



Safety and Access Review

Q2 2022

INSO

INTERNATIONAL NGO SAFETY ORGANISATION
Analysis & Advice for Humanitarians

*IMPROVES ACCESS
SAVES LIVES*

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Introduction

Welcome to the Q2 2022 edition of the INSO Safety and Access Review (SAR), our customised product designed specifically for NGO headquarters.

This report synthesises data and analysis trends from our flagship Quarterly Reports in each country to create a convenient, yet comprehensive, strategic overview that we hope will support situational awareness, policy development and operational planning.

All the information contained in the SAR is sourced directly from our extensive network of field platforms and subjected to multiple layers of review by our global team to ensure you receive highly reliable and up-to-date analysis for each respective period.

In Q2, the Analysis and Research Team completed a piloting phase for additional services with the assistance of our International Advisory Board. Findings from the process will inform the planned expansion of the team's scope of services moving forward.

While our International Advisory Board will assist and contribute to the development of our global products over time, we very much appreciate your ongoing support, engagement and feedback.

Michael Walker
Director
Analysis and Research

Glossary

SECURITY INCIDENT refers to all “Theft”, “Confine”, “Threat” and “Attack” events reported to INSO regardless of type, severity, perpetrator, intent or outcome. For instance, it includes all petty criminal robberies and threats as well as armed assaults and bombings. It includes all accidental involvement as well as all deliberate and targeted attacks. It includes all incidents in which no one was injured or hurt and all those in which someone was.

CONFLICT is a term divided into two recognised types by international humanitarian law: international armed conflict (IAC) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC). IAC exists whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more States whereas NIAC represents protracted armed confrontations between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State. For a situation to be classified as a non-international armed conflict, armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organisation. According to ICRC guidance, ‘internationalised’ armed conflicts occur between two different factions fighting internally but supported by two different states.

OAG indicates an ‘Organised Armed Group’. Rather than adopt terms such as ‘Irregular’ or ‘Opposition’, which imply an identity motivated, mobilised and moulded in contradistinction to ‘Regular’ or ‘State’ forces, INSO applies OAG to encompass combatants, such as Al-Qaida or Islamic State, that neither perceive nor define themselves under state-centric parameters. According to International Humanitarian Law, an armed party to the conflict is one which fulfils the criteria of exhibiting a leadership structure, carrying arms openly, possessing a distinctive emblem and comprising internal disciplinary systems. The first two conditions refer to OAG characteristics while the latter two relate to determining prisoner-of-war status. Other ‘organised’ factors may include the existence of a headquarters, access to military equipment/training, the ability to plan, coordinate and implement military operations as well as negotiate agreements. For Mali, and to differentiate between the presence of diverse OAG interests and operations, INSO adopts the term ‘proscribed OAG’ to detail the activities of selected salafi-jihadi groups internationally designated as ‘terrorist’ organisations.

NGO is a ‘Non-Governmental Organisation’ legally established as a private, non-profit and tax-exempt organisation (i.e. a Charity in the UK; a 501(c) (3) in the USA; and an ASBL in Belgium). The organisation must be registered as a non-profit in both its home State and the country of operation. The definition does not include any UN Agency, Fund or Programme or any Private Development Contractors.

SERIOUS INCIDENT categorises any incident that caused the abduction, injury or killing of NGO staff. INSO makes this distinction to observe what percentage of all incidents result in these most serious outcomes. In this report, ‘abducted’ refers to the number of staff impacted by the incident, namely abductees, whereas the ‘NGO Incidents by Type and Quarter’ charts for each platform detail the number of abduction cases.

*INSO presently operates and provides services in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Kenya, Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria, Diffa region and Cameroon), Mali, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Ukraine. Although INSO is only currently covering conflict-related hotspots in DRC (North and South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika), these will be addressed as areas within their respective countries as opposed to being categorised under geographically-specific regions.

DISCLAIMER: INSO exists to provide dedicated safety and security services to NGOs working in high risk countries. INSO and its partners and donors accept no liability whatsoever for claims that may result from the provision or utilisation of these free services. Whilst every effort is made to verify data, INSO cannot guarantee the accuracy of information provided.

SOURCES: Unless otherwise stated, all data, information and maps contained in this report are sourced from INSO. Maps use WGS 1984 Web Mercator Auxiliary Sphere Projection. Administrative boundaries: UNOCHA, Natural Earth. Security incidents: INSO Incident Database 2017-2018. Terrain Hillshade Service Layer credit: Source: Airbus, USGS, NGA, NASA, CGIAR, NLS, OS, NMA, Geodatastyrelsen, GSA, GSI and the GIS User Community. The data, boundaries and names and the designations used in maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by INSO.

CHOROPLETH MAP METHODOLOGY: The heatmaps for each country section, produced by INSO specifically for this report, contain a graphical view of the aggregation of incident point data to a regularly shaped hexagon grid. The area of each individual hexagon unit is 500 km². This method is used to normalise geography for mapping and to mitigate the issues of using irregularly shaped polygons created by political processes, such as the demarcation of administrative boundaries. The hexbins colours in the heatmaps are categorised and visualised using the Manual Interval method. These classifications sort all incident values into eleven classes, distributed according to the incident quarterly (first 5 classes) and yearly (last 6 classes) average.

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CITATION: All rights are reserved. Citation is prohibited without the written permission of the INSO Director of Analysis & Research michael.walker@hq.ngosafety.org.

LEGAL INFORMATION: Stichting International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) registered 17 January 2019, non-profit Foundation (ANBI) in the Netherlands, KvK 73728489 at Grote Marktstraat 43-C, 2511BH, Den Haag, The Netherlands.

Key Developments

MALI

Security incidents reached their highest levels in nearly two years as OAG violence rose in the north and centre. Five NGO fatalities were recorded across two incidents; an armed robbery in Kayes, and in a mass killing of Dahoussak people in Ménaka. Access is deteriorating around Douentza, where both JNIM and government forces have increased operations.

BURKINA FASO

Conditions continue to deteriorate due to proscribed OAG activity and the context is becoming more militarised in response. Most often NGOs were involved in low impact incidents in the form of in-transit identification checks as conflict actors attempt to retain control of movement. Clear neutrality and principled coordination are essential as GOV becomes more assertive.

NIGER

Overall incidents decreased but OAGs increased the use of IEDs, particularly targeting GOV forces. OAG activity hampered NGO access as GOV forces tightened restrictions, while OAG groups increased irregular checks. Despite ongoing safety concerns in Diffa and Tillabéry, IDP returns are set to resume. OAGs continued to compete for control, as JAS lost ground and Ansaru grew.

UKRAINE

Russian forces seized control of Luhanska as the conflict was characterised by focus on eastern and southern oblasts. NGOs managed risk by avoiding active conflict and occupied areas but were collaterally involved due to missile impacts and airstrikes. Strikes, shifts in frontlines and explosive remnants will remain the main sources of risk until there is a change in Russian GOV posture.

SOUTH SUDAN

Subnational violence often along communal lines continued to be a significant factor in fatal NGO incidents. Nationally, SPLA-iO rejoined monitoring mechanisms but the US withdrew its financial support while separate GOV agreements with holdout groups lapsed. Criminality and flare-ups will continue to shape the context requiring tailored mitigation measures.

SYRIA

The possible non-renewal of UNSCR 2642 and a threatened Turkish military offensive in the north jeopardized access, however neither materialised. The economy remained strained and insecurity persisted at Al-Hole Camp shaping NGO risk. Systemic issues, including uncertainty around access will require NGOs to explore alternatives or a combination of novel solutions.

IRAQ


The prospect of instability increased after the Sadrist bloc withdrew from government despite an election victory. Meanwhile, armed actors in the north continue to contest influence across several low intensity conflicts. The impact of the latter on NGOs is limited while criminality continues to account for the majority of the low NGO incident volume.

AFGHANISTAN

Armed opposition to GOV remained relatively limited despite a noted increase in impactful OAG incidents. GOV interference evidenced coordination challenges especially during response to the June earthquake. Resilient networks of engagement and well-defined internal policy are key as NGOs prepare for increasingly intrusive and socially conservative GOV policy.

SOMALIA

AS accelerated its attacks on foreign force bases while drought drove needs against the backdrop of largely peaceful elections. NGO incident volumes evidenced a slight improvement in the country's risk profile, but several areas faced hampered access due to violence. In-turn NGOs will have to balance growing need with local risks that may be influenced by diminishing resources.



CAMEROON

Separatist related conflict in the Northwest and Southwest drove incident volumes. NGOs encountered an array of related challenges that clearly demonstrated the humanitarian space is constrained. Influence over humanitarian activity will continue to be an avenue for GOV and separatists to assert control requiring significant work to protect the humanitarian space.

LCB

New JAS leadership and ISWAP expansion signified challenges, conversely the region's armed forces launched coordinated operations in border areas. ISWAP continued to project reach through infiltration and complex attacks, which occasionally affected NGOs and contractors. NGOs must account for OAG capacity to suddenly affect key roads and garrison towns in their contingency planning.

CAR



GOV continued to consolidate its control though a crippled economy threatened to disrupt emerging stability. While GOV exercises unprecedented territorial influence, NGOs still contended with significant in-transit risk often involving active OAGs and criminals in Ouham and Basse-Kotto. Growing economic unease and residual OAG activity are likely to drive risk moving forward.

DRC

The quarter was overshadowed by the re-emergence of M23, which prompted clashes with GOV forces northeast of Goma, near Rutshuru. Anti-Rwandan sentiment has grown as a result and associated protests could endanger staff. Meanwhile, MONUSCO forces withdrew from Tanganyika and re-deployed to Ituri and North Kivu. NGOs need to ensure distinction to avoid targeting.


Advanced incident density visualisation

Each of these customised maps groups the nearby incident points into discrete equal-area hexagons (1000 km²) and visualises the hexbins by the volume of incidents with a standardised colour scale for the polygons across all countries. Since all hexbins are the same shape and size, this enables comparative analyses of locations both within and across different countries.




Reporting period: Jan - Jun 2022


Afghanistan




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
DRC, Kenya & South Sudan




Iraq & Syria




Lake Chad Basin




Mali, Burkina Faso & Western Niger




Somalia



Ukraine




Percentage change in incidents from Q1 to Q2 2022




Reporting period: Jan - Jun 2022


Afghanistan




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
DRC, Kenya & South Sudan




Iraq & Syria




Lake Chad Basin




Mali, Burkina Faso & Western Niger




Somalia



Ukraine





1 January to 30 June 2022	
Total NGO incidents in 2022	120
Killed	0
Injured	5
Abducted	0

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

4 out of every 50 NGO incidents





NGO by security incident ratio*


12 NGO incidents out of every 500 security incidents




*each circle represents 5 incidents.




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight


- An increase in OAG activity included the temporary captures of Warsaj and Dara, growth in mass casualty IED attacks and a doubling of civilian casualties.
- GOV contended with international isolation, pockets of armed opposition, a faltering economy and a lack of local cohesion.
- Despite lack of cohesion, GOV attempted to regulate social behaviour and also constrained dissent while shifting personnel from Kabul to confront crime and OAG activity.
- Intra-IEA clashes in Sar-e Pul illustrated limited fragmentation within GOV and contributed to confrontations in Ghor and Bamyan along ethnic lines amid economic downturn.

NGO Incident Insight

- An IED attack on a GOV vehicle in a humanitarian convoy, unverified reports of IS-KP surveilling staff and attempts to infiltrate facilities suggested intent to target NGOs.
- Detentions of NGO staff, including one instance of corporal punishment in Ghor, and hostile rhetoric from IEA leadership indicated contradictory GOV perceptions of NGOs.
- GOV interference constituted over half of NGO incidents, including gender-based harassment and attempts to influence recruitment processes, programming and beneficiary lists.
- Economic pressures drove consistently high levels of thefts, accounting for nearly a third of NGO incidents, while indicators suggested increased threat of targeted violence.



INSO Operational Foresight

- Due to ongoing criminality and OAG hostility to NGO operations, particularly IS-KP, NGOs should manage their profiles, avoid setting routines and review actor maps.
- NGOs should advise their staff to actively manage their social media presence and opinions expressed publicly particularly regarding GOV activity.
- NGOs should dedicate time to discussions on social behaviour to allow individuals and organisations to make informed and principled policy decisions on their conduct moving forward.
- NGOs should monitor for indicators of increasing GOV consolidation while engaging both central GOV and local actors to cultivate resilient networks.




1 January to 30 June 2022


	Total NGO incidents in 2022	34
	Killed	1
	Injured	0
	Abducted	3




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight


- Despite a slight reduction in overall incidents, an increase in civilian and GOV-aligned VDP fatalities indicated a deterioration in overall security.
- In light of ongoing regional isolation, GOV made attempts at reconciliation with mixed results; relatedly GOV engaged in local negotiations with proscribed OAGs.
- Reflecting acute crisis, militarised districts were created in areas of Soum and Est where martial law will apply; civilians were instructed to leave and avoid these areas.
- GOV announced plans to reorganise VDPs and other GOV-aligned personnel into a centrally led brigade to address public unrest and the growing reach of proscribed OAGs.

NGO Incident Insight

- The assassination of an NGO employee, likely due to perceived affiliation with VDPs, and a staff abduction at their home, both in Djibo, were the most serious incidents.
- NGO incidents were the highest on record, largely driven by JNIM interdiction of in-transit staff, which usually involved identity checks and subsequent release of NGO workers.
- On several occasions GOV forces accused humanitarian organisations of indirectly enabling proscribed OAGs by providing aid in areas under their influence.
- Serious impacts were infrequent at JNIM VCPs but the kidnapping of an aid worker on the Fada-Kantchari road and an aid diversion on the Fada-Gayeri road were reported.

INSO Operational Foresight

- NGOs should monitor the outcomes of local negotiations with proscribed OAGs especially regarding recognition of humanitarian space in areas like Djibo.
- NGOs should continue to maintain their impartiality and neutrality to clearly distinguish themselves from parties to conflict.
- Given the growing militarisation of the context, NGOs should continue to utilise and cultivate effective CMCoord mechanisms.
- NGOs should ensure that staff likely to encounter in-transit risk through proscribed OAG VCPs receive appropriate advice and training on interacting with armed groups.



1 January to 30 June 2022	
	Total NGO incidents in 2022 35
	Killed 1
	Injured 4
	Abducted 10

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

5 out of every 50 NGO incidents





NGO by security incident ratio*


15 NGO incidents out of every 500 security incidents




*each circle represents 5 incidents.




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight


- Due to accelerating separatist OAG and GOV activity in NWSW, incident volume increased by nearly a third, including a 70% rise in attacks on bases and encampments.
- Fatal and abduction incidents in NWSW involving civilians increased by 43% amid separatist targeting of symbols of GOV authority like VCPs, schools and hospitals.
- In NWSW, the operating environment remained highly politicised and OAGs often imposed lockdowns to restrict movement and commerce.
- In the Far North, conflict in neighbouring Nigeria likely contributed to a sharp increase in OAG surrenders, attacks on border posts and predatory behaviour toward civilians.

NGO Incident Insight

- In NWSW, constraints characterised the humanitarian space with two NGOs suspending operations and a staff member detained in Fako for alleged cooperation with OAGs.
- Serious incidents included a GOV sexual assault in Menchum, an injury during an OAG attack on a VCP in Meme and the abduction of several staff in Momo in NWSW.
- In NWSW, in-transit risk included aid diversion, access denials, programme interference and several incidents of harassment over display of GOV-issued license plates.
- All three NGO incidents in the Far North were phone snatches in Maroua by perpetrators on motorcycles during commuting hours.

INSO Operational Foresight

- In NWSW, NGOs must continue to consistently review and adhere to their red lines while also developing and applying collective advocacy at senior levels.
- In NWSW, NGOs working in the health and education sectors must develop conflict sensitive programmes and cultivate acceptance from all key local stakeholders.
- NGOs should educate staff on common challenges encountered at VCPs and ensure appropriate documentation that reflects local conditions is available at all times.
- NGOs should continue to invest in profile management and avoid setting easily observable work-related routines where possible in Maroua.



1 January to 30 June 2022		
	Total NGO incidents in 2022	72
	Killed	1
	Injured	16
	Abducted	0

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

11 out of every 50 NGO incidents





NGO by security incident ratio*


17 NGO incidents out of every 500 security incidents




*each circle represents 5 incidents.




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight


- The quarter witnessed a near record low volume of OAG activity, aligning overall incident volume with averages reported prior to the launch of the recent insurgency.
- IMF and GOV-aligned soldiers, including former OAG and militia personnel, contributed to reducing OAG activity and criminality, conversely concerns of rights abuses rose.
- OAGs remained influential in remote areas, controlling artisanal mining sites and engaging in common criminal incidents.
- Slowed commodity and food trade, combined with inflationary pressures and reduced international financing, increased the likelihood of socio-economic unrest.

NGO Incident Insight

- Despite reduced NGO incident volume, serious impacts rose moderately, including the off-duty shooting of a national staff member for mistaken OAG affiliation.
- Slightly under half of NGO incidents were criminal, with the majority perpetrated by OAGs in Ouham while NGO staff were in-transit.
- All but one OAG NGO incident were thefts, with a spate of CPC perpetrated robberies in Basse-Kotto symptomatic of continued constraints on access.
- Concurrent with the economic crisis, incidents of looting at distributions rose, resulting in the cancellation of several exercises and staff relocation.

INSO Operational Foresight

- NGOs travelling in Ouham should anticipate heightened criminal risk and to avoid escalations in all cases of robberies, staff are advised to comply with the perpetrators' demands.
- NGOs should demand the application of IHL during security forces' and militia operations and monitor the latter for their involvement in triggering communal violence.
- NGOs should integrate the continued presence of OAGs, albeit at reduced levels, in rural areas in their movement plans, particularly in Ouham.
- NGOs are advised to take additional steps to mitigate the risk of looting and disorder at distributions, such as structured community engagement and enhanced onsite CMCoord.



1 January to 30 June 2022	
Total NGO incidents in 2022	126
Killed	4
Injured	8
Abducted	16

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

11 out of every 50 incidents





NGO by security incident ratio*


5 NGO incidents out of every 500 security incidents




*each circle represents 5 incidents.




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight


- Incident volumes increased, returning to average levels recorded last year, while the context remains violent with 2,000 civilians killed and another 1,200 abducted in Q2.
- The return to prominence of the armed group M23 has dominated the security environment in North Kivu in recent months and driven tensions with neighbouring Rwanda.
- MONUSCO withdrew its forces from Tanganyika Province in order to concentrate its resources in the more insecure areas of North Kivu and Ituri.
- A dialogue forum between the Congolese government and armed groups was established in Nairobi; talks regarding demobilisation are still in their early stages.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents reflected recent averages, while abductions continue to be a major concern with six in Q2 and in two cases remain unresolved.
- While recent fighting between GOV forces and M23 resulted in only one NGO incident, anti-Rwanda protests in Goma have increased risks to staff in the city.
- Two NGO incidents saw staff being confused for MONUSCO personnel and targeted accordingly, a risk that may increase if UN forces are more assertive in the Kivus and Ituri.
- Criminals perpetrated over half of NGO incidents, in North Kivu and Tanganyika, including two abductions, despite attention to OAGs.

INSO Operational Foresight

- OAG activity in North Kivu and Ituri may worsen in Q3, NGOs need to ensure effective CMCoord with GOV and UN forces to anticipate operations and mitigate risk.
- The conflict with M23 in Rutshuru is set to intensify and while Goma is not directly threatened for now, NGOs should make contingency plans if fighting nears the town.
- NGOs need to ensure they make themselves sufficiently distinct from MONUSCO forces and avoid proximity to them due to rising public anger and the risk of targeting.
- The Nairobi dialogue will make minimal progress; NGOs should monitor tensions with Rwanda which may impede cross-border travel.





1 January to 30 June 2022	
	Total NGO incidents in 2022 9
	Killed 0
	Injured 0
	Abducted 0


Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio
 0 out of every 50 NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*
 1 NGO incident out of every 500 security incidents


*each circle represents 5 incidents.




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight


- Despite political deadlock, GOV forces dominated incident volumes, leading to an increase after a surge in arrests partly attributable to expanded collection efforts.
- Several low intensity conflicts involving GOV, OAGs and international forces characterised the north and, in the case of Sinjar, resulted in significant displacement.
- In line with seasonal trends, IS attacks against civilians increased and included a rare VCP on Jalawla-Kalar road; the group also played a role in catalysing ICV in Diyala.
- Protests more than doubled to 81, including multiple casualty incidents in Babil and Baghdad, illustrating significant unrest driven by rising costs of living and poor services.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents totalled four during the quarter and fit long-established patterns of harassment in Erbil with occasional programming and access related issues noted in Ninawa.
- Three sexual harassment incidents involving female and male staff were reported in Erbil, which historically accounts for the majority of NGO and harassment incidents since 2015.
- ISF detained an NGO team in Ninawa under false allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, but they were released after a brief investigation.
- While not directly impacting staff safety, protests, unrest and heightened security measures forced NGOs to use alternate routes when travelling to avoid protest sites nationwide.

INSO Operational Foresight

- NGOs should continue to foster environments that encourage informed reporting of SGBV incidents, respect for confidentiality and survivor-centred approaches.
- NGOs in the north should continue to manage their proximity to potential military targets as well as monitor for localised triggers for surges in violence in Sinjar, Amedi and Dohuk.
- Given the fragmentation of the actor map, particularly in Baghdad and Ninawa, NGOs must continue to invest in locally tailored engagement and acceptance strategies.
- In addition to sustained protests over economic conditions, NGOs should plan for interruptions and unrest driven by political stalemate, particularly in Baghdad.



1 January to 30 June 2022

	Total NGO incidents in 2022	23
	Killed	0
	Injured	2
	Abducted	1

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

15 out of every 50 NGO incidents




NGO by security incident ratio*

5 NGO incidents out of every 500 security incidents




*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month




Security incidents by perpetrator


- Criminal (36%)
- OAG (36%)
- Government Forces (23%)
- Community Force (1%)
- Others (3%)




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight


- International forces’ regional involvement increased significantly due to joint operations at Lake Chad and Sambisa Forest, as well as the Mandara mountains in Cameroon.
- Amid JAS consolidation and ISWAP global campaigns, and following dismantling of military bases, there was a surge in OAG attacks on Monguno, Damsak and Gubio.
- Civilian mass casualty incidents perpetrated by ISWAP, as well as increased claims of responsibility, confirmed their expanding reach, including in formerly contested Dikwa.
- Political gang violence surged on key dates in Gombe and Adamawa, coinciding with ongoing communal violence in the same states due to land disputes.

NGO Incident Insight

- Nearly all NGO incidents were thefts, concentrated in Maiduguri and did not indicate targeting of NGOs due to humanitarian profile.
- Amid security forces’ operations near Lake Chad, an NGO staff member held in long-term detention by ISWAP was released in Abadam.
- ISWAP publicly linked their abduction of three NGO contractors during infiltration into Monguno to the abductees’ humanitarian work or affiliations.
- There were two injuries in the period, one was a physical assault of an off-duty staff member during election violence in Gombe, the other occurred during a robbery in Maiduguri.

INSO Operational Foresight

- To reduce criminality risk, NGOs should review their physical security measures at compounds, engage in active profile management and advise compliance during armed robberies.
- NGOs operating in and near garrison towns should continue to invest in early warning systems and contingency plans that reflect the heightened risk of OAG activity.
- NGOs should review their assessment of risk transfer to contractors given ISWAP hostility and their increased sophistication in identifying and targeting NGO supply chains.
- NGOs should identify localised triggers for outbreaks of communal violence and their relationship with electoral contests.





1 January to 30 June 2022	
	Total NGO incidents in 2022 65
	Killed 5
	Injured 2
	Abducted 19


Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio




NGO by security incident ratio*




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight


- Security incidents increased to their highest level since Q3 2020 driven by JNIM operations in central Mali, IS-Sahel attacks in the north and a crime surge.
- The first six months of 2022 have seen more civilian casualties than throughout all of 2021, caused by GOV-JNIM violence and clashes between IS-Sahel and signatory OAGs.
- The arrival of Russian instructors and departure of French forces has been accompanied by Mali's withdrawal from the G5 Sahel; JNIM are also now primarily targeting GOV forces.
- The transitional government has recently committed to a timetable for elections, including a constitutional referendum next year; ECOWAS subsequently dropped sanctions.

NGO Incident Insight

- An armed robbery and an IS attack on Dahoussak individuals resulted in five NGO fatalities compared to three fatalities previously reported since January 2019.
- Violence in the north has displaced civilians into Ménaka town, putting more pressure on NGOs operating there and limiting access in rural areas within the region.
- NGO incidents increased around Douentza, while Boni is being blockaded by JNIM, who consistently launch attacks on GOV forces and emplace IEDs along the RN16 road.
- The end of sanctions may alleviate some economic pressures and improve cross-border overland travel with neighbouring states, however the impact on NGOs is limited.

INSO Operational Foresight

- NGOs should advise staff on additional precautions in areas at heightened risk and conduct regular route assessments; the threat of JNIM activity around Bamako is rising.
- The demands of IDPs, presence of OAGs and concentration of NGOs in Ménaka may drive the risk of confrontations and criminality in the town; security plans should be reviewed.
- Armed actors are suspicious of NGO impartiality in central and northern areas, and NGOs should advocate collectively to maintain access and reinforce red lines.
- Political tensions in Bamako will rise ahead of the referendum and legislative polls; NGOs should monitor discourse on OAGs and religion, which could drive unrest.



1 January to 30 June 2022		
	Total NGO incidents in 2022	11
	Killed	1
	Injured	1
	Abducted	0

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

17 out of every 50 NGO incidents





NGO by security incident ratio*

14 NGO incidents out of every 500 security incidents




*each circle represents 5 incidents.




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight


- Amid a drop in incidents in Q2, and despite growing OAG attacks on GOV forces, the situation in Tillabéry improved sufficiently to enable IDP returns according to GOV.
- ISWAP and JNIM significantly increased the use of IEDs against security forces' positions particularly, in southeast Diffa and west Tillabéry.
- OAG groups, particularly JNIM, markedly increased their use of irregular checks as they seek to exert territorial control, especially in the Tillabéry region.
- Q2 saw shifting power dynamics among OAG groups as JAS was pushed East and the Ansaru faction footprint became more apparent on the Nigeria border.

NGO Incident Insight

- 9 NGO incidents in Q2 marked a slight increase from Q1; only one was serious, the off-duty killing of an NGO volunteer by IS-Sahel fighters.
- In response to increased IED use, security forces increased demining efforts in southeast Diffa and west Tillabéry as concerns over potential NGO access restrictions grew.
- In addition to irregular checks by OAGs, where staff were briefly stopped and questioned, NGOs also faced six incidents of access denial.
- NGOs were concerned by IDP return plans, which may place vulnerable people at risk from OAGs, particularly ISWAP in Diffa and JNIM in Tillabéry.

INSO Operational Foresight

- OAGs will continue to exploit the security vacuum while tolerating NGOs, but partners should continuously review contextual data to detect shifting attitudes to humanitarians.
- The growing trend of IEDs targeting security forces will continue and NGOs should conduct regular route assessments and avoid proximity to GOV troops in all regions.
- A continued discussion with NGOs signalled GOV willingness to ease access restrictions, but NGOs need to sustain collective advocacy to ensure improvements are realised.
- Given changing inter- and intra-OAG dynamics, NGOs are encouraged to maintain up to date actor mapping and integrate it effectively into their engagement plans.





1 January to 30 June 2022		
	Total NGO incidents in 2022	17
	Killed	1
	Injured	2
	Abducted	0


Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio
0 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*
5 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents


*each circle represents 5 incidents.




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight


- The presidential and the Lower House elections concluded without major incident, however disputes in Somaliland over further elections continued.
- Incident volumes and territorial control were stable, but AS increased its targeting of military personnel, including its first complex attack on an ATMIS base in Ceel-Baraf in five years.
- Galmudug witnessed interclan conflict, fighting involving ASWJ and mobilisation against AS; also, AS was influential in Bacda and on the Mataban road in neighbouring Hirshabelle.
- Drought persisted, but associated resource competition did not catalyse an increase in interclan conflict, which decreased slightly during the quarter.

NGO Incident Insight

- For the first time on record, no serious NGO incidents were reported, while NGO incident volume was stable, partly due to deliberately reduced exposure during the election period.
- AS publicly stated its continued hostility toward NGOs and in one instance a nearby attack in Jubaland compelled NGO staff to halt a beneficiary registration exercise.
- AS mobility, presence and incursions hampered access in Ceel-Baraf, Bacda and on the Mogadishu-Jowhar-Mahaday and Mataban roads.
- Multiple actors in Togdheer and Mudug disrupted programming due to disputes over beneficiary lists, participation of female staff and local disputes.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Agencies must balance exposure and growing humanitarian needs against mounting risk from AS activity, particularly in areas where security forces' bases may be overrun.
- In anticipation of rising aid demand, NGOs should continue to refine their modalities for distributions and beneficiary selection, as well as contingency plans for disruption.
- NGOs should continue to manage their proximity to potential high-value and military targets, particularly restaurants and venues frequented by GOV officials.
- As the drought continues, NGOs should map local community groups and local escalation triggers, particularly those around resource competition.






1 January to 30 June 2022		
	Total NGO incidents in 2022	144
	Killed	8
	Injured	16
	Abducted	0


Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio




NGO by security incident ratio*




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight


- The highest volume of incidents on record was reported for the third consecutive quarter, reflecting a surge in communal violence incidents and improved collection efforts.
- While signatories resolved a command structure dispute peace agreement implementation lagged with unified forces still awaiting graduation after another deadline passed.
- Incidents with communal dimensions rose to record levels and concentrated in Warrap/Abyei, Jonglei/Greater Pibor and Lakes resulting in several high casualty incidents.
- OAGs were operational, with SPLA-iO related activity affecting Wau, Koch and Mayendit, conversely NAS forces reduced their activity despite a redeployment in the Equatorias.

NGO Incident Insight

- Increased communal and youth mobilisation in Unity and Jonglei/Greater Pibor contributed to a near doubling of thefts amid increasing economic pressures nationwide.
- Attacks on NGOs decreased, however four off-duty national staff were killed, three which occurred during ICV or targeted revenge attacks in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Jonglei and Unity.
- Local ICV surges coincided with several in-transit robberies of marked NGO vehicles, while a community force blockade restricted movement on the Bor-Pibor road.
- Curfews were imposed in Maridi and Ibba due to OAG related rumours, while SPLA-iO conflict resulted in relocations and destruction of humanitarian assets in several areas.

INSO Operational Foresight

- While long-delayed progress on the R-ARCSS concluded the period, NGOs must monitor its implementation and stakeholder perceptions as its scheduled end approaches.
- Where there are established seasonal patterns of surges of violence, NGOs should implement plans that demonstrate sensitivity for national staff vulnerabilities.
- Early warning systems and concomitant contingency planning remain essential in areas identified as more susceptible to communal violence.
- NGOs should consistently review and calibrate their road assessments to evolving conditions that may be shaped by seasonality, criminality and presence of active armed actors.





1 January to 30 June 2022	
	Total NGO incidents in 2022 50
	Killed 2
	Injured 3
	Abducted 0


Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio




NGO by security incident ratio*




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight


- The context was defined by economic crisis, concerns about possible disruption to cross border aid and the threat of a TAF offensive likely deterred by limited international support.
- While a threatened TAF offensive in the north did not materialise, TAF incident volume increased by 45% and was concentrated around Aleppo amid inter-OAG violence.
- OAGs and criminals remained influential in the east, perpetrating incidents in Al-Hole Camp, which witnessed the highest number of violent deaths in over a year.
- In the south, OAG factionalism drove assassinations in Dara to near unprecedented levels, while conflict often involving GOV-aligned RFG exacerbated instability in As-Sweida.

NGO Incident Insight



- Despite a nearly one-third decrease, the composition of incidents remained similar to previous quarters, with criminals constituting the majority of incident perpetrators.
- Despite increased conflict activity, NGO incidents in the north decreased, but included the likely targeted killing of an LNGO senior staff member by an under vehicle IED.
- NGO incidents in the east reflected long-running issues with a majority occurring in Al-Hole Camp, while an NGO vehicle was also collaterally involved in an IED incident in Hasakeh.
- While no NGO incidents were noted in the south, broader issues including western sanctions and bureaucratic controls on humanitarian activities still shaped access.

INSO Operational Foresight


- Due to politicisation of cross-border access, NGOs should explore alternative modalities while advocating at the strategic level for stability of current access mechanisms.
- While diminished, the likelihood of increased Turkish military activity remains; NGOs should incorporate this into their contingency planning in the north and east.
- Given the likelihood that systemic issues will not be resolved at Al-Hole Camp, NGOs should regularly assess whether the camp's threat profile aligns with their risk tolerance.
- NGOs should monitor regional developments including the Iran-Israel rivalry, Turkish domestic stability, and US-Russia competition for potential triggers for shifting local postures.




1 January to 30 June 2022	
Total NGO incidents in 2022	15
Killed	2
Injured	2
Abducted	0




Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Ukrainian forces engaged Russian forces in Kyiv and Kharkiv, both of which saw heavy fighting, including the use of cluster ammunitions and mines, before a drop in conflict activity.
- Russian forces seized territory from Mariupol to Kherson, effectively granting them control of the Azov Sea and supply lines to Crimea.
- Conflict was most intense in the east where Russian forces seized most of Luhanska oblast, however their offensive stalled in several areas of Donetska oblast.
- Against a backdrop of a low, but persistent, threat of Belarusian involvement, conflict activity in the west was largely limited to sporadic missile attacks and airstrikes.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents increased slightly but did not fully correspond to the growth in conflict, suggesting possible underreporting, but also relative success in managing exposure.
- Missile impacts on population centres caused all three reported serious incidents, the most significant was an attack on Kramatorsk railway station resulting in an off-duty fatality.
- The majority of combat incidents occurred in Donetska oblast, while two cases of missing staff may be linked with risk of collateral involvement in combat zones.
- There were no incidents directly attributable to ERW/UXO contamination, however reports suggest that large swathes of the country will face related access impediments.

INSO Operational Foresight

- NGOs should integrate heightened risk of shifting frontlines as well as continued airstrikes into contingency plans across southern oblasts.
- Consistent acceptance by actors in occupied territories is likely untenable, while NGOs operating near fighting should be trained to manage risk linked with armed conflict.
- NGOs seeking to operate in areas that experienced heavy ground fighting should first consult with agencies specialising in UXO/ERW mapping and mine awareness.
- While unlikely, NGOs should monitor for uncharacteristic Belarusian deployments in terms of size and location for indications of increased involvement in the western oblasts.

INSO MONITORING


Kenya

Kenya recorded three NGO incidents in Q2. Although slightly above average, none were serious, and the majority were perpetrated by criminal groups. Overall security incidents increased, but their lethality decreased significantly, potentially due to extensive security operations. Criminal activity grew in Q2, especially reported thefts. Meanwhile, AS activity fell although the group maintains its ability to launch a variety of coordinated attacks. More broadly, the country experienced worsening economic conditions compounded by fuel and food supply chain issues linked to the Russian invasion and increased communal tensions ahead of the August election.

In Nairobi, three suspected criminals robbed an NGO staff member in the street during May, however there were no reported injuries. Criminality in Kenya is normally opportunistic in nature and thus NGOs are encouraged to maintain acceptance strategies at a local level while reminding staff of standard anti-crime measures such as limiting displays of wealth, remaining aware in hotspots, and avoiding movements in isolated streets and alleys. In Samburu, armed bandits attacked an NGO vehicle following cattle raids in June, the second such attack this year. NGOs should review risk management strategies in light of changing local dynamics due to ongoing drought in arid and semi-arid areas of the country.

Looking ahead, the next quarter will be characterised by the aftermath of the 9 August general election. Historically elections have stoked ethnic tensions and violence, especially in 2007-2008, where over one thousand were killed and over half a million displaced. Typically, election day is normally calm with the post-election period once tallying commences being marred by unrest at polling stations, potential attacks on election infrastructure, communication

disruptions and increased movement restrictions. Disputes in courts might follow, as was the case in 2017 when the Supreme Court overruled the first election results, extending the election period by two months. NGOs should ensure staff are familiar with likely risks, adaptive strategies to address those, and planned scenarios along with relevant contingencies. NGOs should maintain strong communications with various coordination fora, including INSO, CMCoord and Access Working Groups, throughout the election period to sustain access and minimise threats to staff, beneficiaries and assets.



ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

AS	Al-Shabaab	ISWAP	Islamic State in West Africa Province
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a	JAS	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'adati wal-Jihad
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia	JNIM	Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin
CAR	Central African Republic	LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organisation
CHDC	Conflict & Humanitarian Data Centre	M23	Mouvement du 23 Mars
CMCoord	Civilian-Military Coordination	MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC
CPC	Coalition des patriotes pour le changement	NAS	National Salvation Front
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	NWSW	North-West/South-West
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War	OAG	Organised Armed Group
GOV	Government	R-ARCSS	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
ICV	Intercommunal Violence	RFG	Raji Falhout Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Person	SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
IEA	Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan	SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
IED	Improvised Explosive Device	TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
IMF	International Military Forces	UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution(s)
IS	Islamic State	UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
IS-KP	Islamic State – Khorasan Province	VCP	Vehicle Checkpoint
IS-Sahel	Islamic State – Sahel	VDP	Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie



INTERNATIONAL NGO SAFETY ORGANISATION
Analysis & Advice for Humanitarians

IMPROVES ACCESS
SAVES LIVES

About INSO:

The International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) is an international charity that supports the safety of aid workers in high risk contexts.

INSO provides registered NGOs with a range of free services including real-time incident tracking, analytical reports, safety related data and mapping, crisis management support, staff orientations and training.

INSO services help NGOs with their day-to-day risk management responsibilities and improve their overall situational awareness to support evidence-based humanitarian access decisions.

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Upcoming INSO Training

Course Name	Afghanistan	Burkina Faso	DRC	Iraq	Mali	Niger	Nigeria	Somalia	South Sudan	Syria
Advanced NGO Security Management		Sep, Oct	Oct	Sep			Aug			Aug
Basic Security for Guards	Aug, Sep									
Crisis Management				Aug	Aug, Sep	Sep	Sep		Sep	Sep
Essentials of NGO Security Management	Aug, Sep	Aug, Sep	Sep, Oct		Aug	Aug, Oct				Aug, Sep
Fire Safety									Aug	
Hostile Environment First Aid Training	Aug, Sep	Oct			Aug					
Hostile Environment Individual Safety Training		Oct					Sep			
Humanitarian Negotiations			Oct	Sep	Sep	Oct	Aug		Sep	Sep
Humanitarian Negotiations for Field Aid Workers		Aug		Oct		Aug, Sep				
Induction to Safety and Security	Sep	Aug, Sep, Oct	Sep, Oct	Aug, Oct	Aug, Sep	Aug, Oct			Aug, Oct	Aug, Sep
NGO Security Management Small Private Online Course				Aug						
Personal Safety Training	Aug, Sep	Sep			Sep			Oct		
Training of Trainers for Guards	Aug, Sep									
Travel Safety		Oct	Sep, Oct	Aug, Sep, Oct	Aug, Sep	Aug				Sep



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