Mis- and disinformation: the challenges and solutions for NGOs

Mis- and disinformation campaigns are having a major impact on NGOs. Emily Wright explores the challenges and explains why analysing the media environment should be a key part of any mitigation strategy.

What are mis- and disinformation campaigns? 

In recent years, misinformation and disinformation campaigns have become increasingly prevalent in daily life – often amplified by social media.

Misinformation refers simply to the sharing of inaccurate information. On the other hand, disinformation refers to the deliberate sharing of inaccurate information with the intention to cause harm. A previous GISF blog explored the concept of disinformation and its impact during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The actors involved in disseminating disinformation can include state, non-state, or private actors. While this phenomenon continues to happen on mainstream social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and X (formerly known as Twitter), there is a rise in the use of more “fringe” platforms. These include Gab, 8Chan, Telegram, and others. Additionally, changes in content moderation rules on mainstream platforms, especially since the transition of Twitter to X, and an evolving reliance on AI to monitor content have impacted what kind of information goes viral.

How do mis- and disinformation campaigns impact NGOs?

Mis- and disinformation campaigns targeting non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can severely disrupt operations in three major ways.

First, these campaigns can compromise the safety of aid workers and turn them into targets. For example, during the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2019, misinformation and the politicisation of the disease hindered the ability of aid workers to respond. Armed groups attacked medical facilities on multiple occasions, resulting in injuries and deaths of aid workers and doctors.

Second, disinformation campaigns can hinder humanitarian access to populations. False and manipulated information can erode trust between communities and NGOs, making it difficult to deliver essential aid. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross faced campaigns claiming that they were forcefully evacuating civilians in Ukraine in 2022. This resulted in confusion and resistance to their work at local levels.

Third, these campaigns can result in significant reputational damage. This in turn can impact political will and jeopardise organisational funding. For instance, the Syrian-based NGO White Helmets saw their funding from the US State Department frozen after a disinformation campaign. Other examples of disinformation impacting the reputations of NGOs include a viral accusation that an executive of ActionAid was working with ISIS (The Islamic State). This had significant damage to ActionAid’s reputation, especially since at that time they worked in countries where ISIS was present.

Three components of a media environment context analysis

As the information environment is continuously evolving, there is no agreed strategy to address mis- and disinformation. However, conducting a media environment context analysis can be helpful.

This can help mitigate the impacts of disinformation and other related digital attacks. The media environment analysis can exist within an organisation’s current context analysis and actor mapping processes. However, due to the growing influence of social media and the impacts of disinformation, it is increasingly important to have dedicated sections examining the information, news, and social media environments.

Specific questions  can be used for each area of this analysis, inspired by Interaction’s Disinformation Toolkit 2.0 and Internews’ Rumour Tracking Studies.

Information environment

• Are information blockages, such as internet or website blackouts and shutdowns, common in the area? If so, who are the main actors involved, including local or state governments or information and communication technology companies?
• Has the government ordered media blackouts or censored specific issues in recent history?

News environment

• Who are the main influencers and stakeholders in the news landscape? Are press outlets state-controlled, owned by a small number of businesses, or is it an open environment with a plurality of independent voices?
• What sources of news are trusted by the public? Are the official news publications seen as legitimate sources or do people rely on information from social media and word of mouth?
• Do local press outlets have a history of running smear campaigns against NGOs, specific politicians, or opposition parties?

Social media environment

• What is the history of mobile connectivity and social media in the area? How long have people had access to cell phones? How long has social media been used and when did it rise in popularity?
• What levels of digital literacy are present in the area? Is there a notable difference in these levels between age, ethnic, or socio-economic groups?
• What kinds of social media platforms are common in the area? Are they ones that have stronger content moderation methodologies? Are they considered more “fringe” such as 8Chan? Or are they ones known for their lack of content moderation, such as X or Telegram?

Further guidance and resources for analysing the media environment

Assessing past mis- and disinformation campaigns against an organisation, its leadership, and topics related to its mandate is also crucial. On a more localised level, it is important to understand the organisation’s operational history in the area, previous challenges, and experiences with local communities.

This concept is explored in Interaction’s Disinformation Toolkit 2.0 and Internews’ Rumour Tracking Studies. GISF’s Digital Risk: how new technologies impact acceptance and raise new challenges for NGOs also expands on these issues.

A response to a disinformation campaign can exist within an organisation’s contingency plan for other security risk management related events. This includes determining management accountability; communications and media protocols; and developing security phases and their corresponding responses. It is also important to develop potential scenarios, including key indicators and warning signs; the related security phase; how this could implicate staff, programmes, and the organisation; and the related response strategy.

By investing time to understand the media and community context, each organisation can develop a tailored contingency plan that is specific to each environment. This allows organisations to be better positioned to respond quickly to emerging threats. In this way, NGOs can minimise the long term and potentially dangerous impacts of mis- and disinformation – enhancing their ability to meet their duty of care requirements.

About the author

Emily Wright is GISF’s Research Officer. She joined in July 2024, having previously served as a Fulbright Research Fellow and Associate Researcher at Partners for Democratic Change Serbia. Emily holds an MA in International Affairs from The New School and a BA in International Studies from the University of Wyoming.

Image credit: Deyvi Romero/Pexels

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