"Saving Lives Together": A Review of existing NGO and United Nations Security Coordination Practices in the Field

Table of Contents	
1. Executive Summary	3
2. Introduction	4
2.1. Context	4
2.2. Objectives and Need for the Review	6
2.3. Methodology	6
2.4. NGOs and the UN: What's what?	9
3. Security Coordination in Practice: Findings and Analysis	
3.1. Structure	
3.1.1. NGO – NGO Security Coordination Mechanisms	
3.1.2. UN-led Security Coordination Services	
3.1.3. UN – NGO Security Coordination	
3.1.4. Staff Capacity and Training.	
4. The Awareness and Use of SLT	29
5. Main challenges and Good Practice	
5.1. Main Challenges	
5.2. Good Practice	
6. An example of good practice coordination outside the humanitarian sector	36
7. Conclusions and Recommendations	37
8. Annexure	40
9. Acknowledgements	60

Acronyms

ANSO	Afghanistan NGO Safety Office
ASC	Area Security Coordinator
AWSD	Aid Worker Security Database
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CD	Country Director
CSA	Chief Security Advisor
DO	Designated Official
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EISF	European Interagency Security Forum
GANSO	Gaza NGO Safety Office
HQ	Head Quarter
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IAWG	Inter Agency Working Group, Kenya
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
INSO	International NGO Safety Organisation
10	International Organisation
ISAO	INGO Safety Advisory Office, Yemen
NHN	National Humanitarian Network (Pakistan)
NNGO	National Non-Governmental Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSP	NGO Safety Programme, Somalia
OCHA UN	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PHF	Pakistan Humanitarian Forum
PRI	Principles for Responsible Investment
RVP	Rendezvous point
SFP	Security Focal Point
SLT	Saving Lives Together framework
SLT LO	SLT Liaison Officer
SLT OC	SLT Oversight Committee
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SSCL	Security Committee for Lebanon
UN	United Nations
UNDSS	UN Department of Safety and Security
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNHCR	UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSMS	UN Security Management System
WFP	World Food Programme

1. Executive Summary

The review has examined the existing Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) and United Nations (UN) security coordination mechanisms and practices in the field. It has researched relevant literature on coordination and interagency dynamics. It has conducted two online surveys of head/regional office and field-based staff. Interviews of international and national staff of a variety of NGOs and staff members of the UN Agency, Funds and Programmes, took place in eight countries selected by the Saving Lives Together Oversight Committee (SLT OC), which also chose a number of global security experts for further interview and advice.

The review has analysed existing UN and NGO security coordination mechanisms, different NGO – NGO security coordination mechanisms, as well as the Saving Lives Together framework within the context of where they function. It has separately evaluated the mechanisms between international NGOs and the UN; and the coordination between both. It has conducted a general overview of the development of the various structures, analysing the services and products achieved. A number of key challenges have been established and evaluated generally, and with specific reference to the selected countries. Relevant case studies of successful humanitarian security coordination structures and good practice have been determined.

The majority of headquarter and field practitioners concluded that security collaboration in the field requires mutual trust and confidence between parties, awareness and commitment to the process, and an understanding that such mechanisms are context-specific. This is evidenced by the development of the Saving Lives Together framework itself and the commitment from the NGO and UN communities to its implementation; supplemented by partnerships with entities engaged in similar activities within the same locations but which are outside the current Saving Lives Together framework.

The recommendations include further development of NGO mechanisms and their accountability; and the requirement for more effective communication and mainstreaming of the Saving Lives Together framework in the field.

With increasing reliance on coordination in complex security environments, interested actors need to build upon the commendable good practice already in place.

2. Introduction

2.1. Context

Attacks and violence of all forms against aid workers across the globe have sharply increased over the past decade.¹ According to the 2013 Aid Worker Security Report,² in 2002 85 aid workers were victims of 46 incidents while in 2012, 274 aid workers were victims of 167 incidents of major violence in 19 countries. Compared to the United Nations and its Agencies (UN) and the Red Cross, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have endured the largest share of security incidents;³ the majority of incidents have involved national staff.⁴ Humanitarian security experts largely agree that due to global geo-political dynamics and a complex security environment in the post-9/11 era, some of the most high risk countries for aid workers have been and continue to be, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Somalia and Pakistan. In addition Gaza, Sri Lanka, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad, Ethiopia, Libya, Niger and Kenya have also been noted as states where attacks on aid worker have been severe and / or relatively prevalent over the last 10 years.⁵ More recently, threats in new disaster responses have extended the high risk areas of operation for aid workers including Syria and its neighbouring countries, Central African Republic (CAR) and Egypt.

In response to the increased exposure to risk, the humanitarian sector has taken significant action to strengthen and professionalise its security management capacity and to define and develop humanitarian field security as a sector in itself since the late 1990s.⁶ Over the past 15 years there has been consensus across the humanitarian community in support of collaboration and coordination on safety and security.⁷ Recognising that each organisation has an obligation to reduce the risks that staff face, inter-agency coordination was deemed as necessary and complementary to the sector's progressive change.

The *Menu of Options*, developed in 2001 by the UN Inter-Agency standing Committee (IASC) and the Office of the UN Security Coordinator, was the first step to formalising security coordination between INGOs and the UN. It was renamed '*Saving Lives Together: A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements among IGOs, NGOs and the UN in the Field*' (SLT) in 2006. The IASC established a Steering Group on Security in 2008 which supervised the revision of the SLT Framework, with a revised framework approved by the IASC in 2011.

The inclusion of security-related requirements in Consolidated Appeal Processes (CAP)⁸ has been facilitated by functional coordination groups which foster dialogue and shared goals. Formal and structured NGO-led security platforms in higher risk locations (see table 1 below), have been praised for providing strong country-based security coordination between NGOs and facilitating engagement with the UN. In other contexts security coordination has been the result of isolated, informal and unacknowledged efforts.⁹

¹ Harmer, Stoddard and Toth, 2013; Wille and Fast, 2013; Glad, 2011; Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenio, 2009; Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2012

² Harmer et al. 2013:3

³ Wille and Fast, 2013:2

⁴ Stoddard, Harmer and Haver, 2006:20

⁵ Harmer et al 2013; Wille and Fast, 2013; Stoddard et al, 2006.

⁶ Van Brabant, 2000 and 2001

⁷ Schafer and Murphy, 2010; Stoddard and Harmer, 2010; Micheni and Kuhanendran, 2010; Collinson and Duffield, 2013

⁸ A programme cycle for aid organisations to plan, coordinate, fund, implement, and monitor their response to disasters and emergencies, in consultation with governments. (IASC website)

⁹ Schafer and Murphy, 2010: 6

UN-led initiatives		NGO-led initiatives
Development of the Menu of Options. ¹¹	2001	
	2002	Set-up of first formal NGO Safety Office in Afghanistan, ANSO.
	2003	
	2004	Set up of INGO Safety Advisory Office (ISAO), Yemen, and NGO Safety Programme (NSP), Somalia.
Menu of Options renamed as SLT, endorsed and distributed.	2005	
	2006	
	2007	
Dedicated SLT officer in Sudan.	2008	Set up of Gaza NGO Safety Office (GANSO).
First international conference on SLT.	2009	
Pilot Project of SLT with SLT LOs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kenya, DRC and Somalia.	2010	
Second international conference on SLT. SLT content endorsed by the IASC.	2011	Set up of Pakistan Humanitarian Forum, Safety and Security (PHF) and formation of global level International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO)
The SLT LO project ends and UNDSS propose to mainstream SLT within the UN security management system.	2012	Transfer of ANSO to INSO Afghanistan and set up of INSO DRC and INSO Kenya.
	2013	Formalisation of Safety and Security Committee for Lebanon (SSCL). Set up of INSO Mali.

Table 1. The History of formal NGO and UN Security Coordination and SLT-related initiatives (timeline is until the end of the data gathering stage in October 2013).¹⁰

At the second SLT conference in 2011 the majority of participants found that in countries in which there was no SLT Liaison Officer (LO), security coordination worked better if NGOs coordinated amongst themselves as a first step, as the UN were otherwise required to duplicate liaison with multiple NGOs. It also concluded that SLT had been more effective in countries in which some formal mechanism of INGO collaboration and a SLT LO were both in place. The lack of a clear information flow within and between agencies¹² was highlighted as a barrier to information sharing, as were the cultural changes that agencies needed to undertake to build the trust to operate in a co-dependent way, and the promoting and building of greater awareness of SLT among UN and INGO staff. The available literature provides little detail about the complexities involved in implementing the SLT framework and its cause and effect in different environments.

Several surveys of the implementation of SLT have been separately conducted by both the NGO and UN community since 2009.¹³ This review intends to build on the current documented understanding of the SLT framework in practice and to examine security coordination mechanisms outside of the framework. It will provide detail of the various coordination structures and procedures in place in different operating environments and analyse their successes and challenges. Further, it intends to inform the SLT OC to stimulate discussion and enable inter-agency debate and learning to support the further development of the SLT framework.

¹⁰ Semi-structured and informal security coordination initiatives (defined below), also central to the study, are not detailed here due to an absence of clear dates and defined establishment procedures.

 $^{^{\}rm 11}$ The Menu of Options was the precursor of SLT and was approved by the IASC.

¹² Phrased "horizontal, vertical and diagonal" by Schafer and Murphy (2010).

¹³ NGO-led (Christian Aid) review of security coordination between UN and Humanitarian Actors (2010); UNDSS internal survey (2012/3); Internal in-country UN survey in Kenya at the end of the SLT LO role (2012).

2.2. Objectives and Need for the Review

This review, initiated by the SLT OC, is part of a two phased process with an overall aim of incorporating the concept of the SLT framework into the structures and daily operations of both the NGO and UN communities. This report is the outcome of the first phase and will be the foundation for intended guidelines and resources. The main objectives of this report are to:

- 1. Review existing NGO-NGO and NGO-UN security coordination efforts and critically analyse their successes and the challenges.
- 2. Share best practice and document lessons learned on security coordination and the implementation of the SLT framework.
- 3. Initiate open discussion and debate across UN and NGO communities on security coordination efforts.

2.3. Methodology

Data was gathered from an extensive range of information sources, stakeholders and experts in the field, making it the largest comprehensive review of security coordination to date. In-country data was gathered in eight study countries:¹⁴ Bangladesh, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Jordan, Kenya, Pakistan, Somalia and Sri Lanka. Within these countries, 106 individual interviews and three security meeting observations were held. The countries were chosen by the SLT OC to recognise and understand different types of coordination efforts and experiences in countries with different risk levels. Two online surveys gathered responses from 96 head / regional office staff and 243 field-based staff (see survey questions in Annex 1 and 2). In addition, 31 global security experts¹⁵ were interviewed. In total, information was gathered from 339 survey respondents and 137 interviewees. A broad review of the existing publically available and internal documentation was also carried out.

Due to the sensitivity of some of the content, all interviews were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis.

	Jordan	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka	Somalia	Kenya	Colombia		Global security experts
	No		No	No	No	No			
	Observation								
UN	9	4	3	4	4	4	5	8	12
INGO	6	11	10	4	4	3	6	4	19
NNGO	1	3	3	1	1	0	1	2	
IOs and donors		1	2	0	0	0	1	0	
UN - NGO (Inter-Agen	cy forum)					1			

Table.2. List of interviewees

Totals	
UN	53
INGO	67
NNGO	12
IOs and donors	4
UN - NGO	1
Total interviewees	137

¹⁴ Interviews in respect of Somalia were conducted with staff currently based in Nairobi, Kenya.

¹⁵ Staff from INGOs and UN with specific experiences and expertise in security practices and coordination.


The online surveys were shared through the European Interagency Security Forum (EISF) and InterAction distribution lists as well as some country-based security coordination mechanisms (see Annex 3 for questions). Open during August and September 2013, the surveys were used to ensure that the research reached NGO, UN staff and others¹⁶ globally. Respondents were not obliged to give their country of operation; the 39% of respondents who did were working in 24 different countries.

In order to receive the most relevant feedback, the research purposefully targeted staff with experiences in security coordination and SLT, the majority of whom are not from national NGOs (NNGOs).

The research successfully gained a balance of perspectives from a representative group of stakeholders in each country. While a similar number of interviews with international NGO (INGO) and UN staff were achieved, the input from national NGOs (NNGOs) was limited.

Due to the described sampling approach, the large majority of interviewees and survey respondents were security¹⁷ or management staff. The conclusions are well placed to explore different types of structures in a variety of contexts.


The research recognises the specific dynamics and complexities within individual countries, the report has aimed to balance these specific lessons with more general trends. The case studies provided reflect the shared opinions and statements of interviewees at the time of researching. They aim to highlight key experiences and in-country dynamics that may initiate discussion or be of relevance to the wider community.





Diagrams 1 and 2. Agency breakdown of online survey respondents

¹⁶ Including International Organisations, such as GIZ; Donor agencies; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC); and Faith-based organisations.

¹⁷ This includes security focal points (those who have security as one as part of a wider job) as well as security staff.








The methodology precludes any fair comparisons of the level of awareness and understanding of security coordination practices and the SLT framework between security staff and others (programmes, operations staff, etc.). Gaining a comparative understanding of how aware non-security or management staff are of security coordination efforts would require a less specific survey assuming a limited awareness of security coordination and SLT.

Whilst it was only possible to carry out observations in three countries: DRC, Pakistan and Colombia, the main details of scheduled meetings and other coordination processes were explained during interviews in the remaining five countries. While the dissemination of the survey reached a larger audience than any other survey on security coordination to date, the channels used for dissemination were insufficient to reach an all-encompassing group of stakeholders. The surveys and

interviews were delivered in English, which may have further restricted the participation of country-based national staff.

NNGOs are not included within the SLT framework for valid legal reasons. When referring to security coordination practices outside of the SLT framework, the gap in small INGO and NNGO participation may be a finding in itself, highlighting their limited inclusion or representation in security coordination practices in general (see section 3.1.1. below).

For ease of presentation and analysis, all percentage calculations were rounded up. Online survey respondents were given the option of reviewing one or



more INGO-led and UN-led security coordination mechanisms (Annex 3). Not all respondents reviewed both. As the number of respondents varied across sections, averages were calculated for

each question. All percentages refer to those who answered the particular question rather than the percentage of all respondents.

Structure	Location	Definition
NGO-led / UN-led security coordination mechanism	All countries	A mechanism led by the UN or by NGO(s) that facilitates inter-agency safety and security coordination and information sharing.
Formal / Structured NGO-led security coordination mechanism ¹⁸	Medium – High risk countries (DRC, Pakistan, Kenya, Somalia)	Officially sanctioned and formally recognised. Has a set structure and objectives with accompanying policies and procedures. Has external funding, dedicated resources (including paid staff) and a recognised brand.
Semi-structured NGO- led security coordination mechanism	Low to Medium risk countries (Bangladesh, Jordan, Kenya)	Security is a standing agenda point and topic of information sharing; it is usually a sub-set of an existing NGO forum. Has no dedicated resources and instead tends to rely on NGO staff volunteer focal points.
Informal security coordination mechanism	All countries	Coordination that is delivered in an unofficial manner through casual, oftentimes intimate, communications. They often start with links to known peers, in many cases through those working in the same regions and/or for like-minded agencies.
Bi-lateral / Personal relationships	All countries	One-to-one relationships between agency staff. Usually trusted relationships that are built up over time.

Table 3. Definitions of the terms used in reference to security coordination mechanisms.

2.4. NGOs and the UN: What's what?

In the context of a changing security environment, the UN Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) articulated the 'how to stay' approach which was incorporated into the UN Security Management System (UNSMS) in 2009. This proposed that practitioners in high risk contexts should change their approach when operating in insecure contexts and think in terms of 'how to stay' as opposed to 'when to leave'. This was further publicised under the title of '*To Stay and Deliver*' by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) in 2011.¹⁹ NGOs have traditionally focused on this approach. It is in this context that practitioners believe that the SLT framework can take on more prominence by being the "*informational and strategic link*" between NGOs and the UN.²⁰

Although the SLT framework represents a commitment to deliver its six pillars,²¹ the framework itself is *'informal and non-binding'*. Actors can interpret and implement it in different ways. Similarly, outside of the SLT framework, priorities and approaches to more general security coordination efforts can vary. The NGOs and UN take different approaches to security management: whilst both rely to a large extent upon building 'acceptance', the UN has tended to place greater emphasis on mitigation and physical security measures to implement programmes than NGOs have done. The UN

¹⁸ For this analysis the word 'mechanism' can be used interchangeably with the word 'platform'. Both describe the structure that is in place to facilitate the inter-agency coordination.

¹⁹ Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard, 2011

²⁰ Egeland et al, 2011: 33

²¹ Saving Lives Together, Inter-Agency Standing Committee, August 2011

has a global security management system including an accountability structure and a compliance mechanism. As such, their approach can be seen to be more unified. NGOs, however, are heterogeneous, autonomous organisations with different views and ethics, operating in different ways. There is no common structure for NGO security management or compliance. While these distinctions are clear to most working within the humanitarian security sector, they have not been sufficiently acknowledged in the implementation of the SLT framework or in security coordination efforts more generally.

This does not suggest that the SLT framework needs to be revised. It is in the implementation of the SLT framework, and in security coordination more generally, that effort is needed to consider the differences between NGOs and the UN to ensure that both are themselves internally organised. Tensions between different entities within the UN, together with similar tensions between NGOs, have to be circumvented in order for actors to effectively collaborate and cooperate with each other.

3. Security Coordination in Practice: Findings and Analysis

3.1. Structure

3.1.1. NGO - NGO Security Coordination Mechanisms

Informal and Formal Mechanisms

NGOs are diverse organisations. Different objectives, ethics and approaches, limited understanding of security management in some cases, and increasing competition over limited funds, can foster an environment of insularity and apprehension of information sharing and collaboration. The research found that for effective security coordination, inter-NGO tensions have to be recognised and reduced before NGOs can efficiently coordinate and collaborate with the UN.

Case Study 1. The evolution and devolution of NGO security coordination mechanisms.

Bangladesh. In response to a changing security environment and an increase in the frequency of hartals (public protests) and the intensity of political violence in Bangladesh in 2013, a semi-structured security INGO forum for security staff and focal points was reestablished in the form of the Administration, Finance and Security Forum. Parallel to this in the Country Director (CD) INGO Forum, a security sub-group was initiated and two CDs were appointed INGO focal points for security coordination and engaging with UNDSS. It was intended that the mechanisms would provide the necessary contact points and systems for information sharing while using an efficient and realistic use of resources and sufficient for the country's low to medium risk level.

Sri Lanka. During the time of research, Sri Lanka was perceived to be relatively stable with a low security risk level. The research found no structured NGO security coordination mechanism in operation. However, during and in the immediate aftermath of the civil war a few years earlier, a structured INGO security forum was in place and operational. Since the country's return to relative peace, that mechanism dissipated. Both NGO and UN leadership felt that, at that time, they would be able to quickly re-establish a security coordination mechanism should the need arise, as there were still strong personal networks that could be activated and formalised.

DRC. Following an enduring environment of instability in DRC, particularly in the areas surrounding Goma in the east, INGOs united to request INSO to establish a platform. While informal NGO security co-ordination mechanisms had been in place prior to the arrival of INSO, they were unable to provide the required level of information sharing, security analysis and other coordination services achieved by a formal security coordination platform with dedicated staff and resources. NGO-led security coordination mechanisms aim to encourage mutual collaboration. The research found that these mechanisms are dependent on their operating context and tend to evolve organically, becoming more or less structured in line with the changing risk level (Case Study 1). Fewer mechanisms exist in areas of peace and stability. It is more likely that a formal, structured model will evolve in higher risk locations as the result of an implicit recognition of the opportunity for and importance of sharing information. This is evidenced by the increase in such mechanisms in medium and high risk contexts over the last decade. Table 3 above outlines some key characteristics that define them. Four of the eight study countries have a structured NGO-led security coordination mechanism in place; these were all in medium and high risk countries:

- NGO Safety Programme (NSP) in Somalia, formally established in 2004;
- Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF) Safety and Security, formally established in 2011; and
- International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), an independent NGO that established platforms in both the DRC and Kenya in 2012 at the request of INGOs working in those countries.

Reinforcing the trend towards formal platforms, efforts over the past decade were made in a range of other higher risk countries (not study countries) to establish new formal mechanisms or develop existing informal NGO-led security coordination mechanisms into more formal structures:

- Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), now INSO Afghanistan, formally established in 2002;
- INGO Forum Security Advisory Office (ISAO) in Yemen, formally in established 2004;
- Safety and Gaza NGO Safety Office (GANSO), formally established in 2008;
- Security Committee for Lebanon (SSCL), formally established in 2013; and
- INSO in Mali, formally established in 2013.

Three of the study countries had a semi-structured NGO security coordination mechanism in place (see table 3 for a detailed definition):

Case Study 2. Alternative options used in other countries, where governments seem to be more averse to formalised INGO security coordination.

Sudan. At the time of researching, interviewees suggested that despite the risks for aid workers, the establishment of a formal INGO-led security forum was not feasible in Sudan. They implied that an INGO forum may not be officially recognised and that subsequently no INGO staff could be recruited purely for security coordination. As a reflection of the UN's commitment to the SLT framework they have committed resources (in line with Pillar 2 of the SLT framework) and lead UN - NGO security coordination efforts in Sudan. This includes providing SLT Liaison Officers (LOs) in individual states. At the time of researching there were five SLT LOs in place, one per state. Their role was to facilitate links for information sharing and security management support between the UN and INGOs.

Syria. At the time of researching, interviewees suggested that a formal INGO forum in Syria may be challenging to establish due to perceived government sensitivities and little understanding of the rebel groups, which made the operating environment for INGOs volatile and highly politicised. Interviewees also suggested that an INGO forum may increase risk through different perceptions and local concerns around sharing security information. Similarly, interviewees noted that INGO movement restrictions undermined their ability to build stronger personal relations with UN representatives. In addition to relationships with the UN, INGO security staff focussed on building trusted personal relationships with other like-minded INGOs working in the same areas. INGO fora in neighbouring countries (Lebanon and Turkey) provided additional support.

- The security working group within the Inter Agency Working Group (IAWG), established in Kenya in 2005;
- Security was formally included in two INGO working groups (INGO Country Director, and Administration, Finance and Security) in Bangladesh in 2013; and
- Security was formally included in the Jordan INGO forum as a working group in 2013.

Security was considered to be low to medium risk at the time of research and the potential for risks for NGOs to increase had been recognised, hence the further formalisation of the mechanisms in Bangladesh, Kenya²² and Jordan.

The study countries without a structured model in place include Sri Lanka and Colombia. The former was considered locally to be at lower risk, whilst the latter, according to the incountry NGO community, benefited from a strong UN presence which provided them with sufficient security service collaboration not to require NGO-led coordination.

Case Study 3. The importance of personal networks and informal structures.

The Pakistan (INGO) Humanitarian Forum (PHF) has a safety and security section; the in-country INGO coordination mechanism. Also, UNDSS shares security information and leads meetings for INGOs. While interviewees noted the value of the PHF and DSS coordination services, they also suggested that personal networks were valuable for sharing and verifying security information and advice. Some interviewees described attending separate informal groups with like-minded agencies, or those working in the same geographic areas, in addition to receiving the PHF and DSS services. Personal networks and informal groups across the country were deemed an important complement to the formalised services that, at times, enabled more depth and openness, particularly on sensitive matters.

Similar examples of personal networks and informal groups co-existing alongside formal structures, were also cited in the other study countries including DRC, Jordan and Bangladesh.

In certain medium to high risk countries, security coordination and the sharing of security information can be particularly sensitive. The existence of any such platform has to be well justified. The research found that, in some circumstances, establishing more formal coordination bodies is a challenge (Case Study 2). Such mechanisms may alter the perceptions of local authorities and non-state actors of the role and nature of NGOs, so increasing the nature of threats facing them.

In most countries the research suggested that staff rely on informal bodies and/or personal relationships for more frank information sharing and analysis. The research found that personal networks complement, rather than duplicate, the more formal structures (Case Study 3). Staff across the study countries, as well as field and HQ staff, explained that there are nuances in the levels of discussion, noting a deeper level of discussion and openness in smaller informal groups.

Services delivered

Despite the different contexts, there are clear similarities in the outputs delivered by the structured NGO-led mechanisms listed above. The most common cover a range of means to collect and share information on safety and security. The research found that in the most advanced mechanisms, no one service is prioritised, but that a combination most appropriate to the information and relevant in the context is used. Respondents listed the range of services below:

- Advisories, including expert advice on the situation
- Analysis, including context analysis

²² At the time of researching in Kenya, both formal and semi-structured mechanisms were in place.

- INGO lessons and experiences
- Situational reports
- Data collection (information management)
- SMS / real-time alerts
- Risk assessments
- General exchange of information on security management and the security situation in country of operation
- Training facilitation or coordination
- Coordination meetings
- Joint INGO field missions
- Incident debriefing
- Advocacy to and coordination with local authorities
- Combined strategies for major incidents
- Facilitate coordination with police
- Facilitate coordination with UN

The research found that while the SLT framework is not the sole reason such mechanisms are developed, it is recognised that having a formal platform in place provides the structure and focal point that the UN can work

Case Study 4. Analytical discussions in a semistructured security coordination mechanism.

The Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) in Kenya was established to facilitate the functioning of the cluster system and is hosted by OCHA, Save the Children International and Oxfam. It is run by one dedicated staff member seconded from one of the partners. It has a broad mandate and, at the time of researching, security was one of the functional areas.

At the time of researching interviewees suggested that IAWG security working group shared raw data on security incidents. Providing written analysis was not part of its remit, instead it provided NGOs the opportunity to work collaboratively in the analysis of their own information. The focus, according to the interviewees, was on active joint analysis. Of particular relevance, interviewees noted that the participatory format brought value to the coordination efforts and as it functioned along the cluster lines it provided a direct link with NGO and UN programmes and operations.

most effectively with. Such NGO-led coordination mechanisms adhere to most, if not all, the pillars outlined in the SLT framework.

Semi-structured mechanisms tend to provide some of the above services. In general, they tend to facilitate meetings and provide a forum for analytical discussion and information sharing rather than a prepared briefing. Information dissemination, including forwarding UN reports and incident reports, is also included. Due to a lack of dedicated resources to collate and analyse information, there is little written analysis from such structures. The findings suggest that their real value is in providing a forum of mutual support for NGOs to share ideas and incidents, gain advice from peers and analyse issues in an open and relatively informal manner (Case Study 4). In some cases they provide a focal point for the UN to lead coordination efforts with. It is also recognised that semi-structured NGO-led coordination mechanisms adhere to some of the pillars outlined in the SLT framework.

Informal mechanisms tend to be casual and largely based on location and the establishment of trusting relationships. Often, detailed information, experiences and analysis are shared with each other to inform analytical discussions and decision-making. Due to the informal nature of these relationships, and the desire for them to stay as such, they are generally closed to others, until confidence and trust in a new individual is built. As these networks are less public and less well known, and are larger in number, there is no one focal point for the UN to lead coordination through. In the context of SLT this has necessitated the UN to engage with all / most NGO security focal points in that particular context. The particular characteristics of informal mechanisms are valued, yet not having one NGO for the UN to engage with has been identified as a clear gap. The significance of having a structured or semi-structured mechanism alongside informal mechanisms and / or trusting personal relationships was reiterated in the research.

Structure and governance

The research found that in the majority of cases, the NGO-led structured and semi-structured mechanisms are designed to be "for NGOs, by NGOs". This is largely based on the premise that a unified approach, collaboration and coordination between not-for-profit agencies with the same underlying focus (to raise money and provide help for those in need), shared values and principles is necessary. Moreover, interviewees felt that maintaining a NGO-only governance system was one way of reassuring members of a commitment to the confidentiality of shared information. Accordingly, in such instances, IOs, UN and other entities are actively excluded from governance and structural decisions.

Interviewees suggested that in such systems NGO perspectives, as opposed to those of other actors within the humanitarian community, are likely to be the priority. The majority of interviewees suggested that this was a natural and effective way of working and that NGO – UN and other relationships were built and sustained outside of this arena. The Somalia example (Case Study 5) suggests that a joint approach could pose challenges of increased risk for NGO operations. In Somalia, as well as other study countries including Kenya, DRC and Pakistan, NGO fora have achieved the balance of having a NGOgoverned structure that maintains close ties with their UN counterparts.

A smaller number of interviewees provided an alternative opinion and suggested that giving both NGO and UN representatives a consistent function on a governing structure could help the two communities embrace different approaches and views. Of the structured and semi-structured mechanisms in the study countries, the IAWG (Kenya) has a combination of NGO, UN, IFRC and Red Cross representation on its executive committee. In non-study countries, the research found that SSCL (Lebanon) also has a mixed executive committee (case study 5).

It is relevant for the sector that different approaches, particularly in terms of ways to extend NGO-UN relationships, are shared. While research from the study countries identifies a Case Study 5. The governance and structure of NGOled security coordination mechanisms in different contexts.

Lebanon. The Safety and Security Committee for Lebanon (SSCL) was formally established in 2013 as one project within an INGO. The executive committee has designated positions for representatives from the UN, civil society and NGOs; the UN was actively engaged in the forum design from the outset. At the time of researching the forum had members from INGOs, UN agencies, IOs, donors, for profit development actors and other civil society actors. NNGOs were included on the condition that there was sufficient funding and capacity to provide the necessary support and the governance structure was in place to approve and vet NNGOs. The inclusion of NNGOs was purposefully held off initially to ensure the above conditions were in place, but also to control and manage the rapid growth of the SSCL and to prioritise the international humanitarian actors.

Somalia. The NGO Safety Programme (NSP) for Somalia was established in 2004 in response to an agreement by the in-country NGO consortium – the Somalia NGO Consortium. It is hosted by an INGO and is not an independent legal entity. The executive committee consists of the same NGO representatives that oversee the NGO consortium. The forum is purposely developed by and for NGOs; it represents members to the UN and the international community. It is only open to registered NGOs, including NNGOs. Members do not pay for NSP services. NNGOs are welcome, but are vetted and approved before they attend. Due to the sensitive environment in Somalia, the majority of NGOs try to minimise working openly with the UN.

DRC and Kenya. INSO is an independent NGO that establishes safety platforms on request of NGOs globally. In both DRC and Kenya, INSO was formally established in 2012. Services are provided to both INGOs and NNGOs who are registered. The initial ten NGOs who requested INSO's establishment, were invited to become the original members of an Advisory Board in both countries. They were empowered to advise and guide the INSO in-country operations, including selecting the content, timing and format of services from a 'master menu'. INSO has established links with UNDSS globally and in its operating countries. In these two countries, UNDSS and INSO are held in mutual regard as 'critical partners' for effective security cooperation and delivery of SLT.

clear trend towards NGO-only governance, it also suggests that it may be useful for the NGO security mechanism in each country to assess the costs and benefits of integrating the UN within governance procedures and the different possible approaches to this.

On the whole, structured NGO-led security coordination mechanisms are delivered through independent donor funds dedicated solely to NGO security coordination. These are either totally independent, such as INSO; one part of an existing humanitarian or NGO forum, such as in Somalia or Pakistan; or hosted by an INGO, such as in Gaza, Lebanon and Yemen (not case study countries).

Semi-structured mechanisms, such as those in Jordan and Bangladesh, are generally managed and facilitated through agency volunteerism, mostly organised from the existing humanitarian or NGO forum and with certain NGOs taking the lead on specific responsibilities.

Case Study 6. Including NNGOs in INGO Security Coordination Efforts in Pakistan.

At the time of researching, members of the INGO forum in Pakistan, the PHF, were in agreement that the most effective and efficient means for NNGOs to participate in security coordination efforts was through one NNGO representative from the National Humanitarian Network (NHN).

In addition, some individual INGO interviewees suggested that they complement this process by working closely with their partner NNGOs. One INGO explained that they hold regular security forum meetings with up to ten of their NNGO partners working in the unstable northwest areas. The aim of the meetings is to share information and to inform partners of their analysis and other security incidents and to receive information and analysis from the NNGOs. The INGO representative explained that this was mutually beneficial for the partners and the convening INGO.

While difficult to generalise, the findings suggest

that the structure of different security coordination mechanisms have been guided by a combination of factors, the main ones highlighted by the research include:

- Country risk level;
- Country context, including legal framework and government sensitivities;
- The existence of other INGO coordination mechanisms;
- Donor funding; and
- Staff capacity.

Representation and Participation of NNGOs

In general, the research found that security coordination mechanisms which did not include NNGOs in any way had fewer resources and lacked the capacity to administer, vet and approve applicants. Some were relatively newly established and prioritised effective INGO participation as a first step. Ideological reasons were also cited for a lack of NNGO participation (detailed below).

The research found that all formal NGO mechanisms in the study countries had policies and procedures in place to include NNGOs in some way. In general, NNGOs are not regular participants in semi-structured mechanisms. Interviewees suggested that the resources and experience of formal mechanisms such as INSO in DRC and Kenya and NSP in Somalia, can help enable the administration and inclusion of individual NNGOs. Alternatively, PHF in Pakistan agreed that NNGO participation was possible through the inclusion of one NNGO representative from the National Humanitarian Network (NHN) (Case Study 6).


However, despite the open policy to include NNGOs in formal NGO mechanisms, limited NNGO participation was identified and the research found that NNGOs are substantially under-represented

in security coordination mechanisms that are NGO-led. Some reasons for the lack of NNGO participation are discussed below.

Interviewees across most of the study countries cited the vast number of NNGOs as an obstacle, noting difficulties around approving and ensuring that agencies are 100% committed to the same

principles as their INGO counterparts. Survey responses also noted the practical challenges of extending access to NNGOs. For example, NSP in Somalia highlighted that their process of registering and vetting NNGOs can, in some cases, take a month or longer with the inclusion of local elders and other community members.

Beyond these practicalities, some suggested confidentiality was a real issue. This was particularly felt in higher risk and more complex political contexts. Due to the sensitivity and type of information shared through security coordination services, interviewees were prudent, assuming that in certain contexts *"there will always be people reporting back to authorities"* (INGO Global Expert interviewee). Another referred to experiences of trying to extend contact to NNGOs through field staff, but such caution and sensitivity were required to ensure mutual trust and confidentiality that in practice it proved more effective to communicate informally rather than through set structures. Diagram 6. Online survey responses showing representation in NGO-led security coordination mechanisms (field staff perspective)



In most contexts, the research found differences between national and international personnel as well as between staff of the same nationality including culture, ethnicity and language, can affect meeting participation as well as the level of engagement and information sharing, particularly in contexts of heightened social tension and hierarchy. The research implies that this challenge requires effort by focusing on genuine relationships built on trust and confidence.

The research suggested that NNGOs have less time and fewer resources to assign to security management; some may also see security as less of a priority. These factors may have direct implications on security coordination attendance. Also, in certain countries, additional risks for national staff being associated with such coordination mechanisms, were highlighted as a physical constraint to their participation.

In spite of the above, the research found that some NNGOs are perceived to have a better understanding of the local context and issues in the field than their international counterparts, but that they may also be less neutral in their activities. Respondents highlighted an apparent lack of formal recognition of the experience and work of NNGOs in NGO-led security coordination mechanisms. The research found that as security coordination mechanisms are only as good as the information they receive, including NNGOs increases opportunities for different sources and perceptions to be accessed for effective analysis; thus, logically, without the engagement of NNGOs, the analytical capacity of a security coordination mechanism is reduced.

Some interviewees considered that not collaborating with NNGOs which are similar entities sharing the operating space and, in so doing, also have an impact on the environment, could increase the risks for INGOs because of perceptions and associations that external stakeholders have of NGOs collectively. In addition, some INGO interviewees described an innate responsibility and duty of care

to their NNGO partners and gave examples of security information sharing, providing security management support and advice with them (Case Study 6).

The research did not observe an active, formal / structured NNGO security network in the study countries. In Pakistan a formal NNGO network - NHN - with a safety and security component was identified, however the findings were unclear as to how active or regular it was. In other countries, including DRC and Jordan, active informal networks for sharing and analysing security information amongst NNGOs were referred to.

It is clear from the findings that NNGO participation in NGO-led security coordination is a contentious issue. A majority of respondents agreed that, to be more effective, there is benefit to engaging NNGOs with INGO-led security coordination mechanisms. Examples of NNGOs in structured NGO-led security coordination mechanisms come from countries where donor resources are in place and security coordination mechanisms are relatively advanced. Also, in most study countries, some individual INGOs had established their own bi-lateral coordination and share security information with their NNGO implementing partners and vice versa. Whichever means is used to further this element of security coordination, accountability is an important issue for consideration.

Area Coordination

The research found that staff delivering programmes and operations in areas outside of the capital city are exposed to different, and in many instances more significant, risks than their counterparts in capital cities. NGO area security coordination in medium to high risk countries use different models. Some formal security coordination mechanisms have hub offices and dedicated staff in key areas across the country that lead location-specific security coordination mechanisms; and support actors with localised information and services. In the study countries, such structures are in place in DRC and Somalia. Elsewhere this model is in place in Afghanistan and Yemen. Findings suggested that this approach can provide a formal structure and system for information sharing and accountability within countries. The findings suggested that this model can be an effective means of keeping up-to-date with the dynamics, intricacies and incidents across the country. Others also suggested that this model could enable more consistent and responsive NGO representation to local government stakeholders, local UN agencies and other local actors.

However, the research found some shortcomings. The cost of establishing and maintaining offices across the country was of prime concern; this was especially pertinent in countries where donor funding for security coordination is less available. The time that it takes to establish offices and their sustainability once established were also questioned. Interviewees proposed that integrating security coordination staff into established premises such as member NGO offices may be cost-effective, but may give rise to potential associated risks for the host. Other models consist of one centralised office, usually in the capital or a large city, and reliance on the goodwill and commitment of NGOs across the country to report information and incidents to a centralised hub. While this model was described in the research as more cost-efficient, concerns about the quality and timing of information received were raised in the findings. Also, it was acknowledged that due to the distance, central security coordination offices may not be consistently included in localised security discussions and information sharing. Where such models exist, local informal NGO security coordination systems and strong personal networks are the preferred means to obtain locally relevant evaluation and analysis.

Countries such as Bangladesh and Jordan, where semi-structured mechanisms are in place, tend to rely on informal networks and personal relationships in operating areas outside of the capital city. In

some instances this can evolve into something more structured (Case Study 7). The research did not highlight any consistent information sharing or communication between the localised security coordination and that at the capital city level. For staff based outside of the capital city, it was the localised, largely informal, networking that was deemed to be most useful due to the detail and relevance to them. The research found that a reliance on staff commitment and good will to coordinate with the central hub has resulted in some NGO-NGO security coordination structures struggling to get the balance right between effectively understanding and responding to security issues in operating areas across the country.

3.1.2. UN-led Security Coordination Services

Since 2005, UNDSS has been responsible for 'providing leadership, operational support and oversight of the security management system' of the UN.²³ UNDSS and OCHA are the prime facilitators of the UN commitment to collaborating closely with humanitarian INGOs through the SLT framework. The UN security coordination efforts produce a range of services, similar to those detailed in the NGO section above, dependent on local context:

- Advisories, including expert advice on the situation
- Analysis, including context analysis
- Situational reports
- Data collection (information management)
- SMS / real-time alerts
- Risk assessments
- General exchange of information on security management and the security situation in country of operation
- Training facilitation or coordination
- Coordination meetings for NGOs
- Joint field missions
- Incident debriefing
- Advocacy to and coordination with local authorities
- Combined strategies for major incidents

The outflow of Syrian refugees into Jordan brought with it a sharp spike in required humanitarian operations, as well as an increase in instability and insecurity. Before the emergence of the refugee crisis, NGOs reported that they tended to work independently with little to no NGO-NGO information sharing or security coordination. NGOs and the UN reported that they did not invest in coordination and as times changed, disconnections and competing agendas between NGOs and the UN hindered effective security coordination.

At the time of researching, INGOs were undecided about what structure to establish, with some supporting a security working group as part of the existing INGO forum, and others favouring the arrival of INSO. With no agreed consensus and the immediate need for security coordination efforts of some sort, an invitation was sent to INSO whilst a security working group was initiated through the INGO forum.

With regards to NGO-UN coordination, prior to the Syrian crisis there had been informal engagement between the NGO and UN on security issues, but a lack of consensus of process within the NGO community lead to a perceived lack of information sharing within the capital.

The evidence highlighted strong coordination efforts at the field level. Out of necessity in one of the larger refugee camps, Zaatari camp, NGOs have come together to establish consensus and build a structured local coordination forum with UN counterparts. Experienced NGO and UN security focal points were identified and a formal system for coordination was established. At the time of researching, the system was led by UNHCR and one INGO in the camp, and other UN entities (including UNDSS) and the NGOs operational in the camp were regular participants in meetings and other coordination services.

Links to the semi-structured INGO security working group in Damascus were upheld largely through internal organisational information sharing rather than through one central structure.

Case Study 7. Establishing security coordination structures with rising instability in Jordan.

²³ DSS mission statement accessed 03 January 2014, <u>https://trip.dss.un.org/dssweb/aboutus/missionstatement.aspx</u>

• Facilitate coordination with police

The research established that UNDSS has a sophisticated and well-resourced capacity with which to gather and analyse security information. In most locations, information alerts, incident reports (daily, weekly, or monthly) and trend analysis are disseminated by the UN to NGOs primarily through SMS alerts, analytical reports and emails. The extent of dissemination varies significantly from information provided to a comprehensive list of NGOs in some countries, to sharing only with a select group in others, and only to the NGO security coordination focal point in other countries. Also, the level and type of information and analysis that is shared differs, with timely information and extensive analysis being shared in some countries and basic, historical incident alerts and limited analysis being shared in others. The extent and type of information dissemination is based on the risk level in a particular country (with more information being shared in a higher risk country), the existence of a NGO-led mechanism (with reports being shared more consistently, and at times in more detail, where an NGO security coordination mechanism is in place), the relationship and level of trust between the UNDSS representative and particular NGOs, organisational restrictions and the experiences that key NGO and UN staff have of the potential benefits of security coordination.

In line with the first pillar of SLT, UNDSS generally provides security briefings for INGO counterparts within capital cities (this is done in all study countries apart from Sri Lanka) or, when required, through area coordinators, in high risk field areas. As with the information sharing, the security briefings are more systematic in some countries than others. The research found that meetings were more likely to be consistent in higher risk countries, where an emergency is on-going and where representatives see the need for UN – NGO security coordination. In Kenya one representative from INSO, and in Pakistan representatives from all INGOs, attend the UN-led security briefings. In four of the study countries, the research found that representatives from the NGO-led security coordination mechanism are invited to attend UN SMT and / or security cell meetings: Jordan (Zaatari camp), Somalia (Nairobi), Kenya (Nairobi) and DRC (Goma). In the remaining study countries (Pakistan,²⁴ Bangladesh, Colombia and Sri Lanka), NGOs are not invited to attend UN security cell meetings.

By comparison, in countries considered low to medium risk, little evidence of explicit security coordination efforts led by the UN was identified. NGO and UN respondents suggested that in such areas, incident alerts, analytical reports and SMS alerts were circulated to a select group of NGO staff and a UN representative would attend an NGO security meeting on an *ad hoc* basis.

Case Study 8. UN security coordination: Experiences from Colombia

Whilst SLT as a 'branded concept' was found to be rarely discussed in Colombia, the research found that UNDSS have created an effective '5 Pillar' locally cost-shared structure within the SLT concept for all UN AFP and registered INGOs. UNDSS appears to have an effective security information and analysis unit to which the Chief Security Advisor (CSA) has taken the innovative step of embedding a jointly-funded part-time security analyst from an IO into the DSS Operations Centre. The unit regularly provides information and analysis, largely to INGOs but one NNGO reported regularly attending meetings and receiving information. NGOs also have access to a nationwide radio network at all times and are entitled to DSS training. Evacuation/relocation is not included, but the UN would assist in extremis.

It would appear that the majority of the NGO community are satisfied with the current structure and do not feel the need for an inter-agency NGO security forum. Having said that, some feel that a security mechanism of some sort could be advantageous.

Many UN and NGO staff are either unaware of the SLT concept or do not use the term in practice, yet they are well aware of UN - NGO collaboration on safety and security (discussed further in section 4).

²⁴ Although at the time of researching, the UN in Pakistan suggested that they intended to invite PHF to future security cell meetings.

In line with pillar four of the SLT framework, the UN provides security training to INGOs in certain medium and high risk countries. Local cost sharing for the training services may be a requirement and the number of NGO staff able to attend is dependent on prioritisation of UN staff. In some instances UN interviewees noted a limited uptake of UN training courses by NGOs; NGOs generally referred to time and cost limitations as prime reasons for restricted attendance.

A module focussing on SLT has been included in all UNDSS training programmes for security staff and Designated Officials (DOs). However, some UN interviewees and survey respondents suggested that the training they received would benefit by more examples from the field of practical ways to deliver SLT and to work with NGOs from a UN perspective. The creation of policy for the SLT framework within the UNSMS is in progress.

SLT Liaison Officer Pilot

As a pilot project funded by extra-budgetary resources, the UN invested in SLT LOs in a small number of higher risk countries. The dedicated role focused on establishing contact and building relationships between NGOs and the UN, facilitating information sharing between the two and providing technical support so as to improve security management procedures for both. The research highlighted broad successes and challenges of the pilot project. The findings suggested that, on the whole, having dedicated UNDSS liaison resources in place was beneficial for UN - INGO coordination. Evidence of particular success came from Sudan, Kenya and Pakistan. Achievements included references to improved coordination and engagement through meetings and information sharing; provision of contextual security training; engagement with local authorities on behalf of the humanitarian community; and an increased awareness, greater understanding and appreciation of the SLT framework by both UN and NGO staff largely in security and management positions. Interviewees also highlighted gaps and inefficiencies in terms of coordination and collaboration that arose after the departure of the SLT LOs. In response to the disharmony that may exist between some of the

Case Study 9. SLT Liaison Officer Pilot

Kenya. An SLT LO was in Kenya from April 2011 to April 2012. He worked closely with the UN-INGO forum in place in the IAWG (see Case Study 4). Through this forum he provided regular security briefings at relevant meetings and circulated updates; worked closely with the INGO community to set up the independent INSO security platform; and worked with other UN agencies to establish training for humanitarian workers in Dadaab (an area with a high number of refugee camps, primarily for Somalis).

When the post ended, an in-country survey on UNDSS – NGO coordination was conducted. INGO respondents agreed that the position highlighted the value in coordination and set a standard for others to follow. It was felt by some that the personality of the LO and his willingness to visit NGOs and build personal relationships was core to its success. Others also felt that, at that time, the term SLT had some traction and was recognised amongst UN agencies, INGOs and donors.

Pakistan. Security coordination in Pakistan is highly complex with clear divisions between NGOs, and between the UN and NGOs. With the arrival of the SLT LO in 2010, the UN reached out to INGOs and set up a regular security forum as well as a mechanism to provide advice and support to individual agencies. Building relations at the outset required a deep understanding of INGOs, their interests and how they functioned. A lack of sharing of information by NGOs, stemming from the embedded distrust, was noted as one key hindrance to effective coordination. This became a core focus for the LO who promoted the SLT framework as a benefit for the UN and NGOs.

Over time, a common understanding of the mutual dependence of the UN and NGOs grew. Reports of increases in trust and in information sharing were one successful outcome.

Over a year after the post ended however the situation reversed. Without a dedicated focal point for NGOs, reports suggested that a lack of understanding and mistrust between UN and NGOs has re-emerged.

UN and NGO community, further success was seen as a result of having dedicated LOs in place. The

development of relationships with NGOs on informal and formal levels enabled SLT LOs to become a conduit between UNDSS and NGOs. The success of this approach also depended in some way on the structure and policies of the NGO coordination mechanism and the benefit of the NGO security focal points in place to facilitate effective communication. Moreover, personality, professional dedication and commitment of the SLT LOs to the value of NGO – UN security coordination were highlighted in the research as factors in this success. In some countries, the extra-budgetary funding enabled UNDSS to purchase IT software for security analysis and dissemination, providing a benefit for both UN and NGO communities.

Some challenges with the SLT LO positions were highlighted. The research found little evidence of detailed training on effective liaison efforts or in the content of the SLT framework. Further, as it was a pilot project, the evidence suggested that the LOs were required to initiate systems, procedures and relationships to reach their objectives, with minimal local support or advice. Some interviewees suggested that the role was disadvantageous in career development in comparison with other UN security posts; one reason cited for this includes limited opportunities for professional progression. Others argued that despite having 'SLT' in the job title, the LOs did not necessarily increase awareness or understanding in a way that was sustainable, they evidenced this by highlighting the limited awareness of the SLT framework at the time of researching in countries where such posts had been in place.

The pilot project was dependent upon extra-budgetary funding, which was ultimately one reason for its termination in 2012. Simultaneously, UNDSS and the UNSMS committed to mainstreaming the SLT framework to be applicable to all countries dependent upon local context. This followed a recommendation by the SLT OC based on the premise that UN – NGO security coordination is not a distinct project and, to be more efficiently implemented, needs to be understood by all security staff. At the time of researching, plans were said to include integrating the SLT framework into security staff job descriptions to enable performance measurement as a core component of professional development.

At the same time, in a few countries where there is the need and sufficient resources based on risk assessment, dedicated UNDSS liaison staff are in place. For example, in the absence of governmental approval for a NGO security platform, five UNDSS staff dedicated to leading UN – NGO security coordination are located in Sudan. The success of this approach depends, in part, on the structure and policies of the NGO coordination mechanism and the NGO security focal points in place. In a different model (Case Study 8), the research in Colombia outlined the value of seconding a non UN (IO / INGO) staff member to the UNDSS Operations Room on a part-time basis so as to be able to share information and support the development of field-related products. This model was also recommended by interviewees in countries where SLT LOs were formerly in place as an efficient solution to building mutual information sharing, joint working and the management of expectations (expectations are discussed in more detail below).

The Role of Other UN Agencies

The findings present some differences in opinion amongst UN and NGO staff of the role that different UN Agencies play in security coordination. In areas where there is no UNDSS presence, other UN agencies take the lead in security coordination efforts and the implementation of SLT: WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF have all led security briefings in their regional / district level meetings with NGOs and have disseminated information to NGOs (Case Study 7). The research found that the consistency of meetings and level of information sharing from other UN agencies can vary significantly. In general, more consistent and comprehensive information is shared in higher risk environments and amongst security staff and / or those with links with NGO counterparts.


Interviewees in regional locations, largely medium risk, suggested that brief security update discussions were held as an introduction to programme meetings. The research found that some UN Agencies share security information either to agreed NGO distribution lists or to select groups of NGOs primarily based on personal networks, independent of UNDSS dissemination.

At the central or capital level in many countries OCHA delivers security coordination, primarily through high level discussions with Country Directors. UNDSS often attend at such meetings.

3.1.3. UN - NGO Security Coordination

When and Where

The majority of the interviewees and online survey respondents suggested that security coordination mechanisms are necessary, in different forms, in all contexts (see Annex 4).²⁵ Some respondents noted that in a low risk environment NGOs are better able to mitigate and manage their own risk, which can reduce the need for coordination, yet most respondents justified having a certain degree of security coordination in all contexts. Respondents explained that the benefits of inter-agency security coordination for all parties involved is not limited to a specific operational environment, but that it is deemed to



be a necessary part of the NGO-UN in-country apparatus that can help achieve an ideal situation of minimal security incidents.

Therefore, even though the SLT framework was conceived in humanitarian terms only, threats in countries perceived to be more stable, where development programming is the mainstream activity, cannot be underestimated. With the effects of climate change becoming more extreme and unpredictable, and conflicts spilling into neighbouring countries and regions, the consideration of security co-ordination among development as well as humanitarian agencies is increasingly important.

It is a reality that in low risk locations, the development sector may outnumber humanitarian staff, but significant natural and man-made hazards occur suddenly which may necessitate a surge deployment of humanitarian personnel. The findings propose that organisational and global commitments to security coordination, and the SLT framework specifically, transcend country boundaries, entities within different countries should not be in a position to pick and choose if they are going to implement it or not: "Do Sphere standards only exist in high threat countries? … Why is safety and security different, it should be the key facilitator to quality implementation of our work in all contexts" (Head/Regional office staff, online survey respondent).

²⁵ A country comparisons table in Annex 4 outlines the different services and mechanisms in places across the study countries.

At the same time though respondents quite naturally highlighted the particular importance of interagency security coordination in higher risk countries due to the complexity of the operating environment and the subsequent need for reliable, consistent, immediate and detailed information and analysis of the changing situation. Also, in such situations, a single agency or organisation is less likely to be able to overcome the particular challenges independently, and UN and NGOs can provide mutual benefit to support each other.

Accordingly, diagram 8 below aims to show that irrespective of the prevailing security level in a particular duty station, the UNSMS is global and always formalised. In contrast, in low to medium risk countries, it is unlikely that there will be a formal inter-NGO security structure; these tend to evolve as the risk increases. Thus, in low to rising medium risk locations there may be none or several duplicated / competing NGO security focal points (SFP) seeking contact with a single UNDSS source. The research found that NGO security coordination and a security focal point in all contexts would be one way of responding to this (Case Study 10). Additionally, the importance of having an agreed process to identifying an SFP, and for security coordination mechanisms more generally, as well as an agreed end objective, was highlighted. This reinforces the point of ensuring ownership, transparency and agreement within the separate NGO and UN communities from the outset.




Diagram 8. UN and NGO security coordination structures in low, medium and high risk contexts

Inter-agency dynamics

In medium and higher risk contexts where NGO security coordination is more structured and there are dedicated and responsible NGO security staff or focal points for UN agencies to engage with, coordination between NGOs and UN agencies is reported to be easier. By comparison, in lower risk countries where NGOs are more likely to be disconnected, and in the absence of one or two key focal points, interviewees and survey respondents reported difficulties of engaging and coordinating effectively with a number of disparate NGOs. While recognising these challenges, NGO and UN interviewees also acknowledged that if efforts are not made to build the foundations for coordination between the UN and NGOs in times or areas of low risk, it will be very hard to catch up if the risk increases.

Both NGO and UN interviewees in the field and at head office / regional level highlighted the need for the NGOs and UN to better understand each other in order to strengthen coordination. A generalised standoff of sorts was referred to in most operating contexts. From the NGO perspective the UN is not open or transparent, does not share sufficient information on a timely basis, or provide *in extremis* support despite having significant resources. From the UN perspective, NGOs want to receive information, updates, analysis and *in extremis* support (such as NGOs in the DRC using UN

Evacuation Rendezvous Points (RVP) as safe havens), without sharing information or being proactive themselves. As highlighted in diagram 9 below, the research highlighted the need for the NGOs and UN to foster and develop an open and trusting relationship where each party engages proactively and on a reciprocal basis at the outset irrespective of the security risk level.

Developing this point further, the research found that due to their differing mandates and methods of operating, NGOs and the UN can have different exposures to risk, and may mitigate in different ways to implement safer service delivery. NGOs are de-centralised and tend to take a more flexible approach whilst the UN, with its common UNSMS and its political mandate, may require more protective measures. At the same time, both NGO and UN survey respondents suggested that to be more valuable, security information from the UN could be disseminated in differing ways in recognition of NGO diversity, particularly in higher risk countries. This view was challenged by some, not least because of NGOs' heterogeneous nature and the impracticalities of customising information dissemination. They highlighted instead the value of generic information-sharing from which each organisation could then make its own judgements and decisions.

The research highlighted instances of NGOs (national and international) operating in areas where UN agencies are unable to have any physical presence - an obvious obstacle to the sharing of security information. At the same time however, the research found that even in areas where UN and NGOs operate in close proximity, the UN is not always fully cognisant of the real situation within the NGO community in terms of security operations and incidents. This may be because of a lack of information sharing from the NGOs themselves (elaborated more below). A relatively narrow understanding that some UN security staff have of NGO approaches, programmes and operations was also noted as one possible causal factor. A few interviewees suggested that placing an IO representative in a UNDSS base, as occurred in Colombia, might be one way to respond to the above concerns and contribute to providing relevant and valuable security information through a formal, efficient and shared NGO – UN process.

Having said that, in some countries, particularly where UN peacekeeping forces or international forces are on the ground and / or in places of conflict and tension, NGOs prefer to keep their distance from the UN (Case Study 12). This, the research suggested, is principally due to risks of association with the UN as it may undermine NGOs' perceived neutrality, impartiality and independence from the military and political aims of the UN mission. The research found that the NGO approach to security management interfacing with the integrated UN security management


Case Study 10. NGO focal points to engage with UN in the absence of formal structures.

Jordan. In the absence of an NGO security coordination structure or focal point at the onset of the refugee crisis in Jordan, the UN, alongside a group of INGOs, assigned the security staff member of one INGO as the focal point for INGO engagement with DSS. From the perspective of the UN and those INGOs in agreement with this decision, assigning a focal point provided clarity, structure and ease in a time or crisis, assuring dissemination to INGOs, and vice versa, through this one focal point. While all INGOs were agreed on the need for a focal point, there were concerns from INGOs that the process and final decision were not unanimous.

Bangladesh. The security working group within the CD INGO forum in Bangladesh assigned two focal points to engage with DSS. This provided clarity and focus for both the INGOs and DSS.

Additionally the Administration, Finance and Security Forum (at the security staff / focal point level) worked on a rotating basis whereby the Chair changed each meeting. This structure was necessary to share the workload between the NGO participants. However, it also meant that there was not one assigned, consistent lead, and no focal point for DSS to engage with. Products shared by DSS were reportedly received by some security staff on an *ad hoc* basis. The lack of clear focal point was deemed one reason for this. system can create ideological challenges and associated risks that harm NGO-UN coordination and information sharing.

Diagram 9. The factors that contribute to an effective security coordination mechanism



The research suggested a dilemma where INGOs and the UN have formalised and agreed their security coordination through SLT, but as yet there are limited documentation, policies or procedures in place, detailing how that should be delivered. Joint NGO-UN country Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for implementing SLT were referred to in two of the eight study countries as valuable working documents (Kenya and Somalia, see Annex 2), representatives in other countries also suggested that country specific SOPs would be a useful tool. With a working document in place (annex 2) that can be used as a template, one suggested way forward could be for NGO SFPs and UNDSS to work together to develop similar documentation in line with the specific context in their countries of operation. In an effort to manage expectations and ensure transparency from the outset, key factors to consider during this process include clearly defining services that can and cannot be mutually provided.

The findings identified some internal policies and procedures in formal NGO security coordination mechanisms that promote and hold staff accountable for information sharing and coordination. One such example is the INSO code of conduct (see references), which makes it compulsory for its members to share security information in an effort to be more accountable. However, beyond the more established formal security coordination platforms, such procedures are not widespread. Moreover, the research indicated that some NGOs have internal policies that compel their staff not to share security or incident information with the UN (or indeed NGO coordination mechanisms), at least not without clearance from their head offices.

One other example of efforts towards a more mutually accountable system is the inclusion of SLT in the job descriptions and professional development of relevant UN and INGO staff. The UN have made steps in this direction and this is in place for INSO Country Directors in each country of operation. Where this is not in place, this example could be built into coordination mechanisms and into the job descriptions of security staff and SFPs more generally. While it is accepted that the gaps in documentation can be attributed in part to a lack of awareness or understanding of SLT (see

section 4 below), interviewees acknowledged the need to expand on existing good practice and build internal and mutual accountability to SLT.

Mutual Expectations

The findings highlighted that UN expectations of NGOs primarily focus on regular information sharing. NGOs have relatively higher expectations of UN safety and security services that include, in addition to information sharing, analysis and in extremis support. Where there is less communication between NGOs and the UN, misunderstandings about what the UN can feasibly provide have created unrealistic expectations. The research found that it is not widely known, or perhaps accepted, by NGOs in the field that the SLT framework is 'non-binding' and therefore there are no legal obligations for the UN to provide safety and security services to NGOs. Despite the precise wording of the SLT framework, some NGOs suggested that the sheer level of resources, information and the safety and security capacity of the UN compared to NGOs obliges them to share information and provide other services to support NGOs and the wider humanitarian community to reach wider programmatic goals, particularly in higher risk contexts. One example is 'in extremis support' which, although not mentioned explicitly in the SLT framework, some NGOs highlighted as a key requirement from their UN counterparts in particular countries.

The different perspectives and misinterpretations of SLT highlight issues within the SLT framework that require further clarification. If this is done, NGO expectations could be managed more effectively by their respective headquarters and consortia with

Case Study 11. The dynamics of UN – NGO information sharing.

Colombia. A system is in place in Colombia whereby NGOs register and pay to receive training and field support information from the UN. Registering for this information includes certain standards and agreements, of which sharing information is one. In addition to the agreement, explicit efforts by the UN to reach out to the NGO community were made. The combination of the two was rewarded by communication and information sharing by NGOs and reciprocal information sharing and analysis by the UN. As well as from the UN, NGOs reported relying on information from local contacts through field staff, the Catholic Church and some rebel groups.

Sri Lanka. Very limited information sharing was reported in Sri Lanka. According to UN sources, NGOs demanded information and logistical support without reciprocating, while NGOs felt that there was little outreach or coordination from the UN and therefore had nothing to respond / reciprocate to. Having said that, both entities agreed that there had been a higher frequency and quality of information sharing during the civil war, when the general risk level was higher. Both also acknowledged that should the risk level increase across the country, their approach to information sharing would follow.

It was generally believed that local NGOs had limited interest in the security coordination scene in Sri Lanka, especially since the war, and were not engaged in any meaningful way in sharing information.

clear explanations of what the SLT framework can and cannot provide in individual countries.

In some instances - predominantly where NGOs have a SFP, with security as one part of an existing programmatic or operations-based role, rather than full-time security staff, and where there is no effectively operating NGO-led security coordination mechanism - reliance is placed solely on UN security outputs. In such instances such reliance is placed without having the internal resources or processes to assess their own risk exposure and without minimum standards to make their own security decisions after considering the UN information. This reality highlights the need for some NGOs to recognise their own accountability for staff security and implement internal policy and

procedure using information from the UN as one source of guidance, for their own evaluation and security judgements.²⁶

Information Sharing

As outlined in diagram 9 above, information sharing was highlighted throughout the research as a key factor for effective security coordination. Both NGO and UN security coordination services deliver information through a range of ways. The research found that the level of trust and confidence between different personalities influences the levels of commitment to inter NGO and NGO-UN security coordination and collaboration and information sharing. People appeared uncomfortable sharing information unless there was an inherent understanding of the credibility of the organisation and the agencies with which they were dealing. Where personalities were aware of the mutual benefits of sharing information, experienced in working with other agencies, and open to collaboration, the research found higher levels of mutual information sharing. This tended to occur more in medium to high risk countries (Case Study 11). In some instances information was purposefully withheld by both actors largely due to considerations specific to the UN, and NGOs' lack of trust and fear of where and to whom their incident reports would be disclosed. The links between information, power, self-image and personality were highlighted in reference to both NGOs and the UN, by field and HQ interviewees as well as online respondents. The research found that some NGO security policies can hinder field security coordination. Membership of the SLT process means agreeing to share information in a way that supports other members working in the same country. Timely dissemination is crucial for information to be of any real value for staff in the field, however, many field staff, particularly from INGOs, reported restrictions from their head office on what they can share and/or requirements for head office to vet and approve information before it is shared with other agencies in country, including formal security coordination mechanisms. In many instances the time difference between the country and head office and the approval process contributed to late information sharing in-country, or no information dissemination at all. Despite the potential direct risks to other agencies and staff in the particular country, field staff consistently stated their commitment to their head office over any in-country security coordination effort. Similarly, both INGO and UN head office interviewees noted that in certain instances they have been made aware of a security incident before their field counterparts, including the security coordination mechanisms.

While acknowledging the need for organisational management priorities, some head office interviewee staff reported that they encouraged a country-based approvals system to foster more local information sharing.

3.1.4. Staff Capacity and Training


The research found that, in many places, the overarching structures for effective inter-agency security coordination are in place but they lack sufficient resources for effective implementation. In countries of higher risk, more experienced and technically able security staff are required, but a minimum level of commitment, experience and understanding of security is also needed in low risk countries. Evidence from the surveys and interviews suggested that in low to medium risk countries, and in some higher risk countries, there is little prioritisation or support of security within many NGOs, particularly smaller scale entities. In low to medium risk countries in particular, but also in some high risk countries, many security staff have a primary role in programmes or operations, whilst security is an additional responsibility. It is very rare, according to the research, that NGO

²⁶ This dilemma is also true of NGO-led security coordination mechanisms and, where mechanisms are effective and valued, NGOs have come to depend on and expect services that may be beyond the resources and capacity of the mechanism.

security staff or focal points in low to medium risk countries, and some high risk countries, have had comprehensive security training or experience in security management. The research found that some SFPs prioritise their primary roles, and with little training, experience or support, struggle to analyse topics from a security perspective, assess agency risks and implement relevant and innovative responses. The research found that differences in staff capacities add to the difficulty of effective coordination. Diagram 9 above, highlights the importance of NGO prioritising security in their programmes and operations for effective security coordination. Similarly, diagram 10 below, highlights building staff capacity and having the appropriate resources and staff capacity for the context as necessary principles for security coordination.

By comparison, in higher risk countries, many NGOs, particularly the larger ones, invest in professional security staff. The research found that those individuals are more adept and open to coordination efforts and to accessing, analysing and sharing information on security through different means. This is largely due to their level of expertise and experiences as well as the need driven by the risk level.

Diagram 10. Findings from both online surveys outlining the key principles that should be the foundation of all security coordination mechanisms



The research found that for security coordination to be most effective, all staff security training needs to be commensurate with the assessed risk. Both NGO and UN interviewees saw value in UNDSS networking with security focal points and NGO staff on an informal basis in order to engage and facilitate coordination at a lower risk level.

Some UNDSS staff reported that the SLT framework was an additional responsibility in their already large job descriptions and that it should not take precedence over their primary tasks of security management or analysis for the UN. This point reiterates the challenge of mainstreaming the framework within the UNSMS.

In countries where there is no formal NGO security mechanism, UNDSS staff reported having no established NGO focal point with whom to facilitate coordination efforts and lamented the difficulties of trying to build relations with all NGOs. Moreover, for some UN staff, the research suggested that building relations and engaging with NGOs can be particularly daunting and arduous, particularly in low to medium risk countries. In addition, it is a reality that a significant number of UN security staff have a military or policing background and may be used to a more disciplined management style and culture than they perceive NGOs to have. While many NGO security staff have had a military background, a growing preference for humanitarian field experience, particularly with regards to SFPs, was observed. Conversely, other respondents acknowledged that a significant proportion of UN staff with military and police backgrounds work well with NGOs. They suggested that such preconceptions and stereotyping based on background can hamper the opportunity for a credible partnership to emerge between NGO communities and UN.

The research established the critical value of those concerned with security issues within both communities investing time and energy into mutual understanding and developing personal and professional relationships in furtherance of SLT. Ideally, this should be at the outset during low risk to enable a seamless change of pace of interaction as risk increases.

The research found that strong, respectful and trusting relationships are central to effective engagement between NGOs and the UN. In many instances, interviewees and survey respondents cited that to have been the root cause of effective coordination. While having the necessary experience and expertise were of course recognised as important for security staff to have, it was character traits that foster mutual support and joint effort, trust, inclusion, honesty and confidentiality that were highlighted as key principles for security coordination (diagram 10).

In addition, the research highlighted the value of having staff and resources dedicated for security coordination. Interviewees maintained the importance of clearly assigning one or two NGO and UN staff with the responsibility of security coordination. Diagram 8 above highlights that respondents see quality staff and teamwork within a security coordination mechanism as the fifth most important factor in its effective delivery.

4. The Awareness and Use of SLT

The research found that the higher the risk level, the greater the need for security collaboration. Although SLT framework documentation has been circulated to both NGO and UN members a number of times since its inception, and despite specific training primarily for UN staff, there is little awareness or use of the term 'SLT' amongst either community in the field. This seemed evident to varying degrees in all the study country interviews and the online survey; despite the frequent existence of formal security mechanisms, the terminology and objective of the framework is not routinely understood or applied.

UN staff in general showed more awareness of the framework than their NGO counterparts. Yet at the same time the research identified a range of UN and NGO staff

Case Study 12. SLT in practice, but not marketed as such.

Somalia. The findings suggested that as a phrase, SLT is used infrequently within Somalia, however the 6 pillars are encouraged and practised amongst the UN and NGOs within the country. Without knowing the SLT concept, staff confirmed that they consider it beneficial to all actors that DSS does reach out to involve the NGO community and that the NGO community responds accordingly to the UN despite differing mandates.

who were either unsure of how, or lacked the motivation, to implement it. On the whole, NGO

security staff in high risk countries were more aware of the term 'SLT' than their counterparts in low to medium risk countries, where the majority were either vaguely aware of the concept or not at all. In the countries where SLT LOs had been in place, awareness of the SLT framework tended to be higher amongst both UN and NGO staff. However, the interviewees noted that the marketing, advocacy and branding promoted during the pilot project is now fading, especially in light of a high turnover of staff. The research suggested that both the NGO and UN communities need to be routinely reminded of the existence and purpose of SLT.

It is fair to suggest however that, over time NGOs and the UN have worked together more readily in higher risk areas, building networks based on trust and reciprocity. In many medium and high risk countries, some pillars of SLT have been put into practice under a broader country-based security coordination term, rather than SLT. When field-based interviewees and survey respondents who were vaguely or unaware of SLT, were presented with the framework document, their response was overwhelmingly positive. Even in instances where structures were in place despite a lack of awareness or understanding of SLT, the detail, transparency, accountability and international endorsement of the SLT framework, were highlighted as reassuring and motivating for field staff.

5. Main Challenges and Good Practices

Five equally weighted and interlinked factors have been identified as the main indicators necessary for good practice. Conversely, challenges and gaps in services have been identified in situations where there is a lack of one or some of these five factors:

- Mutual Understanding and Shared Values
- Awareness and Communication
- Accountability and Transparency
- Managing Expectations
- Inclusion

While it is acknowledged that other factors contribute to good practice as well as challenges, the findings recognise them as root causes for either outcome.

5.1. Main Challenges

According to diagram 11 below, there appears to be consensus amongst NGO and UN staff of the need to 'manage expectation', overcome misunderstandings of the 'informal and non-binding' nature of SLT and to engender mutual trust and confidence. Suggested ways to overcome the particular challenges are detailed in the recommendations section below.

Mutual Understanding and Shared Values and Goals

The hindrance that misunderstandings and a lack of common values, sometimes exacerbated by personality, can have on the implementation of the SLT framework cannot be underestimated. Being able to build relations, trust and confidence based on mutual goals is crucial to effective information sharing. Examples were cited throughout the research from a range of countries assessed to be of low, medium and high risk of NGO and UN staff not understanding the common value of engaging with each other on security matters. Other reasons given for this included a lack of mutual interest and shared goals as well as power and status. (Re)-establishing mutual understanding and shared goals through marketing, communication, training and workshops to develop shared plans, for example, were outlined as one way to overcome this challenge.




Diagram 11. The challenges facing NGO-led security coordination mechanisms

Awareness and communication

Despite the prevalence of various security coordination mechanisms across a range of medium to high risk countries, the research highlighted a lack of awareness of the SLT framework amongst INGOs. A lack of trust and organisational restrictions have contributed to low levels of mutual information sharing and the development of security coordination services that are not timely, do not reflect all of the incidents that actually occur, and do not cover the full analysis.

Misunderstandings and different interpretations of what the SLT framework means and what it can bring for individual agencies are a further challenge. Different interpretations of the phrase 'nonbinding', confusion around where SLT is to be implemented (the framework assumes humanitarian and higher risk only, but the findings suggest all contexts would be useful), which INGOs fall within the framework (differentiating between humanitarian and development-focused), and the NGO - UN relationship remains unclear.

These factors are problematic to consistent implementation of the SLT framework, and security coordination generally, and require clarification. This obstacle has been made worse by the high turnover of staff in both UN and NGO sectors. Training or making just one staff member aware of security coordination efforts can have limited sustainability, and if staff change on a regular basis, or if security is one small part of a wider set of responsibilities, investing in security coordination training may not be prioritised. The findings would suggest the contrary to be a recommended way forward, i.e. investing in security training for all relevant staff.

In most study countries the research highlighted a lack of a common purpose within the INGO community to hold productive discussions with the UN. Conversely, the latter preferred to liaise with a single focal point which can disseminate and facilitate as necessary on behalf of all NGOs.

Accountability and transparency

There are a few NGO structures in place that compel actors to account for their contribution to security coordination efforts, with INSO being the main example. Beyond this, accountability structures are not widespread; this reality exists despite wide recognition of the importance of security collaboration and commitment to the SLT framework. Moreover, in most instances outside of INSO operations, internal accountability systems, namely performance management procedures on SLT within NGOs, are not in place. Furthermore, the level of external transparency between the UN and NGOs, and the opportunities to hold each other to account in respect of the framework are restricted by the heterogeneous nature of the NGO community, and the 'non-binding' principle.

There is no system which can ensure that NGOs and the UN genuinely share information and are transparent in the ways they operate. One suggestion was to refer to 'effective information sharing arrangements', rather than the more confusing 'non-binding', to appeal to all and ensure wide participation.

Managing expectations

Expectations of NGOs and the UN of each other are often higher than the other can provide and in most cases the different resources, restrictions and situations are not explained, leading to tensions around anticipated engagement and services. Badly managed high expectations are caused by a combination of a lack of awareness of roles, responsibilities, resources and ways of operating as well as little mutual accountability.

To progress and for NGO and UN staff to be able to refer to and use the SLT framework consistently, the research highlighted critical components in the framework that need to be reviewed:

- i. What 'non-binding' means exactly for NGO and UN actors;
- ii. If and when *in extremis* support can be provided (despite it not being written into the SLT framework);
- iii. The differentiation between humanitarian and development INGOs in practice and whether SLT should include all INGOs; and
- iv. Where SLT should be implemented (in humanitarian contexts only, as written in SLT, or whether this should be expanded to include all contexts to varying degrees).

Inclusion

The inclusion of NNGOs is not part of the SLT framework for a number of valid reasons; concerns about affiliations and the potential leaking of confidential or restricted information is one possible reason. However there is divergence of views as to whether they should be regular participants in security coordination mechanisms. Some argue that by excluding them, security coordination efforts are missing out on a significant opportunity for local information sources as well as culturally and context-specific information and perspectives. Representation in security coordination mechanisms remains an unresolved and divisive topic that merits further consideration.

Effective resourcing has been identified as a challenge that links to all of the above factors. Despite recognition of the current significant security risks, NGOs and the UN alike highlighted the lack of donor commitments and funding for security coordination and individual agencies' security efforts (including the provision of staff training and having security staff). However, this point presupposes that justified bids for such funding are routinely made – an issue that would benefit from further exploration. Linked to this, both NGO and UN field-based and head office staff highlighted the challenges around managing the change from a low risk mentality where structures are largely

informal and less representative, to meet emerging challenges as a country changes to medium or high risk. Changes in mindset, mentality and approaches tend not to be complemented with the support and resources necessary to adapt effectively to the changed situation.


5.2. Good Practice


Diagrams 12 and 13 below show the relative success and benefit of security coordination mechanisms according to the online survey respondents. Roughly half of those who responded 'substantially' in diagram 12 or 'very' in diagram 13 were based in countries where formal NGO-led security coordination mechanisms are in place. The majority of references were from Afghanistan, DRC, Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The other half of the responses either did not mention a country or were from countries where less formal mechanisms are in place, with Sudan, South Sudan, Haiti and Bangladesh being most referenced.

In diagram 14 below, online survey respondents identified the main positive changes of security coordination as improvements in safety and security standards, improved security management, an increased awareness and understanding of the security situation, and more confidence of and mutual support for security staff in their decision making.

Mutual Understanding and Shared Values and Goals

The research suggested that all security staff having a mutual understanding on security coordination and being committed and motivated to shared goals is at the heart of why there is success. Where there are committed and enthusiastic NGO and UN resources that have open and trusting relationships, we have seen positive results. Examples of personal relations being a necessary foundation for security coordination efforts came from each of the eight study countries (Bangladesh, DRC, Colombia, Jordan, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Somalia and Pakistan). It was also mentioned repeatedly by the online survey respondents working in other countries and the global experts. To a large extent, the SLT LOs succeeded because of their own personalities and commitment rather than the system supporting their work. Often they networked socially and Diagrams 12 and 13. The benefit and effectiveness of security coordination.





informally to build professional trust from which more formal, collaborative structures could be developed, specific examples of this were mentioned in reference to Pakistan and Kenya.

Good practice:

Committed, motivated and enthusiastic teamwork, based on shared understanding and goals, by NGO and UN participants is more likely to achieve effective security coordination.

Awareness and Communication

Where there is an awareness of the value and importance of two-way security coordination amongst both UN and NGO staff, more open and proactive information sharing between NGOs and between the UN and NGOs exists. The evidence found that for some, particularly those in higher risk countries, security coordination, and some elements of the SLT framework, are instinctive and intuitive. Effective security coordination has evolved organically in ways that are relevant to specific contexts, including in areas where the term 'SLT' is largely unknown or people are unaware of how to implement it. In many of these cases, the awareness stemmed in part from prior experiences of working in higher risk locations in a collaborative manner and understanding the benefits it can bring. In other situations success has stemmed from efforts made by NGO staff and the SLT LOs to build awareness through marketing the SLT initiative and concept.

That said, most success exists where the awareness of and commitment to the SLT framework has translated into considered efforts by both the NGOs and the UN to structure themselves and to operate collaboratively. Within the study countries, particular examples have come from Kenya and Somalia.

Good practice:

Awareness of the critical importance of open, effective communication and information sharing for joint security coordination mechanisms can become instinctive and intuitive.




Diagram 14. The positive changes that effective security coordination can bring

Accountability and transparency

In a sector where trust and confidence are crucial, NGO and UN security coordination mechanisms that are transparent about their role, objectives and what they can realistically deliver have been better able to foster coherent internal and inter-agency relationships. The research suggested that

this openness has encouraged more trust, confidence and information sharing. Linked to this, security coordination mechanisms that have the systems and structures in place to be held to account, including through internal performance management, have been better able to encourage two-way information sharing. For example, where NGO security coordination mechanisms or staff are empowered to approach UN agencies, or vice versa, to question them on gaps in services or a lack of information sharing, we have seen increases in the level of accountability towards the other. INSO in Kenya and DRC, and NSP in Somalia, outline clearly their services and responsibilities and at the same time have set in place a single sustainable focal point and a mechanism for accountability to the NGO community and the UN. Mutual two-way communication has been one identified outcome of these mechanisms.

Good practice:

Security coordination mechanisms which prioritise transparent accountability for realistic objectives are more likely to stimulate realistic expectations.

Managing expectations

The research found that the expectations of NGOs and UN Agencies can be best managed in instances where the right resources are in place, there is a good awareness of the SLT framework and security coordination in general and both are accountable and transparent. The core point for both the NGOs and the UN has been clarity and discussion on what services can be provided, to whom, when and why. Similarly, the research suggested that where security coordination mechanisms are context driven and risk-based, they can be established to provide the right services, including training, by staff at the right level and with sufficient experiences.

Good practice:

It is essential for both the NGO and UN communities both at headquarters and in the field, to be able to discuss, clarify and agree consistently on mutual services provision.

Inclusion

Where a range of actors, i.e. NGOs, IOs, UN, NNGOs and others in civil society, can be included in the information sharing process, the research found a greater depth and timeliness of information received. Also, in other instances, separate collaboration and partnership with other actors through networks and formal and informal structures have contributed to the success of NGO or UN security coordination, while upholding a more confined and manageable, member group.

The inclusion of NNGOs within security coordination mechanisms can enhance the quality and depth of information. The initiative taken by one INGO in Pakistan to hold regular meetings with their NNGO partners provided, in their perspective, more relevant, detailed and useful information as it came directly from those working in the field. The commitment of resources by NSP in Somalia as well as INSO in Kenya and DRC to vet and approve NNGOs for their inclusion has also shown recognition of their valuable input.

Good practice:

All potential sources of security information should be cultivated within agreed organisational guidelines, analysed and evaluated for reliability and disseminated by effective security coordination mechanisms.

6. An example of good practice coordination outside the humanitarian sector

This example is included for consideration. While of course there are clear differences between the end users of each framework, the processes used to develop an active community, with members who are transparent and accountable to each other and working on a voluntary basis under agreed principles, may be of interest and some relevance.

The Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) Initiative²⁷ was launched by the UN in 2006 to provide guidelines for institutional investors on incorporating environmental, social and governance issues into investment practices. Since its inception in 2006, PRI has flourished with 1,129 companies around the world signing up and actively participating in the initiative. Before the establishment of PRI, there were strong signs that governments and other stakeholders supported responsible investment, however there were no principles in place to guide investors, institutions were not given clear responsibilities to be more accountable and there was no was no framework to collate ideas and bring activities together. A framework, and an accompanying set of principles, was developed to build an active community where companies could share and pool information, good practices and resources. Some of the key philosophies that underpinned the PRI initiative from the outset included:

- Being aspirational, but containing practical suggestions for implementation
- Representing a voluntary industry code, but maintaining a commitment to reporting
- Maintaining a positive impact on investment performance and on the world in general

With responsibilities in place for investors to commit to, a first priority was to stimulate collaboration. This involved signing up prominent investment funds, having key 'champions' to help promote the initiative and directly pressuring companies to strengthen some aspects of their investment process. The Secretariat also continued to work with signatories to identify new ideas for collaboration. One factor that attracted signatories was the emphasis on the materiality of environmental, social and governance issues, rather than on the ethical issues. This promoted PRI as an initiative that all investors should be interested in regardless of their organisational backgrounds or mandates. Analysis suggested that the fast momentum was largely due to agencies seeing the ultimate benefits for them as a result of participating as well as peer pressure.

The pioneer of PRI, John Glifford, stated: "With any voluntary guidelines, one of the first questions that is asked is: 'What if an investor signs up and then does nothing? How does the PRI initiative intend to ensure that its signatories do what they commit to doing?"²⁸. In response, a comprehensive reporting and assessment system was established to uphold accountability and ensure transparency. A reporting system for signatories to assess their own progress against set indicators was established. Results are not published, yet individual summaries of progress are given to companies, which allows them an estimated comparison with peers. As a voluntary and self-regulatory initiative, the onus is based on individual companies and the community as a whole to progress towards a combined outcome.

While it is acknowledged that the operating environments, core objectives and directives between the PRI Initiative and SLT are hugely diverse, certain points may be of particular relevance to SLT, these are brought out in the recommendations below.

²⁷ <u>http://www.unpri.org/</u>

²⁸ Glifford, J, The History of PRI, a chapter in Kell, G 2010: 212

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

The findings have highlighted a range of practical experiences, successes, challenges and good practice of security coordination efforts. Some significant conclusions can be made. The majority of interviewees were in agreement that security collaboration in the field requires mutual trust and confidence between parties, awareness and commitment to the process, and an understanding that such mechanisms are context-specific. This is evidenced by the development of the SLT framework itself and the commitment from the NGO and UN communities to its implementation; supplemented by partnerships with entities engaged in similar activity within the same locations which are outside the current SLT framework. With increasing reliance on security coordination in the field, interested actors need to build upon improved risk management procedures and the benefits that a range of context-specific informal and formal coordination structures can bring, to enable all actors to communicate effectively. This capacity should be strengthened and developed with policies, procedures and regular security training for all in the field.

Five recommendations for the enhancement of security coordination in the field have been identified:

• Develop a more effective communication strategy and re-publicise the SLT framework as the benchmark for successful NGO-UN security coordination in the field

As considerable time and resources have been put into the development and implementation of the SLT framework, and generally it has been received positively, it is important that it remains the pivotal element of effective NGO-UN security coordination in the field. Similar to the principles of the PRI listed above, the role of the SLT framework itself is to outline practical, as opposed to ethical, goals and objectives, to guide security coordination in the field. In essence, it is aspirational, but at the same time practical; it represents a humanitarian security sector code through maintaining a commitment to information sharing; and maintains a positive impact on humanitarian security practice in the field.

It is evident that well managed and effective security coordination, with the SLT framework as the benchmark, should be promoted widely by both NGO and UN communities. This includes investing in informal networks and relationships as a minimum requirement during times of low risk.

Continue to encourage the development of NGO security coordination mechanisms and platforms

As an informal, non-binding and self-regulatory initiative, the onus is on the NGO and UN communities to work in partnership towards a shared outcome for the safe and secure delivery of humanitarian aid. The UNSMS enables an effective mechanism for security coordination which is not replicated within the diverse NGO community. This should be remedied by capitalising on recent experiences, including the establishment of INSO in individual countries and other in-country formal NGO security coordination mechanisms, and building on the existing best practice for NGO security coordination.

- A first priority is to stimulate collaboration through identifying one or two NGO focal points in each country through which the majority of engagement on security co-ordination with the UN can be directed;
- A NGO-led security coordination mechanism of some form should be set up in every country, with links to critical areas within the country where necessary. The extent of the activity and

operation of these fora, should be consistent with the risk level in the particular country or location.

NGO consortia and organisational headquarters should consider the merit of encouraging specialist security platforms, such as INSO, PHF (within an INGO coordination platform) or NSP (NGO hosted platform), to 'champion' NGO-UN security coordination and the SLT framework within the field; promoting information sharing and relevant policies and procedures within the NGO community. The value of NGO-led security coordination platforms in all countries, with a structure that depends on country risk level, should be promoted. Semi-structured mechanisms, such as the two working groups in Bangladesh, are a realistic and resource-efficient approach to promoting security coordination in countries with lower risk levels.

o Develop greater accountability and transparency for the SLT framework

Unrealistic mutual expectations in respect of security coordination generally and the SLT in particular need to be reduced and managed to sustain real commitment, support and benefit. Greater awareness and understanding of the SLT framework needs to be achieved by both NGO and UN staff in the field. The latter are mainstreaming it within the UNSMS, and NGO consortia and organisational headquarters are making steps to do likewise.

Where they are not already, responsibilities in respect of security coordination and to SLT should be included in the job descriptions of security staff, SFPs and staff in security coordination mechanisms. As noted above, INSO has made SLT a mandatory job requirement of key staff. In other instances, where there is no coordination platform, however the NGO community lacks the coherence, structure and accountability mechanisms required to share information rapidly and systematically to a comprehensive list of NGOs. The UN, on the other hand, has a common security management system and accountability framework, hierarchy, chain of command that means that it should be better able to do this.

Internal and mutually supportive transparent accountability mechanisms are required by both communities to provide beneficial peer pressure, to boost information sharing within NGOs; and between the NGO and UN communities.

o Develop and implement a common NGO training strategy for the SLT framework

Enhanced training for NGOs, especially SFPs, covering the value of security coordination and practical experiences and examples of mutual support and joint liaison efforts would contribute hugely to the quality of security coordination efforts. Delivering training to NGO and UN security staff simultaneously can build relationships and facilitate inter-agency discussions on successes and challenges. For consistency across countries, NGO security coordination platforms (in-country and international) along with UN counterparts, possibly from the SLTOC, could spearhead, and potentially resource, such trainings based on existing modules.

A strategy to increase the awareness of the SLT framework in the field and to build a shared understanding of security coordination approaches and services should be encouraged for both NGO and UN security and management staff. As above, for consistency and reach, in-country NGO security coordination platforms along with their UN counterparts - possibly from the SLTOC - could spearhead such efforts. Ongoing security coordination at an international level, as is currently in place between EISF, InterAction and UNDSS, can also contribute by leading awareness raising and other efforts at the global level.

$\circ~$ Enable and encourage information-sharing beyond the SLT framework, especially with implementing partners and NNGO

The important role and invaluable contribution of NNGOs should be recognised by NGO and UN actors. NNGOs are included in security coordination efforts in a variety of ways depending on the structures, views and sensitivities in particular countries. All entities with national implementing partners should encourage a minimum mutual level of security information sharing that can be factored into NGO – UN security coordination mechanisms. Many interviewees referred to a three tiered approach to security coordination, noting the value of having UN, INGO, and NNGO fora that interrelate in different ways (recognising that NNGOs are not part of SLT), to ensure that all actors are included in security coordination process.

The recommendations focus upon building on the extensive work of recent years to embed and extend security coordination efforts in NGO and UN structures and working practices. The importance of accountability, transparency and shared goals, and key characteristics for effective partnerships, are reiterated, and processes through which these values can be delivered, are endorsed.

While key messages have been taken from this review, they need further expansion, attention and resources to be put into practice. Some of the more contentious aspects such as the clarification of key points within the SLT framework or the participation of NNGOs in NGO mechanisms may need further research, discussions or evaluation to decide key action points. What is clear however, is the potential value of prioritising and developing the current interest and momentum within the NGO-UN communities in strengthening security coordination efforts, to ensure shared objectives and goals can be achieved.

8. Annexure

Annex 1. References

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Annex 2. SOP for UN – NGO security collaboration in Somalia, Final Review, June 2010

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE - SOMALIA

ENHANCING SECURITY COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE UN SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND ITS HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

1. Objective

To enhance the security collaboration between the United Nations (UN) System and its IGO/NGO partners in Somalia in accordance with the Joint OCHA – UNDSS framework of 22 Nov 06.

2. Background

2.1 The work in the field is more and more dangerous, such collaboration is more important than ever. Sharing security information, resources and training is essential to the maintenance of operations in hazardous environments, in which all organizations are too frequently compelled to work.

2.1 The IASC Security Task Force fostered efforts which promoted a common understanding of the situation and the factors that affect the safety and security of all humanitarian actors. *Saving Lives Together* serves as a framework which may be implemented without imposing upon our respective mandates or compromising the neutrality of humanitarian efforts.

2.3 The initiative has been approved by the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) as the framework for enhancing security collaboration between the UN system and non-governmental organizations.

2.4 This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) was developed in consultation with the DSS Desk, Security Cell and Security Management Team (SMT) for Somalia and was accepted by the SMT Somalia on Friday 6 June 2008. This SOP was reviewed in May 2010 and was accepted by the SMT on 18 June 2010. The implementation of the Policy and Objectives should now be implemented.

3. Policy and Objectives for the UN SMS in Somalia

The approach to the implementation of the Saving Lives Together Policy in Somalia is based on the "Duty of Care principle". This implies that the UN Security Management System (UNSMS) does not take responsibility for the security arrangements and support of its IGO/NGO Humanitarian Partners, but will provide support whenever possible, when feasible, and at a cost recovery basis (when required).

Based on this approach no Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UN SMS and IGO/NGO partners will be developed nor is required.

3.1 Participation of NGO and IGOs in the Security Management Teams (SMT)

- (a) IGOs and NGOs may participate in relevant meetings of the UN Security Management Team (SMT) on an ex-officio, representative basis. i.e.: representatives of non-UN organizations are not bound by, nor participate formally in, SMT decisions on UN security policy.
- (b) UN/NGO/IGO security collaboration will be taken as a regular agenda item at SMT meetings and consideration given to inviting Senior Managers of the NGO and IGO to attend relevant portions of the SMT.
- (c) To agree on the protocols for sharing and dissemination of information at the SMT with the following principles:
 - i) Sensitive information will not be shared.
 - ii) Private personnel issues will not be shared.
 - iii) Confidentiality agreement.
 - iv) Minutes will be circulated for internal use only.
- (d) DO to coordinate security decisions with non-UN humanitarian actors.

- (e) IGO/NGO partners to select field security focal points.
- (f) The definition of IGO and NGO, and which IGO/ NGO to include in the collaborative security arrangements will be left to the UN Area Security Coordinators (ASCs) and ASMTs to decide on.

3.2 Convening broad-based Forums for field security collaboration and information sharing

- (a) Somalia CSA and FSCO's to arrange joint meetings¹ to cover:
 - (i) Exchange of security related information.
 - (ii) Incident reports.
 - (iii) Security and trend analysis.
 - (iv) Joint operational planning.
 - (v) Develop protocols for sharing and disseminating information, documents presented or discussed.
 - (vi) Develop security projects to be proposed for the CAP as part of the CAP process.
 - (vii) Resources to address security related needs.
 - (viii) Coordination of Special Police Unit (SPU) support.
 - (ix) Security collaboration in specific operations.
 - (x) Develop a local inventory for sharing specialized, security-related human and material resources.
 - (xi) Develop the use of Emergency Communication Systems (ECS) between UN and IGO/NGOs. (Receive only)
 - (xii) Joint security training.
 - (xiii) Advise on MOSS and MORSS.

3.3 Including Staff Security Concerns in the Consolidated Appeal

- (a) The CSA: Somalia, in consultation with the humanitarian partners, may include in the CAP for Somalia, well conceived and developed UN/NGO/IGO security projects within the CAP to cover additional resources potentially required for enhanced collaboration on staff security. Aspects specifically to be considered are:
 - i. Emergency communications/ Telecommunications.
 - ii. Security Training.
 - iii. Staff Counseling to international and national field staff.
 - iv. Medical support to field locations.
 - v. Additional national and international security staff required.

3.4 Meeting Common Security-related Needs and Sharing of Resources

(a) The CSA: Somalia with the support of the Security Cell, should determine with the humanitarian partners what resources could be made available to help address common security related needs.

3.5 Facilitating Inter-Agency Security and Emergency Communications

- (a) The need for Agencies to have their own internal and integral communications infrastructure is acknowledged. The UN Agency, as well as the UN common Emergency Communications System (ECS), is maintained primarily for the use of the UN staff.
- (b) The need for telecommunication among UN organizations and the IGO/NGO partners in the field should be determined by the DO and HC.

- (c) Until (b) had been decided on, the NGOs that cooperate with the UN SMS in Somalia are offered only "Listening in/ RX" facilities on the UN ECS in the IGO/NGO areas of operations.
- (d) IGO/NGO partners in the field should provide their own radio equipment that meet the standards of the UN ECS, but will be programmed by the UN ECS Technician according to UN ECS standards on those Channels and Frequencies decided by the DO and HC.
- (e) The UN VHF Simplex Channels per area of operation will be programmed on IGO/NGO procured VHF Radios to ensure VHF Communications between UN and IGO/NGO vehicles during joint road movements, and emergencies.

3.6 Collaborating and Consulting on Security Training

- (a) The UN SMS in Somalia will carry out joint security training in collaboration and/ or consultation with other Agencies and IGO/NGO partners to the extent possible. The SSAFE Training Module will thus also be available to IGO/NGO partners.
- (b) The CSA will, in consultation with the Security Cell, determine how to increase the capacity for security related training at all levels and develop training packages that focus specifically on improving security collaboration.
- (c) Security Briefings to newly-arrived or newly appointed UN national and international Staff will be extended to IGO/ NGO staff.
- (d) Access to the Basic Security in the Field (BSITF) and the Advanced Security in the Field (ASITF) training material will be extended to IGO/ NGO staff.

3.7 Sharing Information

- (a) The confidentiality of information will be respected.
- (b) Security-related information will be shared among UN organizations and the IGO/NGO partners, as well as with the IGO/NGOs that request this, through the following methods:
 - i. <u>Daily Security SITREPs</u>. Will be emailed by the CSAs Office for the consolidated Somalia Daily Security SITREP, or by the Area FSCOs to the IGO/NGOs in that Area of Operation.
 - ii. <u>Including IGO/NGO Security Focal Points in SMS Security Alert.</u> The SMS text Security Alerts of the UN may be extended to the IGO/NGO Security Focal Points if this can be funded.
 - iii. <u>Regular UN/NGO/IGO Security Briefings</u>. The CSA and FSCOs will arrange scheduled Security Briefings to IGO/NGOs to present and discuss the SMT/ ASMT accepted Updates to the Threat Assessment as well as the accepted Security Measures to mitigate the risk.
 - iv. <u>Security Cell and IGO/NGO Security Officer Liaison</u>. Dedicated IGO/NGO Security Officers should be invited to attend the CSA/ FSCO Security Cells.
 - v. <u>Attending of IGO/NGO Briefing Forums</u>. Security Officers should attend scheduled IGO/NGO Briefing Forums such as the OSAC Briefings when invited.

3.8 Identifying Minimum Security Standards

(a) The UN MOSS will remain applicable to all UN organizations and staff.

(b) UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners will, under the coordination of the CSA/FSCO, jointly identify and agree on how to apply minimum security standards, principles, and/or guidelines adapted to local circumstances.

Note: The UN MOSS and InterAction's Security Planning Guidelines should be used as examples.

3.9 Seeking Adherence to Common Humanitarian Ground-Rules

(a) The security collaboration of the UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners in specific field operations, to the extent possible, will rest on the respect for common, locally developed ground-rules for humanitarian action.

(b) The Humanitarian Coordinator, in consultation with the UN Heads of Agency, and with the support of the DO/CSA, will develop the ground-rules for humanitarian action with the IGO/NGO partners.

1 May include members of ASMT, NGO/IGO focal points, ASC or other DO Designee, chairperson on rotation basis.

Reference UN memorandum dated 22 November 2006 framework 'Saving Lives Together'

	ex 3. Online Survey Questions d Office and Regional Staff Survey
0000	* hat type of organisation do you work for? UN INGO NGO er (please specify) *
0	here are you located? Headquarters Regional Office gional office, which region?
	* hat is your position / primary responsibility? Security Programme Management Operations er (please specify)
coor shou 4. W O O	section aims to gauge the level of interaction that you and your agency have had with security dination mechanisms in general. It also aims to understand the general principles and approaches that ld guide security coordination and in what context(s) security coordination is useful. hat is the extent of your knowledge of security coordination mechanisms? Non Existent Limited Comprehensive what extent is your organisation involved in security coordination mechanisms?
0 0 6. Da 0 0	In a limited way Substantially o you personally interact with country security coordination mechanisms? Yes
	No t is your role? (e.g. advisor, provide technical support, serve on committee).

7. In what contexts are security coordination mechanisms necessary? You can choose more than one answer.

Low risk
Medium risk
High risk
Never

8. What factors are needed for an effective and well-functioning security coordination mechanism? (e.g. You may want to consider structure, different activities, and different stakeholders). List 3.
 9. What positive outcomes can effective security coordination mechanisms lead to? List 3.

10. What three principles should be the foundation for all security coordination mechanisms? List 3.

This section looks into the detail of country security coordination mechanisms between NGOs.

As HQ and regional staff you will have to choose one country at a time to review. You will have the opportunity to review up to three country NGO / NGO security coordination mechanisms.

If you have not interacted with any NGO / NGO security coordination practices, click 'No' on the first question below and you will be directed straight to review UN / NGO practices.

11. Do you interact with one or more country NGO / NGO security coordination mechanisms?

O Yes

Ο...

No

12. In what country is the coordination mechanism you are reviewing?

13. What are the primary outputs of the mechanism? List 3 in order of frequency.

14. In your view, is the mechanism representative of the NGO and humanitarian community?

- 0
- Yes
- No

Please provide examples.

Ō

15. Are local organisations involved in the mechanism?

Yes

0

No

Don't know

16. Do local organisations participate on the same basis as international NGOs?

O Yes

O No

Ō.

Don't know Please explain.

17.	From what you know, how is the mechanism structured?	
0		
	Hosted by one agency	
0		
	Independent	
0	Neither - no formal structure	
~		
0	Don't know	
If ho	osted by another agency, which one? If neither, how is it informally structured?	
		\mathbf{T}
18.	From your experiences does the structure impact the mechanism's effectiveness?	
0		
\sim	Yes	
\odot		
	No	
Plea	ase explain, e.g. How does this compare to structures in other countries?	
		-
		Þ

Here, we are reviewing the functionality and effectiveness of interacting with NGO / NGO security coordination mechanisms.

Please continue to review the mechanism in the same country.

19. To what extent has the mechanism benefitted your ability to understand, manage and respond to security risks at a HQ / Regional level?

0	Not at all
0	In a limited way
0	Substantially

Please provide examples.	
	\mathbf{T}

20. How effective is the mechanism for you as HQ/Regional staff?



O Moderately effective

Very effective Please provide examples

		Þ
22. \	What are the main factors that make the mechanis What are the main challenges to the optimal effec Do you want to review a second country NGO / NG	tiveness of the mechanism? List 3.
0	Yes	
0	No	

This section looks into the detail of country security coordination mechanisms between UN and NGOs.

You will have to review different countries separately and have the opportunity to review up to three countries. If you have not worked with UN / NGO coordination practices please click 'No' in the first question below and skip to the final section.

24. Do you interact with UN / NGO security coordination mechanisms?

0	Yes
0	No
25. I	n what country is the UN / NGO coordination mechanism you are reviewing?
26. \	Vhat are the primary outputs of the mechanism? List 3 in order of frequency.
27. <i>F</i>	re the security coordination practices representative of the UN and NGO community?
0	
	Yes
0	
	No
Pleas	se provide examples.
28. A	re local organisations involved in the mechanism?
0	
	Yes
0	
	No
29. F	rom what you understand do NGOs participate on the same basis as UN agencies?

0				
Yes				
No	Yes	No		
International NGOs	0	0		
National NGOs and local organisations	0	0		

Please provide examples.	
	-
4	•
30. From what you understand does one UN ag	ency lead all security coordination practices or do different
UN agencies have separate roles in security coo	ordination?
0	

One lead UN agency

O Different agencies have separate roles

O Don't know

Please describe the UN agencies involved and their roles

			*
			_
		_	Ψ.
31.	Does the structure impact the effectiveness of UN / NGO security coordination?		
0	No.		
~	Yes		
O.	Νο		

Please explain.

		Ţ
<	- Þ	

Here, we are reviewing the functionality and effectiveness of UN / NGO security coordination practices.

Please continue to review the same country.

32. To what extent have UN / NGO security coordination practices benefitted your ability to understand, manage and respond to security risks at a HQ / Regional level?

0	Not at all	
0		
~	In a limited way	
0	Substantially	
Pleas	se provide examples.	
		A
		-
33. ⊦	low effective are the coordination practices for you as HQ/Regional staff?	
0	Not at all	
0	Moderately effective	
0	Very effective	
Pleas	se provide examples.	
		A
		-

34. What are the main factors that make the security coordination practices useful? List 3.

35. What are the main challenges to the optimal effectiveness of the UN/NGO security coordination practices? List 3.

36. Do you want to review a second UN / NGO country security coordination mechanism?

0	Yes	
0	No	

Thank you for completing all of the relevant sections so far. We now have a good understanding of your theoretical expectations of security coordination and your practical experiences.

37. If you have any final thoughts or comments on security coordination mechanisms that have not already been mentioned please detail them in the box below.

<u> </u>
-
•

Field Staff Survey

1. What type of organisation do you work for?

0	UN				
0	INGO				
0	NGO				
Othe	er (please specify)			*	
2. W	/here are you loca	ted?			
B	a i a(()				

Countr	v Office	

C **Field Location**

If you are willing, please share the country you are working in.

3. What is your position / primary responsibility?

0	Security
0	Programme
0	Management
O.	Operations
Othe	er (please specify)

This section aims to gauge the level of interaction that you and your agency have had with security coordination mechanisms. It also aims to understand more general principles and theoretical approaches that should guide security coordination mechanisms and in what contexts they are useful.

4. What is the extent of your knowledge of security coordination mechanisms?

- C Non existent
- O Limited

С

Comprehensive

5. To what extent is your organisation involved in security coordination mechanisms?

_		
0	Not at all	
0	In a limited way	
0	Substantially	
6. De	o you personally interact with security coordination mechanisms?	
0		
\sim	Yes	
0		
	No	
Wha	at is your role? (e.g. participant at meetings, serve on committee, staff member).	
		<u> </u>
7. In	what contexts are security coordination mechanisms necessary? You can choose r	nore than one
ansv	wer.	
	Low risk	
	Medium risk	
_	High risk	
	Never	
Plea	se explain your answer.	
		-

8. What factors are necessary to create an effective and well-functioning security coordination mechanism? (e.g. You may want to consider structure, different activities, and different stakeholders). List 3.
9. What positive changes can effective security coordination bring? List 3.

10. What three key principles should be the foundation for all security coordination mechanisms?

This section looks into the detail of country security coordination mechanisms between NGOs. You can answer the questions for the country that you currently work in or a country you have worked in before. Either way, please ensure that throughout you are referring to the same country mechanism.

If necessary you can use the comments sections to mention security coordination mechanisms in other countries. Please focus on NGO / NGO coordination here, UN / NGO coordination will be covered later in the survey.

11. Do you interact / Have you interacted with a NGO / NGO security coordination mechanism? (If no, you will be directed straight to the UN / NGO section).

• Yes

O No

12. In which country is the mechanism that will you be reviewing? Note: This question is not compulsory, if you are not willing to answer it please leave it blank.

In which country is the mechanism that will you be reviewing? Note: This question is not compulsory, if you are not willing to answer it please leave it blank.

13. What are the primary outputs of the mechanism? List 3 in order of frequency.

14. How regular are the coordination meetings?

C

Every week

0	Every two weeks
0	Every month
0	Infrequent
0	
15.	Not applicable - there are no meetings Which of the below points accurately describe the meetings? You can tick more than one.
	Minutes taken
	Minutes shared
	Powerpoint presentation
	Informal presentation of key points
	Relatively consistent number of attendees
	Changing number of attendees
	Higher number of attendees after security incidents
	Interactive discussion amongst most attendees
	Interactive discussion amongst few attendees
16.	In all of its activities is the mechanism representative of the NGO and humanitarian community

nechanism representative of the NGO and humanitarian community? its activities is the ь. i ali o

0	Yes
0	No

Please provide examples.

	$\overline{\mathbf{v}}$
17. Are local organisations involved in the mechanism?	

 \odot Yes

O

No

18. Do local organisations participate on the same basis as international NGOs?

- O Yes
- О No

О

Please explain.

i	
	-
•	
10. How is the machanism structured?	

19. How is the mechanism structured?

О Formally hosted by one agency

O Independent

Neither - no formal structure

security

If hosted by another agency, which one? If neither, how is it informally structured?	
	-
20. Dess and second the second in stick mask sharing 2	
20. Does one agency Chair the coordination mechanism?	
O Yes	
Tes	
No	
If yes, which agency is the Chair and how were they appointed?	
if yes, which agency is the chair and now were they appointed:	
	1
21. Approximately how many agencies are members or 'clients' of the mechanism?	
22. Does the structure impact the mechanism's effectiveness?	
0	
Yes	
No	
Please explain.	
	<u> </u>
	- 1
Here, we are reviewing the functionality and effectiveness of interacting with country N	GO / NGO se
coordination mechanisms.	
23. To what extent has the mechanism benefitted your organisation's operations and	its ability to
understand, manage and respond to security risks?	
0	
Not at all	
O In a limited way	
© Substantially	
Please provide examples.	
	<u> </u>
	-
24. How offective is the mechanism?	<u> </u>
24. How effective is the mechanism?	
O Not at all	

- NО
 - Moderately effective
- C Very effective

Please provide examples.

	-
 E Contraction of the second se	

25. What are the main factors that make the mechanism useful? List 3.

26. What are the main challenges to the optimal effectiveness of the mechanism? List 3.

This section looks into the detail of country security coordination mechanisms between the UN and NGOs. You can answer the questions for the country that you currently work in or a country you have worked in before. Either way, please ensure that throughout you are referring to the same country mechanism.

If necessary you can use the comments sections to mention security coordination mechanisms in other countries. Please focus on UN / NGO coordination here.

27. Have you interacted / Do you interact with a UN / NGO security coordination mechanism? (If no, you will be directed straight to the final section).

0	Yes				
0	No				

28. If different to above, in which country is the mechanism that will you be reviewing? Note: This question is not compulsory, if you are not willing to answer it please leave it blank.

29. What are the primary outputs of the	e mechanism? List 3 in order of frequency.
---	--

30. How regular are the coordination meetings?

- 27	۰.
- 54	

O

How regular are the coordination meetings? Every week

- C Every two weeks
 - Every month
- Infrequent
- \odot

Not applicable - there are no meetings

Please note here if there are additional meetings (e.g. from time to time in response to an incident).

31. Which of the below points accurately describe the meetings? You can tick more than	one.

	Minutes taken
	Minutes shared
	Powerpoint presentation
	Informal presentation of key points
	Relatively consistent number of attendees
	Changing number of attendees
	Higher number of attendees after security incidents
\Box	Interactive discussion amongst most attendees
	Interactive discussion amongst few attendees
Furtl	her details (e.g. estimate number of attendees if consiste

ent)

32. In all of its activities is the mechanism representative of the UN and NGO community?

In all of its activities is the mechanism representative of the UN and NGO community? Yes

O No

О

Please provide examples.

<	
33. Are local organisations involved in the mech	anism?
O _{Yes}	
O No	
34. Do NGOs participate on the same basis as U	ecurity coordination practices or do different UN agencies
One UN agency leads and also carries out a	Il security coordination
	also have different roles in security coordination her UN agencies involved in security coordination?
	v
	F
Approximately how many agencies are	nts' of the UN / NGO security coordination mechanism?
'clients' of the UN / NGO security coordination mechanism? UN agencies	
International NGOs	
National NGOs and local organisations	
37. Does the structure impact the mechanism's	effectiveness?
• Yes	
О No	
Please explain.	
4	
Here we are reviewing the functionality and off	stingers of interreting with UNI (NCO security security
mechanisms.	ectiveness of interacting with UN / NGO security coordination
	ed your organisation's operations and its ability to
understand, manage and respond to security ris	ks?
Not at all	
In a limited way	
C Substantially	

Substantially Please provide examples.

		\mathbf{v}
	ŀ	
20. How offective is the mechanism?		

39. How effective is the mechanism?

0	Not at all	
0	Moderately effective	
0	Very effective	
Plea	ase provide examples.	
		_
		-

40. What are the main factors that make the mechanism useful? List 3.

41. What are the main challenges to the optimal effectiveness of the mechanism? List 3.

42. Many thanks, you have now answered all of our questions. If you have any final thoughts or comments on security coordination mechanisms that have not already been mentioned please detail them in the box below.

Annex 4. Country Comparisons Table

Country	Risk level*	Type of security coordination mechanisms in place		Outputs	NGO attendance at UN security cell or SMT meetings	
		\checkmark	UNDSS	Information dissemination (to ad hoc group)		
	Low -		\checkmark	UN Agencies	UNOCHA & UNHCR meetings with partners - security an agenda point when necessary	
Bangladesh		~	NGO Informal		No	
	Medium?	\checkmark	NGO Formal	Security one agenda point (when necessary) at INGO CD Forum and INGO Finance, Administration and Security forum		
			NGO Platform			
		~	UNDSS	Information dissemination; Security Briefings; Agency-specific security support and advice (at a cost for INGOs)		
	N a divers		UN Agencies			
Colombia	Medium - High	\checkmark	NGO Informal		No	
			NGO Formal			
			NGO Platform			
		\checkmark	UNDSS	Information dissemination; Security Briefings	Yes - SMT (Goma only)	
DDC	112-b	~	UN Agencies	UNOCHA briefings (Goma); UNOCHA Chaired INGO 'Heads of Agency' programme activity discussions (Kinshasa); AFP chaired 'Cluster' meetings/briefings (Goma)		
DRC	High	~	NGO Informal			
			NGO Formal			
		\checkmark	NGO Platform	Information Dissemination; Security Analysis; Security Briefings; Security Training		
		~	UNDSS	Security briefing; Information dissemination		
		~	UN Agencies	UNHCR briefings and information dissemination (Zaatari Camp)	Yes - Security	
Jordan	Medium	\checkmark	NGO Informal		cell (Amman and Zataari	
		✓ NGO Formal Regular meetings when necessary	Regular meetings, security one agenda point when necessary	Camp)		
			NGO Platform			
Kenya	Medium	\checkmark	UNDSS	Information Dissemination; Security Analysis; Security Briefings	Yes - SMT (Nairobi)	

			UN Agencies					
		\checkmark	NGO Informal		-			
		~	NGO Formal	Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) (Nairobi), Information dissemination; Inter- agency analysis				
		\checkmark	NGO Platform	Information Dissemination; Security Analysis; Security Briefings				
		~	UNDSS	Security Briefing; Information Dissemination; Training dissemination; Agency-specific security support				
		\checkmark	UN Agencies	UNOCHA - Security on agenda point in HCT meetings				
Pakistan	High	\checkmark	NGO Informal		No			
			NGO Formal					
		\checkmark	NGO Platform	Security Briefing; Information dissemination; Security Analysis				
		\checkmark	UNDSS	Security briefing; Information dissemination				
			UN Agencies					
Somalia	High	High	High	High	\checkmark	NGO Informal		Yes - Security cell (Nairobi
			NGO Formal		and Somalia)			
		\checkmark	NGO Platform	Security Briefing; Information Dissemination; Training dissemination; Agency-specific security support				
			UNDSS					
			UN Agencies					
Sri Lanka	Low	~	NGO Informal		No			
			NGO Formal					
			NGO Platform		1			
* As defined	by SLTOC (Au	ugusti	2013)					

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Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development, ACTED American Friends Service Committee, AFSC ASAF / IME (IME), Democratic Republic of Congo Assistance for Slum Dwellers, Bangladesh Catholic Agency For Overseas Development, CAFOD **CARE** International Caritas Christian Aid **Church World Services, CWS** Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo dei Popoli, CISP **Concern Universal** Concern Worldwide Conflict Analysis Resource Centre, CERAC CREDDHO, Democratic Republic of Congo Danish Refugee Council, DRC Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO Deutche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusemmenarbit, GIZ Diakonie European Community Humanitarian Office, ECHO European Interagency Security Forum, EISF Eco Social Development Organisation, Bangladesh Internet & Mobile Marketing Association, iMMAP Initiative for Development and Empowerment Axis, IDEA InterAction Inter-Agency Working Group, Kenya, IAWG International NGO Safety Office, INSO International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, IFRC International Medical Corps, IMC International Organization for Migration, IOM International Rescue Committee, IRC Islamic Relief Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization Lutheran Foundation Medecins Sans Frontier, MSF Mercy Corps Merlin National Humanitarian Network, NHN, Pakistan

NGO Safety Programme, NSP Norwegian Refugee Council, NRC Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR Oxfam Pakistan Humanitarian Forum, PHF **Plan International** RedR Saibaan, Pakistan Save the Children International Safety & Security Committee for Lebanon, SSCL Sewalanka Foundation, Sri Lanka South Asia Partnership, Bangladesh Strengthening Partnerships Organisation, Pakistan Tearfund UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, UNAMI UN Children's Fund, UNICEF UN Department for Safety and Security, UNDSS **UN Development Programme, UNDP** UN Mission in Liberia, UNMIL UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN OCHA UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo, MONUSCO Un Population Fund, UNFPA UN Relief and Works Agency, UNRWA War Child World Food Programe, WFP World Vision International Zoa

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