

CARE International





CARE International SAFETY & SECURITY HANDBOOK

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Director, CARE Security Unit

DEDICATION

This handbook is dedicated to those CARE staff who have lost their lives fulfilling CARE's mission.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This handbook is a composite of original work from the author and CARE staff and input from a variety or sources, including WVI "Safety Awareness for Aid Workers," ICRC "Staying Alive," and the UN "Security Awareness Aide-memoire." CARE wishes to thank World Vision International, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the United Nations Security Coordination Office for their kind permission to incorporate information from their publications into this handbook.

In addition, the author would like to thank Virginia Vaughn, Susan Barr, Kevin Ulmer, Jennie Owens, Bennett Pafford, Anne Simon, Mr. Charles Rogers from WVI, Mr. Philippe Dind from ICRC, and Mr. Richard Manlove from the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator for their support, professional counsel, and valued contribution to this publication.

NOTICE

This handbook is designed to assist in improving the safety and security of CARE staff worldwide. Be sure to read it carefully and understand its contents.

Obviously no handbook will provide guidelines for every situation, nor should any single manual be relied upon as the sole source of safety and security information. This handbook provides general precautions and procedures applicable to most situations. Staff members should consult their Country Office's specific safety and security guidelines for their area. The procedures in this handbook are suggestions based on sound practice but each situation is different, and staff members must always use their own training and judgment to determine what course of action is best for them.

Please remember that each staff member has a duty to address issues of safety and security – proactively and flexibly – at all times.

This handbook will be reviewed and updated as necessary. Feedback and suggestions for changes to the handbook should be forwarded to the CARE Security Unit (CSU).

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"In these difficult times when attacks on aid workers are more likely than ever, CARE takes security very seriously indeed. It is possible to be reasonably safe even in a highly insecure environment. But there are some specific prerequisites for that: a healthy awareness of one's own limitations, an openness to listen and learn, and above all a solid common sense. First and foremost, security is a state of mind."

Denis Caillaux

CARE International Secretary General

CARE has increasingly grappled with the reality that the women and men of our organization are more frequently being placed at personal risk due to the nature and character of our work. The first edition of the "CARE International Safety and Security Handbook" was written in 2000 on the premise that the rules for safety and security had changed. As such the necessary measures humanitarian organizations take to ensure the safety of their staff had changed. No longer could we rely on the perception of "good people doing good work" as our only protection.

Since September 11, 2001, the vulnerability of and danger to the women and men involved in humanitarian assistance has continued to increase. We are now confronted with direct threats from dissident organizations, threats involving chemical, biological and radiological agents, collateral violence associated with terrorism, political instability, paramilitary forces, mid-intensity conflict, and banditry.

This edition of the Handbook assembles the best available information regarding how we can work safely in today's humanitarian environment into a single source, which is formatted for use in the field, where it is most needed. The key to an effective safety and security program remains the individual and collective sense of awareness and responsibility. Security is not simply a collection of policies or a list of rules. Each individual is ultimately responsible for her or his own safety and security. As members of CARE International, we are also responsible for each other. It is essential that each individual act in a manner that does not increase risk to CARE staff or other members of the aid community.

This handbook is not the definitive answer to every problem or situation. The hope is that by conscientiously applying these guidelines and procedures CARE staff can minimize risk, and safely and effectively carry out CARE's critical work.

Take care,

Robert S. Marpherson Bob Macpherson

Director, CARE Security Unit (CSU)

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

As a result of growing security risks for humanitarian field staff, CARE International adopted the Policy Statement on Safety and Security in 1999. The statement recognizes that effective safety and security policies and procedures are essential to promoting the safest possible working environment for CARE staff. But safety and security cannot be assured by simply drafting and distributing policies and procedures. Creating a safe working environment requires commitment and action at every level of CARE's organization. Each level, including the individual staff member, has specific roles and responsibilities.

This chapter outlines the level at which certain responsibilities lie and where the staff member should look for guidance or action concerning safety and security issues. Topics include responsibilities of:

Individual Staff Members
Country Office
Regional Management Unit
National Headquarters
CARE Security Unit
CARE International

1.1 INDIVIDUAL CARE STAFF MEMBERS

Situational awareness. Every CARE staff member, national and international, has an obligation to learn and understand the security situation where they are located. International staff members, in particular, have a responsibility to become familiar with the political, social and cultural features of their assigned country. Inappropriate or offensive behavior can put CARE in a difficult position, impair operations, and jeopardize the staff of CARE and of other aid organizations.

Safety and security policies and procedures. Each CARE staff member should adhere to all pertinent policies concerning safety and security, including gender and diversity policies. Lapses in safe conduct can jeopardize the health and welfare of all staff.

1.2 THE COUNTRY OFFICE

Security decisions. Everyone in the operational line of authority has responsibility for implementing CARE International and National Headquarters safety and security policies. However, most security measures are actually implemented by the Country Office and are the responsibility of the Country Director (CD) or Country Representative. The CD may make final decisions in a crisis situation, take disciplinary or dismissive action when security lapses occur, and make other necessary decisions based on his/her assessment of the current situation.

Staff orientation. Upon hire or arrival into a country, all new staff — regardless of position — must be given an updated briefing on threats in the area and the Country Office's safety and security policies and procedures.

Staff meetings. Country Directors should hold regular meetings for management and field staff to provide an opportunity for staff to voice safety and security concerns.

Incident reporting. The Country Office will immediately report all security, safety, and serious health incidents to the appropriate Regional Management Unit (RMU) and the CARE Security Unit (CSU). Original incident reports should be kept at the Country Office with access controlled to ensure confidentiality. Chapter 3: Policies and Procedures details CARE's policy regarding the reporting of security incidents.

Record of Emergency Data. Country Offices should obtain and update annually or as required a Record of Emergency Data (RED) for all staff members. The RED should be kept either in the personnel file or in a separate notebook to facilitate access in the event of an emergency.

Sharing information. Security-related information can be shared with other members of the aid community working in the country or region as appropriate. Caution should be used when choosing communication methods in conflict situations, since transmissions may be monitored. If appropriate, the Country Office can join or form a network for information-sharing with other local organizations and agencies, ensuring that the confidentiality of CARE staff information is protected.

Media Relations. CARE's media objective is to inform the common debate and policy decisions on issues of concern to CARE, and increase public awareness and understanding of issues facing the communities with which CARE works. CARE Country Offices, when in the midst of an emergency or ongoing condition that invites media attention, should have a media officer assigned as a collateral responsibility. The media officer will serve as the primary point of contact between the CARE office and the media. In addition, he or she will support field operations, help gather information with regard to safety and security, and provide media training for CARE staff as necessary.

Emergency evacuation. Country Offices must provide a written policy statement with regard to CARE's policies, procedures, and responsibilities during an emergency evacuation or relocation. These may differ for international and national staff. The Country Office evacuation procedures must be clearly understood by all staff and updated as required. Ordinarily, the final authority for an evacuation rests with the National Headquarters. If time does not permit full coordination or communications are severed, the Country Director has the authority to order and conduct an evacuation or relocation.

1.3 THE REGIONAL MANAGEMENT UNIT (RMU)

Analysis. The RMU will review the effectiveness and value of each Country Office safety and security program and recommend appropriate modifications. It will coordinate with the appropriate staff at all levels on decisions concerning actions during times of crisis or insecurity or in emergency situations.

Orientation. The RMU is responsible for arranging a thorough security briefing prior to an international staff member's assignment. Likewise, they will debrief departing staff. If this is not possible, then the Country Office will ensure the appropriate briefing and training is provided upon arrival.

Incident reports. The RMU will receive, analyze, and coordinate with the CSU all security incident reports forwarded from Country Offices. It will assist the Country Director in developing appropriate changes in security measures.

Information. The RMU will assist the Country Office in preparing upto-date, area-specific, safety and security briefs and profiles for CARE staff. It will ensure that newly assigned staff members are thoroughly briefed on the political and safety situation and health risks at their destination; and departing staff members are debriefed on their experiences, observations and recommendations.

Support. The RMU will provide assets and support as appropriate to ensure effective security-related systems for field staff.

1.4 THE NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Work environment. The National Headquarters will promote a productive work environment with zero tolerance for verbal or physical conduct that harasses, disrupts, or interferes with another person's work. It will prevent creation of an intimidating, offensive or hostile environment, prohibiting discrimination against another person on the basis of his or her race, ethnic group, color, sex, or creed. This includes putting procedures in place to allow an employee to bring job-related safety and security issues to management's attention with the assurance that the matter will be given serious consideration without fear of retribution.

Risk levels. A risk level for every country or area in which CARE operates will be determined by the CSU in consultation with RMUs and Country Offices. The National Headquarters will monitor significant political, social, economic, meteorological and other natural disasters, and military events worldwide, particularly in highrisk countries, that might affect ongoing programs. It will coordinate with the RMU, Country Offices, and CSU during crisis management to determine when, in the interest of staff safety, it may be appropriate to suspend programs and evacuate or relocate staff.

Kidnapping and hostage taking. The National Headquarters is the senior authority during hostage negotiations. The National Headquarters of the detainee, in conjunction with the RMU and Country Director, will lead the coordination with the appropriate authorities, such as local police and others, to facilitate release.

Evacuation. The National Headquarters will coordinate with all concerned members on evacuations and other actions in emergency situations. Unless time or communication problems prevent proper coordination, the National Headquarters has the final decision on whether to evacuate.

Media Relations. Media officers will serve as the primary points of contact between the CARE Country Offices and the media. In addition, they will support field operations and provide media training for CARE staff as necessary.

1.5 CARE SECURITY UNIT (CSU)

Safety and security policies and procedures. The CSU, in collaboration with RMUs, COs and CI, will develop and standardize policies and procedures to ensure a safe and secure environment for CARE staff. The CSU will also provide guidelines detailing minimum security operating standards as well as training and implementation assistance to County Offices to assist in meeting those requirements.

Monitoring and Analysis. The CSU will assist in monitoring CARE's operational environments, coordinate security incident reporting, and provide situational analysis.

Technical Assistance. The CSU will conduct security assessments, provide resident security recommendations, conduct safety and security trainings, and provide other technical assistance as necessary for Regional and Country Offices. Upon request from the RMU or Country Office, CSU staff will review security/contingency plans and suggest amendments and modifications as appropriate.

1.6 CARE INTERNATIONAL (CI)

Analysis. CARE recognizes that a certain degree of risk is acceptable, when justified by the moral and physical imperatives of an intervention. CI will guide appropriate analysis to ensure a balance between risk and anticipated benefits.

Flexibility. CI furnishes National Headquarters and Country Offices with the latitude to shape interventions in a manner that is sensitive to what is prudent and most likely to be safe and effective in the local context.

Human rights. Worldwide, CI is committed to assisting vulnerable populations with their ability to defend their collective and individual rights, to participate in relevant decision-making processes, and to shape their own development.

Leadership. CI provides appropriate support and leadership to its members to ensure the highest possible conditions of security.

Monitoring and evaluation. CI monitors the actions of CARE members, governmental entities, and other non-governmental organizations, assessing the impact of their actions on the safety and security of CARE staff.

THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Safety and security assessment is a process that includes:

- an analysis of threats to CARE staff and property,
- the identification of vulnerability to these threats, and
- development of threat indicators and thresholds to monitor changes in the security environment.

Assessment results are used to establish overall risk levels for the country or area and to make informed decisions about which safety and security measures to adopt.

Safety and security assessment is not a one-time event. It is a continuous process of collecting, analyzing, and using safety and security information. Situations in the field can change, sometimes rapidly and without warning. With each change, the risk to staff may increase or decrease, and security measures should be adjusted accordingly.

This chapter outlines the parts of the assessment process including:

Safety and Security Assessment Procedures Country Office Risk Alert Ratings Country Office Security Strategies

2.1 SAFETY AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES

CARE staff at all levels should continually monitor significant political, social, economic, and military events in the areas where CARE works. But often those best able to conduct assessments in a specific country or region are the staff members working within them. Therefore, the Country Office (CO) has the primary responsibility for conducting the safety and security assessment and developing appropriate measures to reduce vulnerability.

THREAT ANALYSIS

The first step in a safety and security assessment is an analysis of the threats CARE might face. A threat is the possibility that someone or something can injure staff or steal or damage CARE assets. A threat can be any danger in the environment.

Identification of possible threats is similar to the disaster hazard assessment process that asks "what could possibly happen"? It requires a good knowledge of CARE's operating context, which involves the examination of physical, political, economic, cultural, and social factors that could create threats. Not all factors will be relevant for every Country Office. Focus should be placed on those most likely to influence the CO specific security and operational capacity.

Once possible threats have been identified, it is necessary to analyze the type, pattern, trend, and potential impact of each because not all threats are equal.

FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN EXAMINING OPERATING CONTEXT

- Geography Are there regions such as mountain passes that are prone to accidents or ambushes? Are there areas prone to natural disasters such as cyclone, earthquake or flood?
- Climate Are there extreme temperatures or periods of rainfall that could pose health threats? Are there seasons when disease outbreaks are common?
- **Political and economic** Are government policies generally accepted? Are authorities respected? Who over the past 5-10 years has been benefiting and who is losing? How high is unemployment?
- Infrastructure Are roads in good condition? Is the water system contaminated? How are hazardous chemicals transported, stored and disposed?
- Traditions, beliefs, customs and religious dynamics Are there issues that may lead to conflict? What is the expected role of women?
- Social What are the attitudes toward CARE, other agencies and programs, and foreigners? Are there specific ethnic tensions?
- Current security practices Is it common for citizens to carry guns? Are private security companies often employed?
- During emergency response, knowledge of the nature of the disaster, conflict or complex crisis is also important. This may, however, require a separate conflict analysis.

There are generally three main types of threats:

Crime - performed through malicious, financial or personal motivation. How are crimes committed? Are criminals armed?

Direct threats - where CARE staff or property are the intended target. The reasons for targeting may be political, economic, or military, but it is important to identify who might wish to cause harm.

Possibilities may include dissatisfied workers, fired staff, bandits, terrorists, national and/or dissident soldiers, or guerrillas. It is also important to identify why CARE might be targeted. Reasons may be robbery, retaliation, political association, riots, or ransom.

Indirect threats - where CARE is not the intended target, but is unintentionally affected. Situations may include fire, disease, a natural disaster, landmines, rebel fighting, or indiscriminate shelling.

An analysis of threat patterns and trends includes an examination of the location, frequency and intensity of each identified threat. Is the threat limited to a certain part of a city or region? Is the threat always present or does it appear only during certain seasons? Is it occurring more often? Is it increasing in intensity, such as longer power outages or more severe disease outbreaks? Are there contributing factors? For example, organized crime or the threats of violence against women may increase during periods of high unemployment and few opportunities for economic migration. Tools such as checklists, interviews or incident report forms can help answer these questions accurately. Sharing security information between NGOs or acquiring security information from national staff, security consortia, or contacts at embassies also can provide reliable answers.

The next step of threat analysis involves determining the impact of each threat on staff and programming. If this threat occurred, would it be a minor inconvenience or a life-threatening situation? Would it result in a delay in project activities, of a closure of the CARE office? Scenario development is recommended as a useful tool at this point.

Once pattern, trend and impact are known for each threat, it is possible to determine threat levels for them, e.g. low, moderate, high or severe. These levels should be modified by adding any other factors appropriate to the specific situation.

The output of a threat analysis is a list of possible threats with corresponding levels as well as a narrative discussion of the specific factors considered in determining each level.

VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

Generally, everyone in a given area faces the same threats, and CARE has little control over them, but not everyone has the same vulnerability to those threats. Vulnerability can be defined as the likelihood of encountering threatening incidents and having them result in harm to staff or loss of property. As vulnerability is influenced by the level of exposure to a given threat, and the extent to which one can withstand that threat, it can be controlled by CARE and its staff. For example, a carefully shaped security profile and other measures may reduce CARE's vulnerability to theft even if the threat level in the area is considered high. Therefore,

vulnerability = (threat X exposure) security measures

Issues to consider when analyzing vulnerabilities are:

Why are staff and assets vulnerable?

- Are appropriate fire, medical and transportation policies, procedures and guidelines in place? Are staff aware of them?
 Do they understand and follow them?
- Is CARE perceived as "wealthy" and an "easy" target?
- Are specific programming activities creating tensions between those who benefit and those who do not? Do they impact existing power relations?
- Can health services adequately treat vehicle accident victims?

Who or what are most vulnerable?

- Are women more exposed to threats than men?
- Is any particular nationality or ethnicity more likely to encounter threats?

- Are the staff performing certain tasks (such as logistics) or holding certain positions (such as finance) at greater risk?
- Are assets attractive to looters due to their high value?
- Are warehouses more vulnerable than offices?

Where are staff and assets more vulnerable?

- Are certain stretches of roadways more dangerous than others?
- Are staff in remote sites more vulnerable than their urban counterparts?
- Are there restaurants or bars that are known for poor sanitation, violence, or criminal activity?

When are staff and assets most vulnerable?

- When traveling in a car?
- While working at night in the office?
- When transporting or distributing payrolls or relief supplies?
- Immediately after pay day?
- During periods of civil strife?

The same tools used to analyze threats can be used to analyze vulnerabilities. The checklists in Appendix A can also be used to identify common vulnerabilities in any worksite or residence.

Combining threat and vulnerability analyses helps to identify the most likely types of threats staff will face. This is needed to identify security measures to protect staff from specific threats and to avoid adopting unnecessary security measures that have significant costs.

INDICATORS

Certain events may indicate changes in the safety or security environment, which could then suggest possible modifications in safety and security measures. These events or 'indicators' may vary from area to area and are identified during the assessment process. Indicators should be developed to monitor disease epidemic outbreaks, crime, political instability, anti-NGO sentiment and other threats of concern to the Country Office. All staff should be made aware of the indicators. Then, observation during the daily routine is usually sufficient to detect any changes.

SECURITY THRESHOLDS

To complete the security assessment all Country Offices should identify security thresholds for their area(s). A security threshold is a readily identifiable "trigger" event that, when it occurs, automatically brings about changes in the CO's security measures. It is usually closely linked to threat indicators. For example, belligerents threatening the only airport in an area of instability may prompt the early evacuation of non-essential personnel and family members before air service is suspended. These thresholds must be defined for each area, since what is threatening for one region might not be as serious for another.

In the event of a crisis, making an objective decision about increasing security levels and when to evacuate can be difficult. With predetermined indicators and security thresholds, a Country Office can act quickly and appropriately before staff safety is threatened.

CONTINUAL ASSESSMENT

Threats and vulnerabilities can change frequently. Therefore, continuous analysis of the environment is critical. It is recommended to have the same staff member monitoring this process to note changes and

trends in threats and vulnerabilities. Two methods, when used together, facilitate an ongoing safety and security assessments:

- Periodically review the questions detailed in the sections on Threat and Vulnerability Analysis of this chapter.
- Record security incidents affecting CARE staff or involving another organization and identify patterns and trends to determine possible changes in vulnerabilities. An incident viewed in isolation may indicate little, but when grouped with others may indicate a significant trend. This can aid in accurately predicting how threats and vulnerabilities might change, or determining appropriate modifications in the Country Office's safety and security procedures.

2.2 COUNTRY OFFICE RISK ALERT RATINGS

The completed assessment allows the Country Office, in coordination with the CSU, RMU and National Headquarters, to determine the level of risk present in a given area or country. Risk ratings are based on the presence of threats, the likelihood and speed of changes in threats, the vulnerability of the staff to a specific threat, and the effectiveness of any safety and security measures already in place. For example, there may be a significant threat of disease from contaminated water in a given area, but if the staff drinks and cooks only with bottled or filtered water, the risk of disease would be considered low. There are four levels of risk: Low, Moderate, High, and Severe.

Based on communications with the CO, RMU, and National Headquarters, the CSU will review the risk rating of each country on a regular basis and revise it as necessary. Individual regions within a country may be assigned different risk ratings.

LOW RISK- NORMAL OPERATIONS

These are countries, regions, or cities that are essentially stable and free of political, economic, and social unrest. The crime is generally low and organized anti-government or terrorist groups, if present, exhibit limited operational capabilities. It is important to remember those countries with low crime and stable social systems may still have threats from natural disasters, such as volcanoes or floods.

 Normal safety and security measures are required in low-risk countries.

MODERATE RISK

These are countries or regions where low-level political, economic, and social unrest is present and/or where safety and security infrastructure (police or medical care for example) is poorly developed. Organized anti-government or terrorist groups may be active but not strong enough to threaten government stability. The country may be involved in a regional dispute, exhibit high crime rates, or prone to natural disasters or disease epidemics.

 Increased safety and security measures are required in moderate-risk countries.

HIGH RISK

These are those countries or regions where organized anti-government or terrorist groups are very active and pose a serious threat to the country's political or economic stability. A civil war may be in progress and paramilitary or guerrilla forces may be in control of a significant area. Such a country might also be near or in the process of a military coup, be involved in violent regional disputes with its neighbors, or exhibit a

breakdown in social infrastructure, especially police and judiciary. There may be prejudicial treatment of foreigners, or threats or harassment of NGOs or CARE specifically. High risk levels are generally associated with civil unrest and crime, but may also reflect increased threats from disease epidemics or natural disasters.

- Stringent safety and security measures, such as restricted movement or curfews, are required in high-risk countries.
- Non-essential staff and dependents may be evacuated or relocated.

SEVERE RISK

These are countries or regions where the level of violence presents a direct threat to the safety and well-being of humanitarian aid workers. Operations are usually not possible without military support and security cannot be reasonably assured. There may be temporary suspension of operations, evacuation of international staff, and/or additional precautions for national staff.

Country Offices consistently rated as High or Severe Risk countries will be single postings, with no dependents in-country.

2.3 COUNTRY OFFICE SECURITY STRATEGIES

A Country office working in an area where the greatest threats are from crime, instability, civil strife or conflict must have a clear and comprehensive strategy that addresses the risk to staff. A security strategy is based on the perceptions of community members where CARE works and CARE's mission, vision and core values. In many areas it may be possible to rely on the goodwill of the local population for safety (Acceptance strategy). In other circumstances, staff may require armed guards (Protection strategy) or even military units (Deterrent strategy) to

provide a safe working environment.

The choice of a security strategy depends on the range of safety and security measures available. Country Offices should continually monitor their working environment and their perceived position in it. Keeping a low profile or assuming protection based on "doing good work" is not a security strategy. A strategy must be well thought out, carefully crafted and assiduously maintained in order to be effective. Generally, there are three types:

Acceptance. Most aid organizations prefer an Acceptance strategy. It involves reducing or removing the threat by gaining widespread understanding and acceptance for CARE's presence and work. The way projects are designed and carried out, and how CARE reacts to events, must be transparent and consistent with the guiding principles it has been communicating. If the community or government clearly understands and supports CARE's purpose, they can become part of the security network, providing warning of possible changes in the security environment or mitigating their effects.

Protection. A Protection strategy usually involves implementing increased security measures, such as strengthening locks and barring windows, setting curfew or hiring guards for warehouses and offices. These efforts reduce the risk (but not the threat) by making staff and assets less vulnerable. Adopting a protection strategy almost always will require additional budgetary resources. The Country Office should ensure that the staff receives training on equipment and procedures. It also will need to be more attentive to stress management, since this strategy may impose restrictions on normal activities and freedom of movement.

Deterrence. Deterrence involves reducing the risk from instability or crime by containing and deterring the threat with a counter-threat. These may consist of supporting military actions, legal, economic or political sanctions or withdrawing agency support and staff. Single NGOs, including CARE, rarely possess a deterrence capability. However, during modern conflict, other organizations, such as the military (host nation, NATO or the U.S.) or UN troops may deploy

their forces to support humanitarian aid and relief efforts. When considering deterrence as a primary strategy, the Country Office must have a clear understanding of the perception surrounding humanitarian actions conducted in conjunction with armed force. Staff should receive clear guidance on CARE International's policy on appropriate relations with military units and the appropriate use of armed protection. Under no circumstances will CARE employees carry weapons or have weapons or ammunition while on assignment with CARE. Violation of this policy will result in immediate discharge.

CHOOSING A SECURITY STRATEGY

Many organizations have an institutional preference for one strategy or the other, but these strategies are not mutually exclusive. In practice, CARE may employ a mix of strategies or emphasize one more than another in different operational areas of a country. The attempt to gain acceptance and consent may be combined with protective measures where crime and banditry remain a real threat that the authorities and the population themselves do not have the ability to control. Use of deterrence, usually in a military context, may facilitate delivery of aid in conflict settings, and protective measures for CARE assets may still be required.

After conducting a thorough safety and security assessment, and in coordination with the CSU, RMU and National Headquarters, the Country Office should choose the most appropriate strategy or mix of strategies and be prepared to alter the choice as the situation dictates.

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

When specific threats and vulnerabilities are known, safety and security policies and procedures can be implemented and adjusted to ensure offices and projects operate with the lowest possible risk to staff and equipment. These policies and procedures reduce risk by reducing the exposure to, and the potential impact of, threats. Each CARE Country Office should develop its own context-specific safety and security policies and procedures and provide staff training and equipment to ensure effective implementation. Along with data from the assessment process, these policies and procedures comprise the Country Office Safety and Security Plan.

Experience has shown that, no matter what security strategy is adopted, certain fundamental safety and security policies and procedures are appropriate in all locales and in all activities of the organization. This chapter provides the standard policies and procedures that should be included in all Safety and Security Plans. It includes information on:

Personal Conduct
Building and Site Management
Vehicle Operations
Medical Procedures
Personnel Issues
Visitor Security
Incident Reporting
Information Security
Communications
Cash Handling and Transfer
Evacuation

3.1 PERSONAL CONDUCT

CARE staff must not engage in conduct that interferes with operations, discredits CARE or is offensive to co-workers, donors, beneficiaries, vendors or visitors. CARE staff must avoid conduct that may lead to their becoming a victim of a security incident. Personnel should avoid lack of sleep, poor stress management and drug or alcohol abuse since they can impair judgment and the ability to react appropriately in a potential safety or security incident.

LEADERSHIP

Leadership, cohesion, and preparation can provide greater security than locks or reinforced fencing. Everyone should monitor their safety and security situation and should not hesitate to "take the lead" when a discrepancy is noted. CARE staff in supervisory positions should encourage conscientious implementation of all Country Office safety and security policies and procedures. A staff member should be designated to be responsible for evaluating the safety and security situation and ensuring staff training and enforcement of security policies and standards.

ALCOHOL

The unauthorized use, possession, sale or distribution of alcohol while on CARE property is prohibited. Being under the influence of alcohol while working for CARE is also prohibited. Additional restrictions may be imposed when working in certain areas.

SUBSTANCE ABUSE

The use, presence, sale, distribution, manufacture or possession of illegal drugs or controlled substances while on CARE property (including in a CARE vehicle), or on CARE business, is prohibited. In many countries, the possession or use of illegal substances, even in minute amounts, can result in immediate incarceration. The judicial system in many countries does not give the accused the right to post bail or communicate with anyone, and pre-trial detention may last for months. All prescription pharmaceuticals should be kept in their original containers with the patient's and doctor's names clearly identified.

WEAPONS

Under no circumstances will CARE employees carry weapons or have weapons or ammunition while on assignment with CARE. To do so would undermine CARE's humanitarian imperatives and endanger the well-being of all humanitarian workers. CARE offices should adopt a "No Weapons" policy, prohibiting weapons in CARE offices or vehicles.

3.2 BUILDING AND SITE MANAGEMENT

CARE often will need to occupy several different types of structures (offices, residences, warehouses) to meet its operational requirements. These facilities should be selected and managed to reduce the risk of injury to personnel and/or loss or damage of material. Site security is maintained through a series of physical and procedural boundaries. Site safety is maintained through reducing vulnerability to fire and accidents.

SITE SELECTION

The Country Director will determine appropriate residence, office, and hotel/guesthouse locations for the lodging of staff and visitors. The most effective site selection follows a thorough security assessment. Appendix A: Safety and Security Assessment Checklist, should be utilized to evaluate a prospective facility or residence and recommend modifications as required by the area's current security environment and risk level. Key considerations when selecting a facility location include:

- Choose a site close to a main road.
- Ensure there is quick access to at least two departure routes, including an airstrip, in the event an evacuation is necessary.
- Ensure adequate fire exits. The use of bars, grates and locks can make exits in case of fire problematic and make well-marked fire exits even more important.
- Avoid sites close to market areas and police or military compounds.
- Examine the risks from natural hazards especially fires, floods, and wind. For tall buildings, the threat from earthquakes is particularly important to consider.
- Choose a location near embassies or UN offices.
- Cluster with other NGOs if possible.
- Ensure adequate secure parking.

- Do not be lured by an inexpensive lease to a site that could compromise staff safety.
- For temporary lodging, such as hotels, ensure that the facility is safe and conforms to minimum safety standards. Check for the level of security that is provided.

SITE MANAGEMENT

Prior to program implementation, all operational facilities and residences will be provided with appropriate security and safety equipment. Site management guidelines for all offices, regardless of risk level, include:

- Install adequate security lighting to deter intruders, aid observation and prevent accidents at night.
- Establish policies and procedures detailing who has access to what, when and under which circumstances. These policies should address both staff and visitors, during the workday and after hours.
- Familiarize all staff with emergency exit procedures and rendezvous points.
- Ensure that procedures in the event of a bomb threat are reviewed and posted at each phone.
- Ensure that office procedures for local disturbances or incidents, including natural disasters, are in place and reviewed with staff.
- Injuries and property loss from fire and electrical shock are far more common than from crime or instability. Most can be avoided if the Country Office implements simple safety procedures and a regular schedule of inspection. Install fire-fighting equipment in an accessible location and check/service annually. Train all staff in use of fire extinguishers and basic fire drills.
- Install a first-aid kit in an accessible location and keep it well stocked.

- Check all windows, doors, exits, and entrances daily, especially
 when closing the facility for the day. Establish a daily routine for
 locking up and assign a responsible person.
- Secure and lock up all documents of a sensitive nature. In particular, political- or security-related materials should be kept separate from other files and access restricted (computer password protected or locked in a safe).
- Prominently display all emergency phone numbers and provide all staff with a telephone directory listing key local and international numbers.

SITE MANAGEMENT FOR HIGH RISK AREAS

In High risk countries additional precautions for facility security may include:

- Ensure facility is self-contained with ample supplies of fuel, food, and water. If possible, sites should be chosen with alternate sources of power and water.
- Install a back-up generator if appropriate and conduct regular testing and maintenance.
- Protect fuel storage containers. If fuel, oil, or other flammable substances are kept inside the compound, store them in remote areas and below ground level if possible.
- Protect radio equipment by keeping it in the main shelter.
- When possible, erect double fencing around all facilities with alternative exits/entrances and increase exterior lighting.
- Protect water tanks by locating them inside the compound and locking the lid if possible.
- If using armed guards, give clear instructions and define limits of authority. Appoint a senior guard to be in charge of the guard force. Provide identifying clothing and proper security and safety equipment. Allow guards access to shelter and toilet facilities.

ARMED GUARDS

In some situations it may be necessary to employ guards around residences, offices, storage facilities or vehicle parking lots. The use of armed guards will be considered primarily when there is a potential for violence against staff. Although situations vary, in most cases it is preferable to use an established security firm rather than the local police or military.

3.3 VEHICLE OPERATIONS

Vehicle accidents are the main cause of injury and fatality among NGO staff. Avoiding excessive speed, following applicable traffic laws, and wearing seat belts minimize the chances of injury. Each Country Office should implement a transportation policy that ensures vehicles are maintained in a state of operational readiness; journeys are planned; and vehicle users are prepared to respond to a range of possible incidents.

VEHICLE MAINTENANCE

Vehicles must be regularly serviced and checked daily to prevent breakdowns and stranding of staff. Safety discrepancies should be corrected before any journey. The maintenance schedule and a daily inspection checklist should be placed in the log book of each vehicle.

VEHICLE CONTROL

Impassable routes, unnecessary vehicle breakdowns and security incidents can all be encountered when journeys are made without adequate planning. This can waste time and put staff at risk. The submission of a formal trip plan is therefore advised for long distance

travel or for travel to remote or insecure areas. The trip plan serves two purposes: it requires the traveler to think through the journey before setting off, and it provides a written record of the planned journey. A journey can then be monitored and appropriate action taken if something goes wrong and assistance is required. The trip plan should include the following information:

- Vehicle details
- Names of driver and passengers
- Call signs (if fitted with a radio)
- Origin and destination of journey
- Intended route
- Planned stops along the route
- · Contact points along the route
- Estimated time of departure (ETD)
- Estimated time of arrival (ETA)
- Estimated time of return (ETR)
- Other reporting procedures

A vehicle movement board should be placed in each office to indicate the deployment of vehicles on a particular day with driver, passengers, destination, and estimated time of return clearly marked. Times of radio checks and vehicle location at each check can also be recorded.

SEAT BELTS

Seat belts, front and rear, will be worn at all times by all CARE staff.

VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPORTING

All drivers and passengers should be trained in vehicle accident response and reporting procedures. A report format should be placed in the log book of each vehicle.

ARMED ESCORTS

The use of armed escorts, including military, will be used only when there is no alternative, such as in cases of widespread, armed banditry or ongoing civil conflict.

3.4 MEDICAL PROCEDURES

In many areas where CARE works, the national medical support and emergency response infrastructure is not well developed. Implementing basic preventative procedures and training can prevent minor medical problems from becoming significant security incidents.

To reduce the likelihood of a medical emergency, international staff should receive a comprehensive medical and dental examination prior to an overseas assignment. Concurrently, the staff member should receive all required and recommended immunizations for diseases prevalent in the country of assignment.

INOCULATIONS

Country Offices should have a policy for inoculations of staff and family members, both national and international. Programs to encourage appropriate immunizations can enhance safety and security by reducing the likelihood of a staff member or family member becoming ill with

common, preventable illnesses. This is especially useful in remote areas where timely evacuation may be problematic or where health support is lacking.

FIRST-AID / CPR TRAINING

Training on emergency medical response, including first-aid and CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation), is a cost-effective method to increase overall safety. First-aid training should be a high priority for the Country Office and is particularly important in areas where appropriate medical treatment may not be available. In many cases, local Red Cross/Red Crescent offices or other medical personnel can provide the training. The CARE USA Headquarters can provide a Practical First-Aid Training Guide to be used in conjunction with a basic first-aid/CPR course.

FIRST-AID KITS

First-aid kits should be obtained for all CARE offices, vehicles and residences. Well maintained kits, when combined with appropriate training for their use, can minimize the effect of medical incidents. The kit should be sealed, well marked and mounted in a central location. Each office should designate someone to regularly inspect and maintain the kits.

MEDICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Everyone should be familiar with the Country Office medical emergency response procedures in the event of a sudden acute illness or injury. These procedures should be written in a plan, rehearsed and updated regularly. At a minimum, the plan should include:

- Inspected and approved medical facilities
- Emergency contact procedures for senior staff and coordinators
- Procedures to follow in areas where cash payment may be required to begin treatment (access to the medical fund or insurance information, etc.)
- Medical evacuation procedures and contact information
- Location and access to Record of Emergency Data, including notification of family members

MEDICAL EVACUATION

Medical evacuation (medevac) is used when there is an emergency illness or injury in an area where local medical assistance or emergency/hospital care is unavailable or inadequate. It is appropriate when failure to obtain immediate care will likely place the patient's life in jeopardy or lead to serious physical impairment. If a medevac is required, the Country Office should arrange passage through an incountry medevac system, a scheduled commercial flight, or through any one of the private international evacuation programs, such as S.O.S. International. Updated contact information and policy numbers for private services can be obtained from National Headquarters.

INSURANCE

Insurance for both national and international staff should be sufficient to allow quality, timely treatment. Inadequate insurance may make staff, especially national staff, postpone treatment until the condition becomes serious enough to warrant emergency response. All staff must have full access to the conditions of their insurance.

The National Headquarters or Country Office must ensure that international new hires or contractors have the appropriate personal life, health, injury, and medical repatriation/ evacuation insurance.

3.5 PERSONNEL ISSUES

BACKGROUND CHECKS

Background checks (consistent with CARE policy and core values) should be performed on all potential staff members. This can mitigate or prevent potential safety and security incidents, such as hiring a driver with prior drunken driving convictions. The decision to conduct background checks rests with the CD and depends on the specific situation at each Country Office. At a minimum, a photo should be taken and the information provided on the Record of Emergency Data (RED) should be verified. Often these measures will discourage those who may pose a security risk from seeking employment with CARE.

RECORD OF EMERGENCY DATA (RED)

All staff members should have a Record of Emergency Data (RED) on file. During an emergency situation, the RED can provide a central point

to access critical information. REDs should include: date completed, home address, home telephone number, pre-existing medical conditions, next of kin, religious restrictions, blood type, known allergies, medications, etc. The RED should have a map attached showing the directions to the staff member's residence and the location of primary and secondary next of kin. The RED should be completed immediately upon hire and reviewed and updated annually or as required. The RED file should be taken during emergency office relocation to prevent unauthorized disclosure of personal information. Due to possibly sensitive information, REDs can be sealed in envelopes by each individual staff member and stored until needed. When appropriate, a photocopy of the photo page of the passport can be attached.

It is the responsibility of the Country Director to ensure international staff members and their families are registered with the appropriate embassy or consulate.

ORIENTATION

All new personnel (and family members, as appropriate) must receive a safety and security orientation. This discussion should include:

- Area orientation
- Country Office policies and procedures regarding health and safety
- Normal security precautions and procedures (curfews, "no-go areas," areas prone to criminal activity, etc.)
- Travel and security precautions in effect for each area
- · Country Office Evacuation and Safety and Security Plans

SAFETY AND SECURITY TRAINING

Periodic training and security update briefings should be completed for all Country Office staff. Such training enhances overall safety and security, prevents or minimizes potential incidents, and allows the staff to react confidently to crisis or emergency situations.

All completed safety and security training must be recorded in each staff member's personnel file. This allows identification of training priorities and can help determine suitability for advanced training. The training record provides a transportable, permanent documentation of training received and should be given to the member when they leave CARE, with a copy retained in the personnel file.

Mandatory training topics:

- Basic personal security
- First-aid/CPR and emergency medical response
- Fire and electrical safety
- Evacuation procedures
- Landmine/UXO awareness (in appropriate areas)

Additional topics, as appropriate:

- Defensive-driver training and basic vehicle maintenance
- Stress management
- Anti-terrorism
- Communication procedures
- Incident reporting

COMPENSATORY TIME OFF

CARE recognizes that humanitarian aid personnel are subject to increased stress and possible "burn out." Staff tend to do "whatever it takes" to get the job done, often working seven-day weeks and fifteenhour days. To assist with the reduction of stress and potential burnout, in exceptional situations it is recommended that the Country Office provide time away from the area for rest and relaxation. It is impossible to establish exact criteria for every situation, but each Country Director or team leader should ensure that a system is in place to provide sufficient time for rest.

ADVERSE PERSONNEL ACTIONS

In some cases, initiating an adverse personnel action — such as termination or discipline — can bring about threats or hostile acts, resulting in an increased security risk for the office. Such actions should be carefully planned and carried out as appropriate for each situation.

All threats directed at CARE staff and/or operations must be taken seriously. The CARE Country Director (CD) should initiate all security precautions within his/her scope and report the threat immediately to appropriate authorities. Confidentiality is recommended when reporting threats or intimidation.

3.6 VISITOR SECURITY

The lack of area-specific cultural knowledge, security procedures, and language skills can cause difficulties for visitors. Visitors that cannot communicate and who do not know the appropriate security precautions can inadvertently become a victim of crime or a security incident.

GENERAL VISITOR GUIDELINES

Country offices should develop, and routinely update, policies, procedures, and restrictions for in-country visits. Country Directors will determine whether in-country visits are appropriate and if so, the travel criteria and appropriate locations for visitor accommodation. Some general guidelines for visitor safety include:

- Monitor the number and location of in-country visitors.
- Require visitors to check in with their respective embassies or appropriate office.
- House visitors in the same hotel or in several hotels in the same vicinity. Use only hotels approved by the Country Office.
- Provide visitors with an emergency information card with emergency contact phone numbers for the police and ambulance and key Country Office personnel.
- Provide a security briefing for all visitors. Include information on safe modes of transport, areas to avoid and other precautions.
- Use official vehicles for visitor transportation when appropriate.
- Ensure visitors have the ability to maintain contact with the appropriate office when visiting remote project sites. Provide radios or cell phones as appropriate.

VISITOR GUIDELINES FOR MODERATE, HIGH OR SEVERE RISK COUNTRIES

- Carry a radio or cell phone when traveling and establish a time schedule for checks when away from the office.
- Travel only during daylight hours. Night travel is not recommended.
 Avoid traveling alone.
- Ensure visitors receive detailed instruction in safety measures, alarm and communication systems, guard procedures, and the evacuation plan.
- Have visitors vary their daily schedule and routes.
- Unofficial visitor travel is not permitted in severe risk countries.

3.7 INCIDENT REPORTING

A well-maintained incident report system can help Country Office staff identify, analyze and react to changes in their security situation. An effective incident report system relies on a trained and committed staff member that has confidence that the reports will be reviewed fairly and not used against them. Reports must be kept in a secure location with access restricted to the appropriate staff to ensure confidentiality. The incident report file should accompany the senior staff during office evacuation or relocation to prevent disclosure of sensitive information.

INCIDENTS TO REPORT

The following security-related incidents may indicate mounting tension or a possible trend of threats, and warrant the submission of a security incident report.

- Personal attack or assault, or attempted assault
- Theft of money or assets whose value exceeds US\$3,000
- Vehicle accidents involving CARE staff that have been hospitalized, injured or killed
- Landmine accidents involving CARE staff that have been hospitalized, injured or killed
- Bombing or other explosive incidents involving CARE staff that have been hospitalized, injured or killed
- Medical Evacuation (Medevac) of CARE staff
- Arrest of CARE staff
- · Kidnapping or attempted kidnapping
- Extortion or attempted extortion
- Ambush
- Threats, in any format, of harm to CARE staff or property
- Reported or documented surveillance of CARE property
- Other incidents deemed appropriate

INCIDENT REPORT FORMAT

To facilitate analysis and appropriate response, incident reports must be complete and timely. Each report should include:

- Name, sex, age, nationality and other pertinent data
- Status (staff, family member, etc.)
- Detailed description of incident
- Was the incident the first of its kind? If not, indicate approximate dates of previous incidents and/or reports.
- Action taken, including police reports, as applicable

The CARE Security Unit can provide CARE's Incident Reporting format and protocol.

INCIDENT REPORTING PROCESS

Timely reporting of security incidents can aid in protecting staff. Incidents should be reported to the appropriate senior staff through the most expedient means, such as telephone or radio, with a written report provided as soon as feasible. In cases of theft or minor injury, a submission of a written report at the earliest convenient time may suffice. In some areas CARE staff should assume that all communications, including telephone, fax and e-mail, are monitored or will be viewed by persons hostile to the organization or the humanitarian community. Therefore it is imperative to use caution in sending incident reports or situation updates to ensure protection of confidential information and prevent potential harm to CARE staff.

3.8 INFORMATION SECURITY

Most Country Offices have developed a close and effective working relationship with other agencies and government organizations based on transparency and trust. However, all staff should be mindful of the potential misuse of information by criminal elements or during periods of instability. By making protection of information a standard procedure, CARE can avoid suspicion later when emergencies or transmitting sensitive information require increased security. Staff should be made aware of the rationale for the procedures put into place and trained appropriately. Processes should be documented and responsibilities assigned to accountable individuals.

SECURITY OF DOCUMENTS OR COMPUTER RECORDS

Personnel files and Record of Emergency Data sheets should be kept in a secure location with restricted access. Passwords and other computer-based security measures should be enforced to prevent unauthorized access. Financial and personnel records should be shredded using a cross cut shredder before discarding.

COMPUTER DATA BACK-UP

Routine computer file backup prevents loss of critical historical data if the computers are damaged by fire or stolen, or the staff quickly relocates in an emergency. By conducting data backup and storing the backup medium and critical applications offsite, a Country Office can ensure that critical files are available to reconstitute operations in the event of loss of the computers. Routine backup should be automatic, usually at the end of each week. One or two staff members should be designated to take the storage medium away from the Country Office when the office is closed.

PORTABLE ADP CAPABILITIES

In the event of emergency office relocation, damage to the LAN, or loss of power during an emergency, it may be advantageous to have standby portable laptop computers configured to transmit data via cellular and satellite telephone. These computers can provide full restoration of office function and connectivity. They should be loaded with the historical files as part of the routine data back-up procedures. A UPS (Universal Power Source) is recommended which can be used as a back-up power source.

3.9 COMMUNICATIONS

All operational areas, especially within moderate, high, or severe risk countries, should be provided adequate communication equipment and have written communication procedures. Communications equipment, including radios, cellular phones, and satellite phones, should not be used without host government approval and licensing.

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

An effective communications system can be as simple as using two types of telephones, or combining reliable e-mail and voice communications. Each Country Office generally will require a unique and specific communication system planned and installed to support the specific operational environment. Information for designing a system is provided in Appendix B: Communication Equipment.

In general, an effective communications system should provide:

- Reliable communication between the Country Office and any remote staff or travelers.
- The ability to monitor activities in remote sites and to disseminate

notification of a safety or security incident or deterioration of security conditions at any time.

- Coordination of emergency response, especially medical response and evacuation.
- Contact between staff members and between the Country Office and others outside the country during a crisis. Often, local communication systems are interrupted during a crisis or periods of instability.

QUICK COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES

The phone numbers necessary in an emergency should be posted and periodically verified. These numbers and radio frequencies should be available in a variety of formats, such as small cards for all personnel to carry, transportation-specific ones for inclusion in the vehicle log, and larger, more comprehensive ones posted in the office communications center. Some important contacts include:

- National and Regional Headquarters
- Country Office staff to be contacted in case of emergency
- Local police and fire department
- Local medical contacts (doctor, hospital/emergency medical service, etc.)
- Local government, military or private medevac service (with policy
- number and authorizing staff member)
- Local emergency transportation/charter companies
- Local media contacts (newspapers, broadcast)
- Appropriate weather and disaster response centers
- Responsible Embassies
- Local United Nations contacts, such as the Security Officer or reaction force

- Other CARE offices in the region
- Other key local NGO staff

PROTECTION OF COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT

Increasingly, communication equipment, such as computers or cellular telephones, are becoming a prime targets for theft. Protect communication equipment by taking simple precautions, including:

- Avoid carrying or storing laptops in an obvious computer carrying case. Thieves commonly target computer bags, especially during travel. Consider purchasing a padded laptop protector and placing it into a backpack or other generic case.
- Consider purchasing hard-shell, foam-lined cases that protect and disguise expensive equipment. If the equipment is often transported by vehicle, consider purchasing local storage containers commonly used for tools or spare parts. This makes them less attractive targets.
- Theft of vehicle radios is common. Before purchasing vehicle radios consider if they will become attractive targets or put the staff at greater risk. Purchase quick-release mounts to allow removal of installed VHF radios after hours.
- When purchasing VHF handsets or cellular phones, ensure that the belt carry case is the most secure model possible. Purchase a case for each device; hand-carried equipment is easily misplaced or stolen.

- Keep a low profile when using communication equipment. Discrete use limits the chances of thieves targeting the equipment.
- When storing portable communication equipment (GPS, laptops, etc.) in the office, ensure it is kept in a secure area or container. Have someone designated to verify its presence each day.
- Implement an effective accountability procedure for checkout and tracking if equipment is pooled.

3.10 CASH HANDLING AND TRANSFER

Cash storage, management, transfer, and distribution are significant points of vulnerability for a field office. Cash management and transfer are security issues, with related standards, policies, and guidelines that must be implemented and adhered to at all times.

CASH MANAGEMENT

The Country Office must decide on a safe location for cash reserves (including a reserve for emergency evacuation) and a reliable way to receive funds. A field office should consult with the financial and legal officers and advisors of local NGOs regarding what banks, if any, are used and for what purposes. The Country Office also should assess the cash management possibilities in the area, such as the reliability and cashwithdrawal limitations of local banks or the capacity for electronic payment to local businesses.

CASH TRANSFER

Cash transfers are necessary for project funding, local purchases, and wages. In cases where a professional courier service cannot be used to transfer cash, the following guidelines should be implemented:

- Designate two or three staff members to withdraw and transfer cash. Consider breaking the transfer into more than one part, with individuals carrying separate containers with the cash split between them and traveling different routes.
- Travel routes and times must vary and be disclosed only on an as needed basis.
- In-city transport should be done by office vehicle, not public transportation. Use a reliable driver and change cars and drivers frequently.
- Transfer to remote project sites should be done by air travel, when possible.
- When transporting large amounts of cash to project sites, have a contingency plan for delayed flights, and, if possible, a predetermined location for safe storage of the cash, particularly overnight.
- If a train must be used for transport, cash-carrying staff should arrange for sole occupancy of a separate, locked compartment.
- A safe must be immediately available on arrival at the final destination.
- In the event of an attack, staff members must not risk their lives to protect cash.
- Avoid references to cash when communicating by radio and use code words as appropriate.
- Individuals should never talk or boast of their cash-transfer experiences.

3.11 EVACUATION

Each Country Office must have a staff evacuation plan. The plan should be revised and rehearsed annually. It should detail who will be evacuated out of the country as well as the process. The plan should also address relocation – (the physical withdrawal of staff and assets from a crisis spot to a safer location within the same country) and *hibernation* – (staff staying behind in a crisis spot because evacuation or *relocation* are impossible or too dangerous). Information for developing an evacuation plan is located in Appendix C: Evacuation.

PERSONAL SAFETY AND SECURITY

Each Country Office should conduct a comprehensive security assessment, develop a security strategy, and implement general safety and security policies and procedures. However, every CARE staff member must view safety and security as an individual responsibility and not depend solely on the Country Office's procedures. A staff member will gain a greater sense of security and self-confidence by preparing ahead for a potential incident.

This chapter provides general safety and security guidelines that individual CARE staff members can use. Most of them are common sense measures that are frequently forgotten when in an unfamiliar environment or during crisis. Successfully employing the safety and security measures in this chapter requires resourcefulness and vigilance. It is hoped that by applying these measures within a framework of the Country Office security strategy, CARE staff can prevent incidents from ever occurring. When they do occur, the well-prepared staff member can take quick and decisive action to minimize the likelihood of injury or damage. This chapter provides information on:

Situational Awareness
Vehicle Safety and Security
Public Transportation
Walking
Office and Residences
Traveling

4.1 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Situational awareness in its simplest form means paying attention to one's surroundings, being sensitive to changes in them, and adapting behavior accordingly to the current situation. Developing situational awareness to potential threats is the first step in reducing the likelihood of a safety or security incident.

Situational awareness begins with an understanding of the culture, dynamics, and history of the area. A Country Office can help incoming staff develop situational awareness by compiling guidelines into a single document for use during staff orientation. Guidelines should include information on the country, the region, and the specific communities in the operational area.

Contents for Situational Awareness Guidelines:

- cultural norms and practices
- areas of criminal activity or instability
- the sensitivities, policies, and capabilities of the host government
- the identity of various groups within the population and possible hostile or vulnerable groups
- the relationship between local authorities and various interest groups, and the effectiveness of local government and civil infrastructure, such as police, fire and emergency response
- situations that may lead to tension and confrontations among different factions
- indicators developed by the Country Office to monitor the safety or security environment

AT A NEW ASSIGNMENT:

- Learn about local religious and cultural beliefs and practices and the various issues that may arise from them.
- If not from the area, learn the local language and practice it often. At a minimum, be aware of words or phrases that could be offensive as well as those to deter an offender or call for help.

All international staff, family members, and visitors should register with their embassy or consulate. They should know the telephone numbers, contact personnel, location and emergency procedures for their embassy.

AT ALL TIMES:

- Keep informed of potential threats and areas to avoid.
- Be alert to the possibility of confrontation with individuals or groups. Be aware of times when crowds can be expected, such as after religious services, sporting events, or demonstrations. Avoid these areas.
- Be aware of the extent and activities of organized crime and take necessary precautions.
- Immediately leave any location that makes you feel uncomfortable.
- Know the local security arrangements, such as the nearest police station, emergency contact procedures, and potential safe areas.

For detailed information on dealing with specific incidents, see Chapter Five – Safety and Security Incidents.

ACCEPTANCE AND IMAGE

Building rapport with neighbors and local residents can promote acceptance and help ensure access to local safety and security information. Failure to do so may negatively affect the image others have of staff members or, by extension, the reputation of CARE itself. Steps to building positive image in the community include the following.

- Arrange an introduction to the local authorities as appropriate.
- Interact often with neighbors and other staff. Become involved in community activities apart from work.
- Dress and behave in a manner considerate of local customs to avoid unwanted attention or disrespect.
- Avoid political discussions.
- Avoid being drawn into relationships that might carry unwanted personal obligations or expectations.
- Obey local laws at all times.
- Avoid transacting business with or carrying on personal relationships with those suspected of violating local laws.
- Strictly adhere to all CARE policies on personal conduct, alcohol, substance abuse and weapons.

While community acceptance is a preferred security strategy, staff who are accustomed to feeling accepted may have difficulty acknowledging that they are also under threat. They may be reluctant to adopt or adhere to necessary security procedures, leaving them vulnerable to security incidents. The intent of an effective safety and security program is to make staff and assets less attractive targets – hard targets – forcing the criminal or potential attacker to look elsewhere. A balance must therefore be found between presenting a positive image to the community in general and a 'hard target' to a potential perpetrator.

Characteristics of a Hard Target

Inaccessible - Staff and assets are difficult to get to. Staff members rarely travel alone and assets are out of sight, secure, or well-protected.

Unpredictable - Staff members vary their routine, using different routes and times for daily activities without any apparent pattern.

Aware- Each staff member is alert to their surroundings and constantly maintains situational awareness.

Safe habits. Everyone in the Country Office supports and adheres to all recommended safety and security policies and procedures.

RISK PERCEPTION

Situational awareness is more than an individual responsibility for appropriate behavior considerate of the external community. It is also a collective responsibility for appropriate behavior considerate of the internal CARE community. This involves an understanding that individuals have different 'perceptions' of risk. Risk perception is influenced by both cultural and individual factors; and it may therefore differ among or between international and national staff as well as female and male staff. For example, national staff may perceive a situation as dangerous due to social cues indicating increasing ethnic tensions that are not apparent to international staff members. Women may be more aware of their particular vulnerabilities, which will influence their perception of a 'safe' place to live, walk or park their car; or with whom, how and where to socialize. All staff may find themselves doing things as part of their work activities they would not normally do or have never done before. Some may perceive this as a challenge, while others perceive it as a risk. Special care must be taken to avoid misinterpreting cautious behavior in any staff member as patronizing, weakness, overreaction, or panic.

Risk perception is also influenced by one's sense of power. For example, a female staff member may feel a need to be aggressive to be

taken seriously, or a male staff member may feel he will lose power if he admits fear. As a result, both may develop a cavalier attitude towards risk and assume they are exempt from normal safety and security procedures.

- Respect individual differences in risk perception. Always act in a manner that does not increase perceived risk to oneself or other members of the organization.
- Macho appearance in dress and behavior can provoke anger and escalate a dangerous situation. Maintain a calm, mature approach to all situations. Be non-provocative when confronted with hostility or potentially hostile situations.
- Never pressure staff members to prove themselves in the field or to forgo common sense safety measures. General safety and security measures are the same for everyone.
- Respect and follow the recommendations of the CO Security Officer, Security Focal Point, or Team Leader, regardless of his/her sex or nationality.
- In any area, harassment is incompatible with providing a safe and secure working environment and as such is unacceptable. Each Country Office will clearly post the CARE Harassment Guidelines and ensure all staff know and comply with them. The Country Office will investigate all harassment complaints in accordance with CARE policies and procedures.

In high risk situations, restrictions may be imposed on such things as where staff may live, where and when they may socialize, or how they may dress and travel. Due to specific threats in the operating environment, these restrictions may be different for national or international, male or female staff. As the restrictions pertain to what many staff believe are 'individual freedoms' outside of working hours, they are frequently contested.

CO security measures, especially those that pertain to behavior outside of working hours, must be openly discussed to ensure they conform to CARE Gender and Diversity policies.

4.2 VEHICLE SAFETY AND SECURITY

Traffic and vehicle-related accidents are the major cause of injuries and fatalities among aid personnel. Driving in unfamiliar and sometimes difficult conditions, or where traffic laws are different, can increase the likelihood of an accident. If available and practical, all staff members should receive driver safety training.

GENERAL GUIDELINES

- Vehicles should be well maintained and checked daily. Safety discrepancies should be corrected before any journey. Make a maintenance checklist and keep a copy of the checklist and maintenance schedule with each vehicle.
- Have travel documentation in order, including vehicle registration, inspections, and passes as required. All drivers should have an international driver's license or a valid license for the host country.
- Keep an up-to-date, well-stocked first-aid kit in each vehicle.
- Park in well-lit, heavily populated areas. Close all windows and lock doors before leaving the vehicle. Have keys ready in hand when returning to vehicle. Check the back seat before entering.
- Immediately lock doors upon entry. Open windows no more than 5 cm and only those windows near occupied seats.
- It is CARE policy for all staff members to wear seat belts at all times, in the front and rear of the vehicle.
- Motorcycle drivers and riders should wear helmets at all times.
 While it is perhaps not local law, Country Offices should encourage this safety guideline and examine insurance policies for International staff to determine if it is a requirement for coverage.
- It is also recommended that those who ride bicycles wear a helmet.
- Know where the vehicle safety and communication equipment is and how to use it. Know how to perform basic vehicle maintenance (changing a flat tire, checking and adding fluids, etc.)

- Do not speed or drive too fast for conditions. Observe local driving laws and regulations.
- Take extra precautions when driving through rural villages or on undeveloped roads with pedestrians on the roadway.
- Avoid night driving or driving alone.
- Avoid letting the fuel tank fall below half full.
- Keep a spare vehicle key in the office. Keep vehicle and residence keys on separate key chains to reduce additional losses during a carjacking.
- Never voluntarily carry unauthorized passengers, especially soldiers.
 However, if threatened, provide the transportation. In the event of an attempted carjacking, CARE staff are not to risk their lives to save a vehicle.
- In remote areas or where threats may be present along the route, select primary and alternate routes. Avoid developing patterns.
- Avoid areas with criminal activity or known threats. If possible avoid "choke points" such as narrow alleys.
- When possible, consult with other agencies and organizations to monitor route conditions and change routes as necessary.
- Notify others of travel times, destination, and steps they should take if you are late.
- If approaching a suspicious area, stop well before the area and observe other traffic passing through it. This is especially useful for "unofficial" or unexpected checkpoints or police roadblocks.
- Avoid transporting sensitive documents or equipment in areas prone to banditry. Arrange proper permits for transporting items that could be interpreted as useful to combatants or terrorists.
- Mark official vehicles appropriately for the area. In most cases it is advantageous to have CARE placards or flags clearly visible.
- Consider posting a decal on your door or window indicating guns are not permitted in the vehicle.

 In areas of extreme weather conditions, prepare accordingly. For instance, in very hot areas, keep extra water; in extremely cold areas, keep blankets and food in the vehicle. Be prepared to survive if stranded.

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

Traffic accidents involving CARE staff can be minimized by implementing defensive driver training and other precautions, but they can never be avoided entirely. When an accident is mishandled, it can quickly change from an unfortunate occurrence into a security risk. In extreme situations, it can trigger violence or threats of retribution. The following procedures are useful when involved in an accident.

- Quickly discern the attitudes and actions of people around the accident site to ensure that the staff member is not at risk by staying.
- Do not leave the site unless staff safety is jeopardized and then only to drive to the nearest police or military post.
- Provide care and assistance as appropriate. As appropriate, contact local authorities immediately and cooperate as required. Contact the Country Office as soon as practical.
- If feasible, take pictures of the scene and record the names and contact information of witnesses, responding authorities, and those involved.
- When approaching an accident involving other vehicles consider safety and security, taking care not to become involved in a second accident while responding.

SECURITY AT CHECKPOINTS

Checkpoints are manned by personnel with varying degrees of experience, education, or training. Regard all checkpoints with caution, especially in the evening. All staff should receive specific training on identifying and navigating the variety of checkpoints encountered in a given area.

- Avoid checkpoints whenever possible.
- When approaching a checkpoint or threat area, decrease speed and open windows slightly. If possible, allow others to pass through the area and observe from a safe distance.
- At night, switch to low beams and put on the interior light.
- Be ready to stop quickly, but stop only if requested.
- Keep hands visible at all times. Do not make sudden movements or attempts to hide or move items within the vehicle. High theft items, such as radios, cameras, and computers, should always be stored in nondescript containers or kept out of sight.
- Show ID if requested, but do not surrender it unless it is insisted.
- Leave the vehicle only if requested. If the checkpoint is not judged to be an attempted carjacking, turn the vehicle off and take keys.
 Remain close to the vehicle if possible.
- Comply with requests to search the vehicle. Accompany the searcher to ensure nothing is planted or stolen.
- Use judgment about protesting if items are removed. Do not aggressively resist if something is taken. Request documentation if possible.
- Do not offer goods in exchange for passage. This can encourage this behavior, making it more difficult for future travelers.

CONVOY SAFETY

Traveling by convoy in two or more vehicles is often the safest way to travel in areas of conflict or high crime. Having more than one vehicle can deter attack or provide assistance during breakdown. It may be possible to coordinate travel with other aid organizations in the area to create convoys or accompany security force convoys already scheduled. Each Country Office should examine transportation security procedures to determine if convoy travel is recommended in their context. In addition to the basic guidelines for transportation safety listed elsewhere, convoy travelers are advised to consider the following.

- Identify a leader for each vehicle as well as an overall team leader to follow regarding all safety issues.
- Use a pre-planned intended route, have an alternative route, and ask local authorities about the feasibility of those routes. Ensure availability of accommodations along the route in the event of delay.
- Leave behind a description of the intended and alternate routes and expected arrival times.
- Maintain communication between vehicles, ideally via radio, particularly between the lead and rear vehicles. Agree on manual signals in the event of radio failure.
- Do not transmit the names of destination and convoy routes when communicating by radio; use code words.
- Maintain an agreed-upon convoy speed, within legal limits.
- When necessary, notify local authorities of movements to alleviate suspicion.
- Follow in the tracks of the vehicle ahead while maintaining a distance of two to three car lengths. The vehicle behind should always be in view.
- If required to turn back, start with the last vehicle first, and drive in reverse until it is safe for all vehicles to turn around.

4.3 PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

- Never hitchhike or accept a ride from strangers.
- Avoid traveling alone.
- Have the proper token or change ready when approaching the ticket booth or machine.
- Be mindful of pickpockets and thieves when waiting for transportation.
- During off-peak hours, wait for the bus or train in a well-lit, designated area.
- In areas where crime is common on public transport, especially at night, consider using a taxi instead. In some areas, taxi use may also be dangerous but can be safer than waiting for public transport.
- If bus travel at night is unavoidable, sit near the driver. Avoid riding on deserted trains or buses.
- If train travel at night is unavoidable, select a middle car that is not deserted and try to sit by a window. This provides a quick exit in the event of an accident. Alternatively, select a lockable compartment if available.
- Leave any public transport that feels uncomfortable or threatening.
 After getting off any public transport, check to be sure no one is following.

4.4 WALKING

In most settings it is possible to walk safely to and from work or on errands. When the situation permits walking, staff members can help increase their safety with these precautions.

- If unfamiliar with the area, seek reliable advice on areas considered safe for walking. Consult a local street map before leaving and bring it along.
- If possible, walk with companions.
- Avoid walking at night or during times of darkness.
- Walk with confidence and assurance but remember to anticipate problem situations that may arise unexpectedly.
- Use well-traveled and lighted routes.
- Be aware of surroundings. Avoid groups of people loitering, demonstrations, disputes or commotion in the streets.
- Avoid walking too close to bushes, dark doorways, and other places of concealment.
- Pickpockets often work in pairs using distraction as their basic ploy.
 Be aware of jostling in crowded areas. Divide money and credit cards between two or three pockets or bags.
- When carrying a backpack or purse, keep it close to the body in a secure manner to prevent snatch-and-run theft. Do not carry valuables in these bags; instead, leave them in a secure place.
- It is better to carry only a small amount of money and a cheap watch to hand over if threatened.

- If a driver pulls alongside to ask for directions, do not approach the vehicle. A common criminal technique is to ask a potential victim to come closer to look at a map.
- If someone suspicious is noted, cross the street or change directions away from them. If necessary, cross back and forth several times. If the person is following or becomes a threat, use whatever means necessary to attract attention of others. Yelling "Fire!" often attracts more attention than yelling "Help!".
 Remember, it is better to suffer embarrassment from being overcautious than to be a victim of crime.

4.5 OFFICE AND RESIDENCE SAFETY AND SECURITY

FIRE AND ELECTRICAL SAFETY

Basic safety and security procedures are often overlooked in Country Offices and residences. Simple improvements in fire and electrical safety and first aid training and procedures can safeguard all staff and should be the first step in any Country Office Safety and Security plan. Individual staff members, even when traveling, should make every attempt to adhere to common sense precautions concerning fire and electrical safety. Staff members should take advantage of local or Country Office fire and electrical safety training and include family members. Appendix A: Safety and Security Assessment Checklist provides guidelines for ensuring a safe living and working environment. Minimum general guidelines include:

Fire extinguishers - Install and regularly inspect extinguishers useful for all possible fires in all vehicles, offices and residences. Know the location of fire alarms and extinguishers, if present, in hotels, residences and offices.

Emergency exits - Every office and residence should have a primary and secondary exit route. Plan ahead on how to exit the office, residence or hotel room in the case of fire.

Smoking areas - Smoke only in designated areas and dispose of cigarettes and matches properly.

Electrical safety - The electrical condition of many Country Offices and residences can be considered poor, with overloaded circuits, poor maintenance and inferior wiring. This can increase the risk of electrical shock or fire. Measures to improve electrical safety include:

- Conduct regular inspections of residences and office spaces (See Appendix A: Safety and Security Assessment Checklist) and correct electrical discrepancies.
- Locate and mark the electrical cut-off for all offices and residences. The cut-off should be kept free from obstruction, should never be in a locked space, and everyone should be made aware of its location.

Smoke detectors - When available, smoke detectors should be placed where there is cooking or a heat source (lounges with microwaves, coffeepots, kitchens, etc.) and by the main electrical circuit box. Detectors should be tamper resistant, ideally using a sealed power source to prevent battery theft.

LOCKS AND KEYS

Secure locks and proper key management are central to the concept of physical security. Cheap locks are easily overcome or bypassed, and secure locks are worthless if their keys are not protected from unauthorized access. Some general guidelines for lock and key security include:

- Keep a minimum number of keys for each lock and strictly control who has access to them. Keep household keys separate from vehicle keys.
- Use caution when providing keys to house staff.
- Do not allow duplicate keys to be made without permission, and record who has each duplicate.
- If a key is lost under suspicious circumstances have a new lock fitted.

- Never leave keys under the mat or in other obvious hiding places.
- Do not use magnetic "hide-a-keys" on vehicles.

DOORS

- Solid doors provide important protection against theft. Install a peephole, safety chain, strong locks and bolts, lights and intercom (where appropriate) at the main entrance. Keep entrance doors locked at all times, even when at home.
- When answering the door, identify visitors first through an adjacent window, a peephole, or a safety-chained door. Check identification for all repair personnel prior to permitting entry.
- Use an outside light when answering the door at night to illuminate your visitor. Do not turn on the interior light.
- Pay attention to interior doors. In some areas heavy steel internal doors can be used to create "safe rooms" for use during emergency or criminal attack.

WINDOWS

- Keep access windows locked whenever possible. Bars on windows
 can prevent unwanted entry, but they can also prevent emergency
 exit during a fire. Install hinged bars with locks on windows
 designated for emergency exit. Keep keys nearby in an easily
 accessed and well-marked location.
- After dark, keep curtains or blinds closed. Draw curtains before turning on lights and turn off lights before drawing back curtains.
- In areas where there is a threat of violence or disaster, select offices and residences without large glass windows and use heavy curtains over all windows.

ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES FOR RESIDENCES IN INSECURE ENVIRONMENTS

Additional security measures should be taken if located in an environment with a high crime level or potential for insecurity or disaster.

- Select housing as far as possible from host nation military bases.
- An apartment located above the ground or first floor is considered more secure than a single-family dwelling.
- Keep shrubbery and bushes around residences trimmed low.
- Establish a family communication and support system, especially for families of staff members who travel often.
- Preplan for emergencies by stocking extra water, food, and supplies.
- Establish a back-up power supply, as appropriate.
- Be familiar with the routes to approved hospitals or clinics and to airstrips.

FAMILY MEMBERS

Families of staff are just as exposed to threats from crime and other local risks, but are often overlooked. Including family members in a basic safety and security training program can enhance overall security and safety and should be part of the standard orientation training for all new

If multiple CARE staff families are in the same city or area, select housing that is in close proximity.

Know and practice the Country Office evacuation plan and ensure coordination with embassy and other agency (UN, host nation, etc.) plans.

hires. Some procedures that should be stressed to all family members include:

- Family members should know the address and telephone numbers for the office and residence and know how to use the local telephones, both public and private, and radios if in use.
- Family members should avoid local disturbances, demonstrations, crowds, or high-risk areas. In areas of significant risk the location of family members should be known at all times. Family members should be encouraged to develop the habit of "checking in" before departure, after arrival, or when changing plans.
- Everyone should know the personal security procedures for the region and policies and procedures in case of natural disasters, bombings, assault, or other emergency situations.
- Everyone should receive fire and electrical safety training and know the location of safety equipment such as fire extinguishers.

RESIDENCE STAFF

Trustworthy and competent staff employed at private residences can contribute to security. However, even trustworthy staff, if inadequately briefed, may unwittingly endanger the safety of the staff or family. Guidelines for residence staff include:

- Whenever possible, hire domestic staff recommended by others.
- Thoroughly evaluate any applicant for employment. Conduct background checks as appropriate. Take the staff member's photograph and attach it to their personnel record.
- Give all new staff a security briefing to include guidelines for:

Visitor procedures and unexpected visitors.

Telephone calls and messages, including what to tell people during resident's absence.

Procedures for securing keys, windows and doors.

Emergency procedures and emergency telephone numbers.

Safety and security incidents, such as fire, electrical safety, or attempted robbery or attack.

Handling family affairs, habits, and movements with discretion.

 Dismissing a residence staff person should be conducted in a timely manner, avoiding confrontation. Financial considerations in the event of dismissal should be discussed and agreed upon when hiring.

International family members should:

- register with the appropriate embassy and know its emergency evacuation procedures.
- complete a Record of Emergency Data (RED)
- understand procedures for childcare, such as who can pick up children from school, etc.

4.6 GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR TRAVELING

- Take time to plan activities. Try to know the exact route before traveling and leave a planned itinerary with a responsible person.
- Carry a list of emergency names, addresses, phone numbers, and the names of reputable hotels along the route. Carry a phone card, local coins, or cell phone to make emergency phone calls if required.
- When appropriate, photocopy passport and other documents and carry only the copy, keeping a second copy at home or office.
 When carrying the original, consider disguising it with a plain slipon cover. Leave a copy of your passport secured at the office. This will expedite replacement if it is lost or stolen.
- Country Offices should provide photo identification cards for all staff and emergency contact cards for visitors. They can be laminated, two-sided cards with English or another UN standard language on one side and the local official language on the reverse.
- Use hardcase, lockable luggage and label it so the name and address are not easily seen.
- Use common sense security measures. Become familiar with surroundings and trust instincts during travel.
- In public areas or on local transport, sit near other people and hold all belongings.
- Avoid secluded public bathrooms.
- Use caution when taking taxis in areas where cab drivers are known to be involved in criminal activity. When available, take licensed taxis and always settle on the fare BEFORE beginning the trip. Have the destination address written out in the local language to show the driver if necessary. Where possible, seek the advice of the local CARE office.
- Avoid tourist areas that are often favorite places for criminal activity.
- Do not display jewelry, cash, keys, or other valuables in public.

HOTELS

- Be sure the hotel is approved by the Country Office. If possible, contact the appropriate embassy for security and evacuation information for that location.
- Take note if people are loitering in front of the hotel or in the lobby. Avoid hotels frequented by criminals. Try to avoid hotels with businesses in the lobby area.
- Ask for a room between the second and seventh floors, avoiding the top floor. This minimizes unwanted access from outside the building yet is within reach of most fire-fighting equipment.
- Be alert to the possibility of being followed to the room. When returning at night, ask to be escorted to the room by hotel security personnel.
- Advise colleagues of hotel location, room number, and hotel telephone number.
- Note the evacuation route in case of fire or emergency. Keep a flashlight by the bed to aid emergency evacuation.
- Always secure doors when inside the room, using locks and security chains.
- Examine the room, including cupboards, bathrooms, beds, and window areas for anything that appears suspicious.
- If the room has a telephone, check to be sure it is working properly.
- Keep room curtains closed during hours of darkness.

- Do not open the door to visitors (including hotel staff) unless positively identified. Use the door peephole or call the front desk for verification.
- When not in the room, consider leaving the light and TV or radio on.
- If available, use the hotel's safe deposit boxes for the storage of cash, traveler's checks, and any other valuables. Do not leave valuables or sensitive documents in the room.

SAFETY AND SECURITY INCIDENTS

The previous chapters provided guidelines for avoiding or preventing the majority of safety and security incidents. However, even the most prepared person can become a victim of a sudden confrontation. Familiarity with the principles in this chapter will increase chances for survival when threatened and provide a framework for response. This chapter provides general guidelines for dealing with the most common safety and security incidents, including:

Fire

Electrical Shock

Medical Emergencies

Confrontation, Robbery and Assault

Sexual Assault

Car Hijackings

Gunfire

Ambush

Shelling

Grenades

Bombings

Landmines, Unexploded Ordnance and Booby Traps

Kidnapping and Hostage Situations

5.1 FIRE

Fire poses a significant risk to health and safety, especially in countries where fire-response infrastructure is lacking, buildings are not built to minimize fire hazards, and few people have fire-safety training. Fires in offices, warehouses, and residences can prove catastrophic and the threat of fire should be addressed in all safety and security assessments. Most fires start small and can be extinguished if detected early. The best method for fighting fires is prevention through regular inspections, staff training and properly maintained fire-fighting equipment in all facilities.

IMMEDIATE ACTION FOR FIRE RESPONSE

It is important not to panic when confronted with fire. There are many things that can be done to prevent a fire from spreading and minimize damage and potential loss of life. The steps to take are:

- Sound the alarm. Yell for help, summon aid, activate the fire alarm, etc. Do not attempt to fight the fire until the building evacuation is initiated.
- Determine the cause of fire and what is available to fight it. If it is an electrical fire, it is important to first turn off electricity, if possible.
- Attempt to fight the fire but under no circumstances risk injury in the process.
- If successful, continue monitoring the site to prevent flare-ups until help arrives.
- If unable to fight the fire, evacuate quickly, closing doors and windows, if possible, ensuring no one remains in the building.
- Give information to and cooperate with fire-response personnel when they arrive.

STRUCTURE FIRES

Fires in buildings can spread quickly, trapping people inside. It is important to respond immediately to any fire alarm or evacuation order. Do not assume it is a practice drill. Staff should plan ahead and learn the emergency exit routes from residences and offices. In hotels or when traveling, look for the suggested evacuation route and rehearse it, if necessary. When evacuating a building remember the following:

- Think ahead what the route will look like smoke may obscure vision.
- Do not take the elevators (if present) use the stairs.
- Cover yourself with a non-synthetic blanket, coat or other cloth, preferably wet.
- Before opening doors, feel the door for heat. There may be fire on the other side that will flare when the door is opened.
- Avoid routes that are exposed to falling objects.
- Stay low and move as quickly as possible. It may be necessary to crawl to avoid smoke and heat.
- Jumping from more than two stories can be fatal and should only be a last resort. If unable to exit a tall building, make your way to the roof. Offices or residences should not be located in tall buildings that do not have adequate means of evacuation during emergencies.

If in a burning building, it is important that evacuation is not delayed for any reason. Remaining inside should only be an option when there is absolutely no means to escape. If unable to exit, prepare to remain in the building by doing the following:

- Go to a room with an exterior window and mark it clearly to summon assistance. Stay in that room.
- Close the main entry door and any interior door to the room.
- Place blankets and clothes at the base of the doors to keep smoke out. If possible, use wet cloth to make a better seal.
- If possible, wet non-synthetic blankets, coats or other clothes for possible use later.
- Stay low near an open window and continue signaling for help.
- If fire spreads to the room, get under two or more layers of blankets or clothes with the outer layers wet, if possible.

If you or someone near you is on fire, remember - stop, drop and roll.

Stop. Don't panic and don't allow others to run about if they are on fire. Remove burning clothes, if possible.

Drop. Fall quickly to the ground or floor. If someone else is on fire, try to get them to do so. "Tackle" them only if you will not catch fire yourself.

Roll. Roll flat over and over (back and forth if in a room) until the fire is extinguished. The rolling will smother and scatter the fire in most cases. If someone else is on fire, have them roll. You can use water, sand, or a blanket to help smother the fire while they are rolling. Do not attempt to beat the fire out with bare hands; continue rolling instead.

Once the fire is extinguished, summon help and begin first aid.

5.2 ELECTRICAL SHOCK

Like fire, electrical shock usually can be avoided through protection and prevention. Most electrical shocks are caused from worn wiring and electrical equipment, overloaded sockets, or unsafe modifications to electrical systems. Electrical incidents can be prevented or minimized by conducting regular inspections, correcting discrepancies, and ensuring that all staff know the location of the electrical cut-off switch. If electrical shock does occur, take the following immediate actions:

- Summon assistance sound the alarm.
- Remove the electrical source, either through the electrical cut-off switch or unplugging the equipment, if possible.
- Do not approach or touch a person being shocked. Electricity will travel through the person and into the responder.
- Use a rope, broom handle, or other non-conducting (non-metal) object to move victim away from source of electricity.
- Begin aid once the victim is in a safe area or electricity is turned off. Extinguish any fires present.
- Administer first aid, including CPR if necessary, and continue until help arrives.

5.3 MEDICAL EMERGENCIES

Each CARE Country Office should have comprehensive medical emergency response procedures in place for all staff. In some cases, there will be different procedures for national and international staff, including the possibility that international staff will be evacuated to medical treatment in another country. Providing basic first aid training to all staff and family members can greatly reduce the effects of sudden illness or injury, especially in areas without an effective emergency medical response system.

WHEN RESPONDING TO ANY MEDICAL EMERGENCY:

Secure the area - It is important to remember that the victim is not helped if the responder becomes a second victim. Do not rush to aid in an emergency before ensuring that it is safe. Look around for what may have caused the injury and what may injure the responder. Determine the attitude of bystanders, if any.

- Do not enter a suspected landmine area for any reason.
- For electrical shock, ensure the source of electricity is turned off before touching the victim.
- For vehicle accidents, move beyond the accident site and stop well off the road (where possible) to prevent a subsequent accident or injury.
- Pay careful attention to the attitude and reaction of bystanders, and be sure that they understand the rescuer's intent. Consider finding an interpreter, if necessary.
- Be aware of the potential for criminal activity in connection with the incident, including the possibility of fake accidents to lure in potential victims of theft.
- Remember that drowning victims often come in pairs, the original victim and the incautious responder. Avoid doubledrownings.

A rule of thumb for possible drowning is:

- Row attempt to row to the victim.
- Throw find a suitable float or rope to throw to the victim.
- Go swimming to the victim should be a last resort and done with extreme caution.

Summon aid – Call for help or ask a bystander to get help and make sure they understand your request. Call the Country Office, other staff, or the appropriate authorities. In remote areas it may be many hours before someone else comes by, so make sure you notify someone before beginning aid.

Gather materials – Is there a first aid kit in the vehicle? Can a blanket, some bandage material or other necessary items be obtained quickly? If so, it will prevent having to stop first aid later to get these items.

Begin first aid – In most countries, emergency medical care is the responsibility of the initial responder until more competent personnel arrive (ambulance or doctor). The Country Office should ensure everyone is familiar with the legal obligations and standards for treatment for emergency response in their area. Once first aid has begun, it should continue until the victim is transported to a medical facility or until relieved by more competent emergency medical personnel.

5.4 CONFRONTATION, ROBBERY AND ASSAULT

A cooperative, respectful demeanor during confrontation may avoid further provoking, and in some cases, even calm a hostile person. Armed assailants are most likely to shoot when they feel their own safety is threatened. When faced with robbery, threats, or confrontation, consider the following:

- Do not try to intimidate or be aggressive. Instead, maintain a polite, open, and confident demeanor and try not to show anger or fear.
- Speak quietly and distinctly.
- Keep hands visible and move slowly with precise gestures.
- Respond to requests, but do not offer more than what is requested.
- Never take physical risks in defense of property or money. No
 material possessions are worth risking the life of a CARE staff
 member. When faced with a demand for CARE property, such as a
 vehicle or computer equipment, do not resist.
- If in a group, do not talk among yourselves more than is necessary, particularly in a language not understood by the assailants.
- Normally, do not consider attempting escape. If previous information indicates that armed attackers usually attempt to kill their victims then, in addition to added precautions to prevent confrontation, staff members should be given basic training on methods of defense and escape.

5.5 SEXUAL ASSAULT

As part of orientation all staff members should receive a briefing on the Country Office policy on sexual harassment and procedures in the event of sexual assault. These policies and procedures should be reviewed regularly. Basic facts concerning sexual assault that everyone should know include:

- Everyone is a potential victim of sexual assault. It is a crime of violence and control, and all ages, ethnicities and economic groups are at risk.
- Sexual assault is the most under-reported violent crime.
- Victims are usually pre-selected and the perpetrator is often an acquaintance. Preventive measures can reduce the likelihood of becoming a target of opportunity, since the offender will usually wait until the potential victim is vulnerable or isolated.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE

There is no one single best way to respond when threatened with sexual assault. Victims should use their best judgment for the specific incident. Consider the following response options.

Passive resistance: Verbally try to change the mind of the attacker or ruin the attacker's desire to have sexual contact.

Active resistance: Use physical force to fight off the attacker. Scream, shout for help, run away, or fight back, such as with a knee to the attacker's groin.

Submit: If there is no way out and one feels their life is in danger, survival should be the objective.

AFTER AN ATTACK

Sexual assault and its aftermath can be a terrifying experience. Victims often react with a combination of fear and shame and find it difficult to discuss the attack or seek help.

- Victims must remember they are not alone. They deserve sensitive and confidential help because sexual assault is a horrible crime.
- It is the victim's decision whether or not to report the crime.
 Though it may be difficult, the attack should be reported to the appropriate authorities. The Country Director must ensure that procedures are in place to ensure preservation of the victim's confidentiality, legal and human rights, and respect of privacy and dignity.
- A medical examination is strongly recommended, before showering or douching. The examination should include tests for sexually transmitted diseases and treatment for any injuries.
- The Country Director should have someone accompany and support the victim during the reporting and examination.
- CARE will recommend and facilitate counseling for all victims of sexual assault.

Taking the necessary measures to ensure victim confidentiality, the Country Office should complete a CARE Incident Report Form. In some areas there will be a method of sharing general, non-personal safety and security incident information within the NGO community. This is an important step to prevent others from becoming victims.

5.6 CAR HIJACKING

Car hijackings can occur anywhere but are most common at checkpoints or road intersections. CARE staff operating in areas where carjackings occur should receive training on avoiding potential trouble spots and immediate action to take when threatened. A careful security assessment is required prior to operating vehicles in known high-threat areas.

PRECAUTIONS AGAINST CARJACKING

- Vary routes and time of travel. Avoid developing patterns or making plans known to those who are not CARE staff or family.
- Avoid areas with criminal activity or known threats. If possible, avoid "choke points" and other vulnerable areas.
- When possible, have contact with other agencies operating in the area to maintain awareness of the current situation along routes.
 Consider convoy travel with another agency.
- If approaching a suspicious area, stop well before the area to observe other traffic passing through it. This is especially useful for "unofficial" checkpoints.
- Mark the vehicle appropriately for the area. In most cases, it is advantageous to have CARE placards or flags clearly visible.

IF STOPPED WHILE DRIVING

- Stop the vehicle. Apply the hand brake, but keep the engine running in neutral.
- Remain calm. Try not to show fear or anger. Do not become aggressive.
- Keep hands visible and do not make sudden movements. When complying with demands, be sure to move slowly and consider telling the assailant what you intend to do prior to doing it.
- Get out only when instructed to do so. If exiting the vehicle, leave the door open.
- Avoid direct eye contact with attackers, but try to note their appearance, dress, etc. to report later to the authorities.
- Be compliant to demands, but demonstrate composure.
- Allow the hijackers to depart without interference.

5.7 GUNFIRE

GUNFIRE WHEN WALKING

- Try to remain calm. Do not panic and run.
- Take immediate cover on the ground. Lay flat, face down.
- Determine the direction of the firing and determine what, or where, the target is.
- If possible, crawl to any nearby protection, such as a ditch, a hole, or inside a building.
- Observe the actions of others nearby and react accordingly.
- Leave the scene only when in a safe area or after the firing has completely stopped. Contact the appropriate authorities and/or the Country Office immediately.

GUNFIRE WHEN IN A STRUCTURE

- Stay away from windows and doors and move to the interior of the building.
- Take shelter in the best-protected areas, such as a bathroom, the basement, under a stairwell, or behind a solid wall.
- If possible, contact the appropriate authorities for assistance.

GUNFIRE WHEN IN A VEHICLE

- Keep windows slightly opened and radio at low volume to provide early warning.
- If the firing is ahead, but is not directed at the vehicle (as it would be in an ambush), stop immediately. Reverse and when feasible, turn around and drive to a safe area, remaining on hard surface roads or driving back on the same tracks (dirt roads and roadsides may be mined).
- If firing is somewhere other than directly ahead, or if the direction cannot be determined, stop immediately and take cover outside the vehicle (unless in a mined area). Keep keys and communication equipment with you.
- If possible, crawl to any nearby protected area. Never take shelter under a vehicle.

5.8 AMBUSH

The very nature of an ambush, a surprise attack from a concealed position, places a vehicle or convoy at an extreme disadvantage. In areas where ambushes are known to occur, extra security precautions and communication procedures should be strictly enforced. The best defense against vehicle ambush is prior planning to detect and avoid potential vulnerable areas or times.

No single defensive measure, or combination of measures, will prevent or effectively counter all ambushes in all situations. Immediate actions during an ambush should be adapted to the local situation. For example, in some areas it may not be advisable to drive forward when attacked as the assailants may have placed their trap in that direction. As with any threat, careful analysis will indicate potential vulnerabilities and protective measures to be implemented.

DURING VEHICLE AMBUSH

- If at all possible, continue to drive forward under control at the highest possible speed. It is difficult to hit a moving target; the faster it moves, the more difficult it becomes.
- If the firing is coming from the front, attempt to veer left or right up a side street (in a town) or, if in the countryside, off to the side (but do not leave paved road). Reversing or turning around is not recommended. The slower vehicle presents an easier target.
- If the driver has been shot or the vehicle immobilized, get out, keeping behind the vehicle (away from the source of firing) for added protection and concealment. Take the first available protection, then consider moving to better protection if nearby. Hard cover, such as a ditch, rocks or a building, provides the best protection.

5.9 SHELLING

Country Offices that operate in areas prone to shelling will have carefully crafted immediate action procedures in place and specially constructed protective shelters. All Country Office staff and visitors should be given specific briefing and training prior to operating in the area. Some general guidelines for immediate action during shelling include:

- Go immediately to the nearest shelter and stay there until the shelling has completely stopped. In some cases, there will be someone responsible for sounding "all clear." Do not search for unaccounted persons during the shelling.
- If caught in the open, take cover in the nearest ditch, shelter, alleyway or other available cover.
- If driving, attempt to move through the shelling as quickly as possible. NEVER STOP DRIVING, unless there is no choice. If you must stop, seek shelter away from the vehicle.

5.10 GRENADES

If a grenade is thrown or rolls nearby, there are only a few seconds in which to act. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO PICK UP AND THROW OR KICK A GRENADE AWAY! Do not attempt to run to shelter. Grenade fuses last only a few seconds, and the blast range is about 30 meters in all directions, so running is useless. There is less chance of injury for people flat on the ground than those upright or running. Take the following immediate actions:

- Sound the alarm, turn away from the grenade and take one step.
- Drop face down on the ground and cross legs, keeping them straight with feet pointing towards the grenade. Keep arms straight along the body. Do not look back at the grenade.

 If there is no explosion within 30 seconds, stay low, crawl to a safe area and notify the appropriate authorities. Do not go back to the area, and prevent others from doing so.

5.11 BOMBINGS

Bombings and terrorist attacks can take place anywhere without warning or apparent pattern. Most occur in areas where crowds are expected, such as the market, a crowded bus, the post office, or the airport. There may not seem to be a specific target population, though often the attacks are directed toward foreign interests.

All CARE Country Offices could face the possibility of civil unrest and should give basic anti-terrorism (AT) training to all personnel and family members as part of basic security training once per year. While AT training cannot prevent attack, it can increase staff confidence and give them a specific framework for response to lessen the chances of them or their family becoming victims. National Headquarters can provide a general antiterrorism training course that can be modified by CARE Country Offices for their use. Civil disturbances and bombings should be carefully analyzed to determine if CARE staff or assets are being specifically targeted.

5.12 LANDMINES, UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO) AND BOOBY TRAPS

Landmines are explosives with detonating systems that are triggered by contact with, or proximity to, a person or vehicle. When detonated, they are designed to incapacitate a person or vehicle with an explosive blast, fragments, or in the case of some antitank mines, a jet of molten metal. Unexploded ordnance (UXO) are the shells, mortar rounds, and bombs that did not explode during original use. In some cases, the fuses

are so sensitive on this ammunition that merely casting a shadow over it can cause it to explode.

Any area that has experienced fighting may be contaminated with landmines or UXO. This is especially true of lowlands in front of defensive hill positions, military emplacements, or military buildings. Other likely areas of contamination include avenues of approach, bridges, alongside railways and airstrips, key intersections, borders, water sources, and depressions and ditches. This section provides only a brief overview of landmines and UXO and is not intended to replace appropriate mineawareness training. In-depth information on landmine threats and procedures is available in the CARE International/UN Landmine Safety Handbook, available from the CARE Security Unit.

Never pick up or touch landmines or unexploded ordnance

When there is a risk of landmines, UXO, or booby traps in an area, CARE policy is very specific. No one will work in areas with known or suspected landmine/UXO contamination without first receiving appropriate training.

LANDMINES

Landmines are designed to impede or deny movement in a given area. They come in various sizes and configurations and may be placed by hand or by air. Generally, mines are grouped by intended target, either antipersonnel (AP) or anti-tank (AT), with AP mines by far the most common. Some countries have millions of them contaminating a wide range of area.

Landmines are generally buried within 15 cm of the earth's surface, or laid on or above the ground (for instance, on stakes or fixed to trees). Landmines can be triggered by direct pressure, trip wires, tilt rods, command detonation, or by some combination of these methods. Moreover, it is possible to booby-trap any type of mine by using antihandling devices to make removal more difficult.

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)

Most former zones of conflict are littered with unexploded ordnance, such as grenades, rockets, mortar and artillery shells, bombs, cluster munitions, etc. Often these munitions have defective fuses that will cause them to explode at the slightest touch. Unexploded cluster munitions can function almost exactly as landmines, exploding when stepped on or disturbed.

BOOBY TRAPS

A booby trap is a lethal device disguised to look innocuous. Objects that would be likely to be picked up by a soldier, either as a souvenir or for practical reasons, are those most often booby-trapped. Booby traps are often placed in important buildings and can include computer and office equipment, chairs, food stacks, military paraphernalia, etc. Because they take time and some expertise to rig, booby traps are not extremely common. Nevertheless, in the immediate aftermath of conflict avoid places such as former military bases, government buildings, schools, and health centers that are likely to be booby-trapped.

TRAVELING IN REGIONS AFFECTED BY LANDMINES OR UXO

The following guidelines are designed to remind CARE staff of considerations for traveling in regions affected by landmines or UXO. However, this is not a substitute for appropriate landmine-awareness training, which is mandatory for all staff working in areas suspected of having landmines or UXO.

 Never travel to high-risk areas for non-essential reasons. Ensure everyone traveling has received the proper training and preparation.

- Keep office informed of the dates, times and planned routes of all travel. Travel only the approved routes and do not deviate from the planned route, if at all possible.
- Wherever possible, stay on hard-surfaced roads, even if it makes the trip longer.
- Carry a map marked with the best available information about routes known to be free of mines. Update this information by checking with local people during travel. Whenever possible, travel with someone that knows the route.
- Use extra caution when driving during or after heavy rains.
 Mines are often moved or exposed by rain.
- Do not leave the road for any reason. Never drive around roadblocks of former military positions. Never leave the road to overtake someone, pass an obstruction, or turn around. If the road is not wide enough, back up until the vehicle can be safely turned around.
- Never drive over anything in the road. A paper bag, a piece of cloth, a wooden board, or a new pothole could all conceal a landmine.
- Always ask local people about the landmine situation and pay attention to their warnings!
- Never walk through overgrown areas. Use sidewalks and wellused paths.
- Walk in single file when traveling along paths in potentially mined areas. Allow 20 meters between each individual.
- Do not enter abandoned buildings.
- Do not touch anything, especially unexploded ordnance. Do not go souvenir hunting.

5.13 KIDNAPPING AND HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

Kidnappers and hostage-takers almost always choose their targets after careful surveillance. Potential targets are those with visible assets or a clear affiliation with a certain group. Humanitarian organizations are perceived in some countries as large and well-funded, so holding aid

workers for ransom may be seen as a source of income for some groups. Overall, kidnappings and hostage taking of humanitarian staff is still rare, but increasing.

In the event of a kidnap or hostage situation, the appropriate National Headquarters is the senior CARE will not pay ransom or provide goods under duress but will use all appropriate means to secure the release of the hostage. CARE also will provide all possible support to the hostage's family.

authority and should be contacted immediately. Each National Member should have a crisis management plan in place covering these situations.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS FOR THE COUNTRY OFFICE

- Notify local authorities, the National Headquarters and the RMU.
- Verify the identity and condition of the hostage or hostages.
- Attempt to identify the hostage-taking party and its demands.
- Establish continuous communication with regional office and others, as appropriate.
- Increase security measures and communications with remaining staff, as appropriate.
- Inform other organizations (UN, NATO, ICRC, police, appropriate embassy, etc.), as appropriate.
- All Country Office staff should be thoroughly briefed on the potential problems and conditions that might be faced immediately following capture.

- Everyone should be aware of the steps that will be taken to secure release and possible coping methods to employ.
- Only the CD or designated representative should communicate with the media.

ABDUCTION

The time of actual abduction, specifically the first hour, is the most dangerous. The kidnappers are nervous, the victim may not realize what is happening, and the situation can be very volatile.

- Remain as calm and composed as possible, particularly when being transported somewhere by the kidnappers. Try not to cry.
- Talking to the kidnappers is recommended, provided this does not make them more nervous.
- Explain everything you have on your person.
- Escape should not be considered except in very rare circumstances. Escape attempts may lead to injury or death for the hostages.

POST-CAPTURE

The post-capture period is likely to be difficult and unpleasant, particularly in contrast to the comfortable conditions in which the average victim normally has been living.

- Post-capture shock is a major physiological and psychological problem. Capture, when completely unexpected, results in severe trauma brought about by the total change of situation. In such circumstances, the hostage may experience deep depression and extreme anxiety.
- The victim should accept that he or she must obey given orders, taking steps to preserve a sense of self-esteem and personal dignity as the situation allows.

HEALTH DURING CAPTIVITY

In every circumstance, a conscious effort must be made to maintain physical and mental health. Physical health can be maintained by eating food that is offered. Attempt to maintain a regular exercise routine, if possible.

- Mental health can be maintained by identifying and sticking to a system of personal values. It is healthy to focus mental activity on the future and freedom. Prepare mentally for feelings of extreme isolation. Request writing materials or books, if available.
- Maintaining self-discipline is essential in order to overcome the
 effects of the immediate environment and the inactivity imposed by
 it. A routine should be established and observed and standards of
 cleanliness maintained, if possible. If appropriate, gradually
 increase requests for personal hygiene items or books and writing
 material.

NEGOTIATION

The National Headquarters will coordinate hostage release efforts.

- Always remember that steps are being taken to effect release and do not interfere with this process. Except in some special cases, hostages should not negotiate for their own release, nor discuss what action an organization may take. Such discussions could compromise the ongoing negotiations.
- Hostages should not allow themselves to be convinced that they have been abandoned by the outside world.

RELEASE

The time of hostage release may also pose risks for the victim. When the time for release comes, hostages should proceed with great care. Specifically:

- Listen to orders given by captors and obey them exactly.
- Do not make sudden or unexpected moves.
- Stay alert. Be prepared to act quickly if things go wrong.
- Be prepared for delays and disappointments.

HOSTAGE SURVIVAL CHECKLIST

TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, KEEP THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN MIND:

- Remain calm. If capture is inevitable, accept it and follow orders. Your only task is survival.
- Recognize captivity as a fact and mentally accept the change of status and circumstances.
- Give captors details of any necessary medical treatment.
- Accept and eat food that is given, even if it is unpalatable.
- Prepare mentally for a long wait, perhaps many months, before release.
- Adopt an attitude of discrete skepticism toward information passed on by captors.
- Plan a daily program of activity, including daily physical exercise, and adhere to it.
- Try to keep an accurate record of time.
- Take advantage of any comforts or privileges offered by the captors, like books, newspapers or access to the radio. If not offered, ask for them.
- Keep as clean as circumstances permit. Ask for adequate washing and toilet facilities.
- If possible, develop a good rapport with captors and try to earn their respect. It may be helpful to attempt to inform them of CARE's work in their area.

DO NOT:

- DO NOT adopt a belligerent, hostile, or sullen attitude.
- DO NOT enter into conversations on controversial subjects, such as politics or religious beliefs.
- DO NOT become either over-depressed or over-optimistic.
- DO NOT attempt physical violence or engage in verbal abuse of captors.

STRESS MANAGEMENT

The presence of 'stress' or tension is normal in daily life. Exposure to stress produces physical, emotional, intellectual and behavioral changes within the body that enable a proper and effective response. These changes are usually mild and temporary. They can also be desirable to challenge and focus one's efforts.

Due to the nature of work at CARE however, staff members are confronted with work load and political, cultural, social, and physical safety issues that cause additional stress to themselves and their families. When the body is compelled to react to a stressful environment over a long period of time, stress will cause physical and/or mental fatigue or serious health problems. Unless properly managed, stress will adversely affect staff health and hinder performance and judgment. Severe or traumatic stress can be life-threatening.

A safe working environment by today's standards is not only safe from physical injury, but also safe from psychological harm. Managers can play a role in limiting stress from the work environment, but some stress is unavoidable. Individuals must also learn to properly manage stress and take action before stress reaches dangerous levels. Though recommended coping mechanisms are available, each individual will experience stress differently and therefore must manage their stress individually, in their own way. Stress management varies by culture, gender, personality, identity and many other factors. This chapter provides information on:

Sources and Types of Stress Stress Responses Stress Prevention and Management

6.1 SOURCES AND TYPES OF STRESS

Stress itself is a normal psychological phenomena and not an illness. It is the body's response to a perceived gap between the demands placed on us and our ability to meet those demands. These strains can be any emotional, physical, social, economic, or other factor that requires a response or change.

An optimal amount of stress allows us to focus our attention and mobilize our energy. It helps us to face a challenge, prepare for a given task or course of action, meet the goals of daily life, and achieve peak performance. Too little stress can result in boredom, lack of motivation and fatigue; too much stress can negatively affect personality, health and ability to perform. But the 'optimum' amount of stress for one person may overwhelm another. Individual stress tolerance, the factors themselves that evoke stress, and the level of exposure can all impact our response to stress.

STRESS TOLERANCE

Whether a given situation is considered stressful or not will depend on how we perceive it and how we rate our ability to deal with it. This 'stress tolerance' is affected by our:

- personality traits
- coping skills
- current physical and emotional health
- · previous experience
- perception of danger
- · strength of social support network
- socio-economic and demographic characteristics

STRESS FACTORS

Factors that may evoke a stress response can be positive or negative; internal or external; or real or imagined. A variety of common stress factors are illustrated in the box below.

A person's work can create a large number of stress factors. These include:

- job dissatisfaction
- workload (too much or too little)
- · pace or variety of work
- autonomy or control over specific tasks
- conflicting job demands
- multiple supervisors
- lack of clarity about responsibilities or expectations
- level of responsibility
- job security

Major life changes:

- marriage
- separation or divorce
- change of job
- illness of a family member
- birth of a child
- death of a loved one

Minor changes or day-to-day aggravations:

- relationship problems with spouse/partner
- peer or family pressure
- financial concerns

Personality-related:

- impatience
- inability to set realistic goals and to prioritize
- poor health habits
- inflexibility
- · over-dependence
- poor communication skills
- poor interpersonal skills

Physical or environmental:

- excessive or continuous noise
- information overload
- social isolation

It is unlikely that there is a significant distinction between work-related stress and stress at home. As a consequence of stress factors experienced at work, an individual may be irritable at home.

In addition to these 'common' factors, there are other issues specifically related to CARE's work that may cause stress. Staff may encounter these issues in the normal conduct of their work; some are specific to emergency, insecurity, or crisis response.

Personal comfort. Long and tiring commutes; long working hours; the need to relocate to unfamiliar housing (especially if it is communal), power outages, the need to create basic elements for rest and personal comfort from scratch, and monotonous food all place added demands on staff.

Frustration. Factors such as transportation delays, unplanned changes in programs, and shortages of equipment or supplies can cause staff to feel they are not able to accomplish all that they 'should'. Attempts to accomplish all the 'shoulds' often lead to physical and mental exhaustion, and a sense of personal failure.

Feeling indispensable. The "Superman or Wonder Woman Syndrome" leaves staff feeling that no one else can perform their tasks and that they cannot leave their posts, even for a short period.

Personal safety and security. High crime levels, civil disturbances, natural disasters, or any possibility of physical danger either to oneself or to others are stress factors. This is particularly true when the NGO community is specifically targeted.

Isolation. Staff may feel a sense of loneliness due to their location and the type of work they perform.

Group identification. Staff may come to closely identify with an affected group or vulnerable population. In complex crises where atrocities are committed on a specific population, there may be feelings of revenge or redress.

Restrictions on movement. Restrictions on where a staff member may go, such as having borders closed or personnel confined to a compound during off-duty hours, can add to overall stress. When recreation areas are placed "off limits", the possibility of using these stress coping mechanisms is restricted.

Guilt. Staff, especially international staff, may experience a sense of guilt at "having so much." Following a disaster, staff may feel a sense of guilt that they survived.

Despair/Hopelessness. Staff may lose sight of the enormity of the task they are undertaking or become overwhelmed by the magnitude of the situation.

CHRONIC STRESS

For 'optimal' levels of exposure to stress factors, symptoms are generally mild and temporary. Individuals return to normal functioning when the stress factor is removed. If exposure is excessive (multiple factors), repeated, or long-term however, symptoms can persist and multiply, resulting in chronic or cumulative stress. Not only are these response symptoms potentially more physically and mentally detrimental, but chronic stress can erode coping mechanisms. Chronic stress builds slowly and may be hard to notice in oneself. If not properly managed, chronic stress can lead to burnout.

CULTURE SHOCK

Individuals moving into an unfamiliar culture or setting, even within their own national boundaries, may experience the phenomenon known as culture shock. It involves a normal and predictable sequence of emotional responses that many, though not all, people transition through as they enter and adjust to their new surroundings. Recognizing the effects of these transition states on overall stress levels is important, especially since there are measures that can be taken to minimize the negative effects.

Stages of Adjustment (Culture Shock)

- Enthusiasm & Excitement
- Confusion, Disorientation and Doubt
- Withdrawal & Loneliness
- Re-emergence & Adjustment this period may take several months; small adjustments may be necessary throughout the mission.
- Achievement & Enthusiasm
- Return Anxiety
- Shock/Reintegration into Parent Culture

Tips to Minimize the Consequences of Culture Shock:

- Recognize that it is normal to feel overwhelmed and out of place at first.
- Try to construct realistic expectations in the beginning.
- Remember that you have survived major transitions before.
- Take care of yourself: get plenty of rest, maintain proper nutrition, stay fit, and limit intake of alcohol.
- Find a mentor or host country national who can answer questions.
- Don't withdraw from social contact with others.
- Keep in touch with family and friends "back home."
- Reach out beyond the workplace community. Beware of reinforcing negative stereotypes of the host country's people.
- When taking time off, do something not related to work.

TRAUMATIC STRESS

Any event which is very distressing and outside of the realm of normal human experience can result in traumatic stress. Traumatic stress usually produces a very intense response, including fear and/or helplessness, which may overwhelm the individual's coping mechanisms. Such a response is a **normal reaction to an abnormal situation.** It does not necessarily indicate that the person has developed a psychiatric disorder. Nonetheless, such exposure can lead to the development of **post-traumatic stress disorder.**

Traumatic stress is brought on by exposure to emotionally powerful events or "critical incidents" such as those listed to the right. The event may be sudden and unexpected or ongoing in nature.

Some staff may experience 'vicarious' or indirect trauma through witnessing trauma or violence, or being associated with a tragic event such as acute disaster recovery efforts. Others may experience 'compassion fatigue' as a result of exposure to human suffering or tragic situations that are more chronic and long-term. In many cases, the symptoms of vicarious trauma or compassion fatigue resemble those of victims experiencing direct trauma. Individuals with a prior history of significant trauma, instability in current life circumstances, or other vulnerabilities may be at highest risk.

Regardless of the source, traumatic stress may be one of the more serious occupation hazards experienced by staff, both in the field and in headquarters.

6.2 STRESS RESPONSES

The body responds to stress in a three-phased pattern, but not every stress issue produces a response. It is the perceived more than the absolute aspects of stress that determine its impact.

- **1- Alert or Alarm phase:** The body calls on its defense mechanisms in order to react rapidly and prepare a person to meet a challenge or threat. Predominantly physical symptoms appear. Once the stressful situation has been dealt with and the threat is over, physiological state returns to normal. If the stress factors persist, the body usually moves to the next phase.
- **2- Adaptive or resistance phase:** During sustained, prolonged exposure to unmanaged stress, the body may exhibit one or more of the symptoms on the following pages. The presence of several of these symptoms may mean that a person's coping ability is diminishing and work performance is being affected. The number and intensity of symptoms exhibited in a person in any given situation will vary, depending on the level of stress experienced, previous emotional experiences, and the personality of the individual.
- **3- Exhaustion or burnout phase:** The body's coping mechanisms are no longer adequate to adapt to stress factors and symptoms may become chronic. The progressive symptoms of burnout are:
 - physical, mental and emotional exhaustion
 - inability to do whatever helps to relax; loss of interest in previously pleasurable activities
 - feeling that the more you work, the poorer the results
 - inability to say no to additional workload
 - inability to organize your work in a coherent manner
 - feelings of guilt or shame for not functioning as you should
 - self-doubt

- fear that your colleagues despise you
- cynicism and bitterness
- blaming and criticising others
- others avoid your company
- loss of self-esteem
- feelings of failure and powerlessness to change the situation
- overreaction, either in anger or in tears
- suspiciousness, even paranoia
- inability to establish your priorities
- depression

Severe chronic stress, if unmanaged, is also thought to contribute to such illnesses as high blood pressure, stroke, heart attack, diabetes, peptic ulcer disease, menstrual problems, increased vulnerability to cancer, and sexual difficulties.

In terms of post traumatic stress the order, timing and intensity of the response to a traumatic event can be different for everyone. Staff might experience acute reactions during a critical incident or a delayed stress response minutes, hours or days after the event. In more rare cases reactions may come after a few months or even years.

Responses can resemble those of cumulative stress, but they can be much more pronounced. Symptoms may include vomiting, emotional numbing, nightmares, highly focused attention or tunnel vision, grief, flashbacks to the traumatic event, increased sensitivity to violence, or even the fear of returning to work. Often there is a significant distortion of identity, worldview, religious beliefs, or sensory perceptions.

SYMPTOMS OF STRESS RESPONSE

Physical:

- persistent tiredness, fatigue
- sleep disturbance, nightmares, sleeplessness
- compulsive eating or lack of appetite
- digestive changes (heartburn, diarrhea, constipation, sensation of bloating, nausea)
- headaches
- neck and back pain
- tics and tremors allergy or skin problems
- visual difficulties
- recurrent minor illnesses
- rapid heart beat, hot flushes

Intellectual:

- poor concentration
- · loss of objectivity
- · memory difficulties
- difficulty in following through
- problems with decisionmaking
- cynicism
- problems with reasoning and verbal expression
- increased or decreased awareness of one's surroundings
- thinking again and again about the same event
- difficulty identifying familiar objects or people

SYMPTOMS OF STRESS RESPONSE (cont.)

Behavioral:

- increased use of alcohol, cigarettes or other drugs
- nervous mannerisms (biting nails, foot tapping, teeth grinding)
- change in activity levels
- disharmony with colleagues
- decline in efficiency and productivity
- recklessness or excessive caution
- exaggerated response to sudden noise
- constant talking
- withdrawal from social events; or inability to be alone
- decreased personal hygiene
- accident proneness

Emotional:

- irritability, impatience, short-tempered
- apathy
- anxiety or apprehension
- mood swings
- feeling flat, numb, or disconnected
- irrational fears
- panic
- denial
- · depression, tears

DELAYED REACTIONS TO STRESS

Delayed reaction to stress, often called post-traumatic stress disorder (PSTD), can occur well after the source of stress is removed. PSTD can be life threatening and requires a therapeutic intervention. The risk of PTSD can, however, be considerably reduced through preparation, on-site care, and post incident defusing or debriefing.

Staff members who work in severe risk environments should be provided with a post-deployment debriefing, whether they are experiencing traumatic stress response symptoms or not.

6.3 STRESS PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT

Anyone can be affected by stress, but the extent depends largely on lifestyle and is therefore primarily manageable. Whether we have control over the situation that is causing the stress or not, we can have control over our response to the situation. In other words, we can control how stressed we become. Through preventive techniques and good stress management, one can work in arduous circumstances while experiencing relatively low levels of stress.

INDIVIDUAL STRESS MANAGEMENT

Stress management is an individual process. There is no one best set of techniques. For stress management to be effective, it must be consistent and comprise the techniques that work best for the individual.

• It is important to recognize that it is impossible to take care of others if you do not take care of yourself. Remember, the time to act is before you reach burn out rather than after it.

- Learn about stress. The first step in stress management is acknowledging the possibility that you can become stressed. The second step is to be aware of the signs and symptoms of stress.
- Know yourself. Learn to observe your feelings and attitudes before trying to control your behavior.
 - How do you cope with abnormal working hours? with forced periods of inactivity?
 - How do you manage your own irritation, anger or conflicts with others?
 - How do you manage not being recognized or supported by your supervisor? by your colleagues?
 - How much privacy or 'alone time' do you need?
 - How do you adapt to extreme climatic conditions?
- Maintain good physical health. Establish a regular exercise program and stick to it. Beneficial exercise for stress reduction includes deep breathing and muscle relaxation exercises. Be vigilant concerning your diet and eat regularly.
- Ensure rest and relaxation. Get adequate, regular sleep. Maintain your normal routines for relaxation, such as hobbies, reading, etc.
- Maintain a sense of humor and perspective.
 Try to have contact with others outside of the work environment.
- Be informed. Knowledge of the work situation and environment provides an effective way of checking rumors and immediately addressing concerns.

Before beginning a new assignment, learn as much as possible about the context of the mission: the climate and geography of the region, living conditions, food, working conditions and the 'ambiance' of the work group, the political and sociocultural context of the host country. You can then evaluate in advance the degree of stress to which you may be subjected and thus prepare yourself psychologically."

- Change a stressful environment as much as possible. Refuse to see yourself as a helpless victim of circumstance. When faced with a difficult situation, identify the problem, think of alternatives, evaluate the alternatives, and finally select and implement the best alternative.
- Avoid negative thinking. Internal dialogue can add to stress if it is highly negative and self-critical. Instead of thinking, "I'm no good at this" or "I'll never get this done", make positive, helpful statements such as "I don't feel like doing this task right now, but I have done it before, so I can do it again".
- Put words to the emotions you feel. Sharing a problem with others may help you find a solution and will make you feel less isolated. This stress management technique can be useful for men and women. Learn to accept the intensity of your own emotions as normal in an abnormal situation. This is especially important if the emotion you are feeling is fear a natural response to danger. If unable to talk to others about your feelings, keep a journal or diary or write letters.
- Practice belief systems. Maintain spiritual health consistent with your personal beliefs.

SUPERVISOR-LEVEL STRESS MANAGEMENT

The work environment should be monitored to prevent exceptional stress build-up that can quickly degrade the health and safety of staff and effectiveness of programming. Supervisors can help prevent stress build-up in their staff through:

• **Pre-departure briefings and orientation.** Each person should be properly briefed prior to assignment to reduce uncertainty. Ensure that everyone is made aware of health and safety risks in the area and how to protect against them. In areas of insecurity, conduct staff safety and security briefings as often as required to allow staff members to express safety and security concerns or ideas.

Recognition of individual staff efforts.

Express appreciation on a regular basis. People do better in difficult situations when they feel that other people care about them. Provide constructive feedback to build self-confidence when addressing problem areas.

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Staff posted outside their home country should receive briefings before leaving home and additional orientation upon arrival. Individuals should make every effort to learn about the situation in their area of operations to better prepare for possible sources of stress.

- Regular time off for all staff. During periods of heavy workloads or in times of crisis, it is common for staff to attempt to work all day, every day. This can quickly lead to burnout. Many staff members need to be given permission to take care of themselves. Providing an afternoon off to a staff member who is obviously stressed and therefore often ineffective can improve productivity in the long term. In emergency response situations, regular rotation of staff out of the area every three to four weeks can help prevent build-up of excess stress.
- **Good examples.** Demonstrate proper stress management by eating properly, resting and taking appropriate time off.
- The 'buddy system'. Staff members may agree in advance to monitor each other's reactions to identify signs of excessive stress and fatique levels.
- In-country support. National Headquarters should provide a range of psychological support services for staff members. Staff should be advised during orientation, verbally and in writing, of the psychological support services available to them and how to access them. Consider providing culturally appropriate local counseling, support via telephone if local services are not available, and support services to family members. All services provided must be strictly confidential.

TRAUMATIC STRESS MANAGEMENT

Good stress management practices are always helpful, but additional interventions can significantly minimize the intensity and duration of a traumatic stress response.

Defusing is a process conducted by trained personnel within a few hours of the incident. The process allows those exposed to a critical incident to describe what happened, to talk about their reactions, to ask questions, and to receive information on potential responses to expect. In many cases, defusing alone will be insufficient and should be followed by a **formal debriefing** with a mental health professional.

- If a defusing and/or debriefing session is not offered immediately after a potentially traumatic event is suffered, request them. When possible, it is important to voice your thoughts and feelings during the incident as well as the ongoing impact of the incident on you. It is also important to raise whatever questions the incident has left you grappling with, such as "Why me?" or "Is there something I should have done differently?" These are normal questions. Debriefing is also important for those suffering from vicarious trauma or compassion fatigue.
- Insist that you are given time to rest and to process what has happened to you. Be willing to ask for additional help or support in the form of crisis counseling or short- or longer-term psychotherapy if you want or need it. Do not be shy or embarrassed about caring for yourself. It is not unusual to require additional support for traumatic stress.

SAFETY AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST

This checklist is designed to provide a Country Office or individual with guidelines for assessing their own safety and security situation. It is not intended to be a "how to list" and is not all-inclusive. Staff members will have additional ideas concerning security, and what is appropriate for one area may not be so elsewhere. In all cases it is the responsibility of the Country Director to decide which measures are appropriate for each area. Risk levels are indicated by the following: No mark = Low, * = Moderate, ** = High, *** = Severe. Items marked for one risk level also apply to all higher risk levels. For example, a single asterisk (*) denotes measures appropriate for Moderate, High and Severe risk levels. Those items marked with (H) are mandatory for all areas. A Country Office may choose to adopt some security measures designated for higher risk levels to avoid being unprepared should the threat environment suddenly change.

Upon completion of the self-assessment, the Country Director or designated responsible person should decide the priority for corrective action. Most discrepancies can be corrected at the local level, though shortages in communication equipment or vehicle outfitting may require significant additional funding. Mandatory items should be corrected as soon as possible. When the discrepancies involve safety items in an office or residence they should be corrected prior to occupancy.

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TRANSPORTATION

${\ensuremath{\mathtt{H}}}$ Seat belt/shoulder harness always worn front and rear.
$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ All vehicles are equipped with appropriate safety items.
$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ Vehicles are checked daily. Someone has been designated as responsible for maintenance and correction of discrepancies.
$_{\rm H}$ Vehicle logbooks are maintained for each vehicle and contain a copy of the checklist and maintenance schedule, trip tickets, communication procedures, documentation, maps, etc.
H National and international staff have proper travel documentation, including driver license. Essential vehicle registration and documentation is in each vehicle.
$_{\rm H}$ Drivers observe local driving laws and regulations and drive at speeds appropriate for conditions.
$_{\rm H}$ A clear policy concerning the use of CARE vehicles for personal use during and after the workday, weekends, and holidays has been developed and briefed to all staff members.
Helmets are worn by anyone on a motorcycle at all times. (While not a mandatory CARE policy, it is recommended that Country Offices strongly encourage everyone to follow this safety guideline.)
Vehicle fuel tanks are maintained above half full if possible.
Spare vehicle keys are kept under strict control in each Country Office.
Travelers notify others of travel time and destination. Procedures established for actions to be taken if travelers do not arrive as scheduled.
Policy concerning unauthorized passengers, especially soldiers,

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Where applicable, decals are posted on vehicle doors or window indicating guns are not permitted in the vehicle.
Vehicle doors are kept locked while driving and a minimum number of windows open (no more than 5 cm).
Vehicles do not have darkened or tinted windows that may obscure visibility.
Staff members operating a vehicle are able to perform basic maintenance, such as changing a tire and checking engine, brake, battery and radiator fluids.
The appropriate radio frequencies and call signs for all relevant organizations in the area (UNHCR, CARE Sub-offices, other NGOs, etc.) are posted in each vehicle.
Vehicle accident procedures and reporting policies are in place and briefed to all staff.
An updated country or regional roadmap is displayed in the office.
Policies and procedures concerning guidelines and safety considerations when using air transport have been established and staff briefed. Special consideration given to situations when national military or civilian helicopter flight is required.
* When possible, staff travel with at least one other person.
* A radio is provided when traveling during daylight hours. (Night travel is not recommended.)
* Radio check procedures are established for staff traveling out of the area of the office.
* Primary and alternate travel routes are selected that avoid danger areas and provide the safest journey possible.
* Regular contact with relevant local authorities is maintained to provide safety and security updates along the route.

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* Vehicles have extra water and fuel prior to any out of area	trip.
** The use of trip tickets or another vehicle tracking system	is in
place to help track vehicle movement	

FACILITY SAFETY AND SECURITY.

The following items apply to CARE facilities, such as offices, residences, apartments and warehouses and industrial spaces. Checklist items listed in the sections for Fire and Electrical Safety and Disaster Preparedness also apply to every facility at every risk level.

RESIDENCES

	$_{\rm H}$ Each residence has two possible exits (usually through a front and back door).
	$\ensuremath{\mathtt{H}}$ All exterior doors and windows are secure and can be locked from inside.
	$\ensuremath{\mathtt{H}}$ Outside doors to basement and service areas (laundry, storage rooms, etc.) can be locked.
	$\ensuremath{\mathtt{H}}$ Trapdoors in the ceiling or floor, including skylights, can be locked.
	Exterior entries have a method of seeing visitors without opening, and an outside light that can be activated from the inside.
	Area around house or compound is free from hazards, such as holes and exposed wires.
	When located in a walled compound a lightweight ladder is inside the compound to allow escape from the compound in an emergency.

There is a good view of approaches to house.
There is no place in yard for intruders to conceal themselves.
There is no access to roof or compound from neighboring houses or buildings.
Windows and exterior openings are screened to prevent mosquitoes and other vectors.
* Area around house has limited access for pedestrian and vehicle traffic.
* Yard or compound has fence or wall which is kept free from overhanging branches or thick bushes.
* Exterior lighting installed, with all fixtures and cables protected from tampering.
* Exterior light switch is accessible from inside the residence and at entry to compound or yard.
* External electrical, gas and telephone boxes are protected by locked or tamper-proof cover.
* Windows are fitted with bars or grates as appropriate. Metal doors or screened barred doors installed.
* Residence not near market area or host nation military compound.
* Residence has secure parking.
* Keys are carefully controlled. No duplicates made without CD and resident approval.
** If available, motion sensors are installed for exterior lights.
** Residence is near embassy, UN facility or clustered with other NGOs.

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** International staff member has provided a key to the residence to the Country Office for use in an emergency. Keys are kept in a secure location with access restricted as designated by the Country Directory and staff member.	l	
** Radio equipment, if present in residence, is protected from damage and theft.		
APARTMENT SAFETY		
(CHECKLIST ITEMS FOR RESIDENCES ALSO APPLY)		
Preferable located on the first floor (to deter crime) and not higher than the capability for the local fire brigade equipment to reach (usually below the seventh floor).)	
There is a guard or secure lock at entryway.		
Entryway is well lit and in good repair.		
There is a fire escape or other alternative method of exit.		
When present, stairways and elevators are well lit.		
OFFICE CAFFTY (CHECKLIST TEMS FOR RECIPENCES ALSO ARRIVA		
OFFICE SAFETY (CHECKLIST ITEMS FOR RESIDENCES ALSO APPLY)		
H Office evacuation procedures and routes are posted.		
H Someone is responsible for securing all windows, doors, exits, and entrances at the end of each day.		
H Office smoking area designated and an appropriate cigarette disposal container provided. Separate trash containers, clearly		

labeled, are installed in the area.

H Electrical devices and cords are free of damage that may pose a shock hazard. Outlets do not have excessive number of devices plugged into them. All documents of a sensitive nature are put away in an area with controlled access at the end of each day. (Political- or securityrelated materials should be kept separate from other files and access restricted.) Office safes, when used, are securely affixed to the floor and inspected at the end of each day. Office is arranged so that unescorted visitors remain under the receptionist's observation. All visitors are logged and follow proper access control procedures. ** Critical equipment is protected from damage. ** If more than one generator is present, the back-up generator is separated from the main unit. All units protected with sandbags. *** Fuel drums protected with sandbags. If fuel, oil, or other flammable substances are kept inside the compound, they are stored in remote areas and below ground level if possible. WAREHOUSE AND INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS (CHECKLIST ITEMS FOR RESIDENCES ALSO APPLY) H Fire extinguishers and smoke detectors are installed and routinely checked to ensure they are in working order and readily accessible. Staff is trained in fire procedures. H Trapdoors in the ceiling or floor, including skylights, are locked.

H Exterior doors and windows can be locked and are inspected at

the end of each day.

$\ensuremath{\mathtt{H}}$ A system is in place to regularly inspect the interior and exterior of the installation.
H Warehouse and installation personnel understand security measures and appropriate responses, and know emergency contact personnel.
$\ensuremath{\mathtt{H}}$ Key access is controlled and duplicate keys are not allowed without CD approval.
${\tt H}$ Access to storage areas for relief supplies and equipment is restricted to authorized personnel. A list of persons authorized admittance to the storage facility has been published and is displayed at the entryway to the each storage area.
There is no access from outside the building to fire escapes, stairways, and roof.
Warehouse and ground floor windows, particularly those near the ground or accessible from adjacent buildings, have been barred or grated.
Outdoor trash containers and storage bins are located away from the building. $ \\$
Janitorial closets, service openings, and electrical closets are kept locked at all times.
Tree limbs and natural and man made protrusions over the fence or wall have been removed or blocked.
There is alternate communication between the warehouse and the administrative offices in case the primary communication system fails.
* Access to the warehouse complex can be physically restricted to watchmen.
* Outdoor openings, such as air vents and utility access points, have been covered, locked, or screened.

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$\ensuremath{^{**}}$ Exterior floodlights and iron grills or bars for windows are installed and maintained.
** If feasible, the installation is protected by high perimeter fence or wall and a comprehensive external lighting system. There should be more than one exit from the compound.

FIRE AND ELECTRICAL SAFETY

$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ Fire extinguishers are installed in appropriate locations.
$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ Smoke detectors are installed, at least one on each floor.
$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ A first aid kit is present and maintained.
$_{\rm H}$ Electrical cut-off is located and marked. Switch is kept free of obstructions and readily accessible. Staff can turn off electrical current in an emergency.
${\tt H}$ Electrical devices, outlets, circuit breakers and cords are free of damage that may pose a shock hazard. Outlets are in good repair.
$_{\rm H}$ If there are window bars or grates there is at least one set of window bars hinged with an inside release (not padlocked) to allow for emergency exit.
$_{\rm H}$ All floors above the first floor have emergency escape method. For third floor and above there should be a rope or ladder with tested anchor points.
${\tt H}$ Flammable liquids are properly stored, away from house and from other flammables such as wood or paper. Compound and facility are kept free of debris and trash.
$_{\rm H}$ A water source sufficient to reach all parts of the compound is available. If no water is available in the compound a fire extinguisher is available outside the residence.

possible.

	H Circuit boxes, inside and outside, are covered.
	$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ Electrical wires or extension cords are not routed under carpet, where walked on, or where possibly damaged.
	* Electrical circuit, gas, and telephone boxes, if accessible from the outside, are locked to prevent tampering. If the external electrical and gas boxes contain the only cut-offs then the key is kept in a readily accessible location inside and is clearly marked.
DISASTE	R PREPAREDNESS
	$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ Residences and offices meet existing local building and safety codes.
	$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ Consideration given to local disaster planning measures, such as for floods or earthquakes.
	$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ Gas and electrical cut-off switches are located and marked.
	Emergency lighting is in place. (Can be flashlights or installed lights)
	* Residence has emergency items per Country Office policies.
	** Water tanks, if used, are located inside the compound with locking lid if possible.
	** Electrical generator is installed as a secondary power source if

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** If feasible an interior safe room is established in the building for use in case of crime, an attack or an emergency. Safe room should be supplied in accordance with the Disaster Preparedness Plan or other Country Office emergency plan. Safe room requirements:	_
Has a strong solid metal door, not bars or grillwork.	
Two methods of exit (if feasible).	
Has peephole on doors to view other side.	
Exterior windows barred with one hinged for emergency exit.	
Has method for communicating with the Country Office and local authorities (usually radio, cellular phone, or satellite phone, with landline only as a last resort).	
In the basement, only if the basement has been reinforced for use during disaster.	
Has sufficient food, water and supplies for five days or more as directed by the Country Office.	
If over two floors from ground, has rope or ladder for emergency exit.	

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COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT

industrial facilities is in place and tested periodically.
Sub-offices and remote sites have redundant communication capability to Country Office.
Country Office has redundant communication capability to regional office and National Headquarters as appropriate.
Quantity and condition of communication equipment and supplies/repair parts checked and updated regularly. Procedures in place for reporting and correcting communication deficiencies.
Communication problems within the area of operations, such as "dead spots" or interference, have been identified and staff members have been made aware of them.
The CARE emergency evacuation policy concerning destruction of specific communication equipment is posted.
Satellite phones, if available, are tested periodically. Policy for appropriate satphone use briefed to staff.
If possible, portable laptop computers are on hand and updated to allow resumption of office activity and connectivity during emergency relocation.
* If in high theft areas, mounts purchased for vehicles that allow removal of communication equipment when vehicle not in use.
** Appropriate communication equipment, such as satphones, are issued to all personnel traveling out of local area.

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	** If feasible, communication equipment has a back-up power supply (usually a generator). If a generator is used, there is a program for inspection, testing and preventative maintenance.			
	** Radios or other communication devices are used by staff traveling out-of-area.			
COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES				
	H Staff members are knowledgeable on the use of communication equipment installed in the office.			
	$_{\rm H}$ Staff never transmit sensitive information, such as the transfer of cash, in plain language over the radio network.			
	${\tt H}$ The appropriate RMU and National Headquarter personnel have been provided with a copy of Country Office call signs, frequencies and primary and alternate 24-hour contact procedures.			
	H Written communication procedures and guidelines are posted and briefed to staff. Essential emergency contact information, including phone numbers, frequencies, and call signs are posted in the office, in each vehicle, and on a card for each staff member to carry.			
	Communication equipment, including radios, cellular phones, and satellite phones, have host government approval and licensing prior to use if required.			
	There is a procedure in place for routine back-up of computer files, with back-up medium stored outside the office.			
	* Multiple VHF and HF frequencies have been obtained for each office if feasible.			
	* Use of other NGO or UN radio networks has been coordinated			

if available.

APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST * An office communication center has been established and a specific communication layout, including equipment location, has been defined. * Adequate number of national and international staff are able to serve in the communications center. ** Radio checks with remote offices, travelers, the UN and other NGOs in the area are routinely performed as appropriate. ** Duress code words or phrases have been established for common emergency conditions such as kidnapping or intrusion. Their use has been briefed to staff. *** Radios are monitored 24 hours a day as appropriate. **EVACUATION PLANNING** H The Country Office Emergency Evacuation Plan is up-to-date and readily available. H All staff members know assembly areas, safe houses, and routes for evacuation. H Each Country Office has designated a staff member responsible for evacuation planning and operations. H Staff member is identified to be responsible for preparing, maintaining, and updating the evacuee manifest. H The CARE policy concerning actions to be taken when national staff members request evacuation or political asylum has been briefed to all staff members. H Procedures are in place and discussed with all staff concerning an international member of the staff who chooses to remain behind in the event of an evacuation.

H Country Office has established procedures for evacuation or other emergency action for national staff members and all staff briefed. The primary point of contact within the UN and the international/national military force (if applicable) for evacuation planning has been identified and contacted. Assembly areas and alternate assembly areas are identified, validated and coordinated with UN, other NGOs and appropriate agencies and military forces. Primary and alternate assembly areas, evacuation sites, and evacuation routes have been verified. All sites and routes have been coordinated with, and identified to, the UN and/or international/national military forces in the area. The UN and/or appropriate Embassy Emergency Evacuation Plan has been reviewed, coordinated, and briefed to staff as

Specific documents that must accompany the evacuating staff have been identified. Plans made to destroy or carry out documents that reference specific duties and pay scales/salaries of national staff members or that could be used against national

appropriate.

staff members.

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ADMINISTRATION/PERSONNEL

TRAINING / BRIEFING		
	$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ An orientation program is in place for each new staff member.	
	${\tt H}$ The CARE policy concerning Drugs and Alcohol is posted or available and discussed with all national and international staff members.	
	$_{\rm H}$ All staff members receive security training appropriate to their position and level of responsibility.	
	$_{\rm H}$ Staff family members receive appropriate security training prior to their assignment or immediately upon arrival.	
	$_{\rm H}$ Periodic safety and security training and briefings are completed for Country Office staff and recorded in the appropriate office and personnel files.	
	H All new staff receive briefings on the Country Office evacuation plan, the Disaster Preparedness Plan, and other security policies and procedures.	
	* Staff are debriefed when departing.	
ADMINIS	TRATIVE PROCEDURES	
	$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ A Record of Emergency Data (RED) is on file for each staff and family member.	
	${\ensuremath{\mathtt{H}}}$ Appropriate emergency contact numbers have been posted. The notification system is tested regularly.	
	Incident reporting format and procedures have been established and staff briefed.	

	APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT CHECKLIS	T
	Incident reports are treated with confidentiality, transmitted by most secure means to appropriate regional and national offices, and stored with controlled access in the office.	
	** Background checks are conducted on all prospective hires.	
FAMILY N	MEMBERS	
	$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ International staff family members are registered with the appropriate embassy.	
	H All family members are briefed on the Country Office's safety and security procedures and guidelines, including medical emergency response, medical evacuation and crisis evacuation.	
VISITORS	i	
	н Visitors check in with the appropriate embassy upon arrival.	
	${\ensuremath{\mathtt{H}}}$ Visitors are lodged at approved hotels.	
	$_{\rm H}$ Visitors are provided with emergency contact information including phone numbers of key local and international staff.	FCKLIST
	$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ Visitors are provided with an information packet or orientation brief immediately upon arrival.	JENT CH
	* Country Directors determine whether in-country visits are appropriate and if so, the travel criteria and appropriate travel locations. The number of in-country visitors is closely monitored and limited as required.	IX A ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST

* Visitors maintain contact with the appropriate office when

visiting remote project sites.

APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST ** Publicity and press coverage is limited prior

** Publicity and press coverage is limited prior to and during group visits as appropriate.
** Visitors (including visiting staff) receive instruction in safety measures, alarm systems, guards, and emergency and evacuation plans.
$\ensuremath{^{\star\star}}$ Visitors must be equipped with, and instructed in the use of, all appropriate communication equipment.
** Night travel for unescorted visitors is prohibited.
$\ensuremath{^{\star\star}}$ Visitors are instructed to vary their daily schedule and routes.
** Travel is restricted to essential work and must include frequent radio check-in when out-of-area

CASH HANDLING AND TRANSFER

	$_{\rm H}$ Secure methods for receipt, transfer and storage of cash established and appropriate staff are trained.
	Country Office has designated staff members authorized and trained to withdraw and transfer cash.
	Cash is transported by at least two individuals with cash divided between them.
	Travel routes and times is varied and disclosed only on an "asneeded" basis.
	In-city transport is done by office vehicle, not public transportation. Vehicle and driver are changed periodically if possible.
	Cash transfer to remote project sites are conducted by quickest means possible to limit vulnerability.

When transporting large amounts of cash to project sites, a contingency plan is in place for travel delays. A location for safe custody of cash, particularly during an overnight stay, has been identified. When a train is used for transport, cash-carrying staff arranges for sole occupancy of a separate, locked compartment if possible. A safe is available immediately upon arrival at the final destination. Staff understand that in the event of an attack they should never risk their lives to protect cash. Staff members never make references to cash when communicating by radio and use code words as appropriate. **MEDICAL / STRESS MANAGEMENT** H CARE policies concerning sexual harassment and sexual assault are posted or available, and briefed to staff. H CARE policies and procedures concerning stress management are posted or available, and briefed to staff. H CARE policies concerning post stress management and psychiatric treatment are posted or available, and briefed to staff. H Country Director has a confidential system in place to identify personnel requesting or requiring counseling. H International staff members receive medical and dental examinations and vaccinations prior to assignment. H All national and international staff have access to proper

medical care.

$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ An emergency medical response plan is in place and all staff are capable of implementing it.
$_{\mbox{\scriptsize H}}$ Medical evacuation procedure for international staff is in place and briefed to staff.
$_{\rm H}$ The different procedures and policies concerning medical care of national and international staff are discussed with staff.
${\tt H}$ International staff members have proper medical insurance, including evacuation insurance with clauses appropriate to potential risks, prior to assignment.
The staff is aware of the importance of confidentiality while sharing medical information.
The staff has received training in HIV/AIDS awareness, first-aid (including CPR), and potential medical threats in the area, with refresher training provided as required.
As appropriate, a walking blood bank system is in place, with the blood type of all staff recorded on the Record of Emergency Data.
Staff have received all appropriate immunizations. Vaccinations and any pre-existing medical conditions are recorded on the Record of Emergency Data.
As appropriate, the water system for residences and offices has been tested for contamination, including biological, metal, and other harmful pollutants.
** As a stress management measure, periodic time away from area is given to all personnel working in High or Severe risk areas.

COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT

Regional and Country Offices can construct a communications system using a wide variety of equipment. Experts may be required to select and install specific equipment.

COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS

Any communication system or equipment purchased should have these general characteristics:

Redundant. Redundancy allows a remote office to communicate should the primary method, usually the national telephone system, fail. An effective redundant system usually involves a mix of landline or cellular telephones as primary, and radio or satellite phone as secondary.

Reliable/Easy to operate. A system must be reliable, require little maintenance and be easily operated. The equipment purchased should be appropriate for the area and the expected level of use.

Adaptable/Scalable. All systems should be easily adapted to a variety of uses and environments and have the capability to expand as required.

Cost effective. The cost for equipment, training, and maintenance can be included in proposals for projects that involve new communication requirements. Equipment costs can be reduced by avoiding duplication.

Compatible. Equipment should be compatible with other organizations' communication systems. Where there is not a humanitarian aid radio network or countrywide emergency notification system in place, other organizations, such as mining companies and embassies, may have systems that can be used during emergencies.

Emergency operation. The system must work in emergency situations. Vulnerable nodes should be carefully analyzed to determine which ones could be interrupted in instability or disaster.

Environmentally sound. Avoid environmental degradation or improper hazardous material disposal- for example, when placing repeater towers and antennae or discarding used batteries.

COMMUNICATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Landline telephone. In most Country Offices, the primary communication method is through traditional landline telephone for voice, e-mail, and fax. However, landline telephone service can often prove unreliable during disasters or periods of instability and may be monitored. Every Country Office should establish alternative communication systems to provide redundant coverage at all times.

Satellite phones. Satellite phones, which provide high-quality, direct-dial voice, fax, and e-mail, are often used to supplement a radio network, especially in moderate- to high-risk areas. Today's satellite terminals are rugged, portable, and may be cheaper to operate than cellular phones in some areas.

Cellular phones. Cellular phones can be a convenient and easy-to-use alternative. However, there is generally poor coverage in remote or less-developed areas, and some countries have no cellular service. When selecting cellular phones, consider which services would be the most reliable in crisis. Offices should consider having several cellular phones adapted for data transfer via laptop computer to allow data communication capability, should the landline system fail.

VHF radios. Very High Frequency (VHF) radios operate in the 30 to 300 MHz range. Usually handheld, they can communicate over short ranges, approximately 10 kilometers, in most cases. They are often referred to as "line of sight," though in many circumstances they can effectively reach beyond that. Thick trees and buildings can obstruct VHF signals. Elevating the VHF antenna may improve the radio's transmission range. Also, installing a repeater, which automatically receives and re-transmits radio signals, can further extend the range. Repeater systems are reliable and require little maintenance. Humanitarian organizations that do not have their own VHF repeaters may be able to obtain authorization to use those of another agency or NGO. Before using a VHF radio or repeater, it may be necessary to obtain authorization from the host government.

HF radios. HF (High Frequency) radios, in the 3 to 30 MHz frequency range, allow voice communications over medium and long range (conceivably around the world). Less affected by obstacles, HF signals can "bend" around hills and buildings and do not require repeaters to function over long ranges. However, the transmission range of HF signals may be influenced by time of day, weather conditions, electrical interference, and poor system configuration. It takes considerable skill to achieve reliable HF connectivity over long distances. HF radios are often installed in vehicles or at base stations. HF systems are generally more expensive than VHF and require more maintenance.

RADIO PROCEDURES

The benefits of radio equipment can be maximized by following simple standard radio procedures.

- Equipment is maintained in optimum condition.
- Staff and visitors are trained in the use of radios.
- All authorized frequencies and selective calling lists are posted at base stations and in mobile units.
- Radios are monitored 24 hours a day in moderate, high, or severe risk alert countries.
- Each communication has clarity, brevity and security. To ensure effective communication, use the following procedures:
 - Ensure no one else is transmitting at the same time. Wait for ongoing discussions to finish and the users to sign off before beginning transmission.
 - Make message brief but precise.
 - Use common procedure words.
 - Use call signs instead of personal names. Do not identify organizations or personnel by name over the radio.
 - Break the message into sensible passages with clear pauses between.
 - Maintain clear speech with normal rhythm and moderate volume.
 - Hold the microphone approximately five centimeters from mouth.
 - Avoid excessive calling. Use radios for work-related purposes only.
 - Never transmit specific security-related information or travel plans or discuss transfer of cash or goods.

Use of duress code words is encouraged for all risk levels. Duress code words are generally innocuous words or phrases selected for use over the radio or telephone to indicate that the speaker is in a threatening situation but not free to communicate.

GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS (GPS)

Even the most effective communication system is of little use if, during an emergency response, staff members cannot tell others their location. Often CARE works in remote areas with few convenient landmarks or standardized maps. This problem can be reduced with the purchase of global positioning system (GPS) terminals. Inexpensive, small and lightweight, these terminals have become standard equipment for hikers, truck drivers, and aircraft. Using time signals from a constellation of satellites, the devices can accurately determine location to a precision of less than 10 meters. Suitable for day or night use, a GPS can function almost anywhere it can establish "line of sight" with two or more satellites. Country Offices should consult other organizations working in their area that use GPS before selecting a model for purchase.

EVACUATION

Circumstances that might require evacuation of staff and/or their families to a site outside the country include mounting terrorist activities and threats, insurrection and other civil disorder, or a sudden crisis such as a natural disaster. Evacuation should be considered as a last resort after efforts to resolve or mitigate potential threats are unsuccessful.

In most cases, the National Headquarters, in consultation with the Country Director, CARE Security Unit (CSU), and Regional Management Unit (RMU), will make the final decision to evacuate. In the event time or communication difficulties make coordination impossible, the Country Director has the authority to order and conduct an evacuation.

CRITERIA FOR EVACUATION

There are a variety of indicators for evacuation, including:

- Are staff members exposed to increasing and unreasonable risk?
- Have other agencies (UN, Red Cross, etc.) or the government recommended departure? What actions are other international NGOs taking?
- Have the embassies advised foreign nationals to leave?
- En lieu of evacuation, are there measures that can be taken to ensure staff safety, such as curtailing operations or relocation incountry?
- What is the impact on the safety of national staff if international staff depart?
- Is there a requirement to evacuate or relocate national staff members and their immediate family?
- What is the possibility of meeting current project objectives safely?

APPENDIX C: EVACUATION

EVACUATION PHASES

The evacuation process involves four distinct phases, although a situation can deteriorate so quickly that the evacuation may start in any one of them. Other agencies and organizations have their own method for designating these stages, such as letters or colors, but they all generally correspond to the same phases.

PHASE ONE - PLANNING STAGE

Evacuation planning and rehearsals should be ongoing activities for every Country Office, even those without a current crisis. History has shown that the safety and security situation can deteriorate rapidly, often without warning. All Country Offices should have a written evacuation plan in order to facilitate a safe and efficient evacuation or relocation. At a minimum, the plan must address the following six issues:

Who will be evacuated - It is essential that all staff members clearly understand their and their families' eligibility for evacuation or relocation assistance. Country Directors must communicate in this writing. In most cases, only international staff and families will be evacuated.

Each Country Office should determine which staff members are 'essential'; essential staff members are those required to conduct final coordination (Finance Officer for example), office closure, or limited, basic operations. Determine the evacuation order with Priority 1 evacuating first and Priority 4 last.

- **Priority 1** International staff family members
- **Priority 2** Staff members who are in immediate personal danger due to the conditions of the crisis
- **Priority 3** Individuals other than essential staff
- **Priority 4** Essential staff

Where will staff be evacuated to? Identify a specific destination and an alternate destination for evacuation or relocation. Determine visa requirements and logistics upon arrival at the destination(s).

How will staff be evacuated? Establish a notification system to ensure everyone is informed of impending evacuation. Determine and verify a staging point where staff will assemble after notification. Detail the method of evacuation (over land, by air or by sea). Identify potential evacuation routes to airports, seaports, or land borders. Check to ensure that these routes can be traveled under emergency conditions. Inspect border crossings and safe areas. Coordinate plans with embassies, UN agencies, and other NGOs as appropriate.

What goes and what stays? Identify which documents, such as contracts, payroll records, etc., will be needed to re-establish operations once relocated or upon reentry. Other documents should be marked for destruction. Consider how evacuated documents will be perceived if seized by a particular person or group. They may contain information that could put the evacuating individual(s) at risk due to misinterpretation, and would be better destroyed or left behind.

Who is responsible for the various tasks during an evacuation? During crises key staff will be fully occupied so it is imperative that tasks and responsibilities for evacuation be clearly defined during the planning stage. Failure to complete tasks during this phase may mean they go undone, since the transition to other stages may be very quick, leaving no time to "catch up."

What will be the expected impact of evacuation on CARE operations? Will the Country Office be closed and, if so, how? What are the policies and plans for continuing operations with only national staff members?

In addition to these details for evacuation, or the physical withdrawal of staff across an international border, a similar set of details should be developed for two additional scenarios:

Relocation - the physical withdrawal of staff (and assets) from a crisis spot to a safer location within the same country. Identify potential evacuation routes to safe parts of the country in the event of relocation within national borders.

Hibernation - staff staying behind in one or more concentration sites in a crisis spot because evacuation and relocation are impossible or too dangerous. Safe houses should be identified and stocked with the following as appropriate:

- Food and water for 15 days for each person.
- Proper clothing, especially outerwear appropriate for inclement conditions.
- Fuel for generator, vehicles, and lamps.
- Medical emergency kit with proper medications as required.
- Flashlights with extra batteries, flares and other signaling devices as appropriate.
- Communications adequate to stay abreast of the situation and to remain in contact with others.
- Maps and communication plans, as appropriate.

The evacuation plan must be reviewed, revised, and rehearsed annually or as needed.

PHASE TWO - ALERT STAGE

Mounting tensions and/or instability may lead the Country Director, in consultation with the CARE Security Unit, RMU and National Headquarters, to issue a recommendation to limit operations, increase security measures, and review the evacuation plan. Work outside the immediate vicinity of the Country Office may be suspended. Specific tasks during this stage include the following.

- Communication systems for notification should be finalized and tested. Consider tying into other systems, such as warden systems for other NGO or embassy staffs.
- Prepare salaries and place in a safe facility.
- Back up important files onto disks, delete sensitive files, and shred sensitive documents.
- Staff members and their family should assemble personal documentation and carry it at all times.
- Inventory all office equipment and assets. As appropriate, identify the equipment to be evacuated and responsibility for each item.
- International staff families should be considered for an early departure. Potential evacuees should assemble personal belongings to be taken during an evacuation, including:
 - Passport and visa
 - Driver's license and other identification
 - Extra cash (convertible currency)
 - Flashlight with extra batteries
 - Hand-held radio with extra batteries
 - One bag of personal belongings not exceeding 15 kg
- Assign each evacuee to a specific vehicle so that anyone missing may be readily identified, and ensure that all vehicles are ready.

PHASE THREE - CURTAILMENT OF OPERATIONS/ RELOCATION (EVACUATION IMMINENT)

The Country Office usually suspends the majority of normal operations to concentrate on evacuation preparations. Potential evacuees may be relocated to a pre-selected staging or safe area. Remote staff may be recalled or relocated. Staff currently outside of the region should remain in a safe place. Non-essential personnel and family members may be evacuated. Tasks during this phase, which may last weeks or only a few hours, include:

- Coordinate closely with other NGOs, the UN, and other agencies as appropriate.
- Pay salaries to local staff, with salary advances if possible.
- Give clear instructions regarding responsibilities and leadership roles to those staff staying behind. Establish a means of continued communication between remaining staff and those evacuating.

PHASE FOUR - EVACUATION

CARE is committed to the safety and well being of all staff. Under no circumstances should Country Office staff be compelled to remain in an unsafe environment any longer than absolutely necessary. Once evacuation or relocation has begun, it will take precedence over all other activities and should not be delayed for any reason. The Country Office may continue curtailed operations with national staff or may close completely. Considerations during evacuation may include:

- If there is a risk of looting, consider disabling radios, equipment and vehicles. Empty and leave open all safes.
- Ensure effective communication with national staff left behind (if any).
- All evacuees will proceed only to pre-designated areas, establish

contact with the CD or National Headquarters, and await instruction.

 Evacuate by the safest and most orderly means possible, maintaining communication with all groups evacuating.

The evacuated Country Office personnel may conduct operations from outside the country, communicating with and working through the national staff if possible. If a decision is made to close the office completely, the CD and National Headquarters will coordinate requirements regarding staff and the disposition of assets.

Hibernation. If the situation prevents the staff from evacuating, upon order from the CD, they should relocate to a pre-designated "safe" location, such as their homes, the office, their embassy, or, if appropriate, with another NGO or agency. Critical office equipment should be packed and taken to the safe location. Evacuation may follow when the CD feels the situation allows. Alternatively, the crisis may "blow over" and allow resumption of normal activities. This is a last resort for situations where evacuation is warranted but not possible due to the unsafe environment. It is not an alternative to a well-planned and timely evacuation.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS DURING EVACUATION

An evacuation is not easy for the evacuees or for those staying behind. It is a very emotional event, giving rise to feelings of guilt, hurt, frustration, and powerlessness. The departure of international aid agencies can have a variety of meanings to the local population, including the removal of a symbolic safety barrier. Thus, an evacuation is not a neutral act and may even aggravate a crisis. When a Country Office evacuates it should consider providing a statement for the media and others explaining the organization's reasoning and any continuation or possible resumption of programs or aid.

Self-evacuation. Individuals that are working remotely from a local office, or who find themselves isolated during crisis should use their best judgment concerning the safety in their area. All staff members are authorized to conduct self-evacuation in accordance with established criteria and procedures of their country or region when they feel their safety is threatened. Every effort should be made to communicate with the CO during the process, and once in a safe area the individual must contact the appropriate authority immediately. No one may re-enter an area after self-evacuation without specific authorization from the Country Director or RMU.

Evacuation refusal. Persons who are ordered to evacuate or relocate, and who refuse, shall then be considered terminated from their employment by CARE. Such persons must understand that they are staying at their own risk and that CARE will not have any responsibility for their safety. Whenever possible, the decision to remain behind should be discussed during Phase One Planning. Once the evacuation has started, it is possible that the staff member may not have sufficient objectivity to rationally evaluate such actions. The CD and National Headquarters must approve any subsequent support or actions for those refusing evacuation, such as rejoining CARE upon resumption of activities.

Alternate evacuation methods. In some cases, a CARE office may sign on to another agency's evacuation plan (UN, host nation or other NGO). Such an arrangement may improve support and logistic capacity and may be the safest and most effective method for evacuation. An office that signs on to another evacuation plan must ensure that when a crisis occurs they retain the right to make an independent decision regarding when to stay or go. National Headquarters must be informed if such arrangements are made.

Embassy evacuation. International staff and family members must register with the appropriate embassy upon arrival and are usually able to participate in their embassy's evacuation plan if desired. The decision to take advantage of the embassy evacuation should be discussed with the Country Director during the planning process. In some cases, the Country Office may recommend family members and non-essential staff evacuate with their respective embassies.

National staff evacuation. In most cases, only international staff will be evacuated out of the country. If the CD believes that the national staff and/or their families face a direct threat because of work for CARE, then evacuation should be considered.

Internal evacuation plan. National staff members not evacuated should comply with the office's 'internal evacuation plan'. An 'internal evacuation plan' gives a clear line of authority and detailed responsibilities for anyone not evacuating. The plan would include payment procedures, use of assets, continuation of operations, and resumption of activities upon re-entry of other staff.

Return and resumption of activities. This may occur soon after evacuation or take many months. Re-establishing operations after an evacuation can be difficult. National staff who did not evacuate may have experienced hardship and threats to themselves and their families. They may perceive that evacuated international staff members were in relative safety, perhaps receiving critical incident debriefing, stress counseling, or rest and relaxation, options not available to those left behind. This must be considered when reestablishing a Country Office. Restoring relationships with staff, local authorities, beneficiaries, and the local population can be made easier if honesty, tact, and transparency are used with constituents prior to and during the evacuation.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, & RADIOLOGICAL GUIDELINES

Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) materials and industrial contaminants can be dispersed in a variety of ways into the air, water, soil or onto surfaces. Attention has focused on the possibility that a terrorist organization may deliberately release CBR weapons, yet CBR exposure through inadvertent release is much more likely. These 'technical emergencies' can occur anywhere in the world, at any time. Exposure can be sudden (such as during transportation accidents or when a natural disaster damages an industrial facility) or long-term (from pollution). Effects may appear within minutes or take days, weeks, or years to appear. The symptoms likewise range from mild nausea to death, and may be difficult to link to a CBR event.

Terms such as "weapons of mass destruction (WMD)" or "bioterrorism" make the threat seem far beyond the response capacity of an NGO. But despite the number of potential agents, exposure methods, and effects, providing CARE staff with basic awareness and response information can allow effective planning and response against the majority of possible events.

This annex does not list specific actions to take for every conceivable technical emergency but rather provides a framework for planning and response to enhance the safety and security of CARE staff and the communities where they live and work. There are steps one can take to decrease risk and increase chances of survival, even after a serious technical emergency. Each Country Office should use this annex to develop practical policies and guidelines for their region. These policies and guidelines must apply equally to all CARE staff.

POLICIES

It is CARE policy that no one will be allowed to remain or work in any area of known or suspected CBR contamination **where safety cannot be reasonably assured.** No one will be compelled or coerced to remain in, or re-enter, a suspected or confirmed technical emergency area against their will or be allowed to do so without their informed consent. If unable to immediately leave a contaminated area (such as during quarantine) CARE's priority will be the preservation of staff safety and well-being.

This does not mean that CARE will **never** work in an area with CBR contamination. Such a policy is non-supportable and does little to promote development of effective preparation and response procedures. Additionally, due to the long latency period for biological or radiological events, CARE staff may have been working for some time in a contaminated area without realizing it.

It is not CARE policy to purchase CBR-specific personal protective equipment such as respirators, stockpile antidote kits or medications, or purchase detection and decontamination equipment. Such equipment may give staff a false sense of security and the use and maintenance of these items requires intensive training that must continually be refreshed and rehearsed. CARE believes that the best protective measure is effective training of simple, sustainable methods for planning and response, incorporated into relevant contingency plans and programming.

All CARE personnel will receive appropriate CBR training and instruction prior to working in, or traveling into, areas with a **high potential** for deliberate or inadvertent CBR release.

TECHNICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANNING

Acknowledging that it is difficult to predict a deliberate CBR release, CARE Country Offices must work to identify known threats and vulnerabilities from technical emergencies and implement appropriate measures for staff safety.

COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

Characterization of a technical emergency (agent identification, area affected, etc.) requires skilled response teams and is usually beyond the Country Office's capability. In most cases the only reliable CBR detection and decontamination equipment will reside with military or government units. Effective utilization of these capabilities will depend on preplanning and cooperation. In some situations it may be useful to strengthen already existing coordinating systems, in others the necessary links will have to be created. Safety of staff must take precedence over other concerns, such as avoiding civil-military relationships.

COs in areas with a high risk of CBR must identify and coordinate with all available detection and response agencies and personnel. When appropriate, CARE will encourage and support development of surveillance and detection systems (usually through public health channels).

THREAT ASSESSMENT

As part of the Country Offices security assessment process, determine threats and vulnerabilities for all potential technical emergencies, deliberate or accidental. Include the following possible exposures:

- · Belligerents during conflict or insecurity, terrorism
 - Industrial sites, transfer, storage and transport facilities and routes
 - Previous sources of contamination (chemical or radiological dumps, etc.)
 - Poor mitigation and preparedness for natural disasters
- Coordinate the assessment with hazardous material specialists, where available, the CARE Security Unit, and others as appropriate.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

As detailed in Public health response to biological and chemical weapons (WHO Draft 2002), any CBR response should "make maximum use of existing emergency-response resources ... consistent with the principles on which the management of any other type of public health emergency is based." Once the assessment is complete, incorporate the appropriate mitigation, preparation and response procedures into the Country Office contingency plans. Include potential safe areas and criteria for relocation/re-entry involving known threats.

TRAINING

A well-designed, comprehensive education and training program will provide effective, sustainable protection for staff. Ensuring awareness of the risks involved with traveling to, or working in, an area with a known CBR threat is necessary to gaining informed consent from a staff member. Key elements of a successful training program include:

- Area and threat-specific training what can be expected in the region and what can the staff member do to prevent and mitigate the unique effects of these threats?
- Culturally appropriate psychosocial and mental health training, terrorism awareness and basic first aid.
- Involvement of all staff, family and community members, where appropriate.
- Information to allow staff to address and respond to concerns of the local community.

The release of CBR agents may not always be readily apparent. Specialized equipment is often required to characterize chemical events and is almost always required to determine the size and effect of radiological contamination. Confirmation of biological contamination may require laboratory tests. Also, most biological and radiological agents are odorless and colorless and have significant time between exposure and detection.

GENERAL SIGNS OF A POSSIBLE CBR INCIDENT

- Explosions, especially when accompanied by clouds, dust or vapor.
- Unusual liquid sprays or vapors or oily liquids on surfaces (oily film on standing water).
- Low-lying clouds or fog unrelated to the weather.
- Unusual low-lying clouds of dust or particulates.
- Unusual number of dead or dying animals of various types (large/small, domestic and wild, aquatic and birds, etc.).
- Unusual number of people displaying symptoms of CBR agents.
- People having symptoms of illness or diagnosed with diseases not normally present in the area.
- Unknown people in the area dressed strangely (long-sleeved apparel during the summer, etc.) or wearing protective masks (especially when other signs are present).
- Unusual metal debris or bomb-like material, especially if it contains a liquid when there has been no recent rain.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE

Every technical emergency will have different requirements for response. In almost all cases CARE staff should not plan for any role in technical surveillance, detection or response in the contaminated area. Allow properly equipped and trained personnel to conduct an area survey, event characterization and, area decontamination. Staff should re-enter only after that authority has deemed it safe to do so.

The best protective measure is education and awareness prior to any incident. Staff should be prepared to take appropriate measures to ensure their personal safety should an event occur. No one should linger in a suspected area of contamination when evacuation is warranted.

BASIC ACTIONS

- Inhalation is the most effective means of exposure in a deliberate attack and a serious threat during many inadvertent releases. Protect the airway and lungs, covering the mouth and nose with a handkerchief, cloth, mask of any type, coat sleeve or by any other means.
- Cover all exposed skin to prevent contact with contamination.
 Wear whatever expedient protective apparel which may be available such as a rainsuit. Even normal clothing can reduce level of exposure by half.
- Quickly assess the situation to determine appropriate action. Be aware of the possibility of a secondary release. If feasible, determine the area of possible contamination and identify safe routes and areas in the event evacuation is necessary and possible.
- If in-doors and the incident is outside it is usually best to remain inside.

- If outside and the incident is outside move away from the source of contamination, staying upwind or uphill from suspected source of contamination. Most chemical or biological agents that pose an inhalation hazard will be broken down and dissipated when exposed to sun or brisk winds.
 - If in a car shut off air intake vents and roll up windows.
 - If relocation or evacuation is not possible move inside (see decontamination procedures below).
- Once inside, turn off air conditioning and heating to prevent circulation of air. Close windows and doors and seal if possible.
 Move to a pre-designated safe room, usually an interior room above the ground floor.
- If in-doors and the incident is inside move outside minimizing exposure to the contaminated area. Keep windows closed and close doors upon exit.
- Alert others to the danger without increasing exposure. Restrict access to the area if possible and report to the appropriate authorities.
- Evaluate and assist casualties outside the contaminated area and evacuate. Anyone suspected of exposure should be quickly decontaminated and referred to medical care, even if there are no symptoms.

No matter what type of incident is suspected, in every case immediate action is based on addressing three key actions:

TIME – spend the shortest amount of time possible in the hazard area. Time is also critical in assessing persistence of agents to determine when it is safe to move through or return to a contaminated area.

DISTANCE – always maintain a safe distance from the hazard area. Often technical information on the exact hazard is required to determine the safe distance, but in most cases the greater the distance, the less the exposure. Be aware of factors such as wind direction and slope of ground.

SHIELDING – maintain physical barriers between you and the hazard. This may be simple, such as clothing or a vehicle, or elaborate, such as a safe room or personal protective equipment. In some cases moving behind a building or hill can add protection.

FIELD DECONTAMINATION

Field decontamination may be warranted in a known chemical or biological agent attack. It may also be useful in most accidental chemical or radiological exposures.

 Once clear of the suspected area, immediately wash off any suspected contaminant with water. NOTE: Certain industrial chemicals may not be appropriate for water decontamination and the potential for exposure to these agents should be established during the Country Office threat assessment process.

- If sufficient water is not available, liquid agents or contaminants can be removed with absorbing powders such as talcum or flour. Sprinkle the powder on affected area, wait 30 seconds and brush it off completely with a brush or rag. Do not come in contact with the powder; use rubber gloves if available.
- Before entering any building remove outer clothing and leave it outside. If possible, place all clothing and personal items in a plastic bag for later decontamination.
- Shower or wash thoroughly (at least 15 minutes if possible) using soap or a solution of 1 part household bleach and ten parts water.
- Clothing suspected of contamination should be treated with fullstrength household bleach for 30 minutes before discarding or laundering.

FIRST AID IN CBR ENVIRONMENTS

CBR exposure can result in a wide variety of symptoms, some requiring very specific medical treatment. First aid measures likewise vary. For example, exposure to nerve agents requires an atropine antidote injection within minutes. CARE staff working in potential CBR environments should be given instruction on basic first aid for conflict areas emphasizing evaluation of an injury and transport of the injured. In areas with known risk, specific training on appropriate emergency care for that threat should also be given.

It is possible however, that CARE staff may find themselves remaining in a CBR contaminated area due to quarantine, or assisting in the initial reception of any casualties that have been evacuated. In these cases, the following general first aid measures apply.

- Remove the victim from the area.
- Treat life-threatening trauma first before worrying about decontamination. Usually removal of clothing achieves significant decontamination. Also, it is impossible for a living victim to pose a radiation threat to treatment personnel.
- Administer antidote kits if available and warranted. Maintain a record of doses given.
- Clean the victim as thoroughly as possible before admitting to treatment area.
- If eyes are involved, flush for at least 10 minutes with clean water.
- For ingestion of chemical agents, do not induce vomiting. If victim is conscious consider giving milk to drink.
- Take precaution to avoid becoming exposed or contaminated yourself. Follow barrier precautions adapted from hospital care guidelines:
 - Wash your hands after victim contact.
 - Wear gloves and gown when coming in contact with the victim.
 - Wear a mask and eye protection (glasses or face shield), especially during procedures likely to produce splashes or sprays.
 - Handle patient care equipment, linen and other items contacting patient in a manner that prevents spread of contamination.
 - Use care in handling needles and blades.
 - Consider using a face-mask or mouthpiece if mouth-to-mouth resuscitation is required.
- Once life-threatening conditions and trauma are treated the victim should be quickly transferred to a medical facility for definitive treatment and supportive care.

There are obvious differences in direct health effects between natural disasters and technical emergencies, such as the symptoms of CBR exposure may take months or years to appear. But technical emergencies can also be more psychologically complex, with all the normal stresses of emergency response overlaid by issues of fear of another attack or criminal involvement. Media coverage may also contribute to panic or fear.

These differences affect the individual victims, the community and the responders. The community may react in ways unfamiliar to staff accustomed to natural disasters or disease outbreaks, becoming angry or apathetic. There may be shifts in credibility and mistrust of authority, including international aid organizations. There may be ethnic strife as one group blames another and CARE staff may be caught up in this conflict. CARE staff involvement in social activities in nearby communities may leave them prone to over-identification and vicarious traumatization that can increase stress levels and degrade performance. The basic tenants of good stress management become more critical during technical emergencies, but there are additional elements of psychosocial support that are possibly unique to technical emergencies.

PRE-RESPONSE EDUCATION

Pre-response education and counseling will increase both technical awareness and confidence of staff and help them develop a framework for response. "On the job training" is usually inadequate since the source of stress is present well before getting to the job and may already be degrading mental health.

 The media plays a critical role in information management (positive and negative) and press representatives must be aware of the unique requirements when reporting on technical emergencies.

- Decision makers at every level must be informed of the potential effects of technical emergencies. They must also ensure all decisions are in concordance with stated goals, objectives, and policies and do not unnecessarily have a negative impact on staff health and safety.
- Potential tensions between individual roles and response requirements must be addressed. Development staff may find themselves involved in unfamiliar roles; emergency staff may need to closely cooperate with unfamiliar actors such as the military, the police, or international agencies; and all staff may themselves become victims.

POST-RESPONSE SUPPORT

- Ensure follow-up counseling and support beyond the end of the emergency phase; even experienced aid workers find it hard to leave behind the trauma and psychological effects of technical emergencies. Include training on the signs and symptoms of longterm effects, such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
- Emphasize "collective" measures for counseling. A CBR event will affect all staff, national and international at every level. The psychosocial support structure should emphasize and utilize as appropriate group counseling and identification of culture-specific coping mechanisms.
- Include community needs as part of the overall support requirement as NGOs will be looked to by community members to provide this support. CARE staff will need information on how community response may be different, how their work may have unexpected results and effects, and what they can do to ensure effective relief and development programs after a CBR event.



