

June 2022 - NGO Incidents Overview

INSO recorded 121 NGO incidents in June, while threats to humanitarian workers were broadly consistent with those witnessed in recent months. Conflict activity in Ukraine continued to threaten NGO staff and supplies in transit, while another NGO staff member was killed in a revenge attack in South Sudan, bringing the number of fatalities there this year to eight. In Afghanistan, IEA interference in programming and enforcement of conservative social practices on female staff and beneficiaries continue to be major obstacles, as adherence to basic humanitarian principles becomes increasingly difficult. Meanwhile, in Cameroon, the humanitarian space shrank further as OAGs and government forces in the Northwest-Southwest Region enforced contradicting policies on vehicle registration, which will create more problems for NGOs in transit and at VCPs. The Sahel witnessed sustained competition between OAGs and local authorities, with certain groups taking punitive action against village communities that fail to submit to truces. However, the lifting of sanctions on Mali by regional neighbours may alleviate some economic pressures.






Figure 1 - NGO incidents map (June 2022), **Figure 2** - Total NGO incidents per country (June 2022).

Serious Incidents



Of the 121 NGO incidents in June, 14 were serious, including four fatal incidents. Three NGO staff were killed in a roadside attack in Mali. While in-transit risks are high in the context, encounters with criminals and OAGs are rarely fatal, with short term detentions much more common. Meanwhile, an NGO staff member was killed at his home in Burkina Faso in what appeared to be a targeted attack by an OAG, possibly motivated by their suspicion that the victim was associated with government-backed militias. A targeted killing of an NGO office manager using an under-vehicle IED took place in Syria, although both the motive and perpetrators remain unknown. The final NGO fatality was the murder of a national NGO staff member in South Sudan, in what appears to have been a revenge attack. Three NGO abductions took place this month, including one in Burkina Faso close to where the staff member was murdered; the abduction may have been motivated by similar suspicions. The remaining two abductions took place in DRC, one of which was followed by the victim's release, while the other remains unresolved. In the latter case, the victim worked for a local human rights organisation, which may have provided the motive.




Figure 3 - NGO staff impacted, per month. Click the image to expand.

Regional Overview

Central and Eastern Africa

Most contexts in the region saw continuations of existing security trends within NGO incidents recorded in May. Of note, however, was a resurgence of CPC activity in CAR, which resulted in a series of roadside robberies and contributed to circumstances around the death of NGO staff member. NGOs in DRC continued to face an elevated threat of kidnapping, while fighting involving the armed group M23 led to NGO property damage, elevated collateral risks and diplomatic tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali. South Sudan recorded the seventh NGO fatality in the context this year, the highest total of any INSO country. Meanwhile, Somalia saw the peaceful conclusion of its election process, which has dragged on for over a year. Nevertheless, AS remained active in the context and instigated two NGO incidents.




Figure 4 - NGO incidents in Central and Eastern Africa region, per month. Click the image to expand.

Despite lower NGO incidents across the region, communal dynamics continued to drive risks to NGO staff, especially in DRC and South Sudan. Government actors can also pose a substantial threat to NGO staff, as in CAR this month, where the sole serious incident was the assault of an NGO worker by police. The threat of abduction in the DRC is among the highest of any INSO programme and two further kidnappings of NGO staff took place in June, although one victim has now been released. Despite NGO incidents falling slightly in South Sudan, the killing of an off-duty national staff member brought the total of NGO fatalities in the context this year to eight. In Somalia, incident numbers remained consistent with an emerging monthly average and no serious incidents were recorded. The wider context saw clan

militias seek to drive AS away from the Beled Weyne-Matabaan road, which may see escalating violence as government forces are also set to launch operations along the axis.

CAR recorded nine NGO incidents in June, the lowest monthly total this year, against a backdrop of average overall security incident volumes. A single serious incident occurred in Mbomou when two policemen assaulted an NGO staff member during an altercation after he was unable to produce identification documents. Both national and international staff should ensure they have appropriate paperwork available at all times, while adopting a non-confrontational approach when dealing with authorities. An NGO team was briefly detained by OAG operatives in Haut-Mbomou after being stopped in-transit. However, negotiations with the NGO prompted their release unharmed the following day. While OAG-perpetrated incidents impacting NGOs are primarily thefts, a limited threat of abduction remains. Engagement strategies should emphasise acceptance and seek to establish contacts with the context's various OAGs that can be leveraged in emergencies. Indeed, CPC operatives conducted two robberies of NGO staff in June, one on the Markounda-Boguila road and another near Batangafo. The armed group continues to take advantage of the government's distraction with economic difficulties and the drawdown of Russian PMCs, which is driving threats to NGO staff in transit through Ouham and Ouham-Pendé. In Bangui, the family of an NGO agent who was killed protested outside the organisation's compound because the deceased's body was not released to them at the time agreed. Such events are highly unusual, but illustrate the need for NGOs to exercise considerable cultural sensitivity and ensure effective communications with relatives of staff in the case of emergencies, potentially assigning direct liaison officers where appropriate. The wider context saw economic conditions continue to worsen, while the government resorted to requisitioning fuel to avoid shortages within the security forces. Meanwhile, UN forces led two operations to drive OAGs from population centres, effectively assisting government troops. A more assertive posture may be essential to offsetting the potential risk posed by the drawdown of Russian PMCs, but could also drive OAG attacks on UN targets.

DRC recorded its lowest NGO incident volume since May 2019, registering 13 incidents. Nonetheless, nearly half were serious, involving violent confinements or robberies perpetrated by criminals, GOV forces or OAGs. With the exception of an unresolved abduction of a human rights officer working for an LNGO in Ituri, serious incidents were a reminder of pervasive contextual insecurity rather than NGO-specific risks. In addition, resurgent M23 operatives continued to impact the wider operating environment, including capturing and holding Bunagana, while civilians also displaced mostly into already volatile Rutshuru. Concurrently, their momentum raised fears of a possible incursion into the cities of Rutshuru and Kiwanja, or even Goma. However, the more immediate impact on NGO safety was the likely sharpening of communal divisions around Goma linked to accusations of Rwandan support for M23 and raising perceptions of instability as evidenced by subsequent anti-Rwandan protests in Goma. NGOs should take increasing ethnic tensions into account, cultivate their understanding of staff perceptions of risk and internally discuss the appropriateness of implementing enhanced measures in the short term, especially for vulnerable staff. Furthermore, NGOs operating in these localities must revisit their overall assessments of risk and consider the increased likelihood of activating contingency plans. Elsewhere, OAGs in Ituri declared a cessation of hostilities. Even if extreme violence is decreasing, violence continued after the declaration and historical trends suggest that the ceasefire will not be durable.

NGO incidents in **South Sudan** fell for the third consecutive month to 24. The period's most significant NGO incident was the revenge killing of an off-duty national staff member in Duk County, Jonglei. Eight NGO workers have now been killed this year, the majority of which occurred during cyclical communal violence. Given these dynamics, identifying and implementing effective mitigation measures remains difficult, particularly for vulnerable off-duty staff. However, NGOs can still identify localised indicators of accelerating violence and triggers for escalations, as well as setting clear thresholds for activation of contingency plans. In this regard, NGOs operating in and around Tonj North County, Warrap, should plan accordingly after a mass casualty incident involving armed cattle raiders and officials deployed for a disarmament exercise, which has raised the likelihood of further communal violence. The period's other serious incidents both involved officials at checkpoints; a detention for several days of a national off-duty staff member operating a motorbike in Tonj East County, Warrap, for unspecified reasons and the physical assault of an off-duty national staff member on a motorbike in Mundri, Western Equatoria after a dispute. Concurrently, Juba witnessed a surge in harassment of in-transit NGO and UN staff, ostensibly for violating UN curfew. Staff should be regularly briefed and trained on actions to take when encountering checkpoints that may include basic dispute management, while the broader community through appropriate channels should advocate for consistent application of procedures at checkpoints which align with South Sudanese laws. More broadly, in Jonglei, a breakaway faction of SPLA-iO began relocating its forces to Nyirol County and their presence is likely to shape local dynamics given that SPLA-iO exercises influence in the area.




Figure 5 - Accumulated NGO fatalities by Country (Jan 2021 to Jun 2022)

Somalia recorded three NGO incidents in June, reflecting the recent monthly average. None of these were serious, however an NGO staff member was detained for 48 hours by security forces in Puntland during a search operation seeking an AS operative. The staff member was released unharmed, although the incident illustrates the need for situational awareness among NGOs where national staff are exposed to operations by security forces and effective liaison with authorities. Also in Puntland, an NGO team engaged in a cash transfer project had to suspend their activity after being threatened. However, in the days after the incident, the NGO was contacted by a local elder who explained the threat had been made in the context of a local political dispute and that the project was now able to restart. This again demonstrates the need for effective context analysis at the local level, including leveraging the insight of local contacts, which can mitigate temporary threats arising from local political developments. In Sool, Sanaag and Togdheer, a women's protection project was interrupted by armed youths, although police drove them away from the event with no injuries recorded. The incident demonstrates the need

for potentially controversial project activities to be subject to thorough risk assessments and acceptance sought among local communities wherever possible. The wider context saw clan militias seek to drive AS away from the Beled Weyne-Matabaan road, which could witness increasing violence in the coming weeks if government forces also launch anti-AS operations in the area. Meanwhile, AS launched an attack on Baxdo in Galmudug using two suicide vehicle-borne IEDs. However, one of the devices was captured before it detonated and the group suffered significant casualties. Nevertheless, AS remains capable of launching sophisticated attacks in urban centres across the country.

Kenya recorded two NGO incidents in June. Although neither was serious, one did involve an ambush of an NGO vehicle in Baragoi during which shots were fired at the car and so there was considerable risk to the passengers. Nevertheless, the driver successfully evaded the attack and the staff were unharmed. The incident occurred within 24 hours of cattle raids in the area. The incident illustrates the need for consistent, up-to-date route assessments in areas affected by communal violence. The second NGO incident saw stones thrown at an NGO vehicle in Mombasa County, however there were no injuries and the motive remains unclear. The wider context saw persistent AS attacks in Garissa, Mandera and Wajir, although security forces have deterred the group's activity in Lamu since April. Government operations in Elgeyo-Marakwet and Marsabit have also contained intercommunal violence in those counties. In Nakuru, there was a spate of gang-related violent crimes in recent weeks, which provoked a major police response that resulted in mass arrests. While this may have contained gang activity to some extent, NGOs should continue to exercise caution in East and West Nakuru sub-counties in the near term.

Western Africa

While threats to safety and access continue to be significant across the region, Nigeria recorded only two NGO incidents in June, the lowest monthly total this year. Overall security incidents fell slightly in Cameroon, however access continued to be negatively impacted by contradictory directives issued by both OAGs and security forces in the Northwest-Southwest region. Burkina Faso recorded two serious NGO incidents, both were perpetrated by OAGs around Djibo, including the killing of an NGO worker and the abduction of another, who was later released. Burkina Faso also witnessed the government's declaration of zones of military interest in Soum Province this month, which will severely hamper access while endangering civilians. In Mali, IS-Sahel and JNIM perpetrated mass killings of civilians amid increasing irregular checks on NGO staff. Moreover, NGO staff were killed in Mali this month, however little is known about the perpetrators or motive.




Figure 6 - NGO Incidents in Western Africa region, per month.

There were only two NGO incidents in **Nigeria**, the lowest total in six months. This reflected a decrease in security incidents, with June witnessing the least of any month so far this year. The two NGO incidents took place at the same warehouse in western Maiduguri around ten days apart. In the first, thieves broke in and stole several items; on the second attempt the perpetrators were interrupted by security guards and fled. NGOs should be conscious of ongoing economic pressures driving petty crime, especially in urban centres with an array of soft targets, such as offices and warehouses. Reviews of physical security measures may be required. Another relevant incident occurred in Monguno in which three staff of a car vendor were abducted by ISWAP. This may have been due to the company being patronised by NGOs, and indicates the threats facing third parties who deal directly with humanitarians. More broadly, the context was overshadowed by two mass killings of civilians claimed by ISWAP. These took place on 22 May and 7 June in the Dikwa area of Borno State. The victims were largely itinerant scrap metal collectors, who had been warned to avoid the area by the armed group. The reasons for ISWAP's hostility to the scrap collectors is unclear, but may be related to growing suspicion of civilians amid ongoing security forces' operations. Elsewhere, there were efforts to resolve intercommunal violence in Gombe and Adamawa State through dialogue. Talks were brokered by community leaders, potentially offering improved access for NGOs and creating opportunities for peacebuilding programmes.

Cameroon recorded 12 NGO incidents in June, while overall security incidents fell slightly. Access continued to be negatively impacted by directives issued by both OAGs and security forces, while the latter used VCPs to harass NGO staff in transit. OAGs in Northwest-Southwest issued a directive that from 1 June vehicles should be identified by chassis number rather than CEMAC plates. Subsequently, five of the NGO incidents in June involved government forces stopping staff and either questioning their failure to use CEMAC numberplates on vehicles claiming NGO staff did not have the required authorisations or stating they did not have the right vehicle insurance. While four of these incidents took place around Kumba, NGOs are set to face similar interference across the whole Northwest-Southwest as the government seeks to control or deter NGO activity which it believes may aid its political opponents. In most cases these situations were resolved by protracted negotiations or contacting senior officials, however in one instance an NGO team had to return to Buea under military escort, which has previously increased the risk of targeting by OAGs. NGOs should educate staff in what to expect from encounters with government forces, ensure permission to operate is obtained from all levels of government and review appropriate vehicle documentation to minimise the risk of access denial. Similar trends were evident in the two NGO incidents perpetrated by OAGs this month, which involved an NGO team being stopped in transit for using a vehicle with a CEMAC numberplate and another being temporarily detained by OAG operatives who claimed not to have been forewarned of their field activity. The implementation of this policy and the government's hostile response is a major threat to access for NGOs in the region and could lead to staff routinely being stopped by either party. NGOs' route assessments and travel plans should incorporate advisories on when and where to display CEMAC plates so as to minimise harassment by both OAGs and security forces.

Burkina Faso recorded seven NGO incidents in June, as overall incident volumes rose for the third consecutive month. Two of the NGO incidents were serious, both of which took place around Djibo and were perpetrated by OAGs, including the killing of an NGO worker at his residence and the abduction of another, who was later released. These occurred in the context of concerted OAG pressure against VDPs in the locality, which possibly prompted the killing of the NGO staff member, who may have been suspected of being a VDP supporter. These recent clashes appear to have undermined a nascent truce

around Djibo negotiated between traditional leaders and OAGs, with the continued presence of VDPs – effectively government-sponsored local militias – forming a major obstacle to implementing a ceasefire. Consequently, NGOs should anticipate more violence and limits on access in the coming weeks. Four irregular checks were conducted by OAGs on NGO staff on the Fada-Bilanga, Fada-Gayeri and Toma-Tougan roads, with another near Fadji. In three of these incidents either aid supplies or vehicles were stolen. Such thefts alongside irregular checks are now routine and are a symptom of OAGs' need for supplies rather than any substantive hostility to NGOs; the overwhelming majority of irregular checks pass without staff being harmed. The most significant contextual development in June was the government's declaration of zones of military interest in Soum Province. The presence of civilians in these areas is effectively prohibited, including aid workers, in a stated effort to enable military operations against OAGs. Not only will this drastically limit access in these areas and increase needs due to displacement, but it could lead to mounting civilian casualties and human rights abuses if security forces believe they can act without restraint in the zones.

Mali recorded 12 NGO incidents, reflecting average monthly volumes so far this year. Nevertheless, three NGO staff were killed in the sole serious incident in June, which was an armed robbery of two NGO vehicles on the Koussané-Boukoutini road in the Kayes region; the perpetrators are unknown. Another armed robbery of an NGO team in transit took place in Timbuktu. In both these incidents, the perpetrators likely fired warning shots near the vehicles and when they failed to stop fired on them directly. In addition to conducting regular route assessments, NGOs should review and re-emphasise advice to staff and drivers on how to conduct themselves during in-transit robberies. Additionally, there were five irregular checks conducted on NGO staff. Four of these were perpetrated by OAGs and involved staff being stopped in transit, questioned and released within several hours. In one instance in Sikasso, an NGO team turned back on the advice of an OAG-affiliated individual who warned the staff members that his organisation would be hostile to their presence. The final irregular check was conducted by Dozo hunters between Bandiagara and Bankass, in which staff were allowed to continue their journey, but warned not to return. Irregular checks remain a prominent feature of the context and NGO teams should be briefed prior to travel on which groups they are likely to encounter and how they should conduct themselves when stopped. The wider context saw significant civilian casualties, with mass killings perpetrated by IS-Sahel and JNIM. In the latter case, JNIM is targeting villages in central Mali that either refuse to broker truces with them or which are perceived to have breached the terms of such agreements. Meanwhile, there were positive political developments including a new electoral law and timetable, which led to most ECOWAS sanctions being lifted in early July.

There were four NGO incidents in **Niger** through June, none of which were serious, while overall security incidents fell to the lowest monthly total so far this year. Nevertheless, there were still significant numbers of OAG attacks against security forces in both the east and west of the country. These conditions contributed to two of the NGO incidents in June which were perpetrated by security forces. Firstly, an NGO team was denied access by government troops on the Bac Farié-Gotheye, the third such denial around Niamey in recent weeks. Moreover, the incident occurred the day after a nearby OAG attack on security forces, which likely precipitated their desire to control travel through the area. Moreover, police in the town of Tillabéry stopped an NGO team at a checkpoint and held them for questioning for several hours before the intervention by the NGO's management prompted their release. Both incidents illustrate the need for NGOs to allay the suspicion of security forces through effective CMCoord, engagement and reinforcing key principles, especially neutrality and impartiality. However,

while OAGs sustain their campaign against government troops, such interference is likely to continue and staff should be briefed accordingly prior to travel. The remaining two NGO incidents were criminal acts, including the snatching of an NGO staff member's phone in Niamey and an attempted robbery on the Makéra-Toulou road, from which the NGO worker escaped unharmed. The wider context has seen NGOs confront potential fuel shortages as the government has restricted access in order to deprive OAGs of a key resource. Collective advocacy may be required to ensure that NGO operations secure the requisite fuel to continue operations in remote areas. Meanwhile, returnees in Diffa and Tillabéry continue to face challenges despite the government encouraging them to come home. Needs assessments may therefore need to reflect additional demand.




Figure 7 - GOV-Perpetrated NGO Incidents (Jan to Jun 2022)

Middle East, Central Asia and Europe

As the Ukraine conflict entered its fourth month, emerging local and regional trends became more pronounced. Fuel price increases and grain shortages caused by the Russian invasion exacerbated humanitarian needs throughout the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. Humanitarian access is most constrained in Ukraine, particularly in the east and south. Attacks on infrastructure, including railways and aid in transit, will continue amid Russian disregard for humanitarian principles. Afghanistan continues to record some of the highest numbers of NGO incidents of any INSO programme and the long-term viability of a principled response in the face of increasing IEA interference is in question. In Syria, Al-Hole remains the most common location for NGO incidents, although most of these are not serious. Meanwhile, Turkey was an increasingly disruptive actor across both Syria and Iraq. Indeed, Turkish threats of new ground operations in Syria are a key point to monitor.




Figure 8 - NGO incidents in Middle East, Asia and Europe region, per month.

There were 21 NGO incidents in **Afghanistan**, which reflected the recent trend of growing IEA interference in NGO operations. During June, these broadly fell into three categories: demands for involvement in or oversight of NGO recruitment; the enforcement of restrictions on women, both staff and beneficiaries; and a lack of clarity over authorisation of NGO project activity. For example, an NGO project in Laghman was suspended when IEA officials demanded to be actively involved in recruitment, while in Zabul IEA intelligence officers demanded to see staff lists and confidential information at an NGO office, threatening to close down its projects if management did not comply. NGOs need to advocate collectively to resist unreasonable demands that breach basic principles. However, there are indications in some provinces that certain NGOs have yielded to IEA demands regarding recruitment, which could critically undermine wider efforts to resist government overreach and maintain the provisions of the 2005 NGO Law. Meanwhile, examples of the enforcement of restrictions on female staff included IEA officials preventing health workers entering a clinic, as they did not have a mahram, while elsewhere preventing female civilians accessing healthcare again due to a lack of male chaperones. In the latter instance, IEA also threatened to close the NGO clinic in question. NGOs should expect restrictions on women, both civilians and NGO staff, to worsen in the medium term. This will necessitate internal policy discussions within NGOs on whether asking staff to comply is feasible or ethical. Another constant since IEA come to power has been confusion among operatives and officials over the necessary permissions needed by NGOs. This led to project activity being suspended in multiple locations this month due to demands that NGOs receive authorisation from provincial governors or internal security services. Humanitarians will again need to engage extensively with line ministries and provincial authorities to seek lasting solutions to these access obstacles. The wider context was dominated by the earthquake affecting Paktika and Khost, the response to which dominated much of NGOs' capacity over recent weeks. However, this too was rendered less effective due to internal IEA disfunction as well as poor coordination among NGOs, IOs, and non-traditional humanitarian actors.

For the second consecutive month **Iraq** reported no NGO incidents. However, an accidental fire damaged an NGO office and resulted in a civilian casualty. NGOs are encouraged to review fire safety standards in both commercial and residential buildings and seek premises on lower floors where possible. IS conducted two coordinated attacks in Diyala and another in Anbar targeting an ISF position. Despite their operational capacity being much reduced, IS remains capable of organising coordinated attacks, although their consistent targeting of security forces limits the direct risk posed to NGOs. The north witnessed an expanded air campaign by Turkish forces, which conducted their first airstrike into Sulaymaniyah's Kalar district since 2015. This follows several operations against YBS and PKK positions in remote mountainous regions, and retaliatory attacks in early June on PMF bases in Ninawa. While the direct risk to NGOs is limited, they can experience disruption from protest activity provoked by Turkish military activity. Reports of a child killed, and four other civilians wounded as in an airstrike on 15 June only make such protests more likely in northern cities in the coming weeks. NGOs are also advised to limit activities in areas with close YBS and PKK positions. In the wider context, Iraq's Council of Representatives swore in 73 new members, changing the composition of the legislative chamber. While this move paves the way for government formation it may also provoke protests, as the Shia nationalist Sairoon bloc abandon their seats in the assembly.

There were six NGO incidents in **Syria** in June, two of which were serious. An NGO office manager was killed in a targeted attack in Al-Bab, in which an IED was placed under his vehicle. The motive and perpetrators of the attack are unknown, while the NGO in question had to temporarily suspend

operations in the area immediately afterwards. This is a relatively isolated incident, but in such cases it is essential NGOs conduct after-action reviews to determine whether staff have been exposed due to security failings or if there was a personal motive involved. The second serious incident occurred at Al-Hole camp, where an NGO guard was injured by stones thrown at an NGO facility. Moreover, there were two further NGO incidents at Al-Hole, both of which were break-ins to NGO premises and in one case equipment was stolen. Al-Hole continues to be the primary location in which NGO incidents occur in Syria, due to the volume of NGO staff in the vicinity and the difficulty local security forces have in policing the site. Meanwhile, in Sur Town, an individual entered an NGO office and discharged a weapon, demanding the organisation leave the area. This appears to have been personally motivated, as the perpetrator had been rejected as a guard by the NGO in question. At a time when economic pressures are acute, NGOs should anticipate more difficulties with unsuccessful applicants during local recruitment processes. Ensuring transparency and effective communication is essential in mitigating this risk where possible. The wider context was dominated by Turkey's continued rhetoric regarding potential military operations into Syrian territory. There is a real possibility of renewed Turkish ground operations in Syria, although these likely remain dependent on international support or opposition. Turkey has also stepped up drone strikes recently against SDF targets, with the volume of such attacks in 2022 now exceeding the combined total over the last two years.




Figure 9 - Security Incidents Perpetrated by Turkish Forces in Iraq & Syria (Jan 2021 to Jun 2022)

Ukraine reported two NGO incidents as the Russian invasion entered its fourth month. A Russian missile strike hit a train delivering INGO aid in a government-controlled area of Donetsk Oblast, while another missile attack targeted a mall in Kremenchuk, killing at least 21 civilians and injuring 66 others. INGO personnel were unharmed in both incidents, but vehicles were damaged. The attack on the supply train is especially concerning given the centrality of Ukraine's rail network in moving the significant quantities of aid needed across the country. NGOs may need to ensure adequate contingency plans are in place if Russian activity renders transport by rail infeasible. The east witnessed increased hostilities, driving up humanitarian needs across both sides of the front line. Access was further limited, and evacuations remained unsafe, as Russian forces shelled critical highways. After intense urban fighting, Russia now controls the whole of Luhanska Oblast following the capture of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. In the south, access to parts of Zaporizka, Khersonska and Mykolaivska Oblasts remains limited due to artillery exchanges, a Ukrainian counteroffensive and Russian occupation. In particular, the cities of Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv remain under constant threat of artillery and missiles, heavily restricting access. Air and

missile strikes from Belarussian territory continued through June, including an attack on Kyiv coinciding with the G7 summit. Meanwhile, reports of Belarussian exercises near the Ukraine-Belarus border are being used to divert Ukrainian forces and detract from their capacity in the east and south.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AS – Al-Shabab

CEMAC – Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa

CMCoord – Civilian-Military Coordination

CPC – Coalition of Patriots for Change

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

IEA - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

IED – Improvised Explosive Device

INGO – International NGO

IO – International Organisation

IS – Islamic State

ISWAP – Islamic State West Africa Province

JNIM - Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin

LNGO – Local NGO

OAG – Organised Armed Group

PKK – Kurdistan Workers' Party

PMC – Private Military Contractor

PMF – Popular Mobilisation Forces

SDF – Syrian Democratic Forces

SPLA-iO – Sudanese People's Liberation Army – in Opposition

UN – United Nations

VCP – Vehicle Checkpoint

VDP – Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland

YBS – Sinjar Resistance Units

Acknowledgements

INSO presently operates and provides services in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon (Extreme-Nord, Northwest, Southwest), Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo (Ituri, North Kivu, South

Kivu, Tanganyika), Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Niger (Tillabéry, Tahoua, Diffa), Nigeria (Borno, Adamawa, Yobe), Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Ukraine.

"Security incidents" refers to all "Theft", "Confine", Threat" and "Attack" events reported to INSO regardless of type, severity, perpetrator, intent or outcome. For instance, it includes all petty criminal robberies and threats as well as armed assaults and bombings. It includes all accidental involvement as well as all deliberate and targeted attacks. It includes all incidents in which no one was injured or hurt and all those in which someone was.

"Serious incidents" refer to incidents that resulted in Abductions, Injuries and/or Killings.

Disclaimer: INSO exists to provide dedicated safety and security services to NGOs working in high risk countries. INSO and its partners and donors accept no liability whatsoever for claims that may result from the provision or utilisation of these free services. Whilst every effort is made to verify data, INSO cannot guarantee the accuracy of information provided.

Sources: Unless otherwise stated, all data, information and maps contained in this report are sourced from INSO. Maps use Datum/Projection WGS84. Service Layer credit: Microsoft Map Bings. The data, boundaries and names and the designations used in maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by INSO.

Terms of Use: This report is for the exclusive use of INSO registered NGO partners. Sharing the report outside your NGO will be considered a breach of the INSO code of conduct and may result in suspension from services worldwide.

Citation: All rights are reserved. Citation is prohibited without the written permission of the INSO Director of Analysis and Research. caelum.moffatt@hq.ngosafety.org

Legal Information: Stichting International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) registered 17 January 2019, non-profit Foundation (ANBI) in the Netherlands, KvK 73728489 at Grote Marktstraat 43-C, 2511 BH, Den Haag, The Netherlands. For information: info@ngosafety.org

Contact Us



Contacts

Address: Grote Marktstraat 43-C, 2511 BH, Den Haag, The Netherlands

Website: www.ngosafety.org

For a definition of terms used, please refer to:

<https://ngosafety.org/terms>

For information and analysis enquiries, please contact:

global.analysis@ngosafety.org

For subscription and registration enquiries, please contact:

info@ngosafety.org

INSO is gratefully funded by

