

GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

October 2022

CRISISINSIGHT

acaps 

INTRODUCTION [1/2]

ACAPS analysts conduct daily monitoring and independent analysis of more than 150 countries, including regular risk analysis. **ACAPS' Global Risk Analysis** outlines a number of key contexts where a particular situation may notably deteriorate within the next six months, causing (a spike in) humanitarian needs

The risks included in this report were based on the identification of:

- 'Newly emerging crises' (**new risks**) following new events or factors (triggers) that may emerge over the coming six months. Such triggers would point towards a hazard materialising, which would result in new or more severe humanitarian needs in a monitored context.
- Potential '**rapid and marked deterioration**' in an existing crisis include existing crises that, because of **a combination of deteriorating trends and new events or pre-existing factors, may significantly deteriorate in the next six months, leading to worse humanitarian outcomes.**

We run trend analysis to identify such risks. However, a steadily deteriorating humanitarian situation that continues at the same rate is considered a trend instead of a risk. This report does not include trends.

ACAPS identifies risks at the regional, country, or subnational level:

ACAPS has identified risks over the next six months in the following 10 locations to alert humanitarian decision makers and responders on the possible emergence of new crises or significant deteriorations of existing humanitarian crises. The aim is to support preparedness for a timely and adequate response



Myanmar
Ukraine
Yemen



Coastal countries of West Africa
Indonesia
Mexico
Sudan
Syria/Lebanon
Syria/Türkiye



Mauritania

ACAPS METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS

The **ACAPS risk methodology** defines **risk as the probability of a hazard or multiple hazards materialising, combined with the estimated impact of such hazards**. The associated risk level (low, medium, or high) rises with the hazard's probability of occurring and the severity of its expected impact.

Impact is the predicted overall humanitarian consequence of a hazard materialising. It can be an increase in the number of people needing assistance, the severity of their needs, or both. The impact is based on the assessment of different components:

- exposure to the hazard (how many people are likely to be affected?)
- the intensity of the hazard (how will the hazard affect people?)
- the population's vulnerability (to shocks)
- and coping capacity (to deteriorating living and humanitarian conditions).

ACAPS classifies impact on a five-point scale: very low, low, moderate, significant, or major.

Probability is the chance of a hazard materialising. ACAPS assesses probability on a five-point scale: very low, low, medium, high, or very high.

Probability and impact levels are not mathematically calculated but assigned through expert judgement based on context knowledge. The overall risk level is the combination of the two, meaning it is also assigned through expert judgement.



INTRODUCTION [2/2]

KEY PRINCIPLES OF RISK ANALYSIS

Risk analysis requires a solid understanding of the context and an investigation of the interaction of variables that could cause or resist change.

Risk analysis follows a specific method and process, but as it looks at possible future events and expected outcomes, it has a certain degree of uncertainty. An event identified as a hazard might not evolve or materialise as anticipated, or it might not have the projected impact. Events or factors (triggers) expected to drive a shift or change in the situation may not occur, or new factors may arise that prevent the projected change or shift from happening.

Risk probability does not need to be high to warrant concern. A hazardous event with a low or medium probability of occurring should be a cause of concern for humanitarians if the expected impact is medium, high, or very high.

LIMITATIONS

- Considering the diversity and complexity of the crises in this report, we cannot cover each in detail. Instead, we highlight the broad evolution of each crisis to flag potential deteriorations and inform the framing of operations, strategies, and policies.
- The focus on risk analysis means we have not considered multiple possible factors that could lead to a given context improving.
- We do not publish our full risk-monitoring process; we publish an edited version that we deem relevant for the humanitarian sector.
- In this report, we have not considered unforeseen circumstances that may change the course of events (e.g. sudden-onset disasters, including natural hazards such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions).
- Information and data gaps for certain contexts limit the analysis.
- While we seek to ensure that all information is current at the time of publication, the fluidity of the situation in some countries means significant changes can occur quickly.

[Read more about our risk methodology](#)

OTHER FORWARD-LOOKING ANALYSIS FROM ACAPS

ACAPS often produces country-specific risk reports, scenarios, and anticipatory notes. Some recent publications that complement this global analysis are:


- [Afghanistan: Risk Overview](#)
- [Sri Lanka: Socioeconomic Crisis](#)
- [Yemen: FSO Safer Overview Impact Assessment](#)
- [Colombia: Escalation of Violence in Putumayo](#)

For the complete list of risks ACAPS analysts have identified during their daily monitoring and analysis, you can consult the [ACAPS Risk List](#).



GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

OCTOBER 2022



MYANMAR [1/2]

MARKED DETERIORATION




The large-scale military response of the junta following the Arakan Army's increased control of Rakhine state results in intense fighting and violence, leading to displacement and increased humanitarian and protection needs

RATIONALE

The Arakan Army (AA) has obtained direct or indirect control over a sizeable portion of Rakhine state, especially rural areas in the centre and north of the state, and neighbouring southern Chin state (ICG 01/06/2022; The Diplomat 07/06/2022; SCMP 30/01/2022). The Myanmar military junta has been losing its political leverage in Rakhine since the coup despite initiatives to involve some political groups, including the Arakan National Party (USIP 10/08/2022; TNI 10/06/2021 and 22/07/2022; BNI 06/06/2022; Myanmar Now 23/08/2021; ISEAS 14/07/2022). On the other hand, the AA has been establishing its authority in the region by enhancing its administrative and military capacities (ICG 01/06/2022; The Diplomat 07/06/2022). Its administrative branch has provided the population, including some Rohingya communities, with a police force, a judicial system, and health-care services – resulting in significant public support. The AA's advancement towards northern and central Rakhine has potentially compromised the junta's control over the commercially important Bangladesh-Myanmar border and the Sino-Myanmar

oil pipelines, triggering tensions (ICG 01/06/2022; The Diplomat 07/06/2022). Prior to the coup, between December 2018 and November 2020, the Myanmar military and the AA engaged in active fighting in Rakhine. Although the conflict stopped after an informal ceasefire, the military junta demonstrated the will to contain the AA's activities through various actions, such as the imposition of restrictions and surveillance activities. The situation remained relatively calm until early 2022, but the expansion of AA's control has since triggered a strong reaction from the military (TNI 22/07/2022; ICG 01/06/2022; The Diplomat 07/06/2022; ACLED accessed 02/10/2022). Since then, there has been a marked rise in security incidents – armed clashes, explosions and incidents of remote violence (e.g. air and drone strikes and shelling), abductions, and arrests – between the AA and the military compared to the post-coup period in 2021, indicating the possibility of wider conflict within Rakhine state (ACLED accessed 02/10/2022).



IMPACT


A large-scale military operation would most likely affect northern and central Rakhine, especially rural areas, because of the AA's significant presence in these areas. The Myanmar military's recent operations in Rakhine state included the burning of villages, air strikes, and artillery shelling, causing civilian casualties and displacements especially in northern Rakhine (The Narinjara 25/09/2022; The Irrawaddy 29/08/2022 and 05/09/2022; Myanmar Now 23/09/2022; ACLED accessed 18/09/2022). A wider conflict would result in significant internal and cross-border displacement, creating needs for shelter, food, and NFIs for the displaced. Displacement would result in increased pressure on host communities. Movement restrictions imposed by the junta and armed groups and insecurity would also deprive vulnerable groups, such as people with disabilities, pregnant women, and the elderly, of the services they need. Access issues already exist, with de-facto authorities temporarily halting humanitarian operations in several townships (The Irrawaddy 16/09/2022; ECHO 19/09/2022; RFA 16/09/2022).

MYANMAR

[2/2] ⌚ MARKED DETERIORATION



Ethnic minorities, especially the Rohingya, would likely face increased discrimination in the conflict-affected areas under the control of the Myanmar military. The affected population would be exposed to more landmines and explosives, potentially leading to casualties (ICRC 11/03/2022; AI 20/07/2022). Cross-border displacement, including to Bangladesh, would also expose people, especially women and children, to the threat of human trafficking. Rakhine hosts many protracted IDPs, who would face secondary displacement (UNHCR 22/07/2022). Conflict would reduce access to livelihoods in Rakhine, where the poverty rate (around 42% compared to 25% nationally) and food insecurity levels¹ are already high (WB 26/06/2019).



¹ The estimated 2017 poverty rate in the state was around 42% in contrast to the around 25% national figure, with the poverty line being MMK 1,590 per day (WB 26/06/2019). Recent estimations suggest that the national poverty rate has risen to around 40%; it is highly likely that Rakhine's poverty rate has also increased (WB 21/07/2022). Around a quarter of the country's population is estimated to be food-insecure. In Rakhine state, many farmers have been unable to plant given rising fertiliser and fuel prices. Limited agricultural outputs have then led to the rising costs of basic food items in the state, with northern Rakhine experiencing around a 50% increase (from May 2021 to May 2022). Rakhine, along with Kayah state, experienced the highest increase in the country in that period (DMG 05/07/2022; CASS 06/2022; WFP 05/07/2022). Aside from rising prices, travel and transport restrictions have also aggravated the food insecurity situation in the state.

*The post-informal ceasefire period was considered for incidents occurring from 12 November 2020 until December 2021.

*Only security incidents relating to the AA-MAF affecting were considered. Of these, only incidents affecting civilians were considered.

*Explosions and incidents of remote violence include air and drone strikes; shelling and artillery fire; and remote explosive, landmine, improvised explosive device, and grenade attacks.

Source: ACLED (accessed 02/10/2022)



UKRAINE


(1/2) ↗ MARKED DETERIORATION



Increased fighting and power and gas supply disruptions severely limit people's ability to access heating, resulting in loss of life and increased acute humanitarian needs in Russian-controlled areas and areas of active ground conflict in the southeast

● Risk level High

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Since the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian military has damaged or destroyed health, water, and power infrastructures, disrupting critical gas and power supplies in Ukraine's central, eastern, and southern regions (REACH 19/07/2022; Dixigroup 11/08/2022; IOM 30/09/2022). Damage to water supply systems disrupts running water supply, preventing the use of water heating systems (OCHA 11/02/2022). Access to heating is a pressing concern because the cold season starts mid-October and continues into April. Freezing temperatures can reach - 20° C (RFE/RL 30/07/2022; REACH 19/07/2022; OCHA 15/07/2022). The risk of active conflict and extreme constraints in accessing heating services in the oblast triggered the Government of Ukraine to start the mandatory evacuation of at least 200,000 people from Donetsk to safer areas across the country in August. The Government announced further mandatory evacuations in September in parts of Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (RFE/RL 10/08/2022; DW 03/08/2022; OCHA 02/09/2022).

In late August, Russian forces controlled parts of Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (ISW 28/08/2022). Ukraine's counteroffensive advancements in Kharkiv oblast in September where met with Russia targeting the Kharkiv power grid in retaliation (AP 12/09/2022; ISW 28/08/2022). As there are active hostilities along the eastern and southern frontlines, any changes in areas of control are highly likely to result in the disruption or complete shutdown of more power supplies, including because of direct targeting by the Russian military. Russia also controls the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, which produces 20% of Ukraine's power supply (The Guardian 19/08/2022; France 24 25/08/2022; IAEA 11/09/2022). Humanitarian access to and within Russian-controlled areas is extremely constrained, most likely preventing people living in damaged housing with no heating from getting critical winterisation assistance. The damage to infrastructure seen in newly accessible areas indicates that heating will be an issue as the weather gets colder (Kyiv 24 12/09/2022; REACH 27/09/2022)

IMPACT

Many people across Ukraine lack income-generating activities and have depleted their savings because of the conflict, affecting their ability to afford heating sources. The situation is likely to push them to choose between heating their homes and meeting other critical needs (OCHA 26/08/2022; CF SSS 05/08/2022). Reduced access to heating is likely to drive more evacuations from areas where power damage cannot be repaired, likely resulting in the increased use of educational facilities for the displaced (OCHA 02/09/2022).

The severity and level of needs are likely to increase in winter in areas of active hostilities, particularly in the Russian-controlled areas with a high level of damage to infrastructure and disruption of access to critical services, including water, health, electricity, and gas. People remaining in those areas and in need of winterisation assistance would likely have to resort to crisis-coping mechanisms, such as selling income-generating assets, or face physical risks and forced displacement by attempting to





UKRAINE [2/2] ⌚ MARKED DETERIORATION



leave areas under Russian control (OCHA 19/08/2022; HRW 01/09/2022). People living in damaged housing units or makeshift shelters in Russian-controlled or active conflict areas lack financial resources, heating sources, and shelter insulation materials. This lack significantly exposes them to illness and death, the worsening of health issues, frostbite, and hypothermia (WHO 23/11/2018).

This risk would affect everyone who would be exposed to extreme winter conditions. In particular, elderly people, as well as people with chronic illnesses or physical or mental disabilities, are likely to face additional access challenges because of their health, psychological, and mobility needs (OCHA 15/07/2022 and 11/02/2022; HelpAge et al. 15/06/2022; RFE/RL 11/08/2022; ACAPS 30/08/2022 and 29/08/2022).

Oblast most at risk because of damages to civilian infrastructure



Note: the map shows the level of infrastructure damage in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. To visit our dashboard and download our infrastructure damage dataset, you can visit our [webpage](#).



YEMEN

+ NEW RISK



The collapse or non-extension of the truce leads to renewed fighting, resulting in increased civilian casualties, displacement, and reduced access to services, basic goods, and livelihoods

Note: ACAPS identified this risk in August 2022. At the time of the publication of this report, the parties to the conflict in Yemen have yet to agree about extending the truce, meaning the risk is currently materialising. The rationale has been adjusted accordingly.

RATIONALE


On 2 April 2022, the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) of Yemen and the de-facto authorities (DFA) in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis) signed a two-month truce that extended until 2 October. Attempts to secure a six-month extension failed because parties could not agree on the reopening of roads in Ta'iz city and the payment of public sector salaries in northern governorates under DFA control ([SCSS 12/08/2022](#); [EEAS 19/07/2022](#)). The DFA has refused to open any UN-proposed routes around Ta'iz city ([HRW 29/08/2022](#)). Opening the roads would facilitate movement for civilians and humanitarian operations between IRG- and DFA-controlled areas ([ICG 19/05/2022](#)). Political and logistical obstacles to the implementation of any agreement regarding public sector salaries, including the list of civil servants to be paid and which authorities' revenues would finance the payment, have also contributed to the termination of

the truce. In July, tensions also escalated between the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which had the backing of the United Arab Emirates, and Islah-affiliated forces in oil-rich Shabwah governorate. The conflict culminated in a battle in Ataq from 9–10 August ([The New Arab 10/08/2022](#)). The tensions were likely related to the appointment of security posts favourable to the STC.

Infighting among anti-Houthi forces is also at risk of spreading to other areas, weakening their collective force and hampering further negotiation efforts with the DFA ([Al Jazeera 23/08/2022](#)). Leveraging a weakened anti-Houthi front, the DFA could launch an offensive to take control of Ma'rib. During the truce, the DFA already sent more troops to the southern and western frontlines of Ma'rib governorate ([Al Jazeera 18/04/2022](#)). Cross-border attacks towards Saudi Arabia would also likely resume.

IMPACT

Renewed and increased fighting would very likely result in a spike in civilian casualties, particularly from air strikes and shelling from both parties to the conflict around Ma'rib, Sa'dah, Shabwah, and Ta'iz. Internal displacement is likely to reach pre-truce lev-



els, with an average of over 10,000 people displaced per month (based on data between January–March 2022) – higher than the monthly average of 4,000 after the truce started (between April–June 2022) ([IOM accessed 05/09/2022](#)). The collapse of the truce would likely result in new disruptions to fuel imports through Al Hodeidah port. These disruptions, with the currently high global fuel prices, would result in significantly higher fuel prices in DFA areas, especially on the parallel market (see the ACAPS report on the impact of the truce on fuel for details). The high price of fuel would have a ripple effect on the prices of other goods as it increases transport prices. Increased insecurity and higher fuel prices would reduce people's mobility, likely limiting access to livelihoods, health and education services, and humanitarian assistance. Possible fuel shortages in IRG areas because of fuel being trucked to DFA areas could also be expected, as seen during other disruption periods to Al Hodeidah fuel imports. Such a shortage would affect both people and humanitarian operations. The collapse of the truce would also likely result in the return of exchange rate volatility, with the Yemeni rial depreciating faster in IRG areas. Increased prices and currency depreciation would make basic goods and services, including food, water, healthcare, and education, more unaffordable.

COASTAL COUNTRIES OF WEST AFRICA [1/2]

 NEW RISK



The expansion of armed groups from central Sahel to coastal countries (Bénin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo) leads to displacement and increased food insecurity

RATIONALE

Since the beginning of 2021, non-state armed groups linked to the Islamic State or Al-Qaeda in the Sahel have intensified their attacks in the coastal countries bordering Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Govt. of Côte d'Ivoire 29/03/2021; Africanews 11/05/2022; IFRI 11/02/2022). The armed attacks first targeted Côte d'Ivoire and then expanded to Bénin and Togo in May 2022 (Jeune Afrique 11/05/2022). The initial attacks targeted military positions, but the groups have more recently begun targeting civilians, notably in Togo in July 2022 (France 24 11/02/2022 and 08/06/2021; Al Jazeera 27/06/2022; ECHO 16/07/2022). No such attacks have been documented in Ghana, but the country remains exposed because of its geographical proximity to Burkina Faso.

In their advance southwards from the Sahel, armed groups see the forested areas at the border with Burkina Faso as safe bases to launch their activities. The strategy of carrying out scattered attacks in this vast forested area makes military counteroperations difficult. For these armed groups, the coastal countries also represent equipment and food supply circuits and sources of funding, particularly through the sale of stolen livestock (TV5MONDE 16/08/2022; Al Jazeera 12/01/2022; IFRI 11/02/2022; Marianne 09/03/2022; ISS 05/06/2019).

Despite the coastal countries' strengthening of security measures, including the establishment of a state of security emergency in Togo; joint military operations between Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo; and the announced support of France in military equipment to Bénin, attacks by armed groups are likely to continue in the coming months (AA 14/06/2022; Africa24 TV 28/07/2022; RFI 01/12/2021). The gradual militarisation of the area and the presence of self-defence groups in northern Côte d'Ivoire makes an increase in armed clashes and abuses against civilians likely (France 24 03/05/2022; VOA 05/04/2022).

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



IMPACT

The increase of attacks by non-state armed groups on civilians and military operations in the northern regions of the coastal countries are likely to force thousands of people to flee to safer areas towards the centre and south of those countries. Displacement is already reported, particularly in Togo, although the number of people is yet unknown. More people would be displaced if attacks continue (JournalduTogo.com 21/07/2022; Laabal 18/07/2022). The stigmatisation of certain ethnic groups because of their alleged support to armed groups would also lead to population displacement, as is already the case in Côte d'Ivoire (RFI 23/01/2022; VOA 11/04/2022).



COASTAL COUNTRIES OF WEST AFRICA [2/2]


⊕ NEW RISK



About 20,000² people may need food, shelter, protection, and education assistance in areas sharing borders with central Sahel countries. Violence has already affected or is likely to affect these countries in the coming months.

The areas include Savanes region (Togo), Alibori and Atacora departments (Bénin), Denguele, Savanes, and Zanzan districts (Côte d'Ivoire), and Upper East and Upper West regions (Ghana).

Increased armed group activity causing difficulties in accessing fields and disruptions to transhumance routes is likely to affect livelihoods and increase disputes between farmers and herders (France 24 15/06/2020). Across the four coastal countries, food security would likely deteriorate further. 2.2 million people were estimated to already experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse levels of food insecurity in June–August, an outcome of rising food costs, attributable in part to the impact of COVID-19 on the economy and supply chains and of climate hazards (GRANIT 30/05/2022; Cadre Harmonisé 15/05/2022).



Source: ACLED (accessed 30/08/2022)

² This estimate was made considering the limited number of people affected by the non-state armed group activity at the time of publication, and the absence of figures for displaced people.



INDONESIA (1/2)

Violent crackdown on protests and insurgency, and rising ethnic tensions after the announced division of Papua province result in increased displacement and protection needs in West Papua territory



 Risk level | Medium

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Indonesia passed a law on 30 June dividing Papua province into four provinces (VOI 05/07/2022; Asia Times 19/08/2022; Reuters 30/06/2022). Many indigenous Papuans in West Papua territory³ have been calling for independence for their provinces for decades. Most believe that the division of Papua would further marginalise them (The Diplomat 12/12/2021; UCA News 24/02/2022; East Asia Forum 11/06/2022; NYT 27/04/2021; ABC News 12/05/2020; ICNC 03/2011). They fear that this legislation is a move to exploit regional political divisions and gain control of the natural resources of the region (The Diplomat 21/06/2022; UCA News 24/02/2022; East Asia Forum 11/06/2022). Indigenous Papuans have held protests leading up to and after the decision (The Diplomat 19/07/2022 and 21/06/2022). The Government has responded with violence and arrests to past protests, demonstrations, and insurgencies in the country, and it is likely to apply the same methods in response to future protests and insurgency against the new legislation (The

Diplomat 21/06/2022; AI 20/08/2021; Benar News 15/03/2022; AIIA 20/07/2022; CBS News 19/05/2003).

Previous development initiatives, including in the region of West Papua, entailed transmigration programmes, where migrants from other parts of Indonesia settled in the region. The region's transmigrant population was estimated to be around 60% of its population in 2015 (Thesia 09/2021; AIIA 20/07/2022; MacAndrews 01/05/1978; ICP 07/12/2021). This trend of transmigration would likely intensify with the new legislation (RNZ 23/04/2018; UCA News 05/11/2014 and 24/02/2022). Disagreements between ethnic groups over the decision to create new provinces could also heighten social tensions. The creation of new provinces would require additional government apparatuses and lead to the increased presence of security forces and military posts, likely to be met by more protests and heightened insurgency (East Asia Forum 11/06/2022; UCA News 24/02/2022). The main armed group in the region, the West Papua National Liberation Army, has threatened to carry out acts of violence if the division of Papua is realised (The Jakarta Post 17/07/2022).

³ West Papua territory refers to the collective Papua and West Papua provinces (AIIA 20/07/2022; Indo Pacific Images accessed 01/09/2022).

INDONESIA [2/2] ⊕ NEW RISK




IMPACT

Renewed protests against the implementation of the new law are highly likely in Papua and West Papua provinces. Violence and land conflict would result in internal displacement and protection concerns. Since 2018, violence in the region has led to the displacement of 60,000–100,000 Papuans from West Papua territory. Many have moved to remote areas like forests, where they lack access to basic goods and services (UN HRC 01/03/2022). Newly displaced people would likely flee to remote and forested areas to feel safe, increasing needs for shelter, food, NFIs, drinking water, and dignity kits⁴ (UN HRC 01/03/2022; New Naratif 16/03/2022; The Diplomat 03/03/2022). People living in temporary makeshift shelters would be at risk of health issues, such as the spread of diseases resulting from unhygienic living conditions. Temporary shelters are often crowded and lack sufficient living space, resulting in a lack of privacy and protection concerns, especially for women and children.

Indigenous Papuans have already faced economic marginalisation and the loss of land rights because of transmigration programmes in West Papua territory.

Future transmigration would result in the loss of livelihoods for some indigenous Papuans (UCA News 05/11/2014 and 24/02/2022; Kadir et al. 2020; UTexas accessed 26/09/2022). Resulting access constraints and pre-existing poverty would aggravate humanitarian needs. In 2021, 9.7% of people across Indonesia lived below the poverty line, and the highest percentages were in the provinces of Papua (27%) and West Papua (22%) (ACAPS 07/07/2022 and 01/07/2022; UN HRC 01/03/2022; The Conversation 09/01/2019; BPS 25/02/2022).



⁴ A significant portion of the indigenous population lives in highland areas, near forests. The security situation in highland areas of West Papua territory has markedly deteriorated since the killing of a high-ranking military officer in 2021 by the West Papua National Liberation Army (IDH accessed 04/09/2022; UN 01/03/2022). Violence is likely to cause the displaced to flee to areas such as forests.

Source: ACLED (accessed 27/09/2022)

*Protests and riots have seen a slight increase since June 2022, when the new law on the division of Papua province was declared. Number of protests and riots started to decrease again in July. This risk envisages renewed protests with the implementation of the new law, likely to be met by a violent response



MEXICO [1/2]

An increase in the number of Haitian and Salvadoran migrants and asylum seekers in Mexico seeking to reach the US causes a deterioration of needs at the southern border



 Risk level | Medium

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

There were over 562,000 asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants or people of concern in Mexico in 2021 (UNHCR accessed 29/09/2022). According to the government institution working on refugee assistance (Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados), Mexico received over 48,600 asylum seeker applications in the first half of 2022, an almost 15% increase compared to the same period in 2021. For all of 2021, Mexico received around 130,000 applications. 90,000 were filed in the border city of Tapachula (Chiapas state) (Latinus 05/07/2022; WOLA 02/06/2022; IFRC 16/09/2022). Most of the people entering irregularly cross the southern border, mainly through the city of Tapachula. As per the Refugees and Supplementary Protection Law, immigrants cannot leave the point of entry until their migration status is resolved (OCHA 22/08/2022; DRC/JRS 18/08/2022; Cámara de Diputados 21/02/2012). The sheer volume of people arriving and staying in the city has caused delays in the process of obtaining documentation (SEGOB 06/2022; La Jornada 22/06/2022; WOLA 02/06/2022). A further increase of people crossing the

border at an unprecedented scale is expected because of worsening humanitarian situations and security conditions in other countries in the region, such as Haiti and El Salvador.

In El Salvador, a deterioration in humanitarian conditions is expected in the coming months because of a state of emergency – established in mid-May to limit criminal gangs' activity and extended for the fifth time on 16 August – and economic instability (WOLA 31/03/2022; IPS 29/07/2022; AI 31/05/2022; NYT 05/07/2022; CNN 15/05/2022). Through the state of emergency, the Government has suspended constitutional guarantees and has arbitrarily detained more than 50,000 people (WOLA 31/03/2022; IPS 29/07/2022; Diario Las Américas 18/08/2022; DPLF 14/06/2022). The adoption of bitcoin as the official currency in 2021 has deepened the economic crisis. The instability of bitcoin and its downward trend have affected the financing of health, education, and housing social assistance (Chiapas Paralelo 19/09/2022; Forbes 23/05/2022; El Tiempo 13/05/2022; Expansión 21/06/2022; El País 09/05/2022). In Haiti, gang control has spread since the assassination of

Prime Minister Jovenel Möise in 2021, leading to increased protection threats for the population and severe humanitarian access challenges (MSF 28/07/2022 and 29/07/2022; ECHO 28/07/2022; UNCT Haiti 25/07/2022; ICRC 20/07/2022). In the next six months, the further deterioration of the situation in El Salvador and Haiti would likely increase mixed migration to Mexico through the southern border, mainly through Tapachula city.



MEXICO [2/2] ⊕ NEW RISK



IMPACT

The increase in the number of migrants and asylum seekers in need of assistance in Tapachula overwhelms the administrative capacity of Mexican authorities to provide permits that allow them to move and access goods and services (i.e. food, health, education, and work programmes). These mobility restrictions also restrict them from accessing humanitarian aid in other cities in Mexico (SEGOB 06/2022; La Jornada 20/06/2022).

The situation would likely result in a high number of migrants and asylum seekers stranded in Tapachula in need of humanitarian assistance (WOLA 02/06/2022; DRC/JRS 21/06/2022; La Jornada 20/06/2022). Owing to increased migration flows into Tapachula, the increased demand for jobs and a lack of work opportunities – already decreased by business closures and inflation because of COVID-19 – would deteriorate access to income for the host community and migrants (DRC/JRS 21/06/2022; IOM 21/07/2022; Diario de Chiapas 18/07/2022; El Universo 05/07/2022).

The worsening of this crisis in Mexico, particularly in Tapachula, will boost the number of ‘caravans’ of people seeking to reach the US or other Mexican cities (El Tiempo Latino 31/08/2022). Protection needs are likely to rise as people transiting Mexico have experienced xenophobia; the excessive use of force by authorities; and enforced disappearance, killings, and robberies by non-state armed groups (IOM 2021; UN 28/06/2022; El País 28/06/2022 and 14/10/2019; Correa-Cabrera/Koizumi 15/11/2021).

Migration flows to Mexico



Source: MPI 18/05/2022; El Tiempo Latino 29/08/2022; DDC 07/09/2022; EOM 25/11/2021; El Horizonte 27/09/2021

Note: Most Haitians enter Latin America through Chile or Colombia. Lack of livelihood opportunities and financial resources and inflation in South American countries push them to migrate to Mexico, with the aim of reaching The US



SUDAN [1/2]

⌚ MARKED DETERIORATION



Increased intercommunal clashes in Blue Nile state lead to displacement and more needs for shelter, healthcare, and legal documentation

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Tensions have been increasing between the Hausa tribe and other tribes (such as the Fung, Berti, and Hamaj) in Blue Nile state since January, when Hausa celebrated creating their own emirate in the state and started requesting to be part of the Blue Nile Native Administration to achieve governmental recognition. The administration already includes representatives of other Blue Nile tribes (Al Jazeera 19/07/2022; Alhurra 17/07/2022; BBC 23/07/2022). Other factors contributing to the increase in tensions are related to origins: Hausa migrated hundreds of years ago from West Africa but are still perceived by other groups as 'guests' and not natives of Blue Nile state (Alhurra 17/07/2022; Sudan Tribune 06/08/2022; Ayin Network 20/07/2022). For such reasons, the native administration has not welcomed Hausa's request to be included. Tensions peaked in mid-July when a land dispute between members of Hausa and Fung tribes escalated into armed clashes, displacing over 37,000 people mostly from Hausa tribe (OCHA 07/08/2022; IOM 16/08/2022).

Increased ethnic tensions and Hausa returns in some areas would likely drive further intercommunal clashes in Blue Nile. Hausa households would likely face forced evacuation out of Blue Nile. Since mid-July, there has been an increase in hate speech on social media by other tribes' community leaders intending to mobilise people against Hausa (ACJPS 01/08/2022; Masr360 31/07/2022). A dispute over access to markets between an IDP returnee Hausa and Aj Jabalaween tribe member on 14 August resulted in one death and six injuries, indicating the continuation of tribal tensions (IOM 15/08/2022). On 1 September, clashes erupted between Hausa and Hamaj tribes after recently displaced Hausa attempted to return to their homes in Blue Nile, displacing 66,000 people mostly into Sennar state (IOM 04/09/2022; Dabanga 16/09/2022).



SUDAN [2/2]

⟳ MARKED DETERIORATION



IMPACT

Based on previous events of intercommunal violence, increased clashes in Blue Nile would likely displace up to 100,000 people in the next six months. However, some would likely be temporary displacements. As observed during July clashes, shelter needs for the displaced and healthcare needs for the injured are expected to be high for the affected population. Displaced families would likely stay in public buildings, such as schools; the start of the school year on 2 October would result in limited shelter options and increased shelter needs for displaced Hausa families (IOM 16/08/2022; OCHA 07/08/2022; Al Taghyeer 13/09/2022). Evacuated and displaced Hausa people would likely seek shelter in Sennar and Aj Jazira states – as during previous displacement events – and unite with other Hausa tribes residing in those two states (IOM 16/08/2022; OCHA 07/08/2022). This movement has the potential to increase tensions in Sennar and Aj Jazira between Hausa and other tribes, representing an extension of the tribal tensions and clashes in Blue Nile.

The response capacity of healthcare facilities, such as the Ed Damazine hospital, is limited owing to a lack of medical supplies and staff. This limitation increases needs for healthcare services to treat injured people in case of armed clashes (AP 16/07/2022; AllAfrica/Dabanga 20/07/2022).

Assistance to obtain legal documentation, such as identification cards, for the displaced could be needed. Media reporting indicated that there were calls by other tribes to strip away the identification cards of displaced people in July to indicate that they were not Blue Nile citizens (KII 10/08/2022; The New Khalij 17/07/2022; Al Rakoba 17/07/2022).



1.3M

Total population
of Blue Nile
(OCHA 25/09/2022)



800,000

The estimated number
of Hausa in Blue Nile
(KII 22/08/2022)



37,700

Displaced people in Blue
Nile because of inter-com-
munal conflicts between
January-August
(OCHA 05/09/2022)



440,000

People in need of
humanitarian assis-
tance in Blue Nile
(OCHA 02/12/2021)



SYRIA/LEBANON

+ NEW RISK



Involuntary mass returns of Syrian refugees from Lebanon amid a current socioeconomic crisis put them in unsafe and inadequate living conditions

Risk level | Medium

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

In June 2022, the Lebanese Government announced its plan to send 15,000 Syrian refugees monthly to Syria. An exact start date has not been communicated, but authorities have confirmed carrying the plan out soon in cooperation with the Syrian Government (MEMO 24/06/2022; 961 04/07/2022; OLJ 15/08/2022). The UN, UN agencies, and INGOs have long stated that Syria is not safe for return and have renewed calls against the plan (RPW 17/11/2021; MEI 22/02/2022; HRW 06/07/2022). Syrians face resentment and violence from members of Lebanese host communities and face pressure from authorities to leave Lebanon through the imposition of restrictions to access job opportunities and services (OLJ 13/08/2022; Save the Children 08/08/2022; HRW accessed 30/09/2022). Anti-refugee sentiment in Lebanon stems from a combination of economic, political, and social issues (Brookings 15/04/2021; The Economist 22/08/2019; The New Arab 10/08/2022). The COVID-19 pandemic and the Beirut port explosion in August 2020 have aggravated the economic crisis in Lebanon. The Lebanese currency has lost 90% of its value since 2019, and the multidimensional poverty rate has nearly doubled from 42% in 2019 to 82% in 2021 (UNESWA 16/12/2021). The socioeconomic crisis is largely a result of

unsustainable economic policies and political issues but has led to increasing anti-refugee sentiment in public and political rhetoric on planned returns (The New Arab 10/08/2022; Enab Baladi 08/08/2022; AP 21/07/2022; OLJ 09/09/2022; WB 25/01/2022; IMF 21/09/2022). Aside from normalised relations with the Syrian Government, the deportation plans announced in May in Türkiye may have emboldened the Lebanese Government to announce similar deportation plans (MEI 24/03/2022; AP 21/06/2022; Daily Sabah 10/05/2022). Presidential elections set for the end of October 2022 may further entice candidates to use anti-refugee sentiment to gain public support.

IMPACT

Only 20% of 1.5 million Syrians in Lebanon have legal residency documents (UNHCR et al. 19/02/2021; UNDP/UNHCR 08/05/2022; UNHCR accessed 30/09/2022). Deportations could affect up to 90,000 Syrians in the next six months (October–March) (MEMO 24/06/2022; 961 04/07/2022). They would face harsh living conditions in Syria, where over 65% of the population were projected to need humanitarian assistance and over 90% lived below the poverty line in 2022 (OCHA 22/02/2022). Over three million IDPs live in the government-controlled areas where

people would be sent (ECHO 10/05/2022). There are reports of Syrians who returned to Syria from Lebanon and Jordan, including some who had security clearances, experiencing arbitrary detentions, torture, kidnappings, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and incidents of sexual violence (HRW 06/07/2022). Fear of deportation was a significant concern among Syrians in Lebanon in 2021 (RPW 17/11/2021). If Lebanon commences deportations, Syrians may resort to negative crisis-coping mechanisms to hide from Lebanese authorities, such as skipping meals and avoiding critical health services, education, markets, and livelihood activities (Brookings 15/04/2021; NPR 06/04/2020). Many Syrians forced to return are likely to attempt to come back to Lebanon because of economic hardship or insecurity or to evade military conscription, undergoing additional displacement within a short timeframe (RPW 17/11/2021). Anti-refugee sentiment and forced deportations may increase the migration of Syrians from Lebanon to Europe via unsafe boats across the east Mediterranean Sea route, which is particularly dangerous in colder temperatures (The Guardian 24/09/2022; AP 15/08/2022; TNH 18/01/2022).


SYRIA/TÜRKİYE [1/3]



Nearing general elections and economic hardship trigger a renewed military incursion of Türkiye into northern Syria, resulting in displacement and urgent humanitarian and protection needs

 Risk level | Medium

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

In August 2022, Türkiye announced that it had begun final preparations for a military incursion into northern Syria against the Syrian Kurdish armed groups People's Protection Units (YPG) and Women's Protection Units (YPJ) – the People's Protection Units and its sister militia. The Turkish Government perceives the groups as linked with the armed separatist group Kurdistan Worker's Party, with whom Ankara has been in protracted armed conflict since 1984 (Al-Monitor 30/05/2022; ICCT 28/06/2022; CFR 03/08/2022; Ashraq Al-Awsat 10/08/2022). In 2019, Türkiye disclosed its intention to secure all of northern Syria from Kurdish armed groups (The Guardian 24/09/2019). Türkiye faced strong pushback from the US and Russia against further incursion into Syria, but the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine since February 2022 has pulled the attention of international powers towards Europe (HRW 17/08/2022; Al Jazeera 10/10/2019). Internally, with general elections scheduled for June 2023, a military operation could raise approval ratings for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party, as it did in 2019, helping him secure re-election (Reuters

05/11/2019). Parallel with the military plan announcements, Türkiye renewed its intent to move one million Syrians back to Syria (Al Arabiya 03/05/2022; DW 27/07/2022). According to a Metropoll survey conducted in 2021 and reported by the media, over 80% of Turkish electors supported the return of Syrians to their country; among Erdoğan voters, the rate is slightly higher at 84% (The New Arab 24/06/2022; The Guardian 23/08/2022).

On 1 June 2022, Erdoğan stated that the incursion would first target Tal Rifaat and Manbij cities, followed by other areas. If Türkiye seeks to link areas already under its control in northeast Syria, the incursion would likely target areas north of M4 route, including Ain Issa, Kobani, and Tell Tamer (Al-Monitor 30/05/2022; Al Jazeera 01/06/2022).

IMPACT

Türkiye's planned military incursion into northern Syria, starting with Tal Rifaat, would expose at least 100,000 people to conflict. The Manbij population is around 660,000 (Rudaw 20/10/2021; OCHA 07/2022). The estimated population in and around Kobani was 200,000 as at 2019 (Reuters 16/04/2019). Based on past

Turkish incursions (in 2018 and 2019) that resulted in large-scale displacements, renewed active ground conflict and air strikes would result in displacement and emergency humanitarian needs, including shelter, health, WASH, and food. IDPs would likely head further east in northern Syria; because of social and safety perceptions, they would want to remain in Kurdish areas. People in Tal Rifaat and surrounding towns not adjacent to Kurdish areas of control would most likely head south to areas under governmental control, in Aleppo governorate, free from active fighting.

Active conflict and a possible change in territorial control would lead to increased civilian deaths and violence, including gender-based violence, particularly against activists and Syrian ethnic and religious minorities (OCHA 15/06/2018; RI 12/11/2019; VOA 10/06/2020). Alternatively, if the area comes under the control of the Russian military and the Syrian army – whether to prevent Turkish advancement or in coordination with Türkiye – there would be heightened concerns for the safety of those perceived by the Government of Syria as opposition figures and activists (HRW 17/08/2022; VOA 23/12/2020; Al 18/10/2019; The Guardian 23/08/2022).




SYRIA/TÜRKİYE [2/3]

+ NEW RISK



Timeline of Turkish military intervention in northern Syria against Kurdish armed groups




SYRIA/TÜRKİYE [3/3]

+ NEW RISK



Areas of Syria affected by the potential military incursion




Source: ACAPS



MAURITANIA

(1/2)  MARKED DETERIORATION



Rising food and fuel prices worsen socioeconomic instability and ethnic tensions, leading to social unrest and food and livelihood needs

 Risk level | Low

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Three main ethnic groups make up Mauritania's population: the Black Africans, the Black Moors (the Haratin), and the White Moors (the Bidhan) (The Carnegie Papers 04/2012; Arab Center 16/08/2022; GSDRC 01/2014; Crisis24 accessed 28/09/2022). At times, differences in the social and political roles that these groups occupy have resulted in socioeconomic divisions, triggering protests. Since at least the 1960s, tensions have existed between the three groups, mainly because the Bidhan hold the most political positions among them (COFACE accessed 28/08/2022; Global Voices 17/07/2020; Al Araby 23/11/2016; GSDRC 01/2014).


A rise in the cost of living, a decline in hard currency, the possible devaluation of the Mauritanian ouguiya (the local currency), and a prolonged period of drought since 2019 would likely further worsen social (including ethnic) tensions, leading to social unrest (AFDB accessed 28/08/2022; Anbaa 20/07/2022; WFP accessed 28/08/2022; IFRC 30/09/2021). The prices of basic commodities, such as sorghum, maize, and wheat, have been increasing since at least July 2021 (Oxfam accessed 28/09/2022; OCHA accessed 24/08/2022). Year-on-year food

inflation and overall inflation rates driven by debt distress and the global inflation of energy and food prices are at their highest compared to a ten-year rate, reaching 16% and 6.9%, respectively, in June (TE accessed 24/08/2022). The increase in commodity prices is expected to continue in an upward trend until at least January 2023 (FEWS NET 29/07/2022). Media reports indicate that parts of the population are frustrated with how the (mostly Bidhan) Government is managing the country's economy, as well as the increased corruption of officials. In July, the Government increased fuel prices by 30% following the global increase in oil prices, triggering demonstrations led by opposition groups. The police used force to stop the demonstrations (The New Arab 21/07/2022; Alquds Alarabi 17/07/2022; Al-Ghad 26/07/2022).



MAURITANIA [2/2]

⟳ MARKED DETERIORATION




IMPACT

About 17% (770,000) of Mauritania's population live below the extreme poverty line. They would likely be the most affected by the increasing cost of living, social and ethnic tensions, and socioeconomic instability, possibly leading to violent demonstrations and riots (Lloyds Bank accessed 28/09/2022; Oxfam accessed 28/09/2022). Their needs for food, malnutrition response, and livelihood assistance would likely increase.

More than half of the people in Mauritania work in agriculture-related activities, such as farming and herding (IFAD accessed 28/09/2022). Three years of drought and increased fertiliser and feed prices have already been affecting them since 2019. Social instability and potential riots across the country would likely further challenge agricultural activities, disrupt livelihoods, and increase livelihood needs.

Food needs would likely increase with the current rise in commodity prices. Social instability and its impact on livelihoods would also aggravate food needs. Already, an additional 310,000 people are expected to be food-insecure by December 2022, making about 23% of the country's total population food-insecure compared to 15% between March–May (IFRC 05/07/2022; RPCA accessed 28/08/2022; FAO/WFP 06/06/2022).



LATEST DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH

Since mid-August 2022, ACAPS has been closely monitoring the developments related to Al-Shabaab activity in Somali region in Ethiopia.

Evidence, however, is still too limited to have a clear understanding of how the situation might develop in the next six month and what the scale of the impact will be. Regardless, ACAPS believes that humanitarian responders should closely monitor new developments in existing crises such as this one for preparedness.

We have tracked and will continue to update all the developments presented in this Global Risk Report in the ACAPS Risk List.

ETHIOPIA

Security vacuum in Somali region leads to increased Al-Shabaab activity, leading to further displacements, resource-based clashes, and more severe humanitarian needs

In July 2022, Al-Shabaab militants conducted an attack on Aato, Washaqaq, and Yeed towns and Lasqurun village (near Feerfeer town) in Somali region, Ethiopia, entering through southwestern Somalia. During clashes between Al-Shabaab militants and the Liyu police, at least one other armed Al-Shabaab unit was able to enter Ethiopia without resistance ([Ethiopia Insight 09/09/2022](#); [VOA 26/07/2022](#)). Though Al-Shabaab had previously targeted Ethiopian forces deployed in Somalia, attacks within Ethiopian territory were uncommon ([The Jamestown Foundation 09/09/2022](#); [Sudan Tribune 07/08/2022](#)). All current active conflicts within Ethiopia and heightened tensions with its neighbouring countries may stretch the capacity of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces and create a security vacuum in Somali region at the advantage of armed groups like Al-Shabaab ([The Africa Report 25/07/2022](#); [The Independent 07/07/2022](#); [Al Jazeera 24/08/2022](#)).

Severe drought, subsequent resource-based clashes, and tensions between ethnic communities already affect Somali region. These issues have caused the inability of the affected population to meet basic needs, including food and water, and led them to need humanitarian assistance.

Al-Shabaab managing to expand into Ethiopia would challenge access to populations already suffering from drought and deteriorate their humanitarian situation. There were over one million IDPs in accessible sites in Somali region as at the latest IOM assessment in May ([IOM 30/05/2022](#)). Further conflict is likely to increase the number of displaced people within the region, especially from the border towns with Somalia, and result in more severe needs for the affected population.



UPDATE FROM THE MARCH 2022 RISK ANALYSIS

These risks were identified in the February 2022 report. Below each risk title, we have provided an update on the situation.

COLOMBIA/VENEZUELA — ● Medium risk level

The intensification of armed conflict on both sides of the Colombian-Venezuelan border and in Venezuela increases the number of internally displaced Colombians and Venezuelans in Colombia needing assistance

The risk has materialised; the conflict between armed groups at the Colombian-Venezuelan border intensified in the last six months. Increased disputes over territorial control – mainly between the National Liberation Army (ELN), dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), and La Segunda Marquetalia – drive the escalation of the crisis (GIFMM/Protection Cluster 08/07/2022). Arauca, Cauca, La Guajira, Norte de Santander, and Vichada departments (Colombia) and Amazonas, Apure, Bolívar, Tachira, and Zulia states (Venezuela) are the most affected regions as these departments and states are strategic for narcotics traffic (GIFMM/Protection Cluster 08/07/2022; CeroSetenta 05/04/2022; Semana 11/07/2022).

On the Venezuelan side, there have been reports of extortion, homicide, forced displacements, confinements, and other actions by armed groups (La Liga Contra el Silencio 16/08/2022; GIFMM/Protection Cluster 08/07/2022; FundaREDES 04/2022; El Colombiano 12/08/2022). Bolívar state is the most affected by conflict escalation owing to the increased presence of armed

groups and their activity in the region. In Apure, the trend of armed conflict remains stable, but the population is facing enforced disappearances and arbitrary detentions by the Venezuelan military, that is in the area to fight the armed groups (GIFMM/Protection Cluster 08/07/2022; FundaREDES 04/2022). In Apure, Bolívar, and Tachira, there are heightened concerns over the recruitment and trafficking of Venezuelans irregularly crossing the Colombian border (GIFMM/Protection Cluster 08/07/2022; FundaREDES 04/2022; La Liga Contra el Silencio 16/08/2022).

On the Colombian side of the border, individual displacement increased from 763 people in all of 2021 to 11,000 over January–June 2022. Regarding mass displacements, 30,000 people were displaced over January–June. 61,000 people have been confined, including over 2,630 Venezuelan migrants and refugees (GIFMM/Protection Cluster 08/07/2022; CICR 27/07/2022; Infobae 10/08/2022). The Venezuelan population displaced to Colombia are mostly in Arauca, Norte de Santander, or Vichada (CeroSetenta 05/04/2022). The number of people displaced puts a strain on services and resources and has exhausted the capacity of local authorities (CeroSetenta 05/04/2022; Semana 11/07/2022; Fundación Fepropaz 22/04/2022; Infobae 13/05/2022).



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

FROM MARCH 2022

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)

The detection of COVID-19 cases causes the Government to (re-)enact strict border controls, worsening food insecurity and decreasing food consumption and nutritional diversity levels among the most vulnerable

This risk has materialised as raised in March. In May 2022, the DPRK confirmed the detection of COVID-19 cases and a fever outbreak in the country. A strict national lockdown and border control measures followed (BBC 12/05/2022; NK News 17/06/2022; 38 North 15/08/2022; KCNA 13/05/2022). The DPRK announced the confirmed COVID-19 cases soon after the virus peaked in the Chinese province of Jilin in late March. The DPRK shares a significant portion of its border with the province; both countries conduct land trade through this border (BBC 12/05/2022; Reuters 22/03/2022; NK News 17/06/2022; Google News accessed 31/08/2022). Around 4.8 million cumulative fever cases (nearly 20% of the country's total population) were reported in the DPRK as at 31 August 2022 (Worldometer accessed 31/08/2022; NK News 17/06/2022). Newer restrictions in the country and by China, its largest trading partner by far, have restricted the inflow of essential items into the country (Nikkei 07/08/2022; Reuters 05/08/2022; IPCS 17/05/2022; The Diplomat 13/08/2022). The new restrictions are believed to have affected the already dire food insecurity and nutritional deficiency levels in the country, especially among the most vulnerable, including the children and the elderly (IPDF 01/07/2022; IPCS 17/05/2022). In 2020–2021, the food-insecure population was estimated to be 11–16 million (45–60% of the total population) and the prevalence of chronic

● Medium risk level

malnutrition among children under five years of age was estimated at 18% (WFP accessed 31/08/2022; UN RC DPRK 22/04/2020; USDA 28/07/2021). Rice is a staple food in the country, with corn being the cheaper alternative. The prices of both have increased in recent months, with more people possibly being unable to buy food (BBC 23/06/2021; Daily NK 20/06/2022; RFA 28/06/2022).

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

The resurgence of the 23 March Movement (M23) and intensification of conflict lead to displacement and further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Nord-Kivu

The risk that we identified in March has materialised. The humanitarian situation in the territories of Rutshuru and Nyiragongo (Nord-Kivu) has deteriorated since March 2022 because of the resurgence of the M23. Continued clashes between the armed group and the Congolese army have displaced at least 186,000 people within Nord-Kivu province, while an estimated 58,000 people have taken refuge in neighbouring Uganda since January 2022 (UNHCR 12/09/2022). More than 210,000 people need humanitarian assistance, mainly in Rutshuru and Nyiragongo territories, as a result of this crisis (OCHA 05/08/2021 and 24/08/2022; HRW 25/07/2022).

On 13 June, the M23 took control of the city of Bunagana, hampering economic activities. Abuses against civilians were reported (HRW 25/07/2022; Monitor 14/06/2022; Radio Okapi 15/08/2022). The Government made the withdrawal of the

M23 from the city of Bunagana a prerequisite for any negotiations with the armed group (Le Potentiel 19/07/2022; Ouragan 21/07/2022; Politico 08/09/2022). The violence also had political implications given Rwanda's alleged support of the M23. This support led to violent protests against Rwanda in several provinces of the Republic of Congo (Al Jazeera 31/05/2022). Demonstrators targeted people suspected of being of Rwandan origin and looted or destroyed their property. The tensions eased after a meeting between the presidents of the two countries (Africanews 15/06/2022; France 24 15/06/2022; TV5MONDE 06/07/2022).

In July, violent demonstrations accusing MONUSCO of ineffectiveness in the fight against armed groups took place in Goma, Butembo (Nord-Kivu), and Uvira (South Kivu), killing civilians and soldiers (Al Jazeera 26/07/2022).

ETHIOPIA

● Medium risk level

Resource-based clashes because of continuing drought increase insecurity and conflict displacement in Oromia and Somali regions

The risk has materialised; the severity of drought has resulted in the further unavailability of resources like water, food, and land and the aggravation of intercommunal conflicts in Oromia and Somali regions. The rainy season between March–May 2022 failed, making it the fourth consecutive failed rainy season (UNHCR 28/06/2022). Below-average rains are also expected for the October–November rainy season (WMO 25/08/2022). By the end of August, drought had affected more than 24 mil-



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

FROM MARCH 2022

lion people in Ethiopia, mostly in Oromia and Somali regions (OCHA 24/08/2022). This figure is a significant increase from the 6.8 million drought-affected people in December 2021, also mostly in Oromia and Somali (UNICEF 01/02/2022; OCHA 07/03/2022). Between January–June 2022, intercommunal conflicts increased over resources in Oromia, mostly in Guji and West Guji zones. Drought-induced needs likely contributed to the increase. Sporadic intercommunal clashes have also been recorded across the region (OCHA 24/08/2022 and 09/08/2022; Addis Standard 18/07/2022). Conflict, followed by drought, remains the main cause of displacement in both regions, but the link between conflict events and the effect of drought- and resource-based clashes is not always clear (IOM 05/08/2022). Humanitarian access to the two regions has been extremely restricted because of increased insecurity, affecting drought-response operations (OCHA 09/08/2022).

KENYA — ● Low risk level

Electoral violence and increased intercommunal conflict throughout Kenya result in displacement, livelihood disruptions, and protection concerns

Despite some episode of electoral violence, this risk has not materialised as expected. The Kenyan general elections took place on 9 August 2022. In the pre-electoral period and during the campaign from 1 January to 5 August, around 800 protests occurred. This figure is an almost 300% increase from the same period before

the 2017 general elections polling day (270 protests). About half of the 800 were violent and killed nearly 100 people. Protests were particularly violent in April during party primaries (ACLED 09/08/2022; ACLED accessed 23/08/2022; The East African 16/04/2022). In Laikipia county, drought and the divisive campaign rhetoric contributed to intercommunal violence (ICG 20/07/2022). The election day on 9 August was largely peaceful, but there were violent disruptions to the scheduled polling in a few areas, such as Eldas constituency (Wajir county) (KNHCR 11/08/2022; AU 11/08/2022).

Shortly before the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission announced the outcome of the presidential elections on 15 August, some supporters of one of the candidates attempted, without effect, to use physical force to prevent the announcement (The East African 15/08/2022; Capital News 18/08/2022). There were also violent protests in Kisumu city and some informal settlements in Nairobi (Baba Dogo, Kawangware, Kibera, and Mathare) after the announcement of the outcome of the presidential elections. Calm was restored, however, and the protests did not continue after 15 August (News24 15/08/2022; Al Jazeera 15/08/2022; Capital News 15/08/2022). In a ruling made on 5 September, the Supreme Court of Kenya rejected petitions challenging the outcome of the presidential elections. Calm prevailed countywide after the Supreme Court ruling, and William Ruto was inaugurated as the fifth president of Kenya on 13 September (BBC 05/09/2022; TWP 05/09/2022; Global Sisters Report 09/09/2022; BBC 13/09/2022).

MALI — ● High risk level

Prolonged economic sanctions lead to the loss of livelihoods and increased food insecurity

This risk has partially materialised. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) economic sanctions against Mali were lifted on 3 July 2022 after the junta presented a timetable for the next presidential elections, which it set for March 2024. The individual sanctions against the leaders of the junta and the suspension of Mali from the organs of ECOWAS remain until the return of civilian power in the country (VOA 04/07/2022; France 24 03/07/2022). This risk has partially materialised in terms of rising food prices, but the impact of sanctions on humanitarian access has been very limited. The same can be said for the impact of sanctions on livestock farming. The increase in food insecurity has materialised, but food security was expected to deteriorate nationwide regardless of the sanctions, making it difficult to attribute solely to the economic sanctions that lasted almost six months. The decline in trade flows with external markets in connection with ECOWAS sanctions has increased food prices, which continue to be high. Poor households have seen their access to food deteriorate further (FEWS NET 30/04/2022; France 24 03/07/2022).



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MALI — ● Medium risk level

The withdrawal of the Barkhane force and consequent increase in clashes and territorial expansion between armed groups result in displacement, protection concerns, and the deterioration of humanitarian access

This risk has materialised. Since the announcement of the withdrawal of the Barkhane force from Mali in February 2022 and its actual withdrawal in August, non-state armed groups have continued to expand their presence and activity across the country. The presence of non-state armed groups had already been affecting the north and centre of Mali; the humanitarian situation has also since started deteriorating in the south (TV5MONDE 29/07/2022). After a few rare incursions, the activity of armed groups in the south of the country is intensifying, closing several schools particularly in the regions of Sikasso and Koulikoro (Save the Children/UNICEF 27/04/2022). Despite the junta promising to foster the effectiveness and response of the Malian army – with support from the Russian paramilitary company Wagner – after the departure of the Barkhane force, attacks targeting civilians and troops have multiplied across the country (AA 16/08/2022; AI 16/06/2022). Abuses against civilians by the Malian security forces and the paramilitary group Wagner are also reported (ACLED 30/08/2022; HRW 05/04/2022). The attacks are getting closer to the capital Bamako. One of these attacks targeted the Kati military camp on 22 July, where the leader of the junta was living. This attack indicates a desire by the non-state armed groups to increase their activity in areas where they were previously not significantly active or present. The number of displaced people has grown in the regions of

Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro, and Sikasso as a result of the surge in attacks. The total number of displaced people across the country had risen from around 362,000 in February to over 396,000 as at 31 July (TV5MONDE 29/07/2022; BBC 22/07/2022; UNHCR accessed 30/09/2022).

PAKISTAN — ● Low risk level

The strengthened presence of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the newly merged tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) increases humanitarian needs, protection concerns, and access constraints in the area

This risk has partially materialised considering the increased TTP influence in KP province, widespread extortions, and heightened protection concerns for community members (USIP 21/06/2022; Gandhara 17/08/2022 and 21/09/2022).

In June 2022, as part of peace negotiations between Pakistan and the TTP (which started in October 2021), the TTP agreed on an open-ended ceasefire with Pakistan and with tribal leaders of KP (Gandhara 09/08/2022). The TTP ended the ceasefire on 3 September because the Government of Pakistan refused to meet its demands (The Express Tribune 03/09/2022; PT 03/09/2022; Gandhara 14/09/2022). As part of the negotiations with the Government, TTP leaders had demanded the reversal of the decision to merge the tribal districts in KP and the approval for TTP fighters to return from Afghanistan (where they had fled to in 2014 because of Pakistan's military offensive) to KP. Pakistan rejected both demands (Gandhara 13/01/2022; The Hindu 04/06/2022; USIP 21/06/2022). Hundreds of TTP

fighters, however, have already returned to KP from Afghanistan even without a signed peace agreement with the Government. A series of local protests voiced the people's concerns over the return of potential violence, human rights abuses, and criminal activity associated with the TTP, such as extortions (Gandhara 26/08/2022 and 17/08/2022; Dawn 26/08/2022). The TTP also uses its influence to control the lives of the people in certain areas of KP, potentially hampering people's access to public services and increasing access inequality for women and girls (VOA 10/08/2022; Gandhara 26/08/2022; Daily Islamabad Post 25/08/2022). The TTP continues to oppose polio vaccines and targeted polio campaigns in KP in December 2021, although violence against polio health workers in Pakistan is common (DW 11/12/2021; VOA 16/08/2022). Polio cases in Pakistan increased from one in 2021 to 15 by mid-2022, all in the northern Waziristan district of KP bordering Afghanistan (AP 29/06/2022; GPEI accessed 31/08/2022). There is no evidence to attribute the increase in polio cases to TTP presence and influence.

THE PHILIPPINES — ● Medium risk level

Political violence and attacks by armed groups in Mindanao around the presidential May elections result in displacement and protection issues

The risk has materialised. The Philippines' three-month-long election campaign spanned from February–May 2022, with general elections occurring on 9 May (Protection Cluster accessed 30/09/2022; Reuters 08/02/2022). Conflict-related displacements rose from February–May; during that period,



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around 47,000 conflict-related displacements were recorded, including 3,500 in May alone. In comparison, only around 3,130 conflict-related displacements were recorded in the four months prior to the election campaign (October 2021 to January 2022) (Protection Cluster 30/11/2021 a, 30/11/2021 b, 31/12/2021, 07/04/2022, 08/04/2022, 21/04/2022, 20/05/2022, and 14/06/2022; PNA 09/05/2022; MSSD 21/05/2022; Rappler 09/05/2022; The Inquirer 09/05/2022; France 24 09/05/2022; Al Jazeera 09/05/2022). Election-related violence drove around 90% of conflict-related displacements in May. Almost all of these displacements occurred in Maguindanao province (Protection Cluster 14/06/2022). IDPs took refuge in temporary shelters, such as schools and mosques, in nearby communities and with relatives. They were provided with emergency support in the form of tarpaulins, food, and potable drinking water, especially for those residing in temporary shelters. Most conflict-related displacements in the mentioned eight-month period were temporary, and most of the IDPs have returned to their places of origin. Some IDP returnees have expressed concerns regarding their safety and security because of unresolved conflict (Protection Cluster 30/11/2021 a, 30/11/2021 b, 31/12/2021, 07/04/2022, 08/04/2022, 21/04/2022, 20/05/2022, and 14/06/2022). Around 15 people died from election-related violence in Mindanao during the campaign period and on election day (ACLED accessed 31/08/2022; NYT 09/05/2022; The Diplomat 20/05/2022).

SUDAN — ● High risk level

A reduction in subsidies causing severe electricity and fuel shortages leads to crop failures, livelihood loss, and worsening food insecurity

The risk has partially materialised. Expected increases in fuel prices have affected agriculture, contributing to a price spike for some food items and worsening food security levels (FEWS NET 29/07/2022 and 31/07/2022). There has, however, been no escalation of tensions between the Government and farmers in northern Sudan and no disruption to the electrical supply line from Merowe dam. Electricity did not see further cuts in subsidies, meaning no further increases in electricity prices, unlike for fuel. At the beginning of August, transportation costs increased by 40–50% following an increase in petrol and diesel prices in the country (Dabanga 02/08/2022; Asharq Al-Awsat 24/07/2022). High fuel prices have affected agricultural activities, such as land preparation, which usually starts in April. The removal of fuel and electricity subsidies in late 2021 also increased the prices of some food items like sorghum and wheat in 2022. Sorghum prices in July were more than 600% higher than in the same month in 2021 (FEWS NET 29/07/2022 and 31/07/2022).

TONGA — ● Low risk level

Continued COVID-19-related movement restrictions and extreme weather conditions during the cyclone season delay the recovery process from the tsunami and result in increased humanitarian needs

The risk has partially materialised. COVID-19 restrictions in Tonga have hindered recovery efforts after the volcanic eruption and tsunami, resulting in heightened humanitarian needs, although no extreme weather conditions, such as typhoons, have affected Tonga in the past six months. COVID-19 mitigation measures (the state of emergency ended on 26 September), including renewed lockdowns, have had a significant impact on the capacity of governmental and humanitarian organisations to distribute aid (IFRC 15/04/2022; IFRC 01/08/2022; A3M accessed 02/10/2022). Organisations have been forced to scale back operations in terms of time and capacity and adopt contactless distributions during the restrictions (IFRC 15/04/2022). Aid distribution to some outer islands has had to be conducted through air drops (IFRC 24/07/2022). A 14-day quarantine period has been imposed on all people entering the country, and the number of available flights has been reduced (IFRC 15/04/2022 and 01/08/2022). The volcanic eruption on 15 January destroyed satellite connectivity and undersea communications. Rebuilding communications has been challenging, as equipment brought to Tonga has had to undergo stringent COVID-19-mitigation protocols (WFP 06/06/2022; ETC/WFP 27/07/2022). Other COVID-19-related restrictions, such as limitations on inter-island travel, have contributed to food shortages. The restrictions have also affected people with disabilities and children; for one, the



COVID-19 outbreak has temporarily closed Tonga Red Cross Society's school for children with disabilities (IFRC 24/07/2022). Natural disasters in 2022, mainly the volcanic eruption and subsequent tsunamis, and the lockdown have led to around 32,000 schoolchildren losing more than 500 hours' worth of learning (Gov't of Tonga et al. 11/08/2022).

YEMEN — ● Medium risk level

The militarisation of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports leads to targeted attacks on the ports, forcing their closure and causing food and fuel import disruptions

This risk remains active. Since the publication of this risk in March, accusations about the militarisation of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports have subsided as the parties to the conflict agreed on a truce on 2 April 2022. This, however, expired without renewal on 2 October. On 1 September the Houthis organised a military parade in Al Hodeidah, which local and international stakeholders condemned as a breach of the 2018 Stockholm Agreement to demilitarise the port city (The National 02/09/2022; UNMHA Twitter 01/09/2022). A continued display of military force is likely to trigger further tensions that could lead to the materialisation of the newly identified risk about the collapse of the truce. Similarly, if the truce collapses or is not extended, further military presence could build up in Al Hodeidah, likely triggering a resumption of air strikes by the Saudi-led coalition and other military confrontations in the area. Fuel imports through Al Hodeidah are also likely to be disrupted again if the IRG imposes new restrictions in response to the militarisation of ports. Overall, while the probability of a targeted attack on DFA-controlled Red Sea ports remains low, the risk remains relevant as its impact would have significant consequences on food and fuel supply flows, including for humanitarian purposes, resulting in increased acute humanitarian needs.



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