

UN-CMCoord

UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN
CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION

Facilitating the right assistance, to the right people,
at the right time, in the most appropriate way

Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies



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Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies



United Nations

IASC Inter-Agency
Standing Committee

OCHA United Nations Office
for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs

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AND

[HTTP://WWW.RELIEFWEB.INT](http://www.reliefweb.int)

CIVIL-MILITARY GUIDELINES & REFERENCE FOR COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

is the first collection of core humanitarian instruments developed by the United Nations (UN) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on civil-military relationship in complex emergencies.

Its aim is to assist humanitarian and military professionals to deal with civil-military issues in a manner that respects and appropriately reflects humanitarian concerns at the strategic, operational and tactical levels — in accordance with international law, standards and principles.

ABOUT THE GUIDELINES AND REFERENCE

The Guidelines and Reference featured in this booklet were endorsed by the members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). IASC was established in 1992 in response to United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/182, which called for strengthened coordination of humanitarian assistance. In 1993, the General Assembly, through resolution 48/57, affirmed the role of IASC as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. A broad range of UN and non-UN humanitarian partners participate in this Standing Committee. Its products reflect common positions held across a diverse range of international humanitarian actors.

Further information on IASC can be found at:
<http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc>

ABOUT THIS BOOKLET

This booklet was published by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) through a collaboration between the Promotion of the Humanitarian Agenda Unit (PHA) of the Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB) and the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) of the Emergency Services Branch (ESB), with the support of the Secretariat of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and advice from the Office of the Military Adviser (OMA) of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

The electronic version is available at:
<http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines>
and
<http://www.reliefweb.int>

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whose generous contribution has made this publication possible.

John Holmes
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Project Supervisor:
Manuel Bessler

Project Coordinator and Managing Editor:
Kaoruko Seki

Project Advisers:

Amjad Abbashar
Hawaa El-Tayeb
Michael Marx
Ingrid Nordstrom-Ho
Freddy Polk
Yvette Stevens
Marilena Viviani
Yukiko Yoshida

Thematic Advisers:

Simon Bagshaw
Kate Burns
Lloyd Cederstrand
Sarah Muscroft
Ariana Pearlroth

Design

Outreach Division
Department of Public Information

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OVERVIEW

Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies is the first collection of core humanitarian instruments developed by the United Nations (UN) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on civil-military relationship in complex emergencies. Its **goal** is to help promote respect for international law, standards and principles in these situations.

Engaging military support for humanitarian operations is not a new endeavour. In today's security environment, however, the military are ever more involved in the 'direct' provision of aid, while humanitarian actors are often faced with situations where there are no alternatives but to rely on the military, as a **last resort**, for safety and to access populations in need—at the serious risk of compromising their neutrality, impartiality, and/or independence, and thus their ability and/or credibility to operate.

Combined with the tides toward 'integration' and 'whole-of-government' approaches, as well as the increased propensity of some Governments to deploy mixed civilian-military teams to provide aid as a 'tool' to address security threats, the situation calls for enhanced understandings between the military and humanitarian professionals at all levels.

International law, standards and principles can assist both actors to properly and legitimately discharge their respective missions in far-away lands. Adhering to these and de-conflicting each others' activities can maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of the respective operations. These tasks are crucial when working in the same area.

Written in a practical, user-friendly style that brings together the essential guidance materials on the subject into a single form, **the Booklet aims to assist professionals to handle civil-military issues in line with such law, standards and principles, in a manner that respects and appropriately reflects humanitarian concerns at the **strategic, operational** and **tactical** levels.**

Be it for peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peace-building, armed conflict or even war and occupation, readers will find in the **Guidelines and Reference** answers to such questions as:

QUESTIONS


- ➔ Why are principles of **humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence** and **distinction** so vital to civil-military coordination in humanitarian emergencies?
- ➔ When and how should humanitarian actors coordinate with the military?
- ➔ What is meant by the concept of **“last resort”** when employing military assets to support humanitarian operations?
- ➔ How do we mobilise such assets when necessary?
- ➔ Who should provide armed escorts to humanitarian convoys?
- ➔ When and under what circumstances should these escorts be employed?
- ➔ In what ways can we prevent unnecessary ‘militarisation’ of aid?

The **Annex** includes a selection of operational guidelines for peacekeepers and others that relate to civil-military issues. Most of these were developed outside the IASC context, but within the UN System at large.

Readers are also guided to a collection of **Relevant Material** on civil-military relationship and coordination in UN operations, covering such topics as **integrated missions, use of force, command and control, protection of civilians, field security** and **training** amongst others.

A rich list of civil-military-related **Abbreviations and Acronyms** is also provided to familiarise both civilians and military personnel alike.

The Booklet is published by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as the ‘custodian’ of civil-military guidelines and reference endorsed by the IASC. IASC materials reflect common positions held widely across a diverse range of international humanitarian actors.



IASC GUIDING & OPERATING PRINCIPLES

**ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
& USE OF MILITARY ASSETS**

IASC
Inter-Agency
Standing Committee

IASC GUIDING & OPERATING PRINCIPLES

ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP & USE OF MILITARY ASSETS

(Excerpts from early IASC discussions of 1995)

Guiding Principles

- The guiding principles of impartiality, neutrality, humanity and independence from political considerations are the same as those governing humanitarian action in general.
- The military nature of the assets may, however, require increased attention to be paid to the need to ensure that humanitarian action is not only neutral and impartial in intent but also perceived to be so by the parties directly concerned.
- Particular caution should be exercised in circumstances where there is a risk that either the motivation for the use of military or civil defence assets or its consequences may be perceived as reflecting political rather than humanitarian considerations.
- This risk is likely to be greatest in humanitarian actions in countries where military forces are operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, even if the two operations are not considered as integrated.

Operating Principles

- Decisions to accept military assets must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria.
- Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in nature or timeliness of deployment, and its use should be a last resort.
- A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. The operation must remain under the overall authority and control of the humanitarian organization responsible for that operation, whatever the specific command arrangements for the military asset itself. To the extent possible, the military asset should operate unarmed and be civilian in appearance.
- Countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the code of conduct and principles of the humanitarian organization responsible for that deployment.
- The large-scale involvement of military personnel in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance should be avoided.
- Any use of military assets should ensure that the humanitarian operation retains its international and multilateral character.

The **'Guiding Principles'** are excerpts from the 'IASC Guiding and Operating Principles for the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations' reflected in the "Report of the Task Force on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations" of September 1995, endorsed by the IASC Working Group on 27 September 1995. The **'Operating Principles'** are excerpts from the 'IASC Principles on Military-Civilian Relations' of January 1995, which became a key basis for subsequent development of IASC material on civil-military issues, including the above Task Force Report of 1995 as well as the **IASC Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference** featured in this Booklet.



Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies

An IASC Reference Paper

28 June 2004

IASC
Inter-Agency
Standing Committee



Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper ([IASC REFERENCE PAPER](#)) was endorsed by the members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on 17 June 2004. The paper was issued on 28 June 2004, including the final modifications requested by the IASC.

Document Development and Inter-Agency Process (2003-2004)

Drafting and Process Facilitation:
Manuel Bessler and Kaoruko Seki
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Figures inserted in the text of this Booklet are not an official part of the original IASC-endorsed Reference Paper.

Preface


Humanitarian and military actors have both worked in armed conflicts for centuries. Norms have been developed throughout the course of history to define the optimal relationship between civilians and soldiers, based on the cardinal distinction between combatants and non-combatants. In practice, however, strategic, operational, and tactical challenges continue to pose questions including: when and how, if ever, should humanitarian actors coordinate with the military in fulfilling humanitarian objectives?

In today's reality, aid workers and soldiers at times have little choice but to re-explore their relationship and improvise best ways possible for some degree of potential interaction, while simultaneously responding to the emergency at hand. Clearly, however, much time can be lost if fundamentals are left to be sorted out after being deployed to the field. A shared knowledge and understanding of each others *modus operandi* could facilitate necessary dialogue on the ground and better assist in de-conflicting their respective activities — which in turn would enable both actors to avoid harm and duplication, and work more effectively and efficiently.

It is in this spirit that this booklet has been produced — to provide a user-friendly tool to contribute to increased understanding of the humanitarian approaches to civil-military relationship in complex emergencies. I highly recommend it to all professionals who may become involved in this subject.

'Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper' is one of several guidelines and references endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. I encourage the readers to also take a look at the other sections in this booklet as well as the additional civil-military material available through: <http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines>.

This booklet is available in all official languages of the United Nations.



John Holmes
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and
Emergency Relief Coordinator

Introductory Note

This paper was endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG) as an IASC Reference Paper at its 57th Meeting of 16-17 June 2004. It complements the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003.

The paper was drafted by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in collaboration with members of the IASC, the UN’s Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) and the Advisory Panel of OCHA’s Military Civil Defence Unit (MCDU-AP), as well as academic reviewers and field colleagues in a number of organizations.

The paper will serve as a **non-binding reference** for humanitarian practitioners, assisting them in **formulating country-specific operational guidelines on civil-military relations** for particular complex emergencies. It will be updated as the environment in which we work changes and as new guidance on related issues becomes available.

PART 1 of the paper reviews in a generic manner, the nature and character of civil-military relations in complex emergencies. **PART 2** lists the fundamental humanitarian principles and concepts that must be upheld when coordinating with the military, and **PART 3** proposes practical considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.



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PART 1: INTRODUCTION

A. Initial Remarks

1. Traditionally in complex emergencies, there has been a **distinction** between the military and the non-military domains: an approach built upon the principles of international humanitarian law that make a distinction between **combatants** and **non-combatants**, protecting the latter from armed attacks. In recent history, however, military forces have become increasingly involved in operations other than war, including provision of relief and services to the local population. At the same time, due to the changing nature of modern complex emergencies, the humanitarian community has faced increased operational challenges as well as greater risks and threats for their workers in the field, which at times have compelled some of them to seek the support or protection by military forces on a case-by-case basis¹. Thus, practical realities on the ground have gradually necessitated various forms of civil-military coordination for humanitarian operations.

2. These developments, together with cases of military interventions claimed to be for 'humanitarian' purposes, have led to **an erosion of the separation between the humanitarian and the military space**², and may threaten to blur the fundamental distinction between these two domains. It also raises significant concerns associated with the application of humanitarian principles and policies as well as operational issues. Furthermore these develop-

¹ *In the last two years alone, military support and/or protection for certain humanitarian operations has been provided in various complex emergencies, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Liberia, Northern Uganda, and Sierra Leone.*

² *For an explanation on 'humanitarian space' or 'humanitarian operating environment', see paragraph 3 of the "Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies" of March 2003.*

ments necessitate increased communication, coordination and understanding between humanitarian agencies and military actors, and require knowledge of each other's mandates, capacities and limitations.

3. The humanitarian community therefore felt it necessary to examine the broad spectrum of issues arising from civil-military relations, and to come up with a reference paper that extends beyond the individual guidelines already developed, which cover either particular aspects of civil-military relations³ or civil-military relationship in a specific complex emergency⁴.

³ Existing guidelines on particular aspects of civil-military relations include: "Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies" of March 2003 and "Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys — Discussion paper and Non-Binding Guidelines" of September 2001.

⁴ Existing guidelines on civil-military relations in a specific complex emergency include: "General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq" of 8 May 2003 and "Relationships with Military Forces in Afghanistan — Guidelines for UNAMA Area Coordinators and other UN Personnel" of 2002. "General Guidance for Interaction Between United Nations Personnel and the UN-Mandated Multinational Force in Liberia" and "Relations avec les Forces Armees en Haiti: Ligne de Conduite pour le Personnel des Nations Unies" exist in draft form as of 1 April 2004.



B. The Goal and Purpose of this Paper

4. This paper has thus been prepared, following the request of the Working Group of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)⁵, with the overall goal of enhancing the understanding of civil-military relations, including the difficulties and limitations of such relations. While numerous complicated questions arise out of this relationship, what remains vital for the humanitarian community is to develop a clear awareness of the nature of this relation, as well as a common understanding on **when and how** as well as **how not to coordinate with the military** in fulfilling humanitarian objectives.

5. The **purpose** of this paper is three-fold. First, it attempts to highlight, in a generic manner, the **nature and character** of civil-military relations in complex emergencies. Secondly, it reviews some fundamental **humanitarian principles and concepts** that must be upheld when coordinating with the military. Thirdly, attention is given to practical **key considerations** for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.

6. The paper will serve as a **general reference** for humanitarian practitioners: a tool to which they can refer when formulating **operational guidelines** that are tailored specifically for civil-military relations in a particular complex emergency, such as the ones developed for Iraq and Liberia during 2003⁶. Any **situation-specific set of guidelines** requires sensitivity to the special circumstances of the particular operation and hence has to be developed on a case-by-case basis.

7. The **focus** of this paper is the relationship between **humanitarian organizations** and **official military forces** (i.e., military forces of a state or regional-/inter-governmental organisation that are subject to a hierarchical chain of command), be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental. Such military presence may include a wide spectrum of actors such as the local or national military, multi-national forces, UN peacekeeping troops, international military observers, foreign occupying forces, regional troops or other officially organized troops.

⁵ *The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG), at its 52nd Meeting in March 2003, requested OCHA to prepare "...a concept paper on the issue of military and humanitarian interface upon analysing thoroughly the current state of interface."*

⁶ *For details, see footnote 4 above.*

8. The different mandates, characteristics and nature of these diverse military actors may necessitate that the humanitarian community relate to different groups with **varying degrees of sensitivity** or even with **fundamentally different approaches** at times. For example, interaction with an occupying force⁷ would have to entail different considerations from that required vis-à-vis national forces, unarmed military observers, or UN commanded peace-keeping operations. The most important distinction to be drawn is whether the military group with which humanitarians are interacting is, has become, or is perceived to be a **party to the conflict or not**. Separate specific papers will be required to address and advise on the particular circumstances and requirements of the relationships between humanitarians and any of these individual categories of military actors. Such policies may be formulated through various mechanisms. The present paper, however, is an attempt to address the subject of **civil-military relations at a generic level**. Therefore, it will not distinguish between the various military actors.

9. The relationship between humanitarian organizations and non-state armed groups⁸, private military, security companies and mercenaries, as well as any national or international police presence, although highly relevant in today's conflict situations, are excluded from the analysis of this paper to avoid dilution of focus. Issues of general security, including operational challenges faced under increasing threats of global terrorism, are also excluded for the same reason.



⁷ For example, such as the Coalition Forces of the Occupying Powers currently deployed in Iraq.

⁸ Field practices on engagements with non-state actors were collected in "Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners" and "Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups"— published in 2006 and available on-line at <http://www.reliefweb.int>. Relevant conclusions and principles from the Manual may be used to update this paper as appropriate. [Editor's Note (2008): footnote 8 has been updated to reflect the 2006 publication of the Manual and Guidelines, subsequent to the IASC endorsement of the IASC Reference Paper in 2004.]

C. Definition of Key Terms

10. In order to facilitate the understanding of the concepts elaborated herein and to avoid confusion arising out of a variety of possible definitions entailed in terminology, some key terms used in this paper are defined as follows:

Civil-Military Coordination:⁹ The **essential dialogue** and **interaction** between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from **coexistence** to **cooperation**. Coordination is a **shared responsibility** facilitated by liaison and common training.

Complex Emergency: A complex emergency, as defined by the IASC, is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme.”

Humanitarian Actor: Humanitarian actors are civilians, whether national or international, UN or non-UN, governmental or non-governmental, which have a commitment to humanitarian principles and are engaged in humanitarian activities.

Military Actor: Military actors refer to official military forces, i.e., military forces of a state or regional-/inter-governmental organisation that are subject to a hierarchical chain of command, be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental. This may include a wide spectrum of actors such as the local or national military, multi-national forces, UN peacekeeping troops, international military observers, foreign occupying forces, regional troops or other officially organized troops.

DEFINITIONS

⁹ The definition of ‘Civil-Military Coordination’ is identical to that used in the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) uses a different definition of Civil-Military Coordination; see DPKO’s paper on ‘Civil-Military Coordination Policy’ dated 9 September 2002.

D. Background

11. The humanitarian and military actors have fundamentally different institutional thinking and cultures, characterised by the distinct chain-of-command and clear organisational structures of the military vis-à-vis the diversity of the humanitarian community. The two groups have different mandates, objectives, working methods, and even vocabularies. It is important for military actors to understand the complex network of humanitarian assistance, which includes international organizations and local, national and international NGOs that work with national staff and local partners. Humanitarian action is also largely dependent on acceptance by the parties to the conflict. Most of the local actors engaged in humanitarian work are present on the ground long before the arrival of international personnel and will continue their functions after their departure. Susceptibility towards local sensitivities and adherence to the actuality and perception of impartiality and independence are therefore pivotal assets of any humanitarian operation, and this should be made known to the military. For humanitarian actors, on the other hand, it is important to be aware of the varied reasons and motivations why the military may undertake actions that can encroach on humanitarian space.

12. Within the context of civil-military relations, there are a number of situations where some level of coordination between the humanitarian and military actors may become necessary. As defined in paragraph 10, **civil-military coordination** is a **shared responsibility** of the humanitarian and military actors, and it may take place in various levels of intensity and form. Where cooperation between the humanitarian and military actors is not appropriate, opportune or possible, or if there are no common goals to pursue, then these actors merely operate side-by-side. Such a relationship may be best described as one of **co-existence**, in which case civil-military coordination should focus on minimizing competition and conflict in order to enable the different actors to work in the same geographical area with minimum disruption to each other's activities. When there is a common goal and agreed strategy, and all parties accept to work together, **cooperation** may become possible, and coordination should focus on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts to serve humanitarian objectives.


13. In any circumstances, however, it is important to maintain a **clear separation** between the roles of the military and humanitarian actors, by **distin-**

guishing their respective spheres of competence and responsibility. This approach is implicit in and builds on the principles of international humanitarian law, and is crucial to maintaining the **independence** of humanitarian action. The need for the humanitarians to maintain an actual and perceived distance from the military is especially important with regard to belligerent forces or representatives of an occupying power¹⁰. Any coordination with a party to an armed conflict must proceed with extreme caution, care and sensitivity, given that the actual or perceived affiliation with a belligerent might lead to the loss of neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian organization, which might in turn affect the security of beneficiaries as well as humanitarian staff, and jeopardize the whole humanitarian operation in a conflict zone. **Thus, cooperation — the closer form of coordination—with belligerent forces should in principle not take place, unless in extreme and exceptional circumstances and as a last resort.**

14. However, the emphasis on **distinction** should not be interpreted as a suggestion of **non-coordination** between humanitarian and military actors. The particular situation on the ground and the nature of the military operation in a given situation will play a determining factor on the type of coordination that may take

FIGURE 1-1:

The Range of Civil-Military Relationship and UN CMCoord Strategy



Scope for civil-military **cooperation** (for example, joint-operations) decreases as the intensity of the military operation increases towards combat. Joint operations are more acceptable in peace-time natural disaster response.



UN CMCoord basic strategy ranges from **co-existence** to **cooperation**. In either side of the spectrum and in between, **coordination** — i.e., the essential dialogue and interaction — is necessary in order to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, and minimize inconsistency.

Based on: UN CMCoord Course Module

¹⁰ As an example of principles and practical considerations including specifics on permissible and impermissible action when interacting with an Occupying Power, see the "General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq" of 8 May 2003.

place. Possible features of civil-military coordination include the sharing of certain information, a careful division of tasks, and when feasible and appropriate, collaborative planning.

15. The military often have the capability to help secure an enabling environment on the ground in which humanitarian activities can take place in relative safety. The military may also have practical means to offer in the delivery of assistance, such as rapid deployment of large numbers of personnel, equipment, logistics and supplies. However, humanitarian expertise — including beneficiary identification, needs and vulnerability assessment, impartial and neutral distribution of relief aid, and monitoring and evaluation—will remain essential to an effective and successful humanitarian operation.

16. The nature of the relation between one or a group of humanitarian organization(s) and the military as well as the conduct of these actors in this relationship may also have an **effect on other humanitarian agencies** working in the same area and even beyond, possibly affecting the perception of humanitarian action in general. For example, the use of armed escorts by one humanitarian organisation may negatively influence the perception of neutrality and impartiality of other humanitarian organisations in the same area. Coordination amongst humanitarian actors, preferably leading to a common approach to civil-military relations in a given complex emergency, is therefore desirable.

PART 2: PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS

17. All humanitarian action, including civil-military coordination for humanitarian purposes in complex emergencies, must be in accordance with the overriding core principles of **humanity**, **neutrality** and **impartiality**. This section outlines these cardinal humanitarian principles as well as other important principles and concepts that must be respected when planning or undertaking civil-military coordination.

A. Humanity, Neutrality and Impartiality¹¹

18. Any civil-military coordination must serve the prime humanitarian principle of **humanity** — i.e. human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. In determining whether and to what extent humanitarian agencies should coordinate with military forces, one must be mindful of the potential consequences of too close an affiliation with the military or even the perception of such affiliation, especially as these could jeopardize the humanitarian principles of **neutrality** and **impartiality**. The concept of non-allegiance is central to the principle of neutrality in humanitarian action; likewise, the idea of non-discrimination is crucial to the principle of impartiality. However, the key humanitarian objective of providing protection and assistance to populations in need may at times necessitate a pragmatic approach, which might include civil-military coordination. Even so, **ample consideration must be given to finding the right balance between a pragmatic and a principled response, so that coordination with the military would not compromise humanitarian imperatives.**

¹¹ For example, the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality are stipulated as guiding principles for humanitarian assistance in UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991.

B. Humanitarian Access to Vulnerable Populations

19. Humanitarian agencies must maintain their ability to obtain **access** to all vulnerable populations in all areas of the complex emergency in question and to negotiate such access with all parties to the conflict. Particular care must also be taken to ensure the sustainability of access. **Coordination with the military should be considered to the extent that it facilitates, secures and sustains, not hinders, humanitarian access.**

C. Perception of Humanitarian Action

20. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to all populations in need must be **neutral** and **impartial** — it must come without political or military conditions and humanitarian staff must not take sides in disputes or political positions. This will have a bearing on the **credibility** and **independence** of humanitarian efforts in general. Any civil-military coordination must also be mindful not to jeopardize the longstanding local network and trust that humanitarian agencies have created and maintained.



D. Needs-Based Assistance Free of Discrimination¹²

21. Humanitarian assistance must be provided on the **basis of needs** of those affected by the particular complex emergency, taking into account the local capacity already in place to meet those needs. The assessment of such needs must be independent and **humanitarian assistance must be given without adverse discrimination of any kind**, regardless of race, ethnicity, sex/gender, religion, social status, nationality or political affiliation of the recipients. It must be provided in an equitable manner to all populations in need.

E. Civilian-Military Distinction in Humanitarian Action

22. At all times, a clear **distinction** must be maintained between combatants and non-combatants — i.e., between those actively engaged in hostilities, and civilians and others who do not or no longer directly participate in the armed conflict (including the sick, wounded, prisoners of war and ex-combatants who are demobilised). International humanitarian law protects non-combatants by providing immunity from attack. Thus, **humanitarian workers must never present themselves or their work as part of a military operation, and military personnel must refrain from presenting themselves as civilian humanitarian workers.**



¹² A similar provision on needs-based assistance is articulated as Principle 2 in “The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief”. The principle of non-discrimination is expressed in a multitude of human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, etc.

F. Operational Independence of Humanitarian Action

23. In any civil-military coordination **humanitarian actors must retain the lead role in undertaking and directing humanitarian activities.** The *independence* of humanitarian action and decision-making must be preserved both at the operational and policy levels at all times. **Humanitarian organisations must not implement tasks on behalf of the military nor represent or implement their policies.** Basic requisites such as freedom of movement for humanitarian staff, freedom to conduct independent assessments, freedom of selection of staff, freedom to identify beneficiaries of assistance based on their needs, or free flow of communications between humanitarian agencies as well as with the media, must not be impeded.

G. Security of Humanitarian Personnel

24. Any perception that humanitarian actors may have become affiliated with the military forces within a specific situation could impact negatively on the security of humanitarian staff and their ability to access vulnerable populations. However, humanitarian actors operating within an emergency situation must identify the most expeditious, effective and secure approach to ensure the delivery of vital assistance to vulnerable target populations. This approach must be balanced against the primary concern for ensuring staff safety, and therein a consideration of any real or perceived affiliation with the military. The decision to seek military-based security for humanitarian workers should be viewed as a *last resort* option when other staff security mechanisms are unavailable, inadequate or inappropriate.

H. Do No Harm

25. Considerations on civil-military coordination must be guided by a commitment to *'do no harm'*. Humanitarian agencies must ensure at the policy and operational levels that any potential civil-military coordination will not contribute to further the conflict, nor harm or endanger the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.

I. Respect for International Legal Instruments

26. Both humanitarian and military actors must respect international humanitarian law as well as other international norms and regulations, including human rights instruments.



J. Respect for Culture and Custom¹³

27. Respect and sensitivities must be maintained for the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries where humanitarian activities are carried out. Where possible and to the extent feasible, ways shall be found to involve the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and/or local personnel in the design, management and implementation of assistance, including in civil-military coordination.

K. Consent of Parties to the Conflict¹⁴

28. The risk of compromising humanitarian operations by cooperating with the military might be reduced if all parties to the conflict recognize, agree or acknowledge in advance that humanitarian activities might necessitate civil-military coordination in certain exceptional circumstances. Negotiating such acceptance entails contacts with all levels in the chain of command.

¹³ For example, see Principles 5 and 7 of “The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief”.

¹⁴ For example, see UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991.

L. Option of Last Resort¹⁵


29. Use of military assets, armed escorts, joint humanitarian-military operations and any other actions involving visible interaction with the military must be the option of **last resort**. Such actions may take place only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military support can meet a critical humanitarian need.

M. Avoid Reliance on the Military¹⁶

30. **Humanitarian agencies must avoid becoming dependent on resources or support provided by the military.** Any resources or support provided by the military should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel/means. Resources provided by the military are often only temporarily available and when higher priority military missions emerge, such support may be recalled at short notice and without any substitute support.

¹⁵ For example, see Paragraphs 7, 26, 30, 33 and 38 of “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003.

¹⁶ For example, see Paragraph 29 of “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003.




PART 3: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

31. This section outlines the main practical considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.

A. Establishment of Liaison Arrangements

32. Liaison arrangements and clear lines of communication should be established at the **earliest** possible stage and at **all relevant levels**, between the military forces and the humanitarian community, to guarantee the timely and regular exchange of certain information, before and during military opera-



tions. However, these activities should be conducted with caution. Either mentioning or concealing to the public the existence of direct communication between the humanitarian and military actors could result in suspicion and/or incorrect conclusions regarding the nature of the communication. Due to its possible impact on the perception of humanitarian operations, at times, it may be reasonable not to disseminate or publicize the liaison arrangements between the humanitarian community and the military. Obviously, such a decision has to be balanced with the need to ensure accountability, transparency and openness towards the local population and beneficiaries.

33. There are a number of initiatives within the UN system that focus on preparing humanitarian personnel on civil-military issues and practical liaison arrangements in complex emergencies. This includes the **UN CMCoord induction courses**, organised by OCHA's Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU)*. This unit also conducts pre-deployment training and workshops tailored to a particular content and mission.

** Editor's Note (2008): The Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) was renamed as the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) on 3 October 2005.*



34. In addition to **UN CMCoord Officers** deployed by OCHA, UN agencies may deploy **Military Liaison Officers (MLOs)** to focus on specific sectoral and operational civil-military issues and DPKO may deploy **Civil-Military Liaison Officers (CMLOs)**. Where established, the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), an inter-agency facility, also provides a civil-military coordination function on an operational logistics level.¹⁷

Issues arising¹⁸:

- ➔ How should the liaison arrangements between the humanitarian community and the military be conducted: in confidence or in transparency?
- ➔ What would the implications be of public knowledge of such liaison arrangements on the perception of the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian activities?
- ➔ How can transparency of the civil-military liaison arrangements be ensured while maintaining the understanding of a clear distinction between the military and humanitarian actors?
- ➔ How can incorrect perceptions and conclusions be prevented regarding the nature and purpose of civil-military liaison arrangements?
- ➔ Which circumstances call for formal liaison arrangements? When is it better to maintain liaison on an ad-hoc basis?
- ➔ What is the appropriate size and structure of the civil-military liaison component?
- ➔ When, if ever, should the liaison officers of the humanitarian and military communities be co-located in the same facility?

¹⁷ For more information on UNJLC, please go to <http://www.unjlc.org>.

¹⁸ These are questions to be addressed when drafting guidelines for civil-military relations in particular complex emergencies.

B. Information Sharing

35. As a matter of principle, any information gathered by humanitarian organisations in fulfilment of their mandate that might endanger human lives or compromise the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian organizations should not be shared.

36. However, to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to populations in need, information sharing with the military forces may at times become necessary. In particular, information that might affect the security of civilians and/or humanitarian workers should be shared with appropriate entities. Information sharing between humanitarian and appropriate military actors may include:

- **Security information:** information relevant to the security of civilians and to the security situation in the area of operation;
- **Humanitarian locations:** the coordinates of humanitarian staff and facilities inside military operating theatre;
- **Humanitarian activities:** the humanitarian plans and intentions, including routes and timing of humanitarian convoys and airlifts in order to coordinate planned operations, to avoid accidental strikes on humanitarian operations or to warn of any conflicting activities;
- **Mine-action activities:** information relevant to mine-action activities;
- **Population movements:** information on major movements of civilians;
- **Relief activities of the military:** information on relief efforts undertaken by the military;
- **Post-strike information:** information on strike locations and explosive munitions used during military campaigns to assist the prioritisation and planning of humanitarian relief and mine-action/UXO activities.

Issues arising:

- ➔ What kind of information should/could be shared, with whom and when?
- ➔ How can information that may be important for humanitarian purposes be differentiated from information that is politically, militarily or economically sensitive?
- ➔ How do we determine which information might serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian? For example, how do we ensure that information on population movements or aid beneficiaries will not be misused for military purposes?
- ➔ Should information that is shared with one military group be shared with all other military and/or political groups as well? How should we ensure that no side is favoured over another while being mindful of sensitivities involved in information?
- ➔ When and how should we verify information provided by the military?



C. Use of Military Assets for Humanitarian Operations

37. The use of military assets in support of humanitarian operations should be **exceptional** and only on a **last resort**. It is recognized, however, that where civilian/humanitarian capacities are not adequate or cannot be obtained in a timely manner to meet urgent humanitarian needs, military and civil defence assets, including military aircraft, may be deployed in accordance with the **"Guidelines on the Use Of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies"** ("**MCDA Guidelines**") of March 2003.¹⁹ In addition to the principle of 'last resort'²⁰, key criteria in the MCDA Guidelines include: (1) **unique capability** — no appropriate alternative civilian resources exist; (2) **timeliness** — the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action; (3) **clear humanitarian direction** — civilian control over the use of military assets; (4) **time-limited** — the use of military assets to support humanitarian activities is clearly limited in time and scale.

38. **As a matter of principle, the military and civil defence assets of belligerent forces or of units that find themselves actively engaged in combat shall not be used to support humanitarian activities**²¹. While there

¹⁹ For the full text of the MCDA Guidelines, see internet address in the Annex at the end of this paper. [Editor's note (2008): MCDA Guidelines are also included in Section 2 of this booklet.]

²⁰ Last resort is defined as follows: 'Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability.' (See paragraph 7 of the MCDA Guidelines.)

²¹ See Paragraph 25 of the MCDA Guidelines.





are ongoing hostilities, it will be necessary to distinguish between operations in theatre and those outside. In theatre, the use of military assets for humanitarian purposes should generally not be undertaken. Only under extreme and exceptional circumstances would it be appropriate to consider the use, in theatre, of military assets of the

parties engaged in combat operations. Specifically, this situation may occur when a highly vulnerable population cannot be assisted or accessed by any other means. Outside the theatre of operations, military assets of the parties engaged in combat operations may be used in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and guidelines. However, preference should first be given to military assets of parties not engaged in combat operations.

39. Any humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its **civilian nature** and **character**. **While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organisation.** Military and civil defence assets that have been placed under the control of the humanitarian agencies and deployed on a full-time basis purely for humanitarian purposes must be visibly identified in a manner that clearly differentiates them from military assets being used for military purposes.

Issues arising:

- ➔ Who defines last resort and what are the exact criteria for last resort?
- ➔ How can we ensure the credibility and security for a humanitarian operation that uses military assets and how can we maintain the confidence of the local population for such operations?
- ➔ How can we make sure that humanitarian actors retain the lead role and direction of humanitarian efforts even when military assets are used as the only means available?

D. Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys

40. The use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys or operations is **an extreme precautionary measure that should be taken only in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis**. The decision to request or accept the use of military or armed escorts must be made by **humanitarian organizations**, not political or military authorities, based solely on humanitarian criteria. In case the situation on the ground calls for the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, any such action should be guided by the principles endorsed by the IASC in September 2001 and updated in February 2013.²²

Issues arising:

- ➡ Who should provide the escort (UN forces, other international forces, government forces, forces of non-state actors, armed guards provided by security services companies)?
- ➡ How can we ensure that humanitarian operations will not become dependent on military escort — to the extent that it becomes impossible to operate without them?
- ➡ How can the capability, credibility and deterrence of an escort be determined?
- ➡ How do we determine if the escorts themselves are a potential source of insecurity?
- ➡ How do we ensure that short-term gain in access by using armed escorts would not result in long-term loss of losing actual or perceived neutrality, impartiality, independence and even credibility of the humanitarian operation?

²² See IASC *Non-Binding Guidelines on the "Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys"* of February 2013.

E. Joint Civil-Military Relief Operations

41. Any operations undertaken jointly by humanitarian agencies and military forces may have a negative impact on the perception of the humanitarian agencies' impartiality and neutrality and hence affect their ability to operate effectively throughout a complex emergency. Therefore, any joint civil-military cooperation should be determined by a **thorough assessment** of the actual needs on the ground and a review of civilian humanitarian capacities to respond to them in a timely manner. To the extent that joint operations with the military cannot be avoided, they may be employed only as a means of **last resort**, and must adhere to the principles provided in the above-mentioned "**MCDA Guidelines**".

42. One must be aware that the military have different objectives, interests, schedules and priorities from the humanitarian community. Relief operations rendered by military forces could be conditional and could cease when the mission of the military forces changes, the unit moves or if the assisted population becomes uncooperative. Such action by the military can also be conducted primarily based on the needs and goals of the force and its mission, rather than the needs of the local population.

Issues arising:

- ➔ How can the impartiality and neutrality of a humanitarian action be preserved when it is carried out as a joint civil-military operation?
- ➔ What are the implications of a joint civil-military operation regarding access to all civilians in need and the safety of humanitarian staff?
- ➔ What happens if the military is suddenly redeployed to another mission or location, after the start of the joint operation?

F. Separate Military Operations for Relief Purposes

43. Relief operations carried out by military forces, even when the intention is purely 'humanitarian,' may jeopardize or seriously undermine the overall humanitarian efforts by non-military actors. The other parties to the conflict and the beneficiaries may neither be willing nor able to differentiate between assistance provided by the military and assistance provided by humanitarian agencies. This could have serious consequences for the ability to access certain areas and the safety of humanitarian staff, not to mention the long-term damage to the standing of humanitarian agencies in the region and in other crisis areas if humanitarian assistance is perceived as being selective and/or partial. Assistance provided by the military is susceptible to political influence and/or objectives and the criteria used in selecting the beneficiaries and determining their needs may differ from those held by humanitarian organizations.

44. For these reasons, military forces should be **strongly discouraged** from playing the role of the humanitarian aid providers. Their role in relation to humanitarian actors should be limited to **help create a secure operating environment that enables humanitarian action**. If need be, diplomatic efforts should be used to explain and reiterate to political and military authorities the concern of the humanitarian community in this regard.

45. However, there may be extreme and exceptional circumstances that require relief operations to be undertaken by the military as a **last resort**. This might be the case when the military are the only actors on the ground or the humanitarians lack the capacity and/or resources to respond to critical needs of civilians.



Issues arising:

- ➔ What are the means and possibilities of humanitarian agencies to discourage separate military operations for relief purposes?
- ➔ In what circumstances should exceptions be recognized? For example, if belligerent forces were the only ones who could reach vulnerable populations and therefore alleviate extreme human suffering? Should the humanitarian community advocate for the involvement of military forces in such cases?
- ➔ If the military engages in relief activities, what kind of coordination arrangement should be established with the humanitarian community?

G. General Conduct of Humanitarian Staff

46. The **independence** and **civilian nature** of humanitarian assistance should be emphasized at all times. A clear **distinction** must be retained between the identities, functions and roles of humanitarian personnel and those of military forces — i.e., travel in clearly marked vehicles, clearly mark offices and relief supplies, etc. Weapons should not be allowed on the premises or transportation facilities of humanitarian organizations. Humanitarian personnel should not travel in military vehicles, aircraft, etc., except as a last resort or for security reasons. Humanitarian workers should not wear any military-uniform-like clothing. Failure to observe this distinction could compromise the perception of neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian activities and thereby negatively affect the safety and security of humanitarian staff.

Issues arising:

- ➔ How should differences of opinion regarding civil-military coordination be settled between humanitarian and military actors? Who decides?
- ➔ How should public appearances (TV, radio, ceremonies, events, social functions, events sponsored by the military, etc.) be handled, in view of the sensitivity required in fostering the appropriate public images and perceptions?

ANNEX:


Related Documents and Web-Page Address

Related Documents

- ✓ Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (March 2003)
- ✓ Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys — Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines (14 September 2001)
- ✓ General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq (8 May 2003)
- ✓ Relationships with Military Forces in Afghanistan — Guidelines for UNAMA Area Coordinators and other UN Personnel (2002)
- ✓ Guidance On Use of Military Aircraft for UN Humanitarian Operations During the Current Conflict in Afghanistan IMTF (7 November 2001)
- ✓ Civil-Military Coordination Policy by Department of Peacekeeping Operation (9 September 2002)

(* Editor's Note (2008): All the above documents as well as this reference paper, Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies, can be found at the following website address: <http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines>)

FIGURE 1-3: Applicable Civil-Military Guidelines, Concepts, Standards and Law



Based on: UN CMCoord Course Module

2

Guidelines on the

Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets

**to Support United Nations
Humanitarian Activities
in Complex Emergencies**

March 2003 (Revision 1 — January 2006)

IASC
Inter-Agency
Standing Committee



Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA GUIDELINES)

was endorsed by the members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in March 2003.

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Project and Process Manager:

Ingrid Nordström-Ho

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Process Facilitator:

Freddy L. Polk, Senior Adviser to the

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Figures inserted in the text of this Booklet are not an official part of the original IASC-endorsed Guidelines.

Preface

When and how should one decide to request the use of military and/or civil defence assets in support of United Nations humanitarian activities in complex emergencies? Why are military assets considered a *last resort* in these circumstances? What are the existing mechanisms to enable swift mobilisation of these assets when necessary? What is exactly meant by direct assistance, indirect assistance and infrastructure support by the military? Why is direct assistance by the military mostly discouraged? If military and civil defence assets are to be requested, on which criteria should such decisions be made?

All of these are valid questions faced in the field of humanitarian operations in complex emergency situations. A simple mistake could lead to unintended consequences that might harm the operations of not only the humanitarian agency concerned, but the wider humanitarian and local community as well. It is therefore vital that a shared knowledge and understanding is developed amongst a wide range of relevant professionals who may have a role in facilitating the decision-making and its execution.

It is in this spirit that this booklet has been produced — to provide a user-friendly tool to contribute to increased understanding of the humanitarian approaches to the use of military and/or civil defence assets in support of United Nations humanitarian activities. I highly recommend it to all professionals who may become involved in this subject.

'The Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies' is one of several guidelines and references endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. I encourage the readers to also take a look at the other sections in this booklet as well as the additional civil-military material available through: <http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines>.

This booklet is available in all official languages of the United Nations.



John Holmes

Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and
Emergency Relief Coordinator

Introductory Note

This document has been developed with the collaboration of a broad representation of the international humanitarian community, through a *Drafting Committee* consisting of representatives of Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Sudan, Switzerland, UK, USA, DPKO, SCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, as well as a *Review Committee* consisting of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, India, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey, Yugoslavia, COE, ECHO, EC, EUMS, ICDO, ICRC, ICVA, INTERACTION, IOM, NATO, OCHA, THW and WHO.



Changes in this *Revision I* concern the renaming of the Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) of OCHA, to the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS), on 3 October 2005. It also corrects the official IASC definition of a complex emergency (para 1), to read: "a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme."



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INTRODUCTION

Key Terms and Conditions


The following terms are essential for establishing a common understanding of the terminology used by the guidelines as set out in this document.

1. **Complex Emergency:**

A complex emergency, as defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme.”

2. **Humanitarian Assistance:**

Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to **save lives** and **alleviate suffering** of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of *humanity*, *impartiality* and *neutrality*. For the purposes of these guidelines, assistance can be divided into three categories based on the **degree of contact** with the affected population. These categories are important because they help define which types of humanitarian activities



might be appropriate to support with international military resources under different conditions, given that ample consultation has been conducted with all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the assistance.

- **Direct Assistance** is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services.
- **Indirect Assistance** is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel.
- **Infrastructure Support** involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

Figure 2-1: Military Missions, Political Situations and Advisability of Military Support

Impartiality of Forces & their Availability to Support Humanitarian Operations Decrease

Military Mission Assistance Tasks	Peace time	Peace-keeping	Peace-enforcement	Combat
Direct	Maybe	Maybe	NO	NO
Indirect	YES	Maybe	Maybe	NO
Infrastructure	YES	YES	Maybe	Maybe

Visibility of Tasks Decreases

Based on: UN CMCoord Course Module and UN CMCoord Officer Field Handbook

3. The Humanitarian Operating Environment:

A key element for humanitarian agencies and organizations when they deploy, consists of establishing and maintaining a conducive humanitarian operating environment (this is sometimes referred to as “**humanitarian space**”). The perception of adherence to the key operating principles of neutrality and impartiality in humanitarian operations represents the critical means by which the prime objective of ensuring that suffering must be met wherever it is found, can be achieved. Consequently, maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of the military is the determining factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely. Sustained humanitarian access to the affected population is ensured when the receipt of humanitarian assistance is **not conditional** upon the allegiance to or support to parties involved in a conflict but is a right independent of military and political action.

4. Military and Civil Defence Assets:

MCDA, as defined in the 1994 “Oslo Guidelines”, “comprises relief personnel, equipment, supplies and services provided by foreign military and civil defence organizations for international humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, civil defence* organization means any organization that, under the control of a Government, performs the functions enumerated in Article 61, paragraph (1), of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949”. When these assets are under UN control they are referred to as UN MCDA.

[Editor’s Note (2008): For a more recent discussion on civil defence and civil protection, see proceedings of the “Extraordinary Session of the Consultative Group on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets” held on 28 November 2007.]*

5. Other Deployed Forces:


These are all military and civil defence forces deployed in the region other than UN MCDA. For the purposes of these guidelines these forces are divided into four categories based on their missions. These missions are peacetime, UN commanded peacekeeping operations, other peace operation/peace support, and combat. The **mission of a force** is the primary factor that determines a military unit’s availability and appropriateness to humanitarian tasks, as it impacts on whether or not it will be perceived by others as neutral and impartial.

- **Peacetime missions** include training and exercises in the region with no hostile intent.
- **UN commanded peacekeeping operations** include missions under the auspices of Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter.
- **Other peace operation / peace support missions** include a range of tasks undertaken by military forces that are not under UN command, including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building and other so-called peace support operations where forces are deployed under operational parameters that dictate a minimum necessary use of force.
- **Combat missions** are those where the primary purpose of the operation is the defeat of a designated enemy.

6. **Civilian Control:**

A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization. This does not infer any civilian command and control status over military assets.

Figure 2-2: Military Missions, Political Situations, Force Impartiality, and Need for Assistance and Security




Source: UN CMCoord Course Module and UN CMCoord Officer Field Handbook

7. Last Resort:

Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability.

Figure 2-3: Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets as a Last Resort



Based on: UN CMCoord Course Module.

8. Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator:


The Resident Coordinator (RC) is the head of the UN Country Team. In a complex emergency, the Resident Coordinator or another competent UN official may be designated as the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). In large-scale complex emergencies, a separate Humanitarian Coordinator is often appointed. If the emergency affects more than one country, a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator may be appointed. In countries where large multi-disciplinary UN field operations are in place the Secretary-General might appoint a Special Representative (SRSG). The relationship between the SRSG and the RC/HC is defined in a note issued by the Secretary-General on 11 December 2000 (**Note of Guidance on Relations Between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators**, dated 30 October 2000).

9. **Emergency Relief Coordinator and Inter-Agency Standing Committee:**

The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and coordinates the international response to humanitarian emergencies and disasters. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is chaired by the ERC and has the membership of all UN operational humanitarian agencies, with standing invitation to ICRC, IFRC, IOM, UNHCHR, the Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs, the World Bank and the three NGO consortia (ICVA, InterAction and SCHR). It is important to note that the decision whether to and who to appoint as Humanitarian Coordinator is made by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

10. **UN Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination (CMCoord):**

The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.



Aim

11. This document provides guidelines for the use of international military and civil defence personnel, equipment, supplies and services in support of the United Nations (UN) in pursuit of humanitarian objectives in complex emergencies. **It provides guidance on when these resources can be used, how they should be employed, and how UN agencies should interface, organize, and coordinate with international military forces with regard to the use of military and civil defence assets.** The document may also be of value in other large-scale emergencies.



Scope

12. These guidelines cover the use of **United Nations Military and Civil Defence Assets (UN MCDA)** — military and civil defence resources requested by the UN humanitarian agencies and deployed under UN control specifically to support humanitarian activities—and military and civil defence resources that might be available. These other forces on other missions are referred to as other deployed forces.

13. **Principles, concepts, and procedures** are provided for requesting and coordinating military and civil defence resources when these resources are deemed necessary and appropriate, and for interfacing with international military forces who are conducting activities which impact on UN humanitarian activities.

14. These guidelines are primarily intended for use by UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators, UN MCDA commanders and commanders of other deployed forces performing missions in support of the UN humanitarian agencies and liaison officers coordinating UN humanitarian activities with international military forces. All humanitarian actors should also be familiar with the principles, concepts and procedures set out herein and encouraged to adhere to them, as appropriate.

15. They could also be used by decision-makers in Member States and regional organizations when considering the use of military and civil defence resources to provide assistance to civilian populations. They may also be of value to international military or civil defence commanders, including peace-keeping forces, in the pursuit of their missions.

16. This document focuses on the use of military and civil defence assets in **complex emergencies**. The foundation for effective coordination of military and civilian assistance during reconstruction and rehabilitation of a disaster or post-conflict society is often established during relief operations, however reconstruction and rehabilitation activities are beyond the scope of this document.

17. Guidelines for the use of international military resources in **natural disasters and peacetime technological or environmental emergencies** are provided in a separate document entitled: ***"Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief"*** (May 1994), also known as the *"Oslo Guidelines"*.



Status

18. The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the UN humanitarian agencies have agreed to these guidelines. Implementing and operational partners are encouraged to follow this guidance. Member States and regional organizations engaged in relief or military operations in complex emergencies are also encouraged to use the principles and procedures provided herein. While a significant number of Member States have participated in the development of the guidelines and endorsed their use, they are not binding on Member States. The guidelines are considered a living document and may be reviewed as appropriate in the future.



19. These guidelines will not, in any way, affect the rights, obligations or responsibilities of States and individuals under international humanitarian law. This includes, but is not limited to, the obligation to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded delivery of relief consignments, equipment and personnel, protect such consignments, and facilitate their rapid distribution. Nor will these guidelines affect the obligations of States that are parties to the United Nations Conventions on the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, or the United Nations Charter.

Organization:

20. The remainder of the document is divided into **two parts**. The first contains **principles** that guide the use of international military and civil defence



resources by UN humanitarian agencies in complex emergencies and their coordination with international military forces. The second section describes the **tasks and responsibilities** of key actors in situations where UN MCDA are used and in situations when other deployed forces are requested by the United Nations to support humanitarian activities.

Comments, Recommendations and Future Changes:

21. This document was prepared under the auspices of the UN MCDA Project. It complements the existing "Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief" (May 1994) also known as the "Oslo Guidelines". The Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) provides the Secretariat for the UN MCDA Project and is responsible for maintaining these guidelines. Comments should be directed to the **Chief, CMCS, Emergency Services Branch, OCHA (Geneva), Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland, or cmcs@un.org**. Proposed changes will be incorporated annually in the Consultative Group On The Use Of MCDA in consultation with the Advisory Panel to CMCS, and when necessary referred to the ERC and IASC.

PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS

Core Principles:

22. As per UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of **humanity, neutrality** and **impartiality**.

PRINCIPLES

- **Humanity:** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.
- **Neutrality:** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.
- **Impartiality:** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

PRINCIPLES
& CONCEPTS

23. In addition to these three humanitarian principles, the United Nations seeks to provide humanitarian assistance with full respect for the **sovereignty** of States. As also stated in General Assembly Resolution 46/182:

“The **sovereignty**, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country.”

24. The United Nations humanitarian agencies involved in humanitarian activities subscribe to these principles and have incorporated these concepts in their respective mandates and operational guidelines.

25. As a matter of principle, **the military and civil defence assets of belligerent forces or of units that find themselves actively engaged in combat shall not be used to support humanitarian activities.**

Key Concepts for Use of Military/Civil Defence Resources:

26. In addition and in the framework of the above-mentioned principles, the use of MCDA shall be guided by the six following standards:

STANDARDS

- ➔ Requests for military assets must be made by the Humanitarian/ Resident Coordinator on the ground, not political authorities, and based solely on **humanitarian criteria**.
- ➔ MCDA should be employed by humanitarian agencies as a **last resort**, i.e. only in the absence of any other available civilian alternative to support urgent humanitarian needs in the time required.
- ➔ A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its **civilian nature and character**. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization. This does not infer any civilian command and control status over military assets.
- ➔ Humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organizations. Insofar as military organizations have a role to play in **supporting** humanitarian work, it should, to the extent possible, not encompass direct assistance, in order to retain a clear distinction between the normal functions and roles of humanitarian and military stakeholders.
- ➔ Any use of MCDA should be, at its onset, **clearly limited in time and scale** and present an exit strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel.
- ➔ Countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the **UN Codes of Conduct** and the **humanitarian principles**.

27. Implementing and operational partners and members of international civil society, are expected to adhere to these core principles and have been encouraged to adopt the **“Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief”**.

Avoiding Reliance on Military Resources:

28. The UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners rely upon States to guarantee their security and to respect the principle of full and unimpeded access to the affected population. When security cannot be assured by the host government (e.g. when areas are controlled by non state actors), and/or when there are difficulties accessing the affected people, the UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners must rely upon their neutrality for security and use negotiation as the primary means of gaining access to the affected population. Therefore, the use of military and civil defence resources should under no circumstances undermine the perceived neutrality or impartiality of the humanitarian actors, nor jeopardize current or future access to affected populations.

29. Furthermore, most military forces provided by Member States explicitly for UN MCDA or resources diverted from other missions by international military forces to support humanitarian assistance, are **only temporarily available**. When higher priority military missions emerge these forces are often recalled by the Member States or regional organizations. Therefore, as a general principle, **UN humanitarian agencies must avoid becoming dependent on military resources and Member States are encouraged to invest in increased civilian capacity instead of the *ad hoc* use of military forces to support humanitarian actors.**

30. However, there are circumstances when most requirements or security conditions are such that military resources provide the means of last resort for addressing the needs in a timely, effective way. In such cases, military resources, when available, may be appropriate for use. In general these resources can be divided into **two categories**: United Nations Military and Civil Defence Assets (UN MCDA) and resources from other deployed forces.

31. The principal distinctions between these two types of resources are that UN MCDA have been placed under the control of the UN humanitarian agencies and deployed on a full-time basis specifically to support UN humanitarian activities. Only a limited number of these resources are normally available for most emergencies. Other deployed forces are under the direction, and/or support of other entities, normally have security related missions, and may or may not be readily available. However, there may be occasions when support to humanitarian activities forms a specific part of the mandate.

When to Use Military and Civil Defence Resources to Support Humanitarian Activities:

32. The decision of whether or not to use military and civil defence resources in a complex emergency is one that must be taken **with extreme care**. The expedient and inappropriate use of military and civil defence resources can compromise neutrality, impartiality and other humanitarian principles of all humanitarian actors responding to the emergency. This loss of neutrality can result in relief workers becoming direct targets of the belligerents and being denied access to the affected population, not only in the current emergency, but also in future humanitarian crises. In addition, the loss of neutrality can result in the affected population becoming direct targets of the belligerents. Ultimately, **decision-makers must weigh the risk to relief workers and their ability to operate effectively at the moment, and in the future, against the immediacy of the needs of the affected population and the need for the use of military and civil defence assets.**

33. The **Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)**, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, provides the **overall guidance** for a particular complex emergency including parameters for the use of UN MCDA and other military and civil defence resources to support UN humanitar-



ian activities. The UN Resident Coordinator or Humanitarian Coordinator or the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will initiate the request for the use of military and civil defence resources in the field, within these parameters. Within the framework of the key standards listed in Paragraph 26 above, the following questions are provided to help guide these decisions:

QUESTIONS

- ➔ Are they the option of last resort, indispensable and appropriate?
- ➔ Are the countries offering MCDG also parties to the conflict?
- ➔ Based on the need, is a military or civil defence unit capable of the task?
- ➔ How long will they be needed?
- ➔ Can they be deployed without weapons or additional security forces?
- ➔ How will this association impact the security of UN personnel and other humanitarian workers?
- ➔ How will this impact the perceptions of UN neutrality and/or impartiality?
- ➔ What control and coordination arrangements are necessary?
- ➔ How and when will transition back to civilian responsibility be achieved?
- ➔ What are the consequences for the affected people, humanitarian actors, and humanitarian operations in the mid to long term?

34. The **start** and **duration** of any support to UN humanitarian activities by UN MCDG should be determined by the **Humanitarian Coordinator** upon the request or consent by the affected sovereign State. Where such a request or consent can not be obtained, subject to the exceptional circumstances caused by the emergency situation, the decision to that effect must be taken by the Humanitarian Coordinator in strict conformity with the UN Charter and corresponding decisions by the UN Security Council.

35. The use of other deployed forces to support UN humanitarian activities is more problematic. Many international military forces provide assistance to the civilian population in their areas of responsibility. While motivation

for this can be purely humanitarian and needs based, assistance can also be motivated by a desire to legitimize missions, gain intelligence, and/or enhance protection of forces. Unilateral support of this nature can be inappropriate, lack longevity, and can disrupt assistance that forms part of a coherent immediate and long term programme. While there is a need for humanitarian activities to be divorced from political and military agendas, this must be balanced with a clear need for a level of consultation and coordination that ensures assistance provided by international military forces does not undermine the legitimacy and credibility of humanitarian efforts.

36. Nonetheless, other deployed forces often have resources that might be extremely useful in an emergency and, bearing in mind paragraph 25 above, should not be ignored. The primary considerations, which should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, will be the immediacy of the need, ability to fulfill needs with civilian assets, and the impact on the perceived neutrality and impartiality of the assistance effort. It must be also recognized that the availability of these resources is often depending on the mission, capability and discretion of the commander.



Operational Standards for the Use of UN MCDA:

37. The following operational standards, in addition to the Guidelines Key Principles, are provided to ensure that when UN MCDA are used they are in concert with the core humanitarian and UN principles as well as international humanitarian law.

STANDARDS

- **Civilian Control:** Safety of UN MCDA is the responsibility of the designated military or civil defence commander. However, to be effective, direction and coordination of an overall humanitarian effort is a function requiring professional humanitarian staff. As such, **UN MCDA should always remain under civilian control.** Nevertheless, the degree of UN control of UN MCDA will be different than the UN direction of other deployed forces performing ad hoc support tasks. In the case of UN MCDA they will normally be in “direct support” of a UN humanitarian agency. The missions within the agreed Terms of Reference will be assigned by the Humanitarian Coordinator in consultation with the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).
- **At No Cost:** UN MCDA, like all UN humanitarian assistance, is to be provided at **no cost** to the affected State or receiving agency. This should not result in assisting States’ cutting or reducing other planned and programmed assistance, such as development aid resources, to recover the cost of UN MCDA or other relief support.

PRINCIPLES & CONCEPTS

38. In principle, unarmed UN MCDA, accepted as neutral and impartial, and clearly distinguished from other military units, can be used to support the full range of humanitarian activities. However, their involvement in **direct assistance** should be weighed on a case-by-case basis and only if it satisfies the criteria of **last resort**. Their activities should focus on **indirect assistance** and **infrastructure support** missions.

39. Military and civil defence personnel employed exclusively in the support of UN humanitarian activities should be clearly distinguished from those forces engaged in other military missions, including the military component of peacekeeping missions, peace operations and peace sup-

port, and accorded the appropriate protection by the affected State and any combatants.

40. Acceptable means for distinguishing UN MCDA from security and forces engaged in military operations are the markings of the supported UN humanitarian agency or the use of civil defence markings accorded protection under the Geneva Conventions. When UN MCDA are from military organizations the appropriate **white markings** and **UN symbols** may be used. When civil defence assets are employed they should be marked in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Military forces cannot be marked as civil defence forces. In all cases, movement of UN MCDA, including entry to the UN peacekeeping mission area, must be cleared by the UN peacekeeping mission headquarters.

41. Military personnel providing direct assistance should not be armed and should rely on the security measures of the supported humanitarian agency. Guidelines for the security of UN personnel are set by the UN Security Coordinator. However, if military forces providing indirect assistance or infrastructure support missions must be armed, for their security and/or the safeguarding of their equipment, they will operate under strict rules of engagement based on the Law of Armed Conflict and should take account of advice and guidance by the Humanitarian Coordinator, Special Representative, or other appropriate UN official, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

42. Under no circumstance will the request for UN MCDA be construed as an endorsement of any military operations or be used as a justification for undertaking combat operations, resorting to the use of force, or the violation of State sovereignty.

43. Under no circumstance will UN MCDA be used to provide security for UN humanitarian activities. A **separate security force** may, however, be used to ensure security in areas where humanitarian personnel may be attacked while delivering humanitarian assistance. Such assistance, however, is not addressed in this document. Further reference can be found in the ***Non-Binding Guidelines on The Use of Military and Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys*** (text of 14 September 2001 approved by the IASC Working Group).

Operational Standards for the Use of Other Deployed Forces:

44. Bearing in mind paragraph 26, as well as paragraph 37 with regard to civilian control, in the case of other deployed forces, the **Humanitarian Coordinator** will determine what humanitarian tasks need to be done, what modalities must be respected, and request appropriate support. The supporting military or civil defence commander will determine whether he/she can complete the task within his/her means and capabilities given his/her primary mission requirements. Provided that the means indicated by the military or civil defence commander respect the principles of these guidelines, the Humanitarian Coordinator will then, or not, authorise the tasks to be undertaken by the designated unit.

45. Under the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, States have obligations under International Humanitarian Law. These include an obligation not to impede humanitarian activities as well as responsibilities to grant access to the affected populations and the safeguarding of relief personnel.

46. Military forces deployed by Member States or regional organizations whose primary missions are other than humanitarian support may also provide support to UN humanitarian agencies when requested by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator or other designated officials. When these forces undertake activities in support of UN humanitarian agencies or their implementing and operational partners, this support will be on a **case-by-case basis, subject to a request**. The military resources will remain under the control of the military force commander.

47. Military or civil defence forces undertaking missions to support UN humanitarian activities should reconcile their *modus operandi* with the circumstances of the operating environment. Under these conditions only, and provided the *modus operandi* in question respects all appropriate humanitarian principles, should the Humanitarian Coordinator, or other responsible UN authority, authorise the mission.

48. Military forces, other than UN MCDG, performing assistance missions are in principle **not granted any special protection nor are they authorized to display the emblems of the supported UN humanitarian agencies**.



49. When other deployed forces are UN peacekeeping forces operating under the auspices of a UN Security Council mandate, the degree to which these forces can be used to support humanitarian activity will be determined by the **head of the UN mission**, based on the mandate and capabilities of the peacekeeping force. The mechanisms for coordination between the UN humanitarian agencies and the peacekeeping force will also be established by this authority, with careful attention to the coherence of the mission. In all cases, movement of military and civil defence resources supporting humanitarian activities, including entry to the UN peacekeeping mission area, must be cleared by the UN peacekeeping mission headquarters. Further details are to be found in the *[DPKO Policy on Civil-Military Coordination of 9 September 2002](#)*, as well as the *[Note of Guidance on Relations Between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, issued by the Secretary-General on 11 December 2000](#)*.

United Nations Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination (CMCoord) in Complex Emergencies:

50. International civilian organizations providing humanitarian assistance to the affected population and international military forces, regardless of their missions, should maintain some level of interface to ensure that the civilian population does not suffer unnecessarily, that those in need receive the necessary assistance, and that relief personnel are safeguarded to the maximum extent possible.

51. **Liaison** in the midst of perceived or actual offensive military activity should nonetheless take place even when a cooperative arrangement cannot be reached with military forces. Even in the worst of situations a **minimum amount of liaison is required** in order to protect personnel and assets from unintended harm, limit competition for resources and avoid conflict.

52. In all cases, regardless of the mission or status of the military force, there will be a requirement for the **sharing of information**. Considerable humanitarian information can be gleaned by military forces going about their military business (e.g. state of the affected population, availability of key services and critical infrastructure). Operational security notwithstanding, military forces should endeavour not to classify this type of information and should make it readily available to appropriate UN humanitarian agencies through the civil-military coordination structure. Conversely, UN humanitarian agencies should provide necessary

information regarding their activities in order that any military operations can be reconciled with those of humanitarian actors. Even this basic level of information exchange will help to avoid inadvertent damage, disruption and destruction of relief assets and preclude unnecessary risks to humanitarian personnel and the civilian population.



53. Military forces providing assistance to the affected population, for whatever reason, should in normal circumstances coordinate such action with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator. Military forces deployed as part of a UN commanded peace operation should coordinate all humanitarian assistance with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator through the missions' civil-military coordination structure. Timely coordination of such actions will avert inappropriate action, allow, where necessary, appropriate military-humanitarian delineation and promote an increased impact for the affected population.

54. Critical areas for coordination include **security, logistics, medical, transportation, and communications**. In these areas the steady flow of timely information is essential for the success of humanitarian missions. Within these areas there will often be opportunities for task division and planning at both senior levels of the UN and the military and at the field level.

55. One of the effective ways to share information, and when appropriate share tasks and participate in planning, is through the exchange of liaison personnel from the appropriate UN humanitarian agencies and the military at the necessary levels. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, **Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS)**, offers **training** to military and civilian actors in civil military coordination and liaison in a complex emergency. Several UN humanitarian agencies have built up cadres of personnel experienced in liaising with military personnel. Trained liaison personnel are also available through the CMCS to UN humanitarian agencies and other actors responding to complex emergencies.

TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Affected State and Transit States:

56. The **affected State** has **primary responsibility** for providing humanitarian assistance to persons within its borders. Even though UN humanitarian agencies have been requested by the affected State or the UN Secretary General to provide additional assistance, the affected State has the right to decline the use of UN MCDA or the use of other military and civil defence resources by UN humanitarian agencies on a case-by-case basis.

57. States adopting a specific policy on the use of foreign UN MCDA within its borders may consider making this position known to the UN Resident Coordinator and/or UN Humanitarian Coordinator (if present), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

58. States that permit UN humanitarian agencies to call on external forces or forces already deployed by other nations within their borders should make any restrictions on the use of these forces known to OCHA and should include these restrictions in the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) established between their governments and the governments or responsible alliance/coalition which have forces stationed in their country. This does not preclude States from imposing restrictions on the use of military forces deployed within its borders on a case-by-case basis.

59. Affected States should provide security for UN MCDA operating in support of UN humanitarian activities in the same manner that they would provide security for other UN humanitarian personnel and resources. UN MCDA shall have at least the same freedom of movement, immunities, privileges, and exemptions afforded the UN humanitarian agencies when working in support of these activities, including when en route and returning to their units or stations.

60. **Transit States** are those States whose national borders, territorial waters, and airspace are crossed by UN MCDA moving to and from and conducting operations in the affected State. Transit States, especially those bordering the affected State, will facilitate the movement of requested UN MCDA in the same manner that they facilitate the movement of UN relief goods and personnel.

Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator:

61. When a **Humanitarian Coordinator** has been designated, he or she is responsible for initiating requests for UN MCDA or approving the use of other military and civil defence resources. If a Humanitarian Coordinator has not been appointed, the decision to request UN MCDA or use other military and civil defence resources rests with the **Resident Coordinator**, after consultation with the **UN Country Team**. The individual charged with coordinating the UN effort will ensure that affected State clearance is obtained prior to processing the request at the country level.

62. Before requesting these assets the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will consult with the appropriate authorities of the affected State, the ERC, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Resident Representative, as appropriate. If the affected State is capable of and willing to provide the coordination structure for a complex emergency, this arrangement should be used.

63. In the absence of a Humanitarian Coordinator, Resident Coordinator, or SRSG the decision on whether or not to use UN MCDA to support UN humanitarian activities, will be made by the **Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)**, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

64. The HC, RC or SRSG will ensure that the coordination mechanisms and specific guidelines are in place to effectively employ these by the UN humanitarian agencies responding to the complex emergency, to include means for the sharing of information and, where appropriate, the exchange of liaison personnel.

65. The Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will plan for the earliest possible release of UN MCDA and ensure that UN humanitarian activities do not become dependent on these or any other military and civil defence resources, once the complex emergency has passed.

66. In circumstances where there is likely to be a protracted complex emergency, or complex emergency conditions are likely to re-emerge, the supported UN humanitarian agencies will make arrangements for these needs to be met with resources available from the affected State or other civilian sources.

67. When MCDA are made available to UN humanitarian agencies or their implementing and operational partners, following a request from the cognizant decision-making authority, the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will ensure that an appropriate system, consistent with these Guidelines and UN policies and regulations, is put in place to control the use of UN MCDA.

68. When other deployed forces are providing support on a case-by-case basis to UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners, the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will ensure that the provision of humanitarian assistance by military forces does not compromise the humanitarian actors and that the military forces performing these missions understand the importance and humanitarian purpose of such missions. The Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will also seek to ensure that assistance activities carried out by other deployed forces on their own behalf do not compromise UN humanitarian efforts.

69. The Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator or the designated UN authority requesting the military and civil defence resources, should review regularly, with MCDA and military or civil defence commanders, the *modus operandi* of supporting forces and offer appropriate advice and guidance. This review should include such considerations as: the types of task that can be performed, how the unit is armed and its rules of engagement, types of uniforms and equipment, the chain of command, use of liaison officers, exit criteria for the mission or task, status of the forces to include privileges or immunities, claims and insurance matters such as damage compensation.

UN Humanitarian Agencies:

70. **UN humanitarian agencies** will request the use of UN MCDA through the Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator that has coordination responsibilities for the complex emergency.

71. Except in situations where there is imminent loss of life or acute suffering, UN humanitarian agencies will avoid *ad hoc* local requests for UN MCDA and the uncoordinated use of other military and civil defence resources. If in exceptional situations UN MCDA or other military and civil defence resources are used, UN humanitarian agencies will report this use to the responsible coordinator, including when they expect the assets to be released and how they intend to minimize their use in the future.

72. UN humanitarian agencies supported by UN MCDA will respect the integrity and chains of command of the supporting units. They will clearly state what they want the unit to accomplish and leave the unit commander as much latitude as possible in determining how he or she will accomplish the desired outcome, provided that core humanitarian principles are fully respected.

73. UN MCDA supporting UN humanitarian activities will normally not be used in the direct delivery of assistance. When possible the supported UN humanitarian agencies will try to use UN MCDA in a manner that limits their visibility and focus on tasks that do not call into question the neutrality or impartiality of the agency, implementing and operational partners or other humanitarian actors.

74. UN humanitarian agencies should acknowledge the UN MCDA support being provided, but avoid making any public statements on behalf of the UN MCDA units.

75. UN humanitarian agencies making use of UN MCDA will report the arrival, departure and status of these assets to the Civil-Military Coordination Section of OCHA, through the Humanitarian Coordinator / Resident Coordinator, to ensure that the resources are properly tracked and the contribution is recorded and acknowledged by the United Nations.

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA):

76. Within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva, the **Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS)** has the primary responsibility for the mobilization of UN MCDA and civil-military coordination in a complex emergency.

77. CMCS will process the request for UN MCDA, make the necessary arrangements with the Member States, and track the use of these resources by the UN humanitarian agencies.

78. CMCS, with donor support, will maintain a training programme for those involved in the use of military and civil defence resources to support UN humanitarian activities, with special attention to the training of liaison personnel and the procedures and methods for Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) in complex emergencies.


79. On behalf of the Member States, and in accordance with the UN MCDA Project, CMCS will maintain a roster of UN CMCoord trained liaison personnel and assist in mobilizing these personnel to support the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator and the UN humanitarian agencies.

80. If a **UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC)** is established, CMCS will coordinate the UN MCDA used to support logistics with the UNJLC. Likewise, CMCS will assist OCHA **Humanitarian Information Centres (HIC)** in obtaining relevant information from the military where a HIC or similar information-sharing activity has been established.

81. CMCS will maintain the necessary tools to facilitate and support civil-military coordination and the mobilization of UN MCDA in complex emergencies, to include database and communications capacity.

Assisting State and International Military or Civil Defence Commanders:

82. *States or regional organizations and peacekeeping forces involved in complex emergencies or other military operations beyond their borders* should include in the guidance or orders issued to force or contin-



Based on: UN Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook

gent commanders the parameters for the use of their resources to support UN humanitarian activities in a complex emergency. **Commanders** should establish their force *modus operandi* taking into account the operational circumstances, International Humanitarian Law, and core Humanitarian Principles and consult with the host nation, ERC and Humanitarian Coordinator or cognizant humanitarian authority, including the OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) for further technical advice, before deploying into the crisis area.

83. In a complex emergency, prospective assisting States with military resources deployed in the affected area, or in reasonable proximity, should facilitate coordination. This could include information on any assets available to support essential humanitarian functions including the transport of relief goods, the movement of persons at risk, and the reestablishment of basic human services, including medical care.

84. The commanders of UN MCDA assigned specifically to support UN humanitarian activities, and other deployed forces performing humanitarian support missions at the request of the UN, will avoid compromising the neutrality and impartiality of these agencies, their implementing and operational partners and other humanitarian actors responding to complex emergencies. Likewise, all supporting activities will be conducted in a manner that respects the dignity, culture, religions, and laws of the affected population.

85. Military or civil defence organizations dispatched to support complex emergency activities should be self-supporting for the duration of their mission in terms of transport, fuel, food rations, water and sanitation, maintenance and communications, in order to avoid placing additional stress on overburdened local authorities or the supported humanitarian actors.

86. Unless specifically exempted, UN MCDA will abide by the security and movements procedures set by the UN Security Coordinator to ensure the safety of UN personnel and be prepared to provide non-security related assistance in the relocation or evacuation of UN personnel should the need arise.

87. The States providing UN MCDA will not exploit these missions for the purpose of intelligence collection, propaganda, or psychological operations.

88. When military forces have assumed responsibility for vital civilian functions, such as delivery of water, provision of power, or the safe operation of an airfield, regardless of how this responsibility was acquired, they will facilitate a smooth transfer of these functions to the appropriate civilian authority, in coordination with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator as soon as possible. This will be done in a timely manner, well prior to terminating this support, to ensure that any disruption of services will not have an adverse impact on relief and recovery activities.

3

Use of Armed Escorts

for Humanitarian Convoys

Non-Binding Guidelines

27 February 2013



The Non-Binding Guidelines on the use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys was endorsed by the members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on 27 February 2013.

Preface

I am pleased to share with you the updated Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, dated 27 February 2013. The guidelines are endorsed by the IASC Principals and are immediately applicable wherever armed escorts are already in use, or under consideration. Please note these guidelines supersede the 2001 Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys.

An armed escort can affect the actual and perceived neutrality, independence and impartiality of a humanitarian actor, and indeed the humanitarian community as a whole. It is for this reason that armed escorts should not be used to facilitate the movement of humanitarian supplies, goods and assets. The updated guidelines take into consideration the current complexities of the humanitarian operating environment to provide a framework for determining if and when humanitarian actors should consider using an armed escort, the consequences and alternatives, decision making authority, and associated procedures and practical considerations for their use. I fully encourage familiarization with the content and further dissemination to relevant stakeholders.

The IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys is one of several guidelines and references endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. I encourage the readers to also take a look at the other sections in this booklet as well as the additional civil-military material available through: www.unocha.org/uncmcoord

Finally, I should like to thank the IASC Task Force for undertaking this update, with special thanks to Ms. Jules Frost of World Vision International for leading this process.

Yours sincerely,



Valerie Amos
Under-Secretary-General
for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Background

The Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines on the “Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys” were originally endorsed by members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on 14 September 2001. The purpose of the guidelines was to assist a wide range of actors on when and how to use military or other forms of armed escorts to accompany humanitarian convoys. In July 2011, the 79th meeting of the IASC Working Group requested the IASC Task Force on Humanitarian Space and Civil-Military Relations, an IASC subsidiary body, to update the guidelines. The following text is the result of consultations and collaboration between IASC members, in addition to the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and field colleagues from a variety of organisations. This updated document reflects the evolution of security risk management procedures within the UN and non-UN organisations, the increase of actors now commonly present in humanitarian operating environments, and the increasing complexities of undertaking principled humanitarian action.

These guidelines do not seek to promote or endorse the use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys. In fact, the updated guidelines clearly prioritise the need to consider alternative means for establishing and maintaining access to the affected people in the first instance. Thereafter, the guidelines serve to ensure a principled approach is employed when armed escorts are considered by the humanitarian community. The overriding principle articulated in this document is that armed escorts should be used only as a last resort, in exceptional cases, and then only when a set of key criteria is fulfilled. It is acknowledged that there may be occasions when not all of these criteria can be fully met. In such circumstances utmost care must be given to balancing security risks with programme criticality.

These updated guidelines remain non-binding and are intended to assist humanitarian actors to fully consider the implications of using armed escorts to facilitate humanitarian operations. They provide humanitarian organisations with a framework for determining if and when to use armed escorts and, secondly, how to do so effectively.

The guidelines do not provide prescriptive directions as to whether or not to use such escorts for humanitarian convoys. Instead, they are designed to assist organisations to make principled and pragmatic decisions, with full consideration for humanitarian principles and the security of humanitarian operations.

Note: The decision to use armed escorts is directly influenced by security management system policies and procedures and is closely linked to humanitarian issues such as the use of military and civil defence assets (MCDA) which is extensively addressed in the “Oslo” and “MCDA” Guidelines - applicable in natural disasters and complex emergencies, respectively. A list of relevant and Complementary References is provided at **Annex A**.

These guidelines were approved for implementation by the IASC Principals as a Non-Binding Reference Document on 18 February 2013.

1.1.1 Rationale

As the fundamental underpinning of humanitarian action, the principle of humanity is to save lives and alleviate suffering wherever needed. To achieve this, full and unimpeded humanitarian access to those in need is imperative. However, multiple constraints impinge on access, including restrictions imposed by State and non-State actors, attacks on humanitarian personnel and operations, violent crime, and the intensity of hostility in conflict areas. The last decade has been the deadliest on record for humanitarian workers.¹ Consequently, the ability of humanitarian actors to reach those most in need, or the affected people’s access to assistance and services is often restricted.

This is particularly relevant in complex emergencies and insecure operating environments where humanitarian actors face significant challenges to obtain, maintain and sustain access. In these situations, the decisions and actions of humanitarian actors significantly impact their actual and perceived neutrality, independence and impartiality, as well as their ability to continuously liaise with all actors, including those that influence or control access.

A systematic and collective decision by UN and non-UN humanitarian organisations on whether to resort to the use of armed escorts to gain access for humanitarian convoys is ideal, but often difficult to achieve. Such decisions are highly dependent on each organisation’s operational requirements, specific risk profiles and security risk thresholds. While analysis and considerations of options should be done jointly, accountability lies with line management of individual organisations. Each organisation should be conscious of how its choices impact on the broader operating environment, hence, the emphasis on common mechanisms whenever possible to support organisational decision-making.

¹ The Aid Worker Security Database (www.aidworkersecurity.org).

1.1.2 Parameters

Scope

These non-binding guidelines aim to provide UN and non-UN humanitarian actors in the field and at headquarters level with a framework to facilitate consideration of, and decision-making on, the use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys in conflict, insecure and non-conflict environments. They are applicable wherever armed escorts are already in use, or under consideration, for humanitarian convoys transporting humanitarian supplies and/or humanitarian personnel (see definitions below).

The transportation of affected people, humanitarian shipping and airlifts², and static armed security for fixed locations, such as warehouses, offices or accommodations are not covered by these guidelines.

Definitions

The terms below are defined specifically for the purpose of these guidelines.

- i. **Armed Escort:** A security measure that serves as a visible deterrent to a potential attack and, if necessary, acts in self-defence against an attack. Armed escorts can be provided by military as well as non-military actors, such as, police, private security companies or non-State actors.
- ii. **Humanitarian Convoy:** The movement of humanitarian supplies, goods and assets, including humanitarian personnel, by land between fixed locations. A convoy consists of at least one vehicle plus an escort resulting in two or more vehicles traveling together.

² UNHAS/WFP flights will never carry armed personnel. As a general rule, the transportation of firearms in humanitarian flights is not allowed. As the WFP's Air Transport Manual (ATM) states, it may nevertheless be necessary to transport firearms on some occasions. The ATM describes the corresponding safety procedures to be followed, as well as the limitations regarding firearm visibility and military vehicles approaching the aircraft.

iii. Last Resort: No other option is available to facilitate access and the timely delivery of humanitarian supplies, protection, and personnel required to meet critical humanitarian needs. All other options to reduce risks and ensure timely aid delivery are exhaustively explored and determined not viable.³

iv. Non-State Armed Actors: Have the potential to employ weapons and are not within the formal military structures of States, State-alliances, or intergovernmental organisations; and are not under the control of the State(s) in which they operate.⁴ This includes organised 'armed groups' that are under responsible command and exercising control over a part of a country's territory.

1.1.3 Application

These non-binding guidelines seek to advise and enable UN and non-UN humanitarian organisations to collectively and/or individually assess the need for, and the impact of using, armed escorts for humanitarian convoys. Through a series of practical steps practitioners shall consider if armed escorts should be used, and if so, how.

The guidelines can also assist the humanitarian community to constructively engage and negotiate with State and non-State actors which seek to impose the use of armed escorts.



³ Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations: What is Last Resort? (UN OCHA, April 2012).

⁴ This working definition of armed actors draws on the definition in McHugh, Gerard and Bessler (OCHA), *Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners*, Annex III Glossary of Key Terms.

IF AND *WHEN* TO USE ARMED ESCORTS

II. General rule As a general rule, **humanitarian convoys will *not* use armed escorts.**

However, there may be exceptional circumstances in which the use of armed escorts is necessary as a “last resort” to enable humanitarian action. Before deciding on such exceptions, the consequences and possible alternatives to the use of armed escorts shall be considered (see Section V for more details regarding exceptions).

III. Consequences of using Armed Escorts

The use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys can have significant short and long term counter-productive implications for humanitarian actors, their respective organisations and associated operations. These include:

- i. Cooperation with an armed actor – to include a UN-mandated force – can lead local, national and international actors and the population to associate humanitarian organisations and the beneficiaries of aid with the political and/or military objectives of that armed actor, thereby undermining the actual and perceived neutrality, impartiality and independence of the humanitarian organisation and humanitarian community as a whole.

- ii. The armed actor providing the escort may be a target for attack by opposing forces, thus putting humanitarian personnel, supplies and beneficiary populations at risk.
- iii. Cooperation with providers of armed escorts that do not have the capacity to respond appropriately if attacked can make a convoy more vulnerable and create additional risk for humanitarian workers.
- iii. The use of armed escorts by one humanitarian actor can negatively affect the perceptions and, therefore, the security of others that do not use them. Those that do not use armed escorts may come under pressure to do so, particularly if there are economic benefits involved.
- iv. Dependence on support from an armed actor can make it extremely difficult or impossible to operate without such force in the future, undermining the sustainability of humanitarian operations. The provider of armed escorts may develop a financial interest in maintaining the service. In addition, the sudden cessation of use of armed escorts can expose a humanitarian organisation as a soft target.
- v. Cooperation with one armed actor can make it impossible or unsafe to operate in territory controlled by another armed actor.



IV. Alternatives to Armed Escorts

Before resorting to the use of armed escorts, humanitarian organisations must consider all alternative means for establishing and maintaining access to the affected people and associated management of security risks.

Decision-making in the context of each situation must be informed by a thorough security risk assessment, including the threats, vulnerabilities and risks; an analysis of the relevant stakeholders, including the source and motivation of the threats; the risk profile of individual staff members and programmes in a given situation and the operational requirements of a given activity or movement. Alternatives to be considered should be derived from the analysis.

Full consideration should be given to comprehensive strategies and context-specific options for reducing risk and enhancing operational security, the trade-offs and implications of different approaches and to what extent the use of armed escorts will reduce or increase the security risk to humanitarian operations and the affected population.

It is important to note that each of the following alternatives has advantages and disadvantages, which must be weighed in much the same manner as the use of armed escorts.

Examples of alternatives to using armed escorts include:⁵

- i. Cultivate Greater Acceptance:** Actively build and cultivate good relations and consent as part of a risk management strategy with local communities, parties to the conflict, and other relevant stakeholders and obtain their acceptance for the humanitarian organisation's presence and work.
- ii. Humanitarian Negotiations:** On-going liaison and active negotiation with all relevant actors is fundamental to humanitarian operations, particularly with those who influence or exercise control over humanitarian access to affected people. Further investment in negotiation may be required to achieve humanitarian aims, including obtaining, maintaining and sustaining access, ensuring provision of assistance and measures to enhance protection of vulnerable persons, safeguarding the humanitarian operating environment, and improving respect for international law.⁶

⁵ To Stay and Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments (UN OCHA, 2011).

⁶ See the UN OCHA/IASC Manual: Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners (January 2006). See also Humanitarian Negotiation: A Handbook for Securing Access, Assistance and Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict, Deborah Mancini-Griffoli and Andre Picot, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (October 2004).



Some specific types of access arrangements which do not rely on armed escorts and which may be brought about through negotiation include:

- **De-confliction arrangements:** This entails liaison between humanitarian actors and parties to the conflict necessary to communicate the time and location of relief activities / humanitarian convoys in order to ensure that military operations / armed action does not jeopardise the lives of humanitarian personnel, impede the passage of relief supplies or implementation of humanitarian activities, or endanger beneficiaries.
- **Humanitarian pause:** A temporary suspension in fighting for exclusively humanitarian purposes, involving the agreement of all relevant parties, for a defined timeframe, and often covering a specific geographic area where the humanitarian activities are to be implemented.
- **Humanitarian corridors:** An exclusively humanitarian means which requires the agreement of all relevant parties to allow the safe passage of goods and/or people between specific points during active fighting.
- **Days of tranquillity:** This mechanism has been used primarily to enable children to have access to health care during conflict, for example to undertake national immunisation campaigns, or other exclusively humanitarian activities. "Days of tranquillity" require the agreement of all relevant parties to refrain from impeding the mobility and work of medical and other personnel during designated days.

- iii. Remote Management/Programming:** As an adaptation to insecurity, the practice of withdrawing international (or other at-risk staff) while transferring increased programming responsibility to local staff or local partner organisations. Note: Research shows that under many circumstances national staff are commonly at greatest risk and a thorough analysis of national staff risk should precede any consideration of a remote management approach. Additionally, a re-allocation of resources in support of national staff should accompany the remote management decision.
- iv. Low-profile Approach:** Implement a low visibility strategy. For example, rent local vehicles or taxis for transport rather than the white four-wheel-drive vehicles routinely used by humanitarian organisations. Use local traders and merchants to transport humanitarian goods.
- v. Area Security:** When and where it is concluded that armed deterrence or protection is recommended, an alternative and good practice is to request area security rather than armed escorts. Such security may involve 'clearing' and patrolling roads, maintaining a presence in the area, but not being distinctly visible or accompanying the convoy, and/or providing aerial flyovers.
- vi Programme Design:** Consider innovative program designs, such as cash transfers and the provision of vouchers rather than transporting and distributing commodities or materials and seek creative methods of monitoring which reduce the number of field visits required.
- vii. Suspend or Cease Operations:** Worst case scenario could include taking a decision to suspend or cease operations in the area in which access is not possible due to unacceptable constraints.

Note: As a best practice, organisations should explore additional innovative approaches and add to this non-exhaustive list.

V. Decision Making Authority and Procedures

The process outlined in this section is complemented by the Flow Chart on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys at Annex B.

1. Criteria for the Exceptional Use of Armed Escorts

As a general rule, humanitarian convoys will not use armed escorts. An exception to the general rule will be considered, as a last resort, only when all of the following criteria are met:

- i. **Humanitarian Need and Programme Criticality.** The level of humanitarian need is such that the lack of humanitarian action would lead to unacceptable human suffering, yet the transport of essential personnel and relief supplies cannot be undertaken without the use of armed escorts.
- ii. **Responsible Authorities.** State authorities or local non-State actors are unable or unwilling to permit the movement of humanitarian supplies or personnel without the use of armed escorts.
- iii. **Safety and Security.** The armed escorts utilised are capable of providing a credible deterrent necessary to enhance the safety of humanitarian personnel and capacity to provide assistance to the beneficiaries without compromising their security or that of the affected people.



iv. Sustainability. The use of an armed escort will not irreversibly compromise the humanitarian operating environment or the longer-term capacity of the organisation(s) to safely and effectively operate in the future. The humanitarian agency in question has conducted a thorough stakeholder analysis to determine the potential consequences of the using an armed escort, and has put in place all possible mitigation measures to reduce the likelihood and negative impact of such consequences.

Note: The humanitarian community should refrain from making a *carte blanche* determination on whether or not to use armed escorts. Instead, the decision should be determined case-by-case and informed by the outcome of a corresponding structured security risk assessment. The use should be geographically limited, time-bound and with specific purpose. There should be no blanket adoption of armed escorts as a modality for humanitarian operations.

2. Humanitarian Need and Program Criticality

It is the responsibility of the humanitarian community to impartially assess the needs and capacities of affected populations, and to take into account the ability of relevant authorities to respond.⁷ A needs assessment should describe the severity of humanitarian need and any constraints that might impede access or humanitarian operations. With this information, a humanitarian organisation can assess the criticality and relevance in terms of the proposed assistance.

Program criticality analysis involves determining which programs are the most critical (either in terms of saving lives or contributing to identified strategic results), and hence warrant accepting a greater level of risk or a greater allocation of resources to mitigate the risks.⁸ It is one component of a structured security risk assessment.

⁷ Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. See Core Standard 3: Assessment (2011, p.61-65).

⁸ To Stay and Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments (UN OCHA, 2011, p.9).

If the programming is neither life-saving nor seeking to address acute suffering, it is important for the organisation to critically consider the costs-benefits of operating in conditions of extreme insecurity which may require armed escorts. See Guidance Note on Cost and Compensation Considerations at **Annex C**.

Note: The IASC Operational Guidance for Coordinated Assessments in Humanitarian Crises recognises that humanitarian assessments are carried out by a variety of partners, and in different contexts. If assessments are carried out with due attention to coordination, this diversity can be of great benefit to the overall humanitarian response.⁹ This can and should include appropriate modalities for humanitarian access, including shared analysis and common approaches to operational security.

3. Responsible Authorities

In situations of disaster or civil unrest, it is the primary responsibility of the State to address the humanitarian needs of the affected people and to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of persons under their jurisdiction, including the security of persons. Humanitarian organisations may offer or be requested to provide their services to assist in this regard. In situations of armed conflict, all parties to the conflict have a responsibility to ensure the well-being of the civilian population and to respect international humanitarian and human rights law. If they are unable or unwilling to do so, they are obliged to allow and facilitate the impartial provision of assistance in accordance with international humanitarian law. This is subject to the consent of the State, but such consent must not be arbitrarily withheld. Access to affected people entails, therefore, a process of dialogue and negotiation with all relevant parties to obtain consent for impartial humanitarian activities to be carried out.

Within this context, the decision to request or accept the use of armed escorts must be made by humanitarian organisations and based solely on humanitarian criteria. The decision to use armed escorts must not be driven by political or military objectives, nor made by political or military actors.

⁹ As detailed in the IASC Operational Guidance for Coordinated Assessments in Humanitarian Crises, the Humanitarian Dashboard can be used as a tool used to consolidate and present needs assessment and other core humanitarian information in an easily accessible format, to facilitate analysis and evidence-based decision-making.

Host Government or local non-State actors may attempt to insist on the provision of armed escorts in order to monitor or control the activities of humanitarian organisations. Host authorities may also assume that they are responsible for providing military or police forces as escorts as a measure to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian organisations. Host authorities are responsible for enforcing the rule of law and for facilitating humanitarian action, however, this should not be interpreted as necessitating armed accompaniment. Humanitarian organisations must invest considerable effort in enhancing the host authority's understanding of why armed accompaniment is not part of their modus operandi and, in fact, that an ability to operate securely, in accordance with humanitarian principles, heavily depends on not relying on armed escorts.

In some situations, the policies and practices of State authorities or local non-State actors may leave little option but to comply or cease operations. In such a situation, it is recommended that the humanitarian agencies communicate to one another their position to accept or refuse armed escorts, and make clear to all stakeholders the reasoning for this decision.

The security risk assessment (detailed below) should include an analysis of the State authority or local non-State actor's capacity and role in ensuring an appropriate operating environment.

4. Safety and Security

Structured Security Risk Assessments (SRA) are critical to implementing safe and efficient humanitarian action. An accurate SRA will assist an organisation to proactively identify, manage and mitigate operational risk. The information gathered through this type of assessment enables a more confident and rigorous basis for decision-making, planning and incident management.

A common Security Risk Management (SRM) framework contains seven steps: 1) Program Assessment; 2) Threat Assessment including Stakeholder Analysis; 3) Vulnerability Assessment; 4) Risk Analysis; 5) Security Risk Management Recommendations and Decisions; 6) Implementation; and 7) Review and Update. See SRM Model at **Annex D**.

An effective risk assessment will document programme goals, identify and assess threats in the environment to the humanitarian entity, assess the risk of these threats based on the organisation's vulnerability to them, and then recommend whether the risk(s) to the organisation is acceptable or should be minimised.

One of the outcomes of the risk assessment may be the recommendation to utilise armed escorts to mitigate or manage the identified risk.

5.4.1 United Nations

In field operations, the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) is led by the Designated Official (DO) for Security, who is advised and assisted by the UN Security Management Team (SMT). The SMT, chaired by the DO, comprises the country security advisor, representatives of in-country UN agencies, funds and programmes and other members of the UNSMS. NGOs may be invited as observers as best practice under the “saving lives together” arrangement.¹⁰

The DO is accountable for matters concerning the security of UN personnel and property to the Secretary-General, through the Under Secretary General for the Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). The DO is responsible and accountable for engaging with the authorities of the Host Government to advocate for the full implementation of State security in respect of United Nations personnel, premises and assets, and for applying the Security Risk Management (SRM) approach to all United Nations activities and operations.¹¹ In this capacity, the DO, in close collaboration with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes which indicate the need for the use of armed escorts, is the decision maker with respect to the necessity of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys based on the threat, vulnerability and risk assessments and whether the options for the provision of this protection are appropriate. The DO, with the support of the SMT, is responsible for ensuring that the use of the armed escort is as a last resort and is capable of ensuring safe delivery of the humanitarian convoy.

Humanitarian community members of the SMT are to ensure that these non-binding guidelines are fully considered in the decision making of the DO.



¹⁰ Saving Lives Together: A Framework for Security Collaboration (Good Practice Review: Operational security management in violent environments. 8 ed. London: Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute, 2010, p.282-283).

¹¹ United Nations Security Policy Manual, Chapter II, Section B: Framework of Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System.

5.4.2 Non-UN Humanitarian Organisations

For non-UN humanitarian organisations, each entity should decide, document and make known the position within its organisation that has the authority to make decisions regarding the use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys. The Country Director is typically responsible for overall security management strategies and for making critical decisions, in consultation with headquarters and senior staff, which usually includes a security officer. Context and program-specific security risk assessments should be carried out to assist the organisation in making the best decision in accordance with the aforementioned criteria.

5.4.3 Common Humanitarian Position

Every humanitarian organisation (UN and non-UN) has its own risk profile and, therefore, security management considerations and strategies. Each organisation must consider its own position regarding the use of armed escorts. While it is not possible to operate in an identical manner, common positions on critical matters will increase the security of all. As such, the United Nations Designated Official (DO) should consult widely within the humanitarian community before making a determination on the use of armed escorts by the United Nations. To achieve this, he/she is encouraged to invite representatives of the non-UN humanitarian community to participate, either as members or as observers, in the work of the SMT, as deemed appropriate. In the same manner, non-UN humanitarian organisations that are considering using armed escorts should consult with the DO and other non-UN organisations before making a decision. In addition to the SMT, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) provides the primary platform for humanitarian to humanitarian consultations. The HCT, chaired by the Resident Coordinator (RC) or Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), is an operational decision-making forum composed of operationally relevant humanitarian organisations (both UN and non-UN) focusing on common strategic and policy issues related to humanitarian action in country.

Note: The humanitarian community as a whole should adhere to the Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys and use them to determine whether armed escorts are appropriate and necessary to facilitate the delivery of critical humanitarian assistance and protection to affected people. Relevant NGO focal points, DOs and Field Security Officers should be familiar with this document to ensure consistency in its application.

Where and when the decision to use armed escorts has been made by multiple agencies (UN, non-UN or both), coordination on the terms of use of said escorts is encouraged. In such cases, it is recommended that the HCT, led by the RC/HC should:

- i. Establish a common humanitarian position on armed escorts and issue humanitarian operational guidance on the use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys.
- ii. Examine, and when possible come to agreement on, whether or not to enter into a financial arrangement for the provision of armed escorts.¹² Where necessary, costs should also be agreed upon that will cover the operational expenses of the escort (see Annex C).
- iii. Establish a complaints mechanism within the HCT or SMT for agencies to share reports of abuse, misbehaviour or extortion by armed escorts.
- iv. In the case where the host authority has insisted on the use of armed escorts by humanitarian agencies, but, multiple agencies have assessed that such escorts would be detrimental to their operations, it is recommended that humanitarian actors coordinate their efforts to negotiate access without such escorts, utilise acceptable alternative arrangements or agree to the terms of such escorts if unescorted access is continued to be denied.
- v. Develop position paper and/or country-specific guidelines on humanitarian civil-military interaction, to include operational guidance on the use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys. These guidelines are to be developed through the HCT and owned by representatives of the UN and non-UN humanitarian community.
- vi. Monitor the use and impact of armed escorts and the application of humanitarian operational guidance or country-specific guidelines. Review existing procedures and adjust as necessary.

Note: Through establishing a common humanitarian position, the HCT, through the RC/HC, is better positioned to provide the SMT with information on critical humanitarian needs/programme criticality and the resulting humanitarian position on the use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys.

¹² Good Practice Review: Operational security management in violent environments. 8 ed. London: Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute, 2010, pg. 76.

5. Sustainability

With respect to the sustainability criterion, the humanitarian community needs to consider whether the use of armed escorts may make humanitarian action more difficult in the future. It is vital that any engagement of armed escorts takes a view beyond the immediate situation. Whereas specific and unique conditions may justify the use of armed escorts, this can erode the overall image of humanitarian action and may therefore lead to increased insecurity or erosion of organisational ability to more effectively manage security risks elsewhere in the future. In addition, resorting too quickly or too frequently to armed escorts can undermine efforts to increase respect for international humanitarian law and independent humanitarian action.¹³

When considering whether it is appropriate, practical or ethical to pay for the provision of armed escorts, the sustainability of such action should be considered. Among other implications, payment may undermine the actual and perceived neutrality of humanitarian organisations. It may also undermine the ability of a humanitarian organisation to operate when financial resources to compensate armed escorts are constrained or not available.



¹³ Good Practice Review: Operational security management in violent environments. 8 ed. London: Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute, 2010, pg. 75.

HOW TO USE ARMED ESCORTS

VI. Guiding Principles When Using Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys

- A. The Primacy of Humanitarian Criteria.** A decision to request or accept the use of armed escorts must be made by humanitarian organisations, not political or military authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria.
- B. Humanitarian Identity.** Humanitarian convoys must retain their civilian nature and character. Other than the vehicles, weapons, and personnel providing the escorts, the convoys must remain exclusively humanitarian and armed personnel should remain in separate vehicles. In order to give visibility to the civilian character of humanitarian convoys, vehicles other than the ones used to transport armed escorts must be clearly labelled with “No Weapons” markings. Additional measures should be sought to achieve clearer separations, such as flags, colours of vehicles, and maintaining clear distance from armed escort (dependent on the nature of the threat).
- C. The Primacy of the Humanitarian Organisations in Humanitarian Work.** In the first instance, humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organisations. Insofar as military organisations have an immediate role to play in supporting humanitarian work, it should be in helping to create a secure environment conducive to humanitarian action and/or in the provision of logistics support when requested by humanitarian organisations (in accordance with extant international guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets).

VII. Practical Considerations When Selecting Armed Escorts

1. Provision of the Armed Escort

The following is a list of factors to be considered when selecting an armed escort:

- i. **Who will provide the escort?** If armed escorts are deemed necessary, the structured Security Risk Assessment should recommend the most appropriate entity available to provide the escort.

The following is a list of the actors that may be considered as providers of armed escort for humanitarian convoys:

- Host Government Military Forces and/or Police
- UN Peacekeeping Military Forces and/or Police
- Regional Organisation Military Forces and/or Police
- Other Foreign Military Forces and Police Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 27.02.13 12
- Non-State Armed Actors
- Private Security Companies (PSC)¹⁴

- ii. Is the provider of armed escorts a **party to the conflict or regularly engaged in hostile activity with any opposing forces?**

- iii. **What are their capabilities?** Can they provide intelligence on the security situation? Will they represent an effective deterrent to attack? Will they be credible in the event of such an attack? What are the command and control arrangements? Do they have a capacity for extraction? Can they keep a route open and secure for future convoys once force has been used to move one convoy through?

¹⁴ The United Nations Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) adopted in 2012 the United Nations security management system policy on the Use of Private Security Companies (PSC) which was subsequently endorsed by the United Nations High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) and the Chief Executive Board. The use of armed PSCs should only be the last resort and take place where threat conditions and programme needs warrant escorts and there is not possible under the provision of armed escorts from the Host Government or other alternate member State, UN or other Military Forces. In addition, PSC use is subject to approval in accordance with the levels of delegated authority whether UN or non-UN organisations in line with the United Nations Security Management System's established policy on the use of armed private companies.

- iv. **How high a priority is the protection of humanitarian convoys for those providing the escorts?** Are the escorts themselves a potential source of insecurity, a threat to civilian populations or a source of pressure on a local population's resources?
- v. **Is there a choice?** Are those who are providing the escorts insisting – for political, military, economic or criminal reasons – on their use? If so, what are the possible consequences of resisting?
- vi. Would the use of escorts in one area have a harmful **impact on the capacity** of the organisation to fulfil its mission in other areas? If escorts are to be provided by a belligerent, would that affect the ability to operate in areas not controlled by that belligerent? Will it impact others and their ability to fulfil their mission?
- vii **What is their reputation?** How do the local community and the affected population perceive them? If perceived as predatory, illegitimate or corrupt, what impact will this have on the acceptance of humanitarian actors associated with them?
- viii Is there information or grounds for believing that the armed actor has **committed, or is at a real risk of committing**, violations or abuses of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law? Note: Such assessments should be done along the same principles as those referred to in the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces (HRDDP).¹⁵

¹⁵ The Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces (HRDDP) was adopted by the Policy Committee and issued as a decision of the Secretary-General on 13 July 2011. The HRDDP sets out principles and measures to mainstream human rights in support provided by United Nations entities to non-UN security forces globally in order to ensure that such support is consistent with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. According to the policy, UN support to non-UN security forces cannot be provided where there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of those security forces committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law and where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures.

vix What are the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the forces providing armed escort services? Are they limited to self-defence and acceptable to the humanitarian organisation? If ROE do not exist, the humanitarian organisation(s) must be prepared to define these with the provider of the armed escort, and brief convoy staff on what actions to take upon attack. Who determines whether the escorts engage or not? What are the possible ramifications of the accidental or intentional use of force, resulting in an armed engagement or casualties, and how will your organisation deal with those ramifications? Who bears liability in case of injury or death of personnel?

2. Negotiating an Armed Escort

Where multiple organisations are operating in the same area and intend to make use of armed escorts, ideally a single team – representing all humanitarian organisations seeking armed escorts for their convoys – should negotiate escort arrangements. Prior to these negotiations, the team should establish a common approach to the procedural elements to be negotiated. Whether or not it is possible to set up a team, organisations considering the use of armed escorts should work through the following issues.

For example:

- i. Whether the humanitarian organisations will make a consolidated agreement on behalf of all interested organisations, or whether separate agreements with each organisation will be necessary.
- ii. With which parties the escort agreement will be negotiated.
- iii. Whether the agreement will be formal and in writing, or whether it will be an informal understanding. Given liability issues an informal agreement is not advisable.
- iv. What the political ramifications of the agreement are; what issues of legal liability arise, and whether or not the privileges and immunities of the United Nations can be invoked, and who will be covered by them.

- v. Whether or not the existence and contents of the agreement will be made generally available beyond those who are party to the agreement.
- vi. What terms and conditions will be accepted; whether or not and how the costs of the escort provider will be covered, and costs involved (see Annex C).

3. Procedures when using Armed Escorts

As often as possible, the humanitarian community should have common procedures regarding the fundamental elements of using armed escorts.

For example:

- i. Procedures with respect to the composition of convoys (e.g. whether UN and non-UN (e.g. NGO) vehicles, will be mixed; whether or not a consolidated manifest will be available, and to whom; whether passengers will be allowed and, if so, what categories of passengers).
- ii. Procedures with respect to convoy command and control (e.g. who will have authority over the configuration of the convoy and over whether or not to abort a convoy, or to reroute it; whether or not escorted vehicles will have the authority to leave the convoy unilaterally).
- iii. Procedures with respect to the carriage and use of weapons (e.g. humanitarian convoys must retain their civilian nature and character. Other than the vehicles, weapons and personnel providing the escorts, the convoys must remain exclusively humanitarian. Armed personnel should remain in separate vehicles).
- iv. Procedures with respect to communication and liaison (e.g. how will the escorts communicate with those being escorted, en route and at headquarters).

- v. Procedures with respect to demands for preapproved movement, checkpoints, stops, searches, payment, etc.
- vi. Procedures with respect to interacting with persons encountered en route.
- vii. Procedures with respect to security incidents or traffic accidents.

VIII. Establish a Plan for the Discontinuation of Armed Escorts

When a decision to use armed escorts for humanitarian convoys is made, a specific time frame, geographical location and purpose of the escorts should be determined at the outset, to include an exit strategy. Any additional or continued use of the armed escorts beyond the original time frame and circumstances would require new or additional justification.

However, if a decision is taken to utilize armed escorts within a specific context for an extended time period (exceeding 30 days), it is critical to ensure that a monitoring method is put in place to review the effectiveness and on-going appropriateness of using such escorts to avoid creating a dependency. In such circumstances, the same decision-making process which is recommended for determining if and when to use armed escorts should be employed to determine if and when to stop using armed escorts.

Key Steps to Discontinuation Decision-making Process:

- i. Review Humanitarian Need and Program Criticality
- ii. Assess the State or Controlling Authorities capabilities
- iii. Review and revise the Security Risk Assessment as required

- iv. Assess what impact the use of armed escorts is having on the sustainability of the humanitarian action.
- v. Determine whether or not armed escorts are required and continue to be a last resort given the current context. If not, develop an action plan to cease using armed escorts.

Note: Challenges and best practices identified where armed escorts are used should be documented to provide a foundation for reflection, continual learning and adaption of practice within the humanitarian community.



ANNEXES

ANNEX A

COMPLEMENTARY REFERENCES

The following are additional guidance papers, policy instructions or manuals that the reader may find useful in the context of these Guidelines. The list is not exhaustive and is provided for ease of reference.

Good Practice Review: Operational security management in violent environments. 8 ed. London: Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute, 2010. Print.

McHugh, Gerard and Bessler. *Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners*. New York: United Nations, 2006.

Saving Lives Together: A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements among IGOs, NGOs and the UN in the Field, 2004.

The Sphere Project. *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response*. 3rd ed. Geneva: The Sphere Project, 2011.

UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "Descriptive Glossary of Key Terms Relations to Negotiations during Hostilities, updated on 19 March 2012.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief ("Oslo Guidelines")*, November 2007, available at: <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UNCMCoord/publications>

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), *The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*, March 2003, available at: <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UNCMCoord/publications>

UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations: What is Last Resort?* April 2012, available at: <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/publications>


Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies- An IASC Reference Paper*, 28 June 2004, available at: <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/publications>

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), To Stay and Deliver: Good practice for humanitarians in complex security environments, February 2011.


The Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces (HRDDP), 13 July 2011, Decision of the Secretary-General nr. 2011/18.


ANNEX B

FLOW CHART ON THE USE OF ARMED ESCORTS FOR HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS



ANNEXES





ANNEX C

GUIDANCE NOTE: COST AND COMPENSATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PROVISION OF ARMED ESCORTS

Armed escorts for humanitarian convoys should, in principle, be provided free of charge as it is the obligation of the state / responsible authority to facilitate humanitarian operations for civilians under their control. However, the situational reality may require a negotiated solution when the necessary resources are not readily available for an effective armed escort.

Entering into financial arrangements with an armed escort provider can have positive and negative effects. As part of the decision-making process about whether or not to use armed escorts, it is important to carefully consider the potential implications of financial arrangements and ensure that measures are taken to mitigate any possible negative consequence.

If financial support is deemed essential, it should be limited to covering the costs associated with the service – such as fuel or food for the armed escorts. Where the force has limited resources, the provision of funds to cover the costs through an accountable channel or the provision of direct material support for armed escorts can improve the quality of the service, ultimately improving the security of the humanitarian personnel in the convoy.¹⁶

As with all aspects of the use of armed escorts by humanitarian organisations, a shared analysis should as far as possible support a common position and approach among humanitarian organisations regarding financial arrangements. When negotiating an arrangement to cover the costs of armed escorts, agreed standards among humanitarian actors will help to avoid a scenario whereby an armed actor is able to exploit differences in what organisations are willing to pay, mitigate economic incentives for continued insecurity, or the perception of insecurity, and perhaps increase incentives for improved ambient security.

It is important to note that an agency or agencies that pay for ‘privatised protection’ may inadvertently put others, who are unable or unwilling to pay, at greater risk – including beneficiaries, host communities and other humanitarian organisations.¹⁷

¹⁶ *Good Practice Review: Operational security management in violent environments*. 8 ed. London: Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute, 2010, pg. 76.

¹⁷ *Good Practice Review: Operational security management in violent environments*. 8 ed. London: Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute, 2010, pg. 76.

If the force providing armed escort services is a party to the conflict where the humanitarian organisation is operating, the organisation may essentially be providing financial resources in support of one side in the conflict. This has significant ramifications for the organisation's actual and perceived neutrality and, therefore, their credibility and ability to maintain access to the affected people.

It is recognised that if armed escorts are provided by a private sector entity, such as a Private Security Company, the financial arrangements would involve for-profit remuneration for their services and therefore require additional considerations.

In order to mitigate the negative implications, any use of armed escorts should be limited as much as possible to specific timeframes, geographic areas and types of humanitarian activity to be carried out. These parameters should be explicitly defined within the contractual agreement with the escort provider, if dealing with a private security entity, or some form of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) if dealing with a State or non-State armed actors. For this purpose, short-term, renewable contracts or agreements may be preferable.¹⁸

It is also important to consider that agency may need to prematurely terminate the contract or agreement (on the grounds of poor execution or a change in the security environment). To avoid tension in this situation, the agency should ensure that such stipulations are explicit from the outset. If it is necessary to prematurely end a contract or agreement, it is best to base the termination explicitly on the pre-agreed stipulations, and mutually agree on the conditions and termination with the provider. If it is likely that the termination may lead to tensions, it may be necessary to involve a qualified external mediator or legal representative to settle the dispute.¹⁹ Contractual stipulations should also include explicit rules of engagement, as well as legal liability and compensation in case of injury or death to a guard, assailant, bystander or aid worker of the contracting party.²⁰


¹⁸ *Good Practice Review: Operational security management in violent environments*. 8 ed. London: Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute, 2010, pg. 80.

¹⁹ *Engaging Private Security Providers: A guidelines for Non-Governmental Organisations*. European Interagency Security Forum Briefing Paper. 2011. pg. 14

²⁰ *Good Practice Review: Operational security management in violent environments*. 8 ed. London: Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute, 2010, pg. 80.

ANNEX D

SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL



4

Annexes & Appendices



Most of the material in the ANNEXES were developed outside the framework of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), but within the United Nations System at large. The respective sources are indicated in the material.

Annexes

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NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL


Guidance on Integrated Missions

In my directive of 11 December 2000, I provided specific guidance on the relations among Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators. Since that time, integration has evolved significantly and integrated missions now routinely provide for the combined function of DSRSG/RC/HC. While this has greatly facilitated coordination and collaboration between the mission and the UN Country Team, it has also underlined the need for further clarification of the roles and responsibilities of senior mission leadership and their relationship with the UN Country Team.

Following a discussion at the Policy Committee, I tasked the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in consultation with other key partners, to draft a revised Note of Guidance. This document has now been finalized and I am pleased to note that it is based on broad consensus among the agencies, funds and programmes that were involved in this consultative process. As such, it takes due account of specific concerns with respect to humanitarian space and the role of human rights, while affirming the overall authority of my Special Representative in relation to the activities of the United Nations in a given country.

I fully endorse the Note of Guidance and am confident that it will improve the coherence of the UN system in supporting countries emerging from conflict. I count on you to ensure that its provisions are adhered to in your respective areas of responsibility. I would also request that you circulate the Note of Guidance to your staff, including in the field.

Thank you.



Kofi A. Annan
9 February 2006

NOTE OF GUIDANCE ON INTEGRATED MISSIONS:

Clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator

1. The December 2000 Note of Guidance provided directions on the relations between Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSR), Resident Coordinators (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinators (HC) and, specifically, called for the RC/HC to serve as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) in multidimensional peacekeeping missions. As peacekeeping operations have further increased in complexity and scale since that time, a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the different actors is required in order to ensure effective coordination between the mission, UN agencies¹ and other external partners.
2. Successful recovery from conflict requires the engagement of a broad range of actors, including the national authorities and the local population, in a long-term peacebuilding effort. The rationale for the integration of activities undertaken by the United Nations is to assist countries to make this transition from conflict to sustainable peace. The UN's presence must therefore be based on a clear and shared understanding of priorities and a willingness by all actors to contribute toward the achievement of common objectives.
3. This updated Note of Guidance applies to all integrated missions in which the SRSG is supported by a RC and HC serving as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG/RC/HC). Provisions

¹ In this Note, the term "agencies" includes all UN Departments, Programmes, Funds and Specialized Agencies.

relating to the presence of a non-resident SRSG or RSG, as stipulated in the 2000 Note of Guidance, remain in force. It is acknowledged that 'integrated missions' is an evolving concept and that further guidance will be required. This Note of Guidance will, therefore, be updated at regular intervals to reflect these and other emerging considerations.

4. Integration is the **guiding principle** for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy. An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner. This Note of Guidance is primarily intended to clarify institutional relations and to facilitate communication and coordination between the mission and the UN system already present in the country.



Role, responsibility and authority of the SRSO

5. The SRSO is the senior UN Representative in the country and has **overall authority** over the activities of the United Nations. He/She represents the Secretary-General and speaks on behalf of the United Nations in a given country. The SRSO establishes the overall framework that guides the activities of the mission and the UN Country Team and ensures that all the UN components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach. The SRSO reports to the Secretary-General, through the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.
6. The SRSO is supported by two Deputies, one of whom performs the function of DSRSO/RC/HC. The SRSO will devise effective coordination mechanisms among the security, political, human rights, rule of law, humanitarian and development components of the mission.
7. In devising effective coordination arrangements, the SRSO will make use of existing humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms and the expertise of the UN Country Team. The SRSO will also establish appropriate coordination mechanisms between mission-run support services and humanitarian common services.
8. In order to ensure effective coordination of respective planning processes, as well as regular reviews of the implementation of the mission's mandate, the SRSO should establish a planning cell in the mission to engage the UN Country Team, the international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other relevant actors.
9. Those parts of the UN that need to retain a public advocacy role should ensure that such advocacy is conducted in full coordination with the SRSO and in a manner that does not undermine the mandate of the mission.
10. The SRSO will uphold humanitarian principles (as outlined in GA resolution 46/182) in the implementation of the mission's mandate and support the creation of an effective humanitarian operating environment.
11. The SRSO will engage with the UN Country Team, through the DSRSO/RC/HC, to ensure that mission planning and operations management

are compatible with long-term national development goals and that mission exit strategies clearly articulate the hand-over of ongoing activities to the UN Country Team and other relevant actors.

12. Where mission activities have a close bearing on the humanitarian or development response, such as 'hearts and minds' campaigns, quick impact projects or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, the SRSR, through the DSRSG/RC/HC, will establish effective approval and coordination mechanisms to ensure maximum coherence and prevent any adverse impact on humanitarian and development operations.
13. When appointed as Designated Official, the SRSR is accountable to the Secretary-General, through the Under Secretary-General of the Department of Safety and Security, for the security of all personnel employed by the organizations of the UN system and their recognized dependants throughout the country or designated area. The SRSR will also ensure that the goals of the United Nations security management system are met, that a Security Management Team has been constituted and that the DSRSG/RC/HC is appointed as the Deputy Designated Official.



14. While recognizing that UN agencies are responsible for the implementation of their mandated activities, the SRSG may request a given agency to re-orient its planned interventions in line with the broad strategic objectives of the mission, subject to the agency's mandate and available resources.
15. The SRSG will ensure that optimal use is made of existing capacities in the implementation of the different elements of the mission's mandate. Where such elements are best implemented through the combined capacities of the UNCT and the mission, the SRSG will provide overall guidance and encourage the design and implementation of joint programmes and operational partnerships between UN agencies and the mission. Where several agencies could conceivably implement a given programming component, the selection of the appropriate agencies will be made through existing coordination mechanisms, on the basis of their comparative advantage.
16. Human Rights are a cross-cutting concern for both the mission and the UN Country Team and they need to be fully integrated into peace operations². The SRSG will uphold human rights law in the implementation of the mission's mandate. All human rights functions should be co-coordinated by one component of the mission and the head of the human rights component should report to the SRSG, either directly or through one of the two DSRSGs, as appropriate. A secondary reporting line to provide guidance and functional support is retained between the head of the human rights component and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. As representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the head of the human rights component should be a full member of the expanded UN Country Team. Separate public reporting by the mission and/or the High Commissioner on issues of human rights should be routine.

² Given its overriding importance as a cross-cutting concern, the role of human rights in integrated missions was reviewed at a special session of the Secretary-General's Policy Committee (see decision 2005/24).

Role, responsibility and authority of the DSRSG/RC/HC

17. The principal reporting line of the DSRSG/RC/HC is to the SRSG who provides direct supervision and overall strategic direction.
18. In his/her capacity as RC, the DSRSG/RC/HC is responsible for the coordination of the UN Country Team and the planning and coordination of UN development operations. He/She is also responsible for donor coordination in the areas of recovery and development and will maintain links with governments, donors and other development partners for this purpose. The DSRSG/RC/HC retains a secondary reporting line to the UNDP Administrator, as the Chair of the UNDG. UNDP will continue to provide support for the RC function.
19. Similarly, in his/her capacity as HC, the DSRSG/RC/HC is responsible for the planning and coordination of humanitarian operations and will maintain links with governments (and other parties), donors and the broader humanitarian community for this purpose. The DSRSG/RC/HC retains a secondary reporting line to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). Where the HC is supported by an OCHA office, it will serve as the humanitarian coordination office. Where appropriate, the OCHA office may be located separately from the mission to facilitate access by the broader humanitarian community.
20. These two secondary reporting lines are essential to provide guidance and functional support to the DSRSG/RC/HC but do not constitute a day-to-day supervisory relationship. In fulfilling the respective roles of RC and HC, the DSRSG/RC/HC retains existing accountabilities in accordance with prevailing Terms of Reference for these roles.
21. The DSRSG/RC/HC will inform the SRSG of all policy communications with the UNDP Administrator and the ERC respectively. The SRSG will, in turn, keep the DSRSG/RC/HC informed of all relevant substantive communications with Headquarters.
22. Whereas the SRSG has the overall authority for the coordination of UN activities, the DSRSG/RC/HC is expected to serve as the principal interface between the mission and the UN Country Team, to lead the coordination effort for humanitarian, development and recovery activ-

ities and to bring concerns raised by the UN Country Team to the attention of the SRSR. The DSRSG/RC/HC also engages with non-governmental organizations (NGOs).



Resolution of differences

23. The SRSR will resolve any issues related to the co-ordination of different mission components represented by the two DSRSGs, in his/her capacity as their immediate supervisor. Where differences related to the role of RC and HC have not been resolved effectively, the UNDP Administrator (as Chair of UNDG) or the ERC may raise the issue with the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, in an effort to assist with the resolution.
24. All policy differences related to the interpretation of mandates should be resolved in a timely manner at field level. Should the issue involve a UN agency represented on the Country Team, the *DSRSG/RC/HC* is expected to assume a leading role in the mediation effort. Where disputes cannot be resolved in-country, the SRSR is required to jointly review the matter with the executive head of the agency in order to seek a formal agreement, while keeping the USG for Peacekeeping informed. In the event that good faith efforts to resolve disagreements do not produce results, the SRSR and/or the executive head of the agency concerned may approach the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.
25. Where agreement cannot be reached, the matter may be referred to the Secretary-General or his Policy Committee, as appropriate.

OBSERVANCE BY UNITED NATIONS FORCES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

Secretary-General's Bulletin ST/SGB/1999/13 (6 August 1999)

The Secretary-General, for the purpose of setting out fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations forces conducting operations under United Nations command and control, promulgates the following:

Section I — Field of application

1.1 The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.

1.2 The promulgation of this bulletin does not affect the protected status of members of peacekeeping operations under the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel or their status as non-combatants, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians under the international law of armed conflict.

Section 2 — Application of national law

The present provisions do not constitute an exhaustive list of principles and rules of international humanitarian law binding upon military personnel, and do not prejudice the application thereof, nor do they replace the national laws by which military personnel remain bound throughout the operation.



Section 3 — Status-of-forces agreement

In the status-of-forces agreement concluded between the United Nations and a State in whose territory a United Nations force is deployed, the United Nations undertakes to ensure that the force shall conduct its operations with full respect for the principles and rules of the general conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel. The United Nations also undertakes to ensure that members of the military personnel of the force are fully acquainted with the principles and rules of those international instruments. The obligation to respect the said principles and rules is applicable to United Nations forces even in the absence of a status-of-forces agreement.

Section 4 — Violations of international humanitarian law

In case of violations of international humanitarian law, members of the military personnel of a United Nations force are subject to prosecution in their national courts.

Section 5 — Protection of the civilian population

5.1 The United Nations force shall make a clear distinction at all times between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. Military operations shall be directed only against combatants and military objectives. Attacks on civilians or civilian objects are prohibited.

5.2 Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

5.3 The United Nations force shall take all feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian property.



5.4 In its area of operation, the United Nations force shall avoid, to the extent feasible, locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas, and take all necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects against the dangers resulting from military operations. Military installations and equipment of peacekeeping operations, as such, shall not be considered military objectives.

5.5 The United Nations force is prohibited from launching operations of a nature likely to strike military objectives and civilians in an indiscriminate manner, as well as operations that may be expected to cause incidental loss of life among the civilian population or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

5.6 The United Nations force shall not engage in reprisals against civilians or civilian objects.

Section 6 — Means and methods of combat

6.1 The right of the United Nations force to choose methods and means of combat is not unlimited.

6.2 The United Nations force shall respect the rules prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons and methods of combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law. These include, in particular, the prohibition on the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and biological methods of warfare; bullets which explode, expand or flatten easily in the human body; and certain explosive projectiles. The use of certain conventional weapons, such as non-detectable fragments, anti-personnel mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons, is prohibited.



6.3 The United Nations force is prohibited from employing methods of warfare which may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or which are intended, or may be expected to cause, widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.

6.4 The United Nations force is prohibited from using weapons or methods of combat of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering.

6.5 It is forbidden to order that there shall be no survivors.

6.6 The United Nations force is prohibited from attacking monuments of art, architecture or history, archaeological sites, works of art, places of worship and museums and libraries which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. In its area of operation, the United Nations force shall not use such cultural property or their immediate surroundings for purposes which might expose them to destruction or damage. Theft, pillage, misappropriation and any act of vandalism directed against cultural property is strictly prohibited.

6.7 The United Nations force is prohibited from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuff, crops, livestock and drinking-water installations and supplies.

6.8 The United Nations force shall not make installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating stations, the object of military operations if such operations may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

6.9 The United Nations force shall not engage in reprisals against objects and installations protected under this section.

Section 7 — Treatment of civilians and persons hors de combat

7.1 Persons not, or no longer, taking part in military operations, including civilians, members of armed forces who have laid down their weapons and persons placed *hors de combat* by reason of sickness, wounds or detention, shall, in all circumstances, be treated humanely and without any adverse distinction based on race, sex, religious convictions or any other ground. They shall be accorded full respect for their person, honour and religious and other convictions.

7.2 The following acts against any of the persons mentioned in section 7.1 are prohibited at any time and in any place: violence to life or physical integrity; murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; collective punishment; reprisals; the taking of hostages;

rape; enforced prostitution; any form of sexual assault and humiliation and degrading treatment; enslavement; and pillage.

7.3 Women shall be especially protected against any attack, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution or any other form of indecent assault.

7.4 Children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault.



Section 8 — Treatment of detained persons

The United Nations force shall treat with humanity and respect for their dignity detained members of the armed forces and other persons who no longer take part in military operations by reason of detention. Without prejudice to their legal status, they shall be treated in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, as may be applicable to them *mutatis mutandis*. In particular:

- (a) Their capture and detention shall be notified without delay to the party on which they depend and to the Central Tracing Agency of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in particular in order to inform their families;
- (b) They shall be held in secure and safe premises which provide all possible safeguards of hygiene and health, and shall not be detained in areas exposed to the dangers of the combat zone;
- (c) They shall be entitled to receive food and clothing, hygiene and medical attention;

- (d) They shall under no circumstances be subjected to any form of torture or ill-treatment;
- (e) Women whose liberty has been restricted shall be held in quarters separated from men's quarters, and shall be under the immediate supervision of women;
- (f) In cases where children who have not attained the age of sixteen years take a direct part in hostilities and are arrested, detained or interned by the United Nations force, they shall continue to benefit from special protection. In particular, they shall be held in quarters separate from the quarters of adults, except when accommodated with their families;
- (g) ICRC's right to visit prisoners and detained persons shall be respected and guaranteed.

Section 9 — Protection of the wounded, the sick, and medical and relief personnel

9.1 Members of the armed forces and other persons in the power of the United Nations force who are wounded or sick shall be respected and protected in all circumstances. They shall be treated humanely and receive the medical care and attention required by their condition, without adverse distinction. Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be administered.

9.2 Whenever circumstances permit, a suspension of fire shall be arranged, or other local arrangements made, to permit the search for and identification of the wounded, the sick and the dead left on the battlefield and allow for their collection, removal, exchange and transport.

9.3 The United Nations force shall not attack medical establishments or mobile medical units. These shall at all times be respected and protected, unless they are used, outside their humanitarian functions, to attack or otherwise commit harmful acts against the United Nations force.

9.4 The United Nations force shall in all circumstances respect and protect medical personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, transport or treatment of the wounded or sick, as well as religious personnel.

9.5 The United Nations force shall respect and protect transports of wounded and sick or medical equipment in the same way as mobile medical units.

9.6 The United Nations force shall not engage in reprisals against the wounded, the sick or the personnel, establishments and equipment protected under this section.

9.7 The United Nations force shall in all circumstances respect the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems. These emblems may not be employed except to indicate or to protect medical units and medical establishments, personnel and material. Any misuse of the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblems is prohibited.

9.8 The United Nations force shall respect the right of the families to know about the fate of their sick, wounded and deceased relatives. To this end, the force shall facilitate the work of the ICRC Central Tracing Agency.

9.9 The United Nations force shall facilitate the work of relief operations which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, and shall respect personnel, vehicles and premises involved in such operations.

Section 10—Entry into force

The present bulletin shall enter into force on 12 August 1999.

(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General

WE ARE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL

United Nations Standard of Conduct:

The United Nations Organization embodies the aspirations of all the people of the world for peace. In this context the United Nations Charter requires that **all personnel must maintain the highest standards of integrity and conduct.**

We will comply with the **Guidelines on International Humanitarian Law for Forces Undertaking United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*** and the applicable portions of the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights** as the fundamental basis of our standards.

We, as peacekeeping personnel, represent the United Nations and are present in the country to help it recover from the trauma of a conflict. As a result we must consciously be prepared to accept special constraints in our public and private lives in order to do the work and to pursue the ideals of the United Nations Organization.

We will be accorded certain privileges and immunities arranged through agreements negotiated between the United Nations and the host country solely for the purpose of discharging our peacekeeping duties. Expectations of the world community and the local population will be high and our actions, behaviour and speech will be closely monitored.

(* Editor's Note: This is the Secretary-General's Bulletin on "Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian Law — ST/SGB/1999/13 of 6 August 1999)

We will always:

- Conduct ourselves in a professional and disciplined manner, at all times;
- Dedicate ourselves to achieving the goals of the United Nations;
- Understand the mandate and mission and comply with their provisions;
- Respect the environment of the host country;
- Respect local laws, customs and practices and be aware of and respect culture, religion, traditions and gender issues;
- Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration;
- Act with impartiality, integrity and tact;
- Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak;
- Obey our United Nations superiors/supervisors and respect the chain of command;
- Respect all other peacekeeping members of the mission regardless of status, rank, ethnic or national origin, race, gender, or creed;
- Support and encourage proper conduct among our fellow peacekeeping personnel;
- Report all acts involving sexual exploitation and abuse;
- Maintain proper dress and personal deportment at all times;
- Properly account for all money and property assigned to us as members of the mission; and
- Care for all United Nations equipment placed in our charge.



We will never:

- Bring discredit upon the United Nations, or our nations through improper personal conduct, failure to perform our duties or abuse of our positions as peacekeeping personnel;
- Take any action that might jeopardize the mission;
- Abuse alcohol, use or traffic in drugs;
- Make unauthorized communications to external agencies, including unauthorized press statements;
- Improperly disclose or use information gained through our employment;
- Use unnecessary violence or threaten anyone in custody;
- Commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially women and children;
- Commit any act involving sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual activity with children under 18, or exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex;
- Become involved in sexual liaisons which could affect our impartiality, or the well-being of others;
- Be abusive or uncivil to any member of the public;
- Willfully damage or misuse any United Nations property or equipment;
- Use a vehicle improperly or without authorization;
- Collect unauthorized souvenirs;
- Participate in any illegal activities, corrupt or improper practices; or
- Attempt to use our positions for personal advantage, to make false claims or accept benefits to which we are not entitled.

We realize that the consequences of failure to act within these guidelines may:

- Erode confidence and trust in the United Nations;
- Jeopardize the achievement of the mission;
- Jeopardize our status and security as peacekeeping personnel; and
- Result in administrative, disciplinary or criminal action.

Editor's note:

These Standards appear as **Annex H** in the “Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and [participating State] contributing resources to the [United Nations Peacekeeping Operation]”- the so-called “Model MoU” between UN and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). The original version of the MoU is contained in the “Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual) annexed to General Assembly (GA) document A/C.5/60/26.

In June 2007, a Working Group of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations recommended to the GA that it request the Secretary-General to incorporate in the Model MoU a number of proposed amendments, including these Standards as **Annex H**, as reflected in its Report A/61/19 (Part III) of 12 June 2007. Subsequently, the GA adopted the recommendation through its Resolution A/RES/61/267 B of 24 August 2007. These Rules are also available as Annex III to the Note by the Secretary-General to the GA on “Making the Standards Contained in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin Binding on Contingent Members and Standardizing the Norms of Conduct so that they are Applicable to All Categories of Peacekeeping Personnel” — A/61/645 of 18 December 2006.



TEN RULES: CODE OF PERSONAL CONDUCT FOR BLUE HELMETS

1. Dress, think, talk, act and behave in a manner befitting the dignity of a disciplined, caring, considerate, mature, respected and trusted soldier, displaying the highest integrity and impartiality. Have pride in your position as a peace-keeper and do not abuse or misuse your authority.
2. Respect the law of the land of the host country, their local culture, traditions, customs and practices.
3. Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration. You are there as a guest to help them and in so doing will be welcomed with admiration. Neither solicit or accept any material reward, honor or gift.
4. Do not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation of the local population or United Nations staff, especially women and children.
5. Respect and regard the human rights of all. Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak. Do not act in revenge or with malice, in particular when dealing with prisoners, detainees or people in your custody.
6. Properly care for and account for all United Nations money, vehicles, equipment and property assigned to you and do not trade or barter with them to seek personal benefits.
7. Show military courtesy and pay appropriate compliments to all members of the mission, including other United Nations contingents regardless of their creed, gender, rank or origin.

8. Show respect for and promote the environment, including the flora and fauna, of the host country.
9. Do not engage in excessive consumption of alcohol or any consumption or trafficking of drugs.
10. Exercise the utmost discretion in handling confidential information and matters of official business which can put lives into danger or soil the image of the United Nations.

*(*Editor's Note: These Rules are also available as Annex IV to the Note by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on "Making the Standards Contained in the Secretary-General's Bulletin Binding on Contingent Members and Standardizing the Norms of Conduct so that they are Applicable to All Categories of Peacekeeping Personnel" — A/61/645 of 18 December 2006.)*



SPECIAL MEASURES FOR PROTECTION FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND SEXUAL ABUSE

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S BULLETIN ST/SGB/2003/13 (9 October 2003)

The Secretary-General, for the purpose of preventing and addressing cases of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, and taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 57/306 of 15 April 2003, "Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa", promulgates the following in consultation with Executive Heads of separately administered organs and programmes of the United Nations:

Section 1: Definitions

For the purposes of the present bulletin, the term "**sexual exploitation**" means any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. Similarly, the term "**sexual abuse**" means the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.

Section 2: Scope of application

2.1 The present bulletin shall **apply to all staff** of the United Nations, including staff of separately administered organs and programmes of the United Nations.

2.2 **United Nations forces** conducting operations under United Nations command and control are prohibited from committing acts of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, and have a particular duty of care towards women and children, pursuant to section 7 of Secretary-General's bulletin ST/SGB/1999/13, entitled "Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law".

2.3 Secretary-General's bulletin ST/SGB/253, entitled "Promotion of equal treatment of men and women in the Secretariat and prevention of sexual harassment", and the related administrative instruction³ set forth policies and procedures for handling cases of sexual harassment in the Secretariat of the United Nations. Separately administered organs and programmes of the United Nations have promulgated similar policies and procedures.

Section 3: Prohibition of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse

3.1 Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse violate universally recognized international legal norms and standards and have always been unacceptable behaviour and prohibited conduct for United Nations staff. Such conduct is prohibited by the United Nations Staff Regulations and Rules.

3.2 In order to further protect the most vulnerable populations, especially women and children, the following specific standards which reiterate existing general obligations under the United Nations Staff Regulations and Rules, are promulgated:

- (a) Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse constitute acts of serious misconduct and are therefore grounds for disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal;

³ Currently ST/AI/379, entitled "Procedures for dealing with sexual harassment".

- (b) Sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18) is prohibited regardless of the age of majority or age of consent locally. Mistaken belief in the age of a child is not a defence;
- (c) Exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex, including sexual favours or other forms of humiliating, degrading or exploitative behaviour, is prohibited. This includes any exchange of assistance that is due to beneficiaries of assistance;
- (d) Sexual relationships between United Nations staff and beneficiaries of assistance, since they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics, undermine the credibility and integrity of the work of the United Nations and are strongly discouraged;
- (e) Where a United Nations staff member develops concerns or suspicions regarding sexual exploitation or sexual abuse by a fellow worker, whether in the same agency or not and whether or not within the United Nations system, he or she must report such concerns via established reporting mechanisms;
- (f) United Nations staff are obliged to create and maintain an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. Managers at all levels have a particular responsibility to support and develop systems that maintain this environment.

3.3 The standards set out above are not intended to be an exhaustive list. Other types of sexually exploitive or sexually abusive behaviour may be grounds for administrative action or disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal, pursuant to the United Nations Staff Regulations and Rules.

Section 4: Duties of Heads of Departments, Offices and Missions

4.1 The Head of Department, Office or Mission, as appropriate, shall be responsible for creating and maintaining an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, and shall take appropriate measures for this purpose. In particular, the Head of Department, Office or Mission shall inform his or her staff of the contents of the present bulletin and ascertain that each staff member receives a copy thereof.

4.2 The Head of Department, Office or Mission shall be responsible for taking appropriate action in cases where there is reason to believe that any of the standards listed in section 3.2 above have been violated or any behaviour referred to in section 3.3 above has occurred. This action shall be taken in accordance with established rules and procedures for dealing with cases of staff misconduct.

4.3 The Head of Department, Office or Mission shall appoint an official, at a sufficiently high level, to serve as a focal point for receiving reports on cases of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. With respect to Missions, the staff of the Mission and the local population shall be properly informed of the existence and role of the focal point and of how to contact him or her. All reports of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse shall be handled in a confidential manner in order to protect the rights of all involved. However, such reports may be used, where necessary, for action taken pursuant to section 4.2 above.

4.4 The Head of Department, Office or Mission shall not apply the standard prescribed in section 3.2 (b), where a staff member is legally married to someone under the age of 18 but over the age of majority or consent in their country of citizenship.

4.5 The Head of Department, Office or Mission may use his or her discretion in applying the standard prescribed in section 3.2 (d), where beneficiaries of assistance are over the age of 18 and the circumstances of the case justify an exception.

4.6 The Head of Department, Office or Mission shall promptly inform the Department of Management of its investigations into cases of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, and the actions it has taken as a result of such investigations.

Section 5: Referral to national authorities

If, after proper investigation, there is evidence to support allegations of sexual exploitation or sexual abuse, these cases may, upon consultation with the Office of Legal Affairs, be referred to national authorities for criminal prosecution.

Section 6: Cooperative arrangements with non-United Nations entities or individuals

6.1 When entering into cooperative arrangements with non-United Nations entities or individuals, relevant United Nations officials shall inform those entities or individuals of the standards of conduct listed in section 3, and shall receive a written undertaking from those entities or individuals that they accept these standards.

6.2 The failure of those entities or individuals to take preventive measures against sexual exploitation or sexual abuse, to investigate allegations thereof, or to take corrective action when sexual exploitation or sexual abuse has occurred, shall constitute grounds for termination of any cooperative arrangement with the United Nations.

Section 7: Entry into force

The present bulletin shall enter into force on 15 October 2003.

(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General

UN-CMCOORD OFFICER

GENERIC TERMS OF REFERENCE

ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING AND REPORTING RELATIONSHIPS: This position is located in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The Civil — Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Officer will be deployed to [town, country]. The UN-CMCoord Officer will report to the Humanitarian / Resident Coordinator through the Head of the OCHA Office in [country].

ACCOUNTABILITIES: Within limits of delegated authority, the UN-CMCoord Officer will be responsible for the following duties:

1. Serve as an adviser to the HC/RC for humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) matters; advise on overall policy direction on specific issues; and, more generally, review and provide advice on a diverse range of policy issues related to UN-CMCoord and the safeguarding of humanitarian principles.
2. Serve as primary focal point for all matters, including policy, related to civil-military coordination, in close consultation with the HC/RC.
3. Assist and advice in the development of country-specific guidelines on civil-military relations and use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), based on the current '*IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*', '*Guidelines on the Use of MCDA to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*' and the '*Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys*,' applicable Security Council resolutions and other relevant instruments.
4. Ensure that the country-specific guidelines and, if necessary, the generic guidelines mentioned above are properly disseminated and understood by both the humanitarian actors and the military forces present, as well as by local actors, as appropriate. Promote and ensure adherence to the above Guidelines within the entire humanitarian community and advise on potential consequences if these principles are compromised.

5. Establish and maintain dialogue and coordination with the military forces in the area of responsibility. Identify, establish and maintain contact with the appropriate military counterparts and ensure mutual exchange of information about ongoing humanitarian assistance issues. Advise the military forces in the area of responsibility on international humanitarian coordination mechanisms. These mechanisms may include the UN Country Team, UN Security or Disaster Management Teams, UN Joint Logistics Centre, Humanitarian Information Centre, Humanitarian Clusters, etc.
6. In parallel, establish and maintain contact with civilian humanitarian actors in the area of responsibility and serve as an information channel and advocate for their issues with relevant military systems.
7. Work in close cooperation with UN OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) in Geneva to support the UN-CMCoord training programme as appropriate. Identify and coordinate with OCHA/CMCS regarding potential candidates for inclusion in the UN-CMCoord Training Programme.
8. In coordination with UN OCHA/CMCS, establish and maintain contact with actors involved in military exercises in area of operation and advise on which events should be monitored and/or supported. Support planning for and execution of exercises, lessons learned workshops, seminars, and training events with military participation, as appropriate.
9. Monitor, analyze and report on any major accomplishments and progress as well as identify any difficulties in relations between the humanitarian and military communities.
10. Participate in work groups, meetings and consultations with other UN agencies and humanitarian partners; organize meetings with Heads of Agencies on UN-CMCoord matters.
11. Support logistics and operations personnel in the area of responsibility on all issues connected to civil-military relations.
12. Establish, if appropriate, an information exchange forum for stakeholders and interested parties in civil-military relations and participate in relevant meetings.

13. Prepare or provide input to requests for MCDA assets.
14. Provide situation reports on ongoing civil-military activities and the overall civil-military relations situation in [country] in agreed formats and timeframes. Upon concurrence with the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator, these reports should be disseminated to the UNCT, UN OCHA Office in [country], UN OCHA/CMCS, relevant CRD Desks, PDSB/PHA. Reports may also be disseminated to other agencies if relevant and appropriate.
15. Any other duties as may be requested by the Humanitarian / Resident Coordinator.

*(*Editor's Note: The above is an excerpt from the 'Draft Generic Terms of Reference: Civil-Military Coordination Officer (P/L4)' of February 2008—developed based on 'Annex A' of the 'United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Concept' endorsed by the IASC in March 2005.)*

Appendices

A. Abbreviations and Acronyms

B. Relevant Material

ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

[A] Abbreviations

	Armed Escorts Guidelines	Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys: Non-Binding Guidelines (27 February 2013)
	IASC Reference Paper	Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper (28 June 2004)
	MCDA Guidelines	Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (March 2003, Revision 1 — January 2006)
	OSLO Guidelines	Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (November 2006, Revision 1.1 — November 2007)
	UN-CMCoord Concept	United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Concept (22 March 2005)
	UN-CMCoord Handbook	United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook (29 November 2007)

[B] Acronyms

NOTE: This list highlights some of the commonly used acronyms in the civil-military context, mostly in United Nations operations. In practice, slight differences exist across missions. This is not an official version, nor is it exhaustive.

3Ds	Diplomacy, Development and Defense
3BW	Three Block Wars
A	
AA	Agency Agreements
A/A	Air to Air
AAM	Air to Air Missile
AASLT	Air Assault
ABN	Airborne
AC	Aircraft Commander
ACA	Airspace Coordination Area
ACA	Airspace Control Authority
ACC	Administrative Committee on Coordination
ACFT	Aircraft
ACM	Airspace Control Measures
ACQ	Acquisition
ACR	Armoured Cavalry Regiment
ACT	Analysis Control Team
AD	Air Defence
AD	Armoured Division
ADA	Air Defence Artillery
ADM	Admiral
AdPro or AP I, II	1977 Geneva Protocol (I, II) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
AG	Advisory Group

AG	Adjunct General
A/G	Air to Ground
AGL	Above Ground Level
AGM	Air to Ground Missile
AI	Air Interdiction
AIREVAC	Air Evacuation
ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ALITE	Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies (WFP)
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
ALT	Altitude, Alternate
AMB	Area Mission Brief
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
AMMO	Ammunition
AOC	Air Operations Centre
AO	Area of Operations
AOI	Area of Interest
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AOS	Area of Separation
AP	Advisory Panel
AP	Ammunition Point
AP	Anti-Personnel
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
APM	Anti-Personnel Landmines
ARMD	Armoured
ARTY	Artillery
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATM	Anti-Tank Mines
AS	Area Security

ASG	Assistant Secretary-General (UN)
ASLT	Assault
ASOC	Air Support Operations Centre
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASR	Alternative Supply Route
ASR	Ammunition Supply Rate
ATA	Actual Time of Arrival
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATD	Actual Time of Departure
ATF	Amphibious Task Force
ATK	Attack
ATS	Air Traffic Services
ATO	Air Tasking Order
AU	African Union
AVN	Aviation
AXP	Ambulance Exchange Point
B	
BAT or BN	Battalion
BC	Battle Command
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
BDE	Brigade, Brigadier
BDU	Battle Dress Uniform
BDZ	Battle Defence Zone
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BOI	Board of Inquiry
BONUCA	United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
BP	Battlefield Positions
B/P	Be Prepared Mission

BRIG GEN or BG	Brigadier General
BSA	Brigade Support Area
BTRY	Battery
BZ	Buffer Zone
C	
C	Chemical
C2	Command and Control
C2W	Command and Control Warfare
C3	Command, Control and Communications
CA	Civil Affairs
CA	Combat Assessment
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CAO	Civil Affairs Officer
CAP	Combat Air Patrol
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CAS	Casualty
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CAS	Chief Administrative Services (DPKO)
CATK	Counter-attack
CAV	Cavalry
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological
CBT	Combat
CCIR	Commander's Critical
CCPOQ	Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions
CCW	1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

CDR	Commander
CE	Command Element
CERF	Central Emergency Revolving Fund
CFL	Coordinated Fire Line
CG	Consultative Group
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO)
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CJTF	Commander of Joint Task Force
CMA	Civil-Military Affairs
CMCO	EU Civil-Military Coordination
CMDR	Commander
CMO	Chief Military Officer
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centre
CMCoord	Civil-Military Coordination
CMCS	Civil-Military Coordination Section (OCHA)
CMLO	Civil-Military Liaison Officer (DPKO)
CMLO	Chief Military Liaison Officer (DPKO)
CMO	Civil-Military Operations (US)
CMO	Chief Military Observer
CMO	Chief Military Officer
CMSEC or COMSEC	Communication Security
CO or COY	Company
CO	Commanding Officer
COA	Course of Action

COE	Contingent Owned Equipment (DPKO)
COIN	Counter-insurgency
COL	Colonel
COMD or CMD	Command
COMM	Communication
COMMZ	Communication Zone
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
CONST	Construction
COS	Chief of Staff
CP	Check Point
CP	Command Post
CPL	Corporal
CPO	Chief Procurement Officer
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRD	Coordination and Response Division (OCHA)
CS	Combat Support
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CSE	Contingent Support Element
CSS	Combat Service Support
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CW	Chemical Warfare
CZ	Combat Zone
D	
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DCO	Deputy Commanding Officer
DCOS	Deputy Chief of Staff
D-DAY	Day on which a Particular Operation Starts
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation

DFC	Deputy Force Commander	ECPS	Executive Committee on Peace and Security
DFS	Department of Field Services (UN)	ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
DGZ	Desired Ground Zero	ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (changed to OCHA in 1998)	ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
DIV	Division	ELSEC or ESEC	Electronic Security
DMT	Disaster Management Team	EMOP	Emergency Operations
DO	Designated Official	EN, ENG or ENGR	Engineer
DO	Director of Operations	EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
DO	Duty Officer	EOM	Experts on Mission
DOA	Director of Administration	EOSG	Executive Office of the Secretary-General
DOA	Direction of Attack	ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
DOS	Date of Supply	ERDC	Enhanced Rapid Deployable Capacity
DOW	Died of Wounds	ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
DP	Decision Point	ETA	Expected Time of Arrival
DPA	Department of Political Affairs (UN)	ETD	Expected Time of Departure
DPI	Department of Public Information (UN)	EU	European Union
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)	EW	Electronic Warfare
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance	EZ	Extraction Zone
DSG	Deputy Secretary-General (UN)	F	
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN)	FAA	Forward Assembly Area
DSS	Department of Safety and Security (UN)	FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
DZ	Drop Zone	FB	Fire Base
E		FC	Force Commander
EA	Engagement Area	FCL	Final Coordination Line
EASBRIG	Eastern African Standby Brigade	FH	Field Hospital
ECHA	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs	FIR	Force Information Requirements

FITTEST	Fast Information Technology & Telecommunications Emergency Support Team (WFP)
FLB	Forward Logistics Base
FLOT	Forward Line of Own Troops
FLT	Fork Lift Truck
FM	Field Manual
FOB	Forward Operations Base
FPU	Formed Police Units
FSCO	Field Security Coordination Officer
FSO	Field Security Office
FWD	Forward
G	
G1, J1, or U1	Personnel
G2, J2 or U2	Intelligence, Information, or Security
G3, J3 or U3	Operations
G4, J4 or U4	Logistics, Field Support
G5, J5 or U5	Planning or Civil Affairs
G6, J6 or U6	Communications
G7, J7 or U7	Training
G8, J8 or U8	Finance
G9, J9 or U9	Cooperation, Capabilities or Doctrine
GA	General Assembly
GC I, II, III, IV	1949 Geneva Conventions I, II, III, IV
GEN	General
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GPS	Global Positioning System
GW	Guerrilla Warfare

H	
HA	Holding Area
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HACC	Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centre
HAO	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
HC	1907 Hague Conventions
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator (UN)
HE	High Explosive
HELO	Helicopter
HET	Heavy Equipment Transporter
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
HN	Host Nation
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Centre
HOM	Head of Mission
HOS	Hostile
HOSP	Hospital
HVT	High Value Target
I	
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IASC-WG	Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICDO	International Civil Defence Organisation
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICL	International Criminal Law
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross

ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies	JMC	Joint Movement Centre
IDP	Initial Delay Position	JMCC	Joint Movement Control Centre (DPKO)
IDP(s)	Internally Displaced Person(s)	JOA	Joint Operations Area
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	JOC	Joint Operations Centre (DPKO)
IFV	Infantry Fighting Vehicle	JTF	Joint Task Force
IG	Inspector-General	K	
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation	KIA	Killed in Action
IHL	International Humanitarian Law	L	
IMPP	Integrated Missions Planning Process (UN)	LAV	Light Armoured Vehicle
IMTF	Integrated Missions Task Force (UN)	LC	Line of Contact
INF	Infantry	LEMA	Local Emergency Management Authority
INSARAG	International Search & Rescue Advisory Group	LF	Landing Force
INT	Intelligence	LNO or LO	Liaison Officer
INTREP	Intelligence Report	LO	Law and Order
InterAction	American Council for Voluntary International Action	LOA	Letter of Assist
IO	International Organisation	LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
IOM	International Organisation for Migration	LOC	Line of Communication
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks	LOC	Logistics Operations Centre
J		LOD	Line of Demarcation
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission	LOG	Logistics
JEZ	Joint Engagement Zone	LRS	Long-Range Surveillance
JLOC	Joint Logistics Operation Centre (DPKO)	LT COL or LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre (DPKO)	LZ	Landing Zone
JMC	Joint Military Commission	M	
		MACC	Mine Action Coordination Centre
		MAG	Mine Advisory Group
		MAIN	Primary Command Post
		MAPEX	Map Exercise
		MBA	Main Battle Area
		MCDA	Military and Civil Defence Assets

MCDU	Military and Civil Defence Unit (changed to CMCS in 2005) (OCHA)
M-DAY	Mobilisation Day
MECH	Mechanised
MED	Medical
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MG	Machine Gun
MILAD	Military Adviser
MILOB	Military Observer
MINOPUH	UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MINUGUA	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURCA	UN Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MLO	Military Liaison Officer (UNHCR, WFP)
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MOB	Main Operations Base
MONUA	UN Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC	UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOOTW	Military Operations Other than War
MOTAPM	Mines Other than Anti-Personnel Landmines
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement

MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Military Police
MPS	Military Planning Service (DPKO)
MPV	Multi-Purpose Vehicle
MSA	Mission Subsistence Allowance
MSD	Minimum Safety Distance
MSR	Main Supply Route
MTF	Medical Treatment Facility
MU	Medical Unit
N	
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCC	National Contingent Commander
NEO	Non-combattant Evacuation Operation
NFA	No Fire Area
NFL	No Fire Line
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NVD	Night Vision Device
O	
OAS	Offensive Air Support
OAS	Organisation of American States
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OIOS	UN Office of Internal Oversight Services	PL	Platoon
OLA	UN Office of Legal Affairs	PM	Provost Marshal
OMA	Office of Military Affairs (DPKO)	POC	Point of Contact
ONUB	UN Operation in Burundi	POC	Protection of Civilians
ONUC	UN Operations in the Congo	POD	Point of Debarkation
ONUSA	UN Observer Group in Central America	POE	Point of Embarkation
ONUSAL	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador	POW	Prisoner of War
OO	Office of Operations (DPKO)	PSN	Position
OP	Observation Post	PSO	Peace Support Operations
OPCOM	Operational Command	PSYOP	Psychological Operations
OPCON	Operational Control	PVO	Private Voluntary Organisation
OPLAN	Operational Plan	PZ	Pick-up Zone
OPO	Operation Order	Q	
OPS	Operations	QIP	Quick Impact Project
OPSEC	Operations Security	R	
ORLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (DPKO)	R2P	Responsibility to Protect
OSOCC	On-site Operations Coordination Centre	R3P	Rearm, Refuel, Resupply Point
OT	Observer Target	RAA	Rear Assembly Area
P		RAS	Rear Area Security
PA	Public Affairs, Political Affairs	RC	Resident Coordinator (UN)
PAO	Political Affairs Officer	RDRA	Regional Disaster Response Advisor (OCHA)
PAX	Passenger	RFA	Request for Assistance
PDSB	Policy Development & Studies Branch (OCHA)	RFA	Restrictive Fire Area
PETD	Policy, Evaluation & Training Division (DPKO)	RFI	Request for Information
PHA	Promotion of the Humanitarian Agenda Unit (OCHA)	RFP	Request for Proposal
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation	RECCE or RECON	Reconnaissance
		REGT	Regiment
		ROE	Rules of Engagement
		ROI	Rules of Interaction
		ROZ	Restricted Operations Zone

RPV	Remotely Piloted Vehicle
RSGIDP	Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs
S	
S/A	Surface to Air
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SAR	Search and Rescue
SAT	Security Assistance Team
SATCOM	Satellite Communication
SC	Security Council
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SECT	Section / Sector
SF	Special Forces
SG	Secretary-General
SGB	Secretary-General's Bulletin
SGT	Sergeant
SGTM	Standard Generic Training Module
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SHIRBRIG	Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations
SITMAP	Situation Map
SITREP	Situation Report
SMILAD	Senior Military Advisor
SMO	Senior Military Officer
SMT	Security Management Team
SMT	Senior Management Team

SO	Special Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPEC	Specification
SQN	Squadron
SRSO	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN)
SSM	Surface to Surface Missile
STM	Standard Training Module
T	
TA	Technical Agreement
TA	Travel Authorisation
TACC	Tactical Air Control Centre
TACOM	Tactical Command
TACON, TACCON	Tactical Control
TAM	Technical Assessment Mission
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
TCF	Tactical Combat Force
TF	Task Force
TGT	Target
TOC	Tactical Operations Centre
TOR	Terms of Reference
U	
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UN	United Nations

UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNAMI	UN Assistance Mission for Iraq	UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNAMIC	UN Advance Mission in Cambodia	UNIIMOG	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNAMID	African Union / United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda	UNIOSIL	UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone	UNJLC	UN Joint Logistics Centre
UNASOG	UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group	UNMO	UN Military Observer
UNAVEM	UN Angola Verification Mission	UNMOGIP	UN Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UN-CMCoord	UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination	UNOE	UN Owned Equipment
UNCRO	UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	UNPOL	UN Police
UNCT	UN Country Team	UNIPOM	UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission
UNDAC Team	UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (OCHA)	UN MCDA	UN Military and Civil Defence Assets
UNDG	UN Development Group	UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Force	UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNDP	UN Development Programme	UNMIH	UN Mission in Haiti
UNEF	UN Emergency Force	UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNFPA	UN Population Fund	UNMIN	UN Mission in Nepal
UNGOMAP	UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	UNMIS	UN Mission in the Sudan
UNHAS	UN Humanitarian Air Service (WFP)	UNMISSET	UN Mission of Support in East Timor
UNHCR	UN Office for the High Commissioner for Refugees	UNMIT	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNIC	UN Information Centre	UNMOP	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
		UNMOT	UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
		UNOCI	UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire

UNOGBIS	UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNOGIL	UN Observer Group in Lebanon
UNOSOM	UN Operation in Somalia
UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	UN Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMUR	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOWA	UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa
UNPOS	UN Political Office for Somalia
UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
UNSCO	Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East
UNSF	UN Security Force in West New Guinea
UNSMIH	UN Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and W. Sirmium

UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group
UNTMIH	UN Transition Mission in Haiti
UNTOP	UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organisation
UNV	UN Volunteers
UNYOM	UN Yemen Observation Mission
USG	Under-Secretary-General (UN)
UW	Unconventional Warfare
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
W	
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WIA	Wounded in Action
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
Z	
ZOS	Zone of Separation
ZULU	Universal Time

RELEVANT MATERIAL

[A] Humanitarian Guidance on Civil-Military Issues and Armed Groups

GENERIC

Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies (OCHA, 2008)

United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook (OCHA, 29 November 2007)

UN CMCoord IMPACT (Integrated Missions Practical Approach to Coordination Tools) Electronic Study Tool (OCHA, February 2007)

CMCS's Structure, Functions and the Role within the Humanitarian Community (OCHA, December 2006)

United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Concept (IASC, March 2005)

The Use of Military and Civil Defence (M/CD) Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations: Report of the Task Force (IASC, 27 September 1995)

IASC Principles on Military-Civilian Relations (IASC, January 1995)

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (GA, December 1991)

The Charter of the United Nations (1945)

COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper (IASC, 28 June 2004)

Civil-Military Relations in Armed Conflict: A Humanitarian Perspective (Bessler & Seki OCHA, November 2004, published 2006)

Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (IASC, March 2003 / January 2006 — Revision 1)

Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys: Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines (IASC, 14 September 2001)

NATURAL DISASTERS

Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief November 2006 (IASC, Rev 1.1, November 2007)

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC

UNMIL Guidance for Civil-Military Coordination in Liberia — CIMIC Guidance (UNMIL, December 2006)

Guidelines for Interaction Between MONUC Military and Civil Organizations (MONUC DSRSG/HC, June 2006)

Guidelines for Humanitarian Organizations on Interacting with Military and other Security Actors in Iraq (UNAMI DSRSG/HC, October 2004)

Principles Guiding the Civil-Military Interface in Afghanistan (UNAMA, 2004)

Relations With the Military Forces in Haiti—Guidelines For UN Personnel (MINUSTAH, April 2004)

General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq (SG, 8 May 2003)

Relationships with Military Forces in Afghanistan—Guidelines for UNAMA Area Coordinators and other UN Personnel (UNAMA DSRSG/HC, 2002)

Guidance On Use of Military Aircraft for UN Humanitarian Operations during the Current Conflict in Afghanistan (UNAMA DSRSG/HC, November 2001)

HUMANITARIAN SPACE

Respect for Humanitarian Mandates in Conflict Situations (IASC, 1994)

AGENCY-FOCUSED

UNHCR and the Military: A Field Guide (UNHCR, September 2006)

UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations (UNHCR, January 1995)

The ICRC and Civil-Military Relations in Armed Conflict (ICRC, 2001)

The ICRC and Civil-Military Cooperation in Situations of Armed Conflict (ICRC, 2000)

NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners (Bessler & McHugh, OCHA, 2006)

Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups (Bessler & Mc Hugh, OCHA, 2006)

[B] UN Peace Operations and Civil-Military Issues*Some items listed in this section are restricted to the UN***OVERVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines: (DPKO, 18 January 2008)

Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, December 2003)

CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION AND LIAISON

DPKO Policy Directive on Civil-Military Coordination and Liaison (DPKO Draft, 2008)

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Review of Military Involvement in Civil Assistance in Peacekeeping Operations–A/60/588 (OIOS, December 2005)

Civil-Military Coordination Policy, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, September 2002)

United Nations Military Symbols Handbook (DPKO, 2000)

SYSTEM-WIDE COORDINATION AND INTEGRATED MISSIONS

United Nations Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General (SG, June 2006)

Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions (SG, February 2006)

Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Relations Between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators (SG, 11 December 2000)

Standard Directives for the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SG, 1999)

ACC Guidelines on the Functioning of the Resident Coordinator System (CCPOQ, September 1999)

USE OF FORCE

Guidelines for the Development of Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, November 2000)

Secretary-General's Bulletin: Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian Law–ST/SGB/1999/13 (SGB, August 1999)

Policy Governing the Use of Force and the Use of Firearms by United Nations Security Officers (UN, January 2001)

Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (UN, September 1990)

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, 15 February 2008)

Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNITAR, 2004)

TRAINING FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION AND LIAISON IN PKOs

Standard Training Module (STM) 2-6 on Civil-Military Coordination (DPKO, April 2005)

Standardized Generic Training Module (SGTM) 10 on United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (DPKO, February 2005)

MILITARY GUIDELINES AND DIRECTIVES

Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and Troop Contributing Countries — A/61/19 Part III (GA, 12 June 2007)

Guidelines for the Development of Command Directives for the Force Commander and the Chief Military Observer in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, October 2001)

Generic Standard Operating Procedures for United Nations Force Headquarters (SOP/UNHFHQ) deployed in Peace Operations (DPKO, April 2001)

Sample Directive for the Force Commander (DPKO, November 2000)

Sample Directive for the Chief Military Liaison Officer (DPKO, November 2000)

Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-keeping Operations — A/45/594 (GA, 9 October 1990)

MISCELLANEOUS

Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), DPKO Policy Directive (DPKO, February 2007)

Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres, DPKO Policy Directive (DPKO, July 2006)

[C] Field Security

Saving Lives Together: A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements Among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field (IASC Amended Version, November 2006)

Policy on Cooperation and Coordination between the Department of Safety and Security and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DSS and DPKO, October 2006)

Be Safe, Be Secure: Security Guidelines for Women (DSS, September 2006)

Recommendations to the IASC-WG from the IASC-WG Staff Security Task Force (IASC, 18 January 2002)

Security in the Field: Information for Staff Members of the United Nations System (former UNSECOORD, 1998)

1994 UN Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel; and its 2005 Optional Protocol

[D] Code of Conduct and Standards

Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission — A/RES/62/63 (GA, 18 August 2007)

UN Standard of Conduct: “We are the United Nations Peacekeepers” in A/61/19 (GA, June 2007)

Ten Rules Code of Conduct for Blue Helmets in A/61/645 (GA, December 2006)

The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (SPHERE Revised Edition, 2004)

Directive for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers (DPKO, 2003)

[E] Gender/Abuse/Violence

GENDER EQUALITY

IASC Policy Statement on Gender Equality (IASC, March 2008)

Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Peacekeeping Contexts: A Strategy Workshop with Women’s Constituencies from Troop and Police Contributing Countries: Final Report (DPKO, February 2007)

Women, Girls, Boys and Men: Different Needs — Equal Opportunities, Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action (IASC, December 2006)

DPKO Policy Directive on Gender Equality in UN Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, 3 November 2006)

Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, July 2004)

Security Council Resolution 1325 (SC, 31 October 2000)

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE

United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel — A/62/595 Annex, adopted by A/RES/62/214 (GA, 21 December 2007)

DPKO Directive on Sexual Harassment in United Nations Peacekeeping and Other Field Missions — For Military Members of National Contingents, Military Observers and Civilian Police Officers (DPKO, 2003)

Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse — ST/SGB/2003/13 (SGB, October 2003)

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Guidelines for Gender-based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings (IASC, September 2005)

Action to address Gender-based Violence in Emergencies: IASC Statement of Commitment (IASC, 22 Dec 2004)

[F] International Humanitarian Law

GENERAL

1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

1977 Geneva Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions — AP I Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; and AP II Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts

1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

1949 Geneva Convention—GC I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

1907 Hague Conventions and Declaration—in particular, HC IV on Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land; V on Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land; VII Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships; VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines; IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War; XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War; and XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War

CULTURAL PROPERTY

1999 Second Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict

1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict

1954 First Hague Protocol of the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict

ENVIRONMENT

1994 ICRC/UNGA Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict

1976 UN Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

WEAPONS

1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction

1980 UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; 1980 Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments; 1980 Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices and its Amended Protocol of 1996; 1980 Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons; 1995 Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons; and 2003 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War

1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

[G] Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts

OCHA's Role in Supporting Protection: International and Field Level Responsibilities (OCHA, September 2006)

Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians (OCHA, 2004)

Frequently Asked Questions on International Humanitarian, Human Rights and Refugee Law in the Context of Armed Conflict (IASC Task Force on Humanitarian Action and Human Rights, 2004)

Glossary of Humanitarian Terms in Relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (OCHA, 2003)

[H] Information and Communication

Secretary-General's Bulletin on Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling — ST/SGB/2007/6 (SGB, 12 February 2007)

Policy and Guidance for Public Information in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (DPI and DPKO, July 2006)

Standard Operating Procedure on Press Statements (DPKO, 3 April 2006)

NOTE: The list is not exhaustive and country/mission-specific guidelines have not been included.

Readers are encouraged to check the following websites for further material on civil-military relationship.

OCHA: <http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines>

RELIEFWEB: <http://www.reliefweb.int>

IASC: <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc>

DPKO: <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Pages/Public/Home.aspx>

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