67	.69	.64
Human rights	.51	1.53	1.71
Field-based staff	.17	.26 <sup>**</sup>	.59
Experienced high- or medium-threat incidents	6.43 <sup>***</sup>	4.44 <sup>**</sup>	8.4 <sup>***</sup>
Nagelkerke R2	.35	.22	.30
Cases classified correctly	75%	67%	71%

1. The results are based on logistic regression analysis. For each perceptions category, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the respondent rating (based on average of all items in scale) fell above the average for all respondents and equal to 0 if the respondent rating fell at or below the average of all respondents. Respondents scoring 1 are those that feel the most unsafe.

2. Because formal hypotheses were not established prior to analyses, significance levels are based on two-sided tests. Two-sided tests are more stringent than one-sided tests because the probability in favor of the null hypotheses can fall within an area under the density curve that is 2X greater than that for a one-sided test. Significance levels: <sup>+</sup> p <= .07; <sup>\*</sup> p <= .05; <sup>\*\*</sup> p <= .01; <sup>\*\*\*</sup> p <= .001.

3. Because of missing data on the items included in the perceptions scales, the total number of observations included in the analysis varies across models.

Table 3.8: Odds Ratios for Security Perceptions Scores at Various Locations<sup>1, 2</sup>

	Model 1: Security perceptions at home (N=150) <sup>3</sup>	Model 2: Security perceptions at office (N=150)	Model 3: Security perceptions at field sites (N=143)	Model 4: Security perceptions traveling (N=137)
Had security training	.856	1.61	.359**	1.32
In country three months or less	1.22	.574	.516	.999
International staff	1.99	1.92	.782	1.17
Posted in large urban context	1.42	1.27	.556	1.03
Posted in ASI very high danger country	1.14	1.52	1.34	1.56
Male	1.85	1.78	2.15 <sup>+</sup>	1.45
Thirty-five or older	1.21	2.12	1.33	1.06
Works for an IGO	1.77	.893	.826	.927
Human rights	1.04	1.61	1.84	1.48
Field-based staff	1.89	1.70	.529	1.33
Experienced high- or medium- threat incidents	4.25***	3.17**	3.58**	3.30**
Nagelkerke R2	.26	.26	.22	.18
Cases classified correctly	73%	71%	69%	69%

1. The results are based on logistic regression analysis. For each perceptions category, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the respondent rating (based on average of all items in scale) fell above the average for all respondents and equal to 0 if the respondent rating fell at or below the average of all respondents. Respondents scoring 1 are those that feel the most unsafe.

2. Because formal hypotheses were not established prior to analyses, significance levels are based on two-sided tests. Two-sided tests are more stringent than one-sided tests because the probability in favor of the null hypotheses can fall within an area under the density curve that is 2X greater than that for a one-sided test. Significance levels: <sup>+</sup> p <= .07; \* p <= .05; \*\* p <= .01; \*\*\* p <= .001.

3. Because of missing data on the items included in the perceptions scales, the total number of observations included in the analysis varies across models.

Table 3.9: Scores for Security Measures Perceptions Scale<sup>1</sup>

	N	Average score
<b>DETERRENCE MEASURES</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>2.98</b>
Armed escort	114	2.46
Armed guards at residence or office	122	3.16
International military or peacekeeping force	116	3.49
<b>PROTECTIVE MEASURES</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>4.61</b>
Blast plates and/or armored vehicles	95	3.00
Communication/information sharing about security	161	5.52
Compound protective measures	142	4.71
Curfews	124	3.78
First aid training	142	4.74
Ready access to communications equipment	158	5.73
Restricted movement	125	4.23
Security alarms	127	4.09
Security training	143	5.41
Seatbelts	163	5.40
Travel in marked vehicles	141	4.06
Travel in unmarked vehicles	133	3.91
Walking or traveling in groups	148	4.4
Unarmed guards at residence or office	143	4.17
<b>ACCEPTANCE MEASURES</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>5.68</b>
Culturally appropriate dress and behavior	150	5.51
Ethnic and/or religious diversity in local staff	150	4.65
Having good relationships with local officials	157	5.80
Having good relationships with local partners	151	5.93

1. Scores for perceptions of security measures range from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the lowest security perception and 7 indicating the highest (i.e. measure makes respondent feel very safe).



Table 3.10: Average Scores for Security Measures Perceptions Scale by Respondent Characteristics<sup>1, 2</sup>

	N	Deterrence	N	Protection	N	Acceptance
Security training – no	51	2.77	57	4.47	72	5.61
Security training – yes	67	3.09	76	4.72	81	5.75
In country three months or less	18	2.60	18	4.59	21	5.38
In country more than three months	83	3.06	97	4.61	112	5.73
International staff	97	2.92	110	4.65	122	5.68
National staff	22	3.25	24	4.44	32	5.69
Posted in large urban area	75	2.92	88	4.51	101	5.66
Posted outside of large urban area	44	3.08	46	4.81	53	5.73
Posted in country ranked high or very high danger on ASI scale	111	2.94	125	4.63	140	5.64
Posted in country ranked low/medium danger on ASI scale	8	3.48	4.41	9	14	6.16
Male	76	2.98	84	4.59	92	5.59
Female	42	2.92	49	4.65	61	5.81
Age thirty-five or older	66	3.02	78	4.62	89	5.92
Younger than thirty-five	52	2.92	55	4.59	64	5.51
Worked in humanitarian sector more than 3 years	87	2.79 <sup>+</sup>	99	4.46 <sup>***</sup>	108	5.65
Worked in humanitarian sector 3 years or less	29	3.36	33	5.10	42	5.83
Field-based staff	68	2.99	78	4.71	88	5.64
Not field-based staff	50	2.99	55	4.45	65	5.73
Works for an IGO	18	3.15	20	4.73	21	5.84
Works in non-governmental sector	99	2.97	112	4.59	131	5.65
Works for a large INGO	82	3.05	93	4.61	109	5.66
Works for small INGO, NGO, or IGO	35	2.89	39	4.63	43	5.74
Works for relief organization <sup>3</sup>	81	2.87 (3.21)	92	4.59 (4.66)	102	5.58 (5.88)
Works for development organization <sup>3</sup>	73	3.10 (2.79)	85	4.59 (4.65)	97	5.59 (5.85)
Works for peace building organization <sup>3</sup>	18	2.79 (3.01)	20	4.31 (4.67)	22	5.53 (5.71)
Works for human rights organization <sup>3</sup>	20	3.12 (2.95)	21	4.88 (4.56)	25	5.48 (5.72)
Works for multi-issue organization <sup>3</sup>	66	2.96 (3.11)	75	4.58 (4.69)	87	5.55 (5.88)
Experienced any high-threat incident	41	3.15	45	4.89 <sup>**</sup>	52	5.76
Experienced any medium-threat incident	55	2.99	60	4.65	63	5.59
Experienced any low-threat incident	86	3.02	99	4.66	113	5.67
High rating of high-threat incidents	55	2.89	57	4.85	59	5.67
High rating of medium-threat incidents	69	3.13	71	4.68	75	5.58
High rating of low-threat incidents	63	3.13	69	4.79	72	5.67

1. Scores for perceptions of security measures range from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the lowest security perception and 7 indicating the highest (i.e. measure makes respondent feel very safe).

2. Because formal hypotheses were not established prior to analyses, significance levels are based on two-sided tests. Two-sided tests are more stringent than one-sided tests because the probability in favor of the null hypotheses

can fall within an area under the density curve that is 2X greater than that for a one-sided test. Significance levels: + p <= .07; \* p <= .05; \*\* p <= .01; \*\*\* p <= .001.

3. The figure in parentheses denotes anyone working outside the sector. For example, the figure in parentheses for "works for human rights organization" is for all personnel who do not work this type of organization.

Table 3.11: Odds Ratios for Security Measures Perceptions Scale<sup>1, 2</sup>

	Model 1: Deterrence (N=97) <sup>3</sup>	Model 2: Protection (N=111)	Model 3: Acceptance (N=129)
Had security training	1.29	2.08	1.26
In country three months or less	.421	.818	.408
International staff	.841	1.49	.947
Posted in large urban context	1.14	.469	.780
Posted in ASI very high danger country	1.09	1.02	2.46 <sup>+</sup>
Male	1.23	.323 <sup>*</sup>	.705
Thirty-five or older	.732	.809	1.63
Works for an IGO	1.01	.937	.740
Human rights	2.01	4.15 <sup>*</sup>	1.00
Field-based staff	.766	.889	.539
Experienced high- or medium-threat incidents	1.04	1.16	.850
Nagelkerke R2	.07	.22	.11
Cases classified correctly	58%	68%	66%

1. The results are based on logistic regression analysis. For each security measures category, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the respondent rating (based on average of all items in scale) fell above the average for all respondents and equal to 0 if the respondent rating fell at or below the average of all respondents. Respondents scoring 1 are those that view the security measures most favorably.

2. Because formal hypotheses were not established prior to analyses, significance levels are based on two-sided tests. Two-sided tests are more stringent than one-sided tests because the probability in favor of the null hypotheses can fall within an area under the density curve that is 2X greater than that for a one-sided test. Significance levels: + p <= .07; \* p <= .05; \*\* p <= .01; \*\*\* p <= .001.

3. Because of missing data on the items included in the perceptions scales, the total number of observations included in the analysis varies across models.

## Appendix 4 – Security Perceptions Survey

You are invited to participate in a study that explores how relief and development actors perceive threats to their physical safety and security, and what measures they perceive to be effective in mitigating these threats. You were selected to participate as an individual involved in relief and/or development work, broadly speaking. The results from this study will be used to better understand threat perception and to assess the effectiveness of various security measures in addressing these threats.

All that is required of you is to complete the "Security Perceptions Survey," which should take approximately 15-20 minutes of your time. Your responses will be kept confidential, and you will not be identified as a participant in this study. Only the researchers will see the individual survey data. The research results will be shared with the aid community in the form of written documents and/or oral presentations.

You may withdraw from this study at any time, for any reason, with no risk to your relationship to the researcher or to the University of Notre Dame. Your participation is voluntary and there is no penalty for not participating or withdrawing. There is no cost or compensation connected with this study. You must be over 18 to participate.

You will be asked to provide information about where you work and what kind of work you do, security training experiences, and demographics about yourself. You will also be asked to review a list of security threats and to indicate their occurrence and perceived threat levels. You will then be asked about security measures, and the survey concludes with open-ended questions providing the opportunity for you to elaborate on your security experiences.

### Instructions:

- \* Please complete the questionnaire as completely and accurately as possible.
- \* Complete the survey keeping in mind one "country of reference" (i.e., your current or previous country posting).
- \* For questions or comments, contact Larissa Fast at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, USA 46556 (phone: +1.574.631.7096; fax: +1.574.631.6973 or e-mail: lfast "at" nd.edu).

### I. PLACEMENT INFORMATION

#### 1. What is the "country of reference" for this survey?

Country: \_\_\_\_\_

If your country of reference is not on this list, please write it in: \_\_\_\_\_

#### 2. With regard to the country of reference, which of the following best describes your situation?

I am currently living in this country.

I have lived in this country, but am currently based elsewhere.

I live elsewhere and make periodic visits to this country.

I live elsewhere and made periodic visits to this country.

#### 3a. How long have you lived in this country?

For this assignment? \_\_\_\_\_

In total? \_\_\_\_\_

#### 3b. How long did you live in the country of reference?

For your most recent assignment? \_\_\_\_\_

In total? \_\_\_\_\_

Country of current posting: \_\_\_\_\_

**3c. If you do not live in the country of reference,**

How often do you make visits? \_\_\_\_\_

How long is a typical visit? \_\_\_\_\_

Country of current posting: \_\_\_\_\_

**3d. If you do not live in the country of reference,**

When did you make visits? \_\_\_\_\_

How often did you make visits? \_\_\_\_\_

How long was a typical visit? \_\_\_\_\_

Country of current posting: \_\_\_\_\_

**4. Location of posting in country of reference:**

Large urban area (100,000+ people)

Smaller urban area (<100,000 people)

Rural area

**5. What kind of agency or organization do you work for?**

UN agency

Other intergovernmental agency

Large international NGO (50+ total employees)

Small international NGO (<50 total employees)

Large national NGO (50+ total employees)

Small national NGO (<50 total employees)

**6. What is the main focus of your organization/agency's work? Mark all that apply.**

Relief

Development

Peacebuilding

Human rights

Other \_\_\_\_\_

**7. Which best describes the type of position you have?**

Field-based staffperson

Headquarters-based staffperson

Consultant

Other \_\_\_\_\_

**8. Title or position within your organization/agency: \_\_\_\_\_**

**9. How long have you worked...?**

In this position in this location?

Less than 6 months

For this organization/agency?

6-12 months

In the humanitarian and/or development

1-3 years

sector?

4-5 years

5+ years

**II. SECURITY TRAINING**

**11. What do you think has been your most physically insecure posting?**

Country: \_\_\_\_\_

If the country is not on this list, please write it in: \_\_\_\_\_

**11b. Calendar year(s) of most physically insecure posting:**

From month \_\_\_\_\_ Year \_\_\_\_\_

To month \_\_\_\_\_ Year \_\_\_\_\_

**12. Have you participated in a personal security training?**

Yes

No

**13a. How long was the training?**

Less than one day

One day

Two or more days

**13b. When did the training take place? Mark all that apply.**

Less than 6 months ago

6-12 months ago

More than a year ago

In a previous posting

**III. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION**

**14. Nationality:**

Country: \_\_\_\_\_

If your nationality is not on this list, please write it in: \_\_\_\_\_

**15. Sex:**

Male

Female

**16. Age:**

Less than 25

25-34

35-44

45-54

55 or older

**17. Marital status:**

Single/divorced/widowed, without dependents

Single/divorced/widowed, with dependents

Married or with partner, without dependents

Married or with partner, with dependents

**IV. SECURITY THREATS AND INCIDENTS**

18. How recently have you and/or one of your colleagues experienced the following incidents (check (✓) all that apply):

	<b>In the last month</b>		<b>In the last 3 mos.</b>		<b>In the last 6 mos.</b>		<b>On field visit</b>
	Self	Colleague	Self	Colleague	Self	Colleague	
Abduction, kidnapping or hostage-taking							
Aerial bombing							
Ambush							
Arrest or detention							
Armed robbery							
Artillery, rockets or mortar fire							
Assault							
Attacks on civilian population							
Car-jacking							
Armed/unarmed individuals at checkpoint							
Crime or banditry							
Disgruntled colleagues or staff							
Disgruntled partner organizations							
Disgruntled beneficiary populations							
Explosion: Anti-personnel landmine (APM)							
Explosion: Anti-vehicle landmine (AVM)							
Explosion: Unexploded ordnance							
Explosion: Improvised explosive device (IED) (e.g., roadside bomb)							
Evacuation							
Homicide/murder							
Riots or mob violence							
Sexual violence or assault							
Theft or looting at office or warehouse							
Theft or break-in at residence							
Vehicle accident							
Use of weapons (e.g., handgun or rocket-propelled grenade) near home or office							
Work stress							

19. In your day-to-day life in the country of reference, to what extent do each of the following make you feel unsafe?

	<b>Not at all</b>							<b>Very much</b>	Not applicable
Abduction, kidnapping or hostage-taking	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Threats of abduction, kidnapping or hostage-taking	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Aerial bombing	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Ambush	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Armed robbery	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Arrest or detention	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Arson	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Artillery, rockets or mortar fire	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Assault	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Attacks on civilian population with whom I work	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Bullying in the workplace	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Car-jacking	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Checkpoints: <u>Unarmed</u> individuals	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Checkpoints: <u>Armed</u> individuals	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Crime or banditry	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Demonstration	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Disgruntled colleagues or staff	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Disgruntled partner organizations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Disgruntled beneficiary populations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Homicide/murder	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Illness	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Inexperienced colleagues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Natural disaster	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Presence of <u>anti-personnel</u> landmines (APMs)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Presence of <u>anti-vehicle</u> landmines (AVMs)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Presence of unexploded ordnance or improvised explosive devices (IEDs)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Riots or mob violence	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Sexual violence or assault	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Theft or looting at office or warehouse compounds	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Theft or break-in at residence	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Travel in marked vehicles	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	

Travel in unmarked vehicles	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A
Vehicle accident	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A
Visible presence and/or use of small arms and light weapons (e.g., handgun or rocket propelled grenade)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A
Walking alone	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A
Walking in pairs or in groups	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A
Work stress	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A

## V. SECURITY AND SAFETY MEASURES

20. In general, how secure do each of the following measures make you feel in the country of reference?

	<b>Not at all</b>							<b>Extremely</b>	Not applicable
Armed escort	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Armed guards at residence or office	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Blast plates and/or armoured vehicles	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Communication/information sharing about security	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Compound protective measures (eg, high walls, lighting)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Culturally appropriate dress and behaviour	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Curfews	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Ethnic and/or religious diversity in local staff	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
First aid training	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Having good relationships with the community in areas in which we work	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Having good relationships with local officials	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Having good relationships with local partners	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Presence of international military or peacekeeping force	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Ready access to communication equipment	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Restricted movement outside "safe" areas	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Security alarms	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Security training	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Seatbelts	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Travel in marked vehicles	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Travel in unmarked vehicles	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Walking or traveling in groups	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	
Unarmed guards at residence or office	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	N/A	



21. To what extent do you feel secure at the following locations?

	<b>Not at all</b>					<b>Very much</b>	
Home	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Office	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Traveling between home and office	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Traveling to field sites	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
At field sites	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

**V. EXAMPLES AND COMMENTS**

22. Describe one event/situation/context in which you felt your physical safety or security was threatened.

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23. Give an example of how this incident affected the way you function in your current placement.

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24. Additional comments or questions:

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**Thank you for your time and participation in this study.**

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